What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of anti-money laundering policy implementation in the UK? Exploring money laundering crime and policy by Sittlington, Samuel Brian Kerr
Citation:  Sittlington,  Samuel  Brian  Kerr  (2014)  What  are  the  factors  that  influence  the 
effectiveness of anti-money laundering policy implementation in the UK? Exploring money 
laundering crime and policy. Doctoral thesis, Northumbria University. 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/36465/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to third  parties  in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content  must not be 
changed in any way. Full  items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
 
“What are the Factors that Influence the 
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering 
Policy Implementation in the UK? 
Exploring Money Laundering Crime and 
Policy” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samuel Brian Kerr Sittlington 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 
 
“What are the Factors that Influence the 
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering 
Policy Implementation in the UK? 
Exploring Money Laundering Crime and 
Policy” 
 
 
Samuel Brian Kerr Sittlington 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements of the 
University of Northumbria at Newcastle 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Research undertaken in Newcastle 
Business School 
 
 
September 2014 
  
i 
 
Abstract 
Anti-Money Laundering has become the term for many stakeholders including 
Financial Institutions and law enforcement agencies that attempt to prevent the 
movement of money obtained from criminal activity. This research combines two 
important areas within the money laundering arena: Anti-Money Laundering 
preventative measures and Anti-Money Laundering Policy. 
This study aims to discover significant determinants that influence the current 
anti-money laundering policy (AML) by understanding the relationship between 
criminal activity, stakeholder activity and public policy. This research adopts a 
pragmatic approach which embraces the use of mixed methods. The strategy 
using mixed method (triangulation) approach for data collection increase the rigor 
and robustness of the research in terms of exploration, validation and 
confirmation of findings. From a pragmatic perspective a better understanding of 
the research problem could be achieved that overcomes complexities in the 
context of the research, such as access to key stakeholders.    
The research question “What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of 
AML policy implementation in the UK?” is answered using a four phase approach 
to data collection and analysis that incorporates theme identification from 
literature, focus group interviews, survey questionnaire and verification of factors 
through individual participation. The findings of the research point to three areas 
of activity that could be confirmed as areas in which policy changes can be 
applied. These are ‘sentencing’ as a deterrent to crime; ‘reporting regime’ for 
suspicious activity reports, and ‘criminal knowledge’ based on law enforcement 
tactics’. The methods used also provided an abundance of additional material 
that set the findings in their appropriate environment.  
Key words: Anti Money Laundering, Policy, Mixed Methods, Factor Analysis 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the thesis 
 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis. Basic background to the 
Money Laundering concept and the potential contribution of the identification of 
factors of influence in AML policy is provided. An overview of the research 
programme undertaken is also presented along with an outline of the thesis.  
 
1.1 Introduction  
The aim of this research is to identify the determinants that influence the 
effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) policy implementation in the UK. 
This pragmatic study will provide empirical evidence based on a robust research 
framework that is divided into four sequential phases of activity. The research 
explores opinions, assumptions, experiences and motivations of key 
stakeholders within the AML framework using mixed methods within the 
qualitative and quantitative disciplines. Data obtained using methods within those 
disciplines is then subject to analysis techniques that provide for each phase of 
the research. The research question is answered by applying the standards of 
validity and reliability within each phase and the methods chosen. The research 
produces original work which makes a significant contribution to knowledge in the 
AML area by eliciting data from three dominant areas of the AML environment: 
prevention via regulators, detection via enforcement and criminality via ex-
offenders. Furthermore the results will impact on practice and policy at a time 
when change is necessary. A Thesis map is provided at Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 Thesis Map 
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1.2 Background to the research 
Money Laundering refers to the process whereby criminals attempt to clean the 
money tainted by their criminal activity, in order that it may appear to come from 
a legitimate source. There are many definitions and interpretations of money 
laundering and these will be further explored in Chapter 2. Money laundering 
impacts on society in general through infiltration of banking systems; growth of 
organised crime and enabling criminal activity to continue. Tackling money 
laundering therefore can locate stolen funds and restore them to victims, deprive 
criminals of their ill-gotten gains and disrupt organised criminal activity. As money 
laundering predominantly takes place within the financial systems, the integrity of 
those systems depend heavily on the perception that it functions within a high 
level of legal, professional and ethical standards. One of the most valuable assets 
of a financial institution is its reputation for integrity (Alldridge, 2003; FATF, 2003; 
Reuter and Truman, 2005; Harvey, 2007). The cost of money laundering to 
society is therefore a driver for governments to ensure the legislation and 
regulation in place is concentrated and vigorous.  
 
Estimations of the cost of money laundering globally are wide and varied. The 
amounts however are significant: Figures quoted as to the cost of money 
laundering suggest the lack of empirical underpinning to measure such a 
phenomenon (Schneider, 2010). The fact that money laundering is a clandestine 
activity hidden from view and that criminals don’t record their activities, makes 
measuring such a phenomenon difficult. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
in 1998 suggested money laundering to be between 2% - 5 % of the world GDP. 
Other global amounts suggested by Agarwal & Agarwal (2006) estimate money 
laundering to be between US $2.0 to US $2.5 Trillion annually (Schneider, 2010). 
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In the UK money laundering is estimated to cost £15bn per annum (HM Treasury, 
2007).  
 
Whilst the cost of money laundering is a significant stimulus to conduct research 
in this area it is not the objective of this research. The methods chosen to 
measure the cost of money laundering hold a major significance, as a starting 
point in this research. The process of money laundering has consequences for 
many agencies involved in prevention, detection and enforcement. These range 
from the following activities: collating the number of reports made to law 
enforcement by banks, the number of prosecutions for money laundering, the 
amount of assets seized, methods of money laundering and knowledge within 
those agencies about the type of individuals involved in money laundering. The 
knowledge of key personnel within those agencies is invaluable to research in 
this area and that view suggests the areas looked at for measurement are 
relevant to this research.   
 
As will be discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2 and methodology in 
Chapter 3 themes can be drawn from the various elements chosen for 
measurement. An example of such a theme is ‘spend’ which is provided under 
the measurement methods of ‘confiscation’ and ‘cash movements’ as described 
by Unger (2006) and Schneider (2006). One of the major contributions to 
estimating the cost of money laundering is Walker (1992, 1995, 1999, and 2007). 
Others have built on the work of Walker to carry out their own measurement 
research and provide empirical discussions and criticisms of measurement 
methods, such as Tanzi (1996), Reuter (2001), Mayhew (2003), Schneider 
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(2006), Unger (2006), Masciandaro (2007) and many others that will form part of 
the discussions in Chapter 2.  
 
Generally the crime of money laundering is preceded by an offence were there 
has been a monetary gain or benefit to the criminal; for example drug trafficking, 
robbery or fraud. In most jurisdictions offences are committed by organised crime 
gangs or individuals. The provisions in place to deal with money laundering are 
wide and varied internationally but generally relate to offences to prosecute 
money laundering and confiscate assets obtained from criminal activity.  
 
The UK however is regarded as having the most comprehensive piece of 
legislation and regulation that deals with organised crime and removes assets 
from criminals (Levi, 2003; SOCA, 2013). To tackle money laundering the 
legislation and regulation in place provides that it can be approached from two 
directions; namely, prevention and detection. Generally Law Enforcement have 
the responsibility to put in place procedures to detect and prosecute offenders, 
likewise regulatory authorities have the responsibility to put in place procedures 
to prevent and detect suspicions of money laundering. This “detection” overlap 
suggests all stakeholders in the AML environment have a role to play.  Exploring 
how well the system is working has driven this research and established the 
research question: 
  
“What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of anti-money 
laundering policy implementation in the UK?”   
 
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 will suggest the AML system in the UK is not 
working (Tupman, 1998; Levi, 2003; Reuter and Truman, 2005; Alldridge, 2008; 
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Harvey, 2007, 2008, 2009). Issues presented will relate to definitional problems 
around money laundering, terrorist financing, predicate offence and processes 
around reporting suspicions of money laundering by financial institutions and co-
operation with agencies both local to the UK and globally. Each element within 
the AML process will be explored to develop the concept for the research.  
 
The driving force behind Anti-Money Laundering provisions globally was 
originally the United Nations through their Convention in 19881; however the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is recognised globally as the standard setter 
for anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CTF), (Schott, 
2006).  
 
FATF is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes 
policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist 
financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(Schott, 2006; FATF, 2013).  FATF make recommendations based on an 
assessment of risks to the global economy. The UK is a member of FATF and 
implemented the AML standards of FATF through European Directives to 
legislation; the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) and Money Laundering Regulations 
(2003) and (2007).  
 
The past two decades has seen the UK AML landscape dramatically altered as 
a result of legislative changes that focusses on the financial arrangements of 
criminal money launderers and terrorists. There is an historical sequence to those 
                                            
1 “The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffick in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances (1988). UNODC on money 
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (2014)” www.unodc.org  
7 
 
changes and these will be further explored in Chapter 2. However changes within 
the UK are not always the result of localised activity but are the consequence of 
events that occur outside of the UK. One of those events was the Terrorist attacks 
in the USA in 2001. As a result of those attacks on the World Trade Centre in 
New York, the Pentagon and the hijacking of US Airlines, legislators in the US 
introduced the “Patriot Act”.2 The act was principally aimed at strengthening 
measures to prevent, detect and prosecute international money laundering and 
financing of terrorism (FinCEN; 2013). Furthermore the impact of the USA attacks 
moved the FATF to review their 40 recommendations introduced in 1990 and add 
a further 8 recommendations in 2001 and a further ninth recommendation in 
2004. It is the momentum of this activity that prompted changes in legislation in 
the UK and globally3. 
 
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, there was already a significant onus 
on UK banks and financial institutions to report suspicions of money laundering 
under the existing UK legislation (Drug Trafficking offences Act 1986; Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 and Drug Trafficking Act 1994). After 2001, new legislation and 
regulation as previously mentioned was introduced. In the UK the Joint Money 
Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) is seen as the advisory body that issues 
guidance and rules to the regulated industry following any changes in legislation 
or regulation. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) now the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) and The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), have a statutory 
duty under the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), (prevention and 
                                            
2 The official title of the USA Patriot Act is Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001” (FinCEN; 2013) 
3 FATF new recommendations “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
and Proliferation – the FATF Recommendations” (16th February 2012) came into force in 2013.   
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detection of money laundering4) to effectively police the regulatory regime. This 
role allows the FCA to institute proceedings for breach of their rules governing 
regulated activities. The FCA regularly conducts audits of banks and financial 
institutions to ensure they are compliant with the money laundering regulations.  
 
Law Enforcement relies on information and intelligence in order to conduct all 
types of investigations. However, reports from financial institutions relating to 
suspicions of money laundering called suspicious activity reports5 (SARs) can 
provide a starting point for money laundering investigations, as they indicate the 
movement of money (transactions) in suspicious circumstances. The number of 
SARs reported annually is used as an indicator of effectiveness by government 
but are part of the compliance regime of the financial industry required to make 
suspicious reports. The increased number of SARs does not necessarily mean 
law enforcement will be more effective, neither does it mean that financial 
institutions are more vigilant (Harvey, 2007; Van Duyne et al, 2005). “This 
provides an equally accurate reflection of the UK situation” (Harvey, 2007: 9). 
Quantity does not necessarily mean quality and the additional SARs may not 
represent any meaningful information that law enforcement can deal with in 
addition an increase could come from financial institutions receiving some recent 
training in AML.   
 
 It is incumbent on financial institutions to ensure their AML policy is effective as 
the consequences of an ineffective regime go beyond the banks borders. In a 
                                            
4 Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) Part 1 Regulatory (1-18) Part 2 Regulation and Prohibited Activities (19-39a) 
Powers of Investigation Part 11 (178-192) 
5 “Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) is a piece of information which alerts law enforcement of potential money laundering 
or terrorist financing. This could be a large cash purchase or a series of large, out of character deposits” (2014). 
www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk 
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recent study by Idowu & Obasan (2012) questioning the AML policy and its effect 
on bank performance in Nigeria, concluded that: “there was a strong relationship 
between a bank’s performance and the adoption of a sound money laundering 
policy” (Idowu and Obasan, 2012:367). Similarly, Ferwerda (2009) who questions 
the effect of AML policy on crime levels, uses an estimation model to conclude 
that; “improved AML policies especially international co-operation are associated 
with lower crime levels” (Ferwerda, 2009:923). Whilst the evidence is not over 
whelming there lies a strong indicator of a relationship between policy and AML 
effectiveness. 
 
1.3 Theoretical foundation of the study 
The above section provides background information of the study relating to AML 
activities and AML policy. The literature review is provided in Chapter 2 and as 
suggested by Becker (2004) is an assessment of existing knowledge – both 
empirical and theoretical that relates to the research topic. This section will 
discuss the theoretical foundation appropriate to this research by considering 
theories relating to the choice behaviour of individuals and organisations. The 
authors own choices of examples are designed to provide simple structure to an 
area of theory that is wide and substantial. This section provides the introduction 
to the legal and regulatory framework, the literature review and the methodology 
chapter that follows.  
 
Theories are a set of principles designed to generate predictions and provide 
useful insights in the area in which the practice of activity is based (Smith, 1996). 
In observing anti-money-laundering policy activity it has been recognised that 
behaviour of criminals is a reaction to a number of changes, such as: a change 
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in legislation and regulation in the anti-money-laundering environment or a 
country switching to the Euro, a major disaster or some new financial product 
introduced on the market. Change in policy and practice tends to occur after 
attempts to secure the economic stability of countries in a global market (such as 
the introduction of the FATF 40 Recommendations in 1991) or a catastrophic 
event such as the events of 9/11 (the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 which 
introduced the US PATRIOT Act (2001)). These observations link to several 
theories of behaviour under the umbrella of classical criminology theory which 
include deterrence theory, rational choice and economic regulation theory.  This 
thesis applies those concepts to the theoretical framework that will direct the 
research and the methodology chosen. Stakeholder theory was originally 
included in the theoretical framework but disregarded as the research 
progressed6.  
 
Figure 1.2 provides a Venn diagram of the concept relationships between the 
three theories. The relationship represented by ‘R’ in the centre of figure 1.2 
provides a visual demonstration of overlap and which the three theories of 
Deterrence, Rational Choice and Economic Regulation merge. For example 
cost/benefit is a concept within all three theories presented. Further discussion 
on the three theories is provided in sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 and in 
Chapter 3. 
                                            
6 The relationship between the key agencies that participated in anti-money-laundering policy activity, necessitated the 
inclusion of stakeholder theory. However, the use of the term stakeholder is not a reason to use the principles of 
stakeholder theory in this research, particularly when other more suitable theories exist. Stakeholder theory was initially 
included in the theoretical framework as analysis of focus group data identified a number of factors that necessitated its 
inclusion. Some of those factors included: influence from outside agencies in the financial sector that changed the 
perception of the AML purpose6. Policy decisions within Law Enforcement agencies that appear ethically incorrect or at 
the very least morally wrong6. As the research unfolded it became clear that stakeholder theory was not a suitable attribute 
to this research and the response to the above sectors could be better progressed with the theories chosen. 
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Figure 1.2: Venn diagram illustrating the overlap concepts within the 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 provides a summary of the theoretical framework and the work of 
particular author’s viewed for this thesis. The authors chosen are extensively read 
and provide a broad range of views that capture and conceptualise the purpose 
of this research. The following sections of Chapter 1 review the three areas of 
theory illustrated. 
  
 
 
Rational Choice 
Theory
Economic 
Regulation 
Theory
Deterrence 
Theory
OVERLAP 
Cost/Benefit 
Choice 
Behaviour 
Deterrence 
Certainty 
 
OVERLAP 
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Choice 
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Public interest 
Deterrence 
 
 
OVERLAP 
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Control 
Influence 
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Public interest 
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Table 1.1 Theoretical framework 
Crime Theory Economic Regulation Theory 
Rational Choice 
Siegel (2009) 
Keel (2005) 
Paternoster (1996) 
Lyman and Potter (2007) 
Public Interest Theory 
Ferris (2000) 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) 
Masciandaro, (1999)  
Cornish and Clarke (1986) 
Deterrence 
Siegel (1992) 
Nagin (1998) 
Keel (2005) 
D’Arcy (2011) 
Capture 
Stigler (1971) 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) 
 
Economics of Crime  
Becker (1968) 
Masciandaro (2004) 
Ferwarder (2009) 
Self-Regulation Theory 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) 
 
 
1.3.1 Review of crime theory 
There is a vast literature on the theory of crime and deterrence and it is important 
to restrict that view to literature from an AML perspective and not progress into 
the behavioural studies of why people commit crime. A suitable theoretical 
starting point in this research can be capsulated in the vision of Cesare Baccaria 
in 1764 as demonstrated below by Muncie, McLaughlin and Langan (1996):  
 
“in order for punishment not to be, in every instance, an act of violence 
of one or of many against a private citizen, it must be essentially public, 
prompt, necessary, the least possible in the given certain 
circumstances, proportionate to the crime, dictated by the laws”  
 
(Muncie, McLaughlin and Langan, 1996:13)  
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Focusing on AML crime and AML policy various aspects of crime and deterrence 
theory became more relevant. AML being a fairly recent phenomenon there is a 
lack of literature available on the link between money laundering crime and policy; 
however Spicker (2006) suggests a link between law and policy: 
 
  “Many laws are devised not to establish the limits of right and wrong, 
but to draw a line between those rules that work in practice, and those 
that won’t; it is a line of reasoning that policy makers may also need to 
follow”.  
 
(Spicker, 2006:5) 
 
Of further relevance to this research is his suggestion that any problems 
encountered within the policy will be addressed by the practitioners. As will be 
discussed, this is confirmed in comments by a number of the key actors from 
focus group interviews.7  
 
Despite the scientific study of criminology being a recent event its development 
has come from a long history of crime and punishment behaviour (Siegel, 2009). 
From mid-eighteenth century social philosophers began looking for a more 
rational approach to punishment of crime than the harsh violent treatment of 
offenders that frightened people into obeying laws. The main theories that came 
from that era were the Classical theory of criminology and the Positivist theory of 
criminology. It is important to view both these positions to gain an understanding 
of the current day thinking of crime deterrence and in particular for this study the 
                                            
7 Focus group Accountants “I mean I’ve had some recent experience with SOCA and I have to say somewhat concerned that, in my 
mind in this thing there is, a the opportunity of a lifetime but it must be taken within the lifetime of that opportunity, and the thing 
is moving so slowly that I’m rather concerned about where it’s all ending up, and I don’t know I’m puzzled as to why” In response to 
a question about the success of asset recovery. 
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relationship between current Anti Money Laundering Legislation and crime 
activities. 
 
Siegel (2009) provides an explanation of the introduction of classical criminology 
by Cesare Baccaria and the foundation of deterrence and rational choice theory. 
Classical theory of crime was inspired by Cesare Beccaria in 1700’s and his 
ulitarian views to form the basis of the classical theory of crime. As suggested by 
Siegel, Beccaria believed that all people will engage in activity whether it is 
criminal or non-criminal, (for example regulatory offences) and without the fear of 
punishment would continue to do so. Individuals possess free will and use it to 
make rational decisions weighing up the benefits of committing a crime against 
the punishment of committing a crime.  
 
Keel (2009) in describing Baccaria’s vision believed that the only deterrence to 
crime, is if the punishment fitted the crime (Keel, 2009). The effectiveness of the 
deterrence was to balance the punishment that it should be no more or less than 
the benefit gained from the criminal activity. The view of today’s modern society 
suggests that now people’s actions are based on whether that particular action 
makes them happy or not and avoided an unpleasant consequence. This view 
has its own place within classical criminology and a short explanation is provided 
at this point. Utility theory follows Jeremy Bentham’s (1788) idea of crime 
prevention by using the force of punishment to deter the individual from 
committing an offence. This idea was extended by Becker (1968) into the 
‘economics of crime’. Becker suggests that governments should ensure that 
sufficient laws are in place that ‘crime does not pay’.  Ferwerda (2008) provides 
a clear description of Becker’s view: 
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“Laws should ensure that the costs of committing an offence (the 
chance of being caught multiplied by the amount of punishment), 
are higher than the benefits of each offence. If this is the case, 
the punishment will deter the criminal from committing the 
specific offense. This follows the economists’ usual analysis of 
choice and assumes that a person commits an offense if the 
expected utility exceeds the utility he could get otherwise”. 
 
                                                                          (Ferwerda, 2008:905) 
 
Further discussion on utility theory is provided at section 1.3.3. Laws are created 
by the dominant groups who decide societal norms in order to maintain 
community harmony and punishment is used as a crime prevention method. This 
was designed to discourage criminals from committing less serious offences. The 
impact of this theory at the beginning of the nineteenth century saw reported 
crimes increased and as a result a new theory of the cause of crime started to 
emerge. Classical theory as described by Siegel therefore had several basic 
elements8. 
 
Further discussions on classical criminology can be viewed through: Keel (2005), 
Muncie, McLaughlin and Langan (1996) and Paternoster and Simpson (1996).  
 
The challenge to classical theory came from the Positivist camps explanation of 
the causes of crime. During the nineteenth century advances in scientific methods 
to explain how the world worked was questioned: why the same methods could 
                                            
 8 In every society, people have free will to choose criminal or lawful solutions to meet their needs or solve their 
problems. 
 Crime may be the more attractive alternative as lawful ones because it usually requires less work for greater 
reward. 
 A person’s choice of criminal solutions may be controlled by his or her fear of punishment. 
 The more severe, certain, and swift the punishment, the more successful it is in controlling the criminal 
behaviour.  
                                                                                                                                                        (Siegel, 2009:3) 
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not be used to study human behaviour and as a result a new vision emerged. 
Siegel (2009) in addressing the work of Auguste Comte suggests positivists 
embrace a rational, scientific view of the world. This view shared by Siegel who 
posits a number of elements of positivist traits. 
 
 Positivists use the scientific method to conduct research. The scientific 
method is universal and remains constant in all social and cultural 
boundaries 
 
 Positivists maintain the goal of predicting and explaining social 
phenomena in a logical manner. This means identifying necessary and 
sufficient conditions for any phenomena to occur 
 
 Only real and observed phenomena can be tested scientifically 
 
 Science should be value free and not influenced by a person’s biases or 
political point of view 
 
(Siegel, 2009:4) 
 
1.3.2 Review of Positive criminology 
Positivist criminology was concerned less with the content and implementation of 
the criminal law and more with establishing the causes of law breaking (Muncie, 
McLaughlin and Langan, 1996). This provided a number of views within the 
positive perspective that will be mentioned here.  
 
The most influential theorist on positivist criminology is Cesare Lombroso who 
believed criminals and non-criminals were scientifically different. He believed that 
there were ‘born criminals’ linked to crime through biological traits. This view 
denied that offenders were responsible for their deeds and therefore should be 
treated and not punished (Peelo and Soothill, 2005). 
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Other forms of positivist thought at the time included sociologists Emile Durkheim 
and Adolphe Quetelet who looked at the influence of social aspects as the reason 
to commit crime along with the influence of age and sex of an individual.  This 
view suggests, according to Durkheim’s vision of social positivism that crime is 
normal in society and occasionally helpful in that it paves the way for social 
change. 
 
This view of social chaos or anomie was reinforced by the Chicago School of 
social study by Burgess and Park who argued that crime was not a function of 
personal traits or characteristics but rather reaction to an environment that was 
inadequate for proper human relations and development (Siegel, 2009). This was 
a challenge to the belief that criminals were biologically different and instead 
crime was seen as a social problem that could be eradicated through improved 
social and economic conditions. Edwin Sutherland also from The Chicago School 
of social study further developed this view to argue that criminality was linked to 
an individual’s view of older law breakers and that quality of life in education, 
family life, and peer relations were all attributable to their criminal behaviour. 
 
Understanding white collar crime was to become his trademark theory. 
Sutherland’s challenge to conventional wisdom argued that crime was a classless 
act and therefore a feature of all classes. 
“We have little or no evidence one way or the other whether business 
leaders are, indeed, “emotionally balanced”. However the point 
remains that the main burden for explaining white collar crime seem 
unlikely to fall upon psychological approaches, partly because the 
problems are widespread and so cannot be explained as aberrations” 
 
 
(Peelo and Soothill, 2005:8)   
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With this view in mind controlling white collar crime or financial crime becomes 
an emotive and sensitive subject, As Siegel suggests, attempts to prosecute 
white collar crime as opposed to lower class street criminals sees a prosecutorial 
imbalance with few prosecutions. When they are prosecuted the sentences are 
minimal. 
 
In recent time’s evidence of efforts to bridge the imbalance has seen the 
development of governmental strategies of control through legislation, 
compliance of the institutions involved through reporting and deterrence and 
through a shift in the sentencing regime with an added deterrence through 
confiscation, particularly in relation to the legislation that this study refers to 
(Proceeds of Crime Act 2002). As deterrence has become an important element 
of this theory exploration it is relevant to return to the classical criminology 
viewpoint and rational choice theory.  
 
1.3.3 Review of Deterrence and Rational Choice Theory 
Deterrence is the use of punishment as a threat to deter people from committing 
a crime. Discouraging an individual from committing further criminal acts by 
making them aware of the consequences of doing so, (primarily by incapacitating 
them so they cannot commit further crime) becomes a specific deterrence. 
Making an example of those individuals in order to deter other individuals from 
committing crime becomes a general deterrence:  
 
“The swiftness, severity and certainty of punishment are key elements in 
understanding the Laws ability to control human behaviour”  
 
(Keel, 2005:1) 
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It is suggested that not all crime deterrence is caused by the criminal justice 
system but by other means such as closed circuit TV and private ownership of 
firearms suggesting that the criminal is more afraid of getting caught than the 
threat of punishment. Rational choice theory suggests an offender will decide to 
commit a crime after first considering his own personal situation: 
 
“Need for money, personal values, and living expenses against 
situational factors such as target security, benefit, and police 
capability. The offender then calculates the risk of getting caught 
against expected punishment, the value of the enterprise and his need 
for gain”  
 
 
(Siegel, 1992:131) 
 
When we shift the perspective to the ACT of criminal behaviour the issue 
becomes one of how to make that behaviour less attractive to the individual. This 
could be carried out using crime prevention methods or reduced through policies 
that convince criminals to desist from particular criminal activity. It could be 
suggested that the AML policy is such a tool as it punishes offenders on two 
levels: socially through incarceration and financially through confiscation (Clarke 
and Cornish, 1985).   
 
Recent research in this area tested deterrence theory and rational choice theory 
separately. D’Arcy and Herath (2011) tested deterrence theory in Information 
systems (IS) to enlighten and advise security management strategies in 
deterrence principles for computer crime. They found that despite deterrence 
theory having a strong theoretical foundation and empirical support in predicting 
illicit behaviour in organisational settings (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996)  
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“there were inconsistencies and sometimes contradictory findings for 
deterrence theory in the IS security context”  
 
(D’Arcy and Herath, 2011:644).  
 
Some academics see rational choice and deterrence theory complimenting each 
other and that they should be viewed together and not as individual theories 
(D’Arcy and Herath, 2011; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996, Paternoster and 
Nagin, 1993). 
 
 While much of the literature on deterrence and rational choice theory tested 
offences Jeremy Bentham (1788-1843) transformed this view to determine the 
economics of crime. The effectiveness of the deterrence was to balance the 
punishment that it should be no more or less than the benefit gained from the 
criminal activity. Becker (1968) was to be credited with modernising this theory of 
crime within the economics of cost and benefits. Becker suggests that 
Governments introduce legislation on the premise that “Crime does not pay” The 
deterrence is the cost of the offence (the chance of getting caught multiplied by 
the amount of punishment) and that the cost should be higher than the benefits 
of the offence (Ferwerda, 2009; Keel, 2005; Becker, 1968).  
 
From a deterrence point of view Keel’s analysis suggests this should deter the 
criminal from committing the offence. From an economist’s viewpoint Becker 
suggests it suits the purpose if the expected utility (cost) exceeds the utility 
(benefit) he would get otherwise9. 
                                            
9 EU = pU( y − f ) + (1− p)U( y) (1)  when y is income (monetary and psychic) from an offence, 
U(⋅) is the offender’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, 
 f is the monetary equivalent of punishment, which may include the opportunity cost of imprisonment captured by lost wages 
(f is often informally called the “severity of punishment”) 
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Masciandaro and Portalano (2007) further examine the problem by applying the 
economics of cost/benefit to money laundering. If more money laundering crime 
takes place, the greater the negative impact on the financial system. In addition 
criminals and criminal organisations benefit by enjoying the rewards and are still 
able to use the proceeds to help them avoid prosecution.  
 
“The Policy maker may thus decide to implement a regulation that 
creates serious obstacles to money laundering, or it can decide to 
make the opposite choice, devising a regulation that facilitates money 
laundering”  
 
(Masciandaro and Portalano, 2007:5).  
 
This implies regulation can provide the opposite effect of its intention. 
Masciandaro suggests that it leaves the door open to other stakeholders to 
influence decisions and direction of policy in the regulatory arena. This does not 
imply a deliberate attempt to make things easy for the criminal but inadvertently 
the policy makers make mistakes. The agents are left to pick up the pieces, work 
with what powers they have and try to lobby change through working groups and 
government contacts. Focus groups conducted in this research have commented 
on this issue.  
 
Deterrence theory is discussed by D’Arcy (2011), Paternoster (1996), Nagin and 
Paternoster (1993). Much of the discussion relates to testing deterrence and 
rational choice theory through studies of University undergraduates and their 
perceptions of committing crimes such as theft, sexual offences and drink driving. 
                                            
and p is the (subjective) probability of conviction (often informally called the “certainty of punishment”); a crime is committed if 
EU > 0 (Becker, 1968). 
22 
 
The tests used involved scenario based script and each individual had to decide 
what their personal response would be given similar circumstances. There was 
conflicting evidence in the results of these studies. However AML policy was 
introduced to deter crime and to extend the cost of committing crime therefore 
the inclusion in this research of both deterrence and rational choice theory are 
significant. Further contributions are made by Masciandaro (1999, 2007) and 
Ferwarder (2009) who discuss creating a theoretical model to establish the 
impact of anti- money laundering policy and the reduction of crime.  
 
1.3.4 Review of economic regulation theory 
Economic regulation theory equally generates interest for this study due to the 
nature of the agencies involved in the AML process. Regulation by the financial 
services sector incurs a cost to its members in its compliance function and 
enforces the regulation with the threat of sanctions and fines (Harvey, 2007).  
   
Stigler (1974) provides an account of the introduction of economic regulation; this 
is followed by a general discussion of the components related by Ricketts (2006) 
and the expansion of the regulatory state and intervention. Posner (1974) gives 
an account of the public interest position and the concern about regulation with 
its vulnerability to capture (Perlman, 1994). As discussed previously those 
concerns have been made by participants in the focus group interviews and who 
equate the regulator interests of those being regulated, (Financial institutions 
regulated by the FSA now FCA), with the public interest (Becker, 1968; Baldwin 
and Cave, 1999). Ricketts further reviews the work of Stigler (1971) giving an 
account of the equilibrium effect of private costs and social benefits (Ricketts, 
2006). An interesting conclusion to this review is that Masciandaro (2007) in his 
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economics of regulation paper provides a similar set of regulatory interest groups 
to the focus groups used in this study10.  
 
Economic regulation theory deals more specifically with the regulated institutions 
that form part of this research and the AML process: “To regulate implies the 
exercise of some influence on an activity that is different from total control” 
(Ricketts, 2006). See also Posner (1974) and Stigler (1974). Economic regulation 
theory incorporates public interest theory (Posner, 1974) and capture theory 
(Becker, 1968; Posner, 1974, Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Masciandaro (2007) 
identifies four categories of entities interested in regulation: The policy maker, 
criminal organisations, financial institutions and the cost bearers of money 
laundering. Each of these contributors have their own interests and will influence 
policy or regulation to suit their own purposes.  
 
“To be sure, money-laundering regulation could be opposed, and is 
indeed opposed, by the political authorities that represent the public 
interest. The dispersion of the costs, however, makes money 
laundering a low salience issue for the public and consequently quite 
low on the political agenda. The man on the street simply does not feel 
the bite of money laundering, and political actors will act 
consequently”.  
 
(Masciandaro, 2007:6) 
 
 
The regulation and public interest models serve legitimate public purpose with 
the goal of correcting failing markets (Baldwin and Cave 1999). However analysis 
of these externalities suggests that when externalities exist the cost and benefit 
for individuals of social cost and benefits and unconstrained individual action will 
result in more negative externalities than positive ones. Imposing cost/subsidies 
                                            
10 Focus groups: Law enforcement, accountants, prosecutors, MLROs and ex-offenders 
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can theoretically correct this divergence - traditionally controlled through 
regulation. A government can enhance social welfare by intervening to correct 
market failures and protect the public through regulation. Similarly regulation and 
self-interest motivates a government to act before and after legislative changes 
in order to limit the impact or to maximise the benefit for industry. A concern 
therefore about regulation is its vulnerability to capture which equates the 
interests of those being regulated with the private interest (Perlman, 1994). This 
idea further suggests the extent that regulation is driven by public, private or 
stakeholder interests and must be considered (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). 
 
The stakeholder’s involved in this study appear to lead by their own interests and 
their own agenda as Masciandaro, (2007) suggests, this observation helps to 
explain why supervisory authorities rather than politicians provide the initiatives 
in money laundering prevention. The regulated institutions that are governed by 
the money laundering regulations put in place preventative mechanisms and 
reporting regimes for persons suspected of money laundering through their 
institutions. Failing to make the suspicious reports could make the staff liable for 
prosecution or the institution liable for fines, sanctions and loss of reputational 
integrity. The cost of the process is borne by the institution and therefore 
conflicting priorities in terms of roles and responsibilities are visible. The benefit 
to the institution becomes an issue for debate and policy within the AML arena 
can be diluted to suit the institution.    
 
Prior to concluding this section; a civil remedy model that has similar 
characteristics to the economic regulation theory and falls under the rational 
choice prospective is worth discussing. As Clark (1997) advocates the criminal 
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law is not the only mechanism that is available to deal with criminal behaviour. 
Civil remedies are defined as:  
 
“an action taken by an authoritative body… A legislator, a court, or an 
administrative agency… To enforce compliance with prescribed 
conduct, or, to impose a cost for failure to comply”.  
 
(Mann, 1992:1908) 
 
Mann describes this civil remedy as a ‘script analytic model’ and is used as a 
crime prevention technique by which the official seeks to prevent the crime. Civil 
remedies are used in situational crime prevention, to control offending 
opportunities as opposed to the offender themselves (Smith, 1998). Examples of 
this are current today with civil remedies in the regulatory fines and sanctions for 
breaches of regulatory rules on money laundering and terrorist financing. 
 
The rational choice prospective was developed to provide a theoretical 
framework for thinking about situational crime prevention (Cornish, 1993; Clarke, 
1995). The objective was to look at offender’s perceptions of the risks, rewards 
and efforts in situations to guide the analysis of crime prevention possibilities. An 
advantage being that a criminal does not have to be identified for the model to be 
effective (Cornish, 1994b). By using successive points in a crime script, Cornish 
suggests using the script to develop intervention points and crime prevention 
policies. This scheme can be classified into four broad purposes: increasing 
perceived effort; increasing perceived risk; reducing anticipated reward and 
inducing guilt or shame. 
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Liability suits and civil recovery are two areas that indirectly can affect crime 
opportunities (Smith, 1998). The latter area for the purposes of this study applies 
to compensation generally and confiscation powers provided by the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (POCA). Each can be applied as a crime prevention method (at 
least indirectly, to produce a situational crime prevention effect) or to regulate 
crime opportunities (Smith, 1998). The confiscation process as applied by the 
(POCA) provides a second bite at an offender (following conviction) by 
determining the benefit obtained from criminal activity and stripping the offender 
of that benefit. This civil process as the study will suggest is a deterrent factor in 
AML crime. Civil recovery is also available under the same legislation (without 
conviction) when a determination of a person’s wealth is made on the assumption 
that the wealth is made up of funds from previous criminal activity. The POCA 
and the dangers of reliance on civil recovery as opposed to prosecution are 
further discussed in Chapter 3 Literature Review. 
 
1.3.5 Conclusion to theoretical framework section 
This section has presented a theoretical framework within the domain of study 
that represents the problem of prevention, detection and investigation of money 
laundering crime. The section draws on deterrence and rational choice theories 
through the vision of Cesare Beccaria and extended by Becker (1968), Cornish 
and Clarke (1986) and Cornish (1993), and economic regulation theory 
introduced by Ricketts (2006). The observations and discussions represent a 
view of social behaviour and the economics of regulation of the AML business, 
and how that business is affected by the interactions of those within it. The section 
suggests there is theoretical support for AML policy and the deterrence affect. 
The costs of committing a crime are weighted against the benefits obtained from 
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the crime. The section also debates the interests of policy makers and their 
rationale for AML policy that provides government treasury with additional funds 
(asset recovery process). Further discussions suggest that change impacts on 
offenders, law enforcement and the regulated institutions that follow AML policy.  
 
Deterrence theory opens up to economic crime theory under the assumption of 
rational choice and economic regulation theory which encapsulates “capture” and 
“public interest”. Figure 1.2 and Table 1.1 above provided a summary of the 
theoretical framework. 
 
Finally as each of the agencies involved in this study are stakeholders in the 
sense of the definition that they are key partners in AML prevention and 
enforcement within the AML process. The section suggests that regulatory or 
other influences can change the way stakeholders conduct their business in order 
to reach targets set by government or to generate income. In light of this, the 
study hopes to extend the extant literature around AML activities and AML policy, 
based on the results of this research and in answer to the research question: 
“What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of AML policy 
implementation in the UK”. 
 
1.4 Motivation for this research 
The author lectures on the subject of AML compliance and investigation as well 
as other related subjects in financial investigation on behalf of the European 
Commission (EC). A background of law enforcement and financial investigation 
led the author to seek this teaching role prior to and after his retirement from the 
police service. Having also written a number of related dissertations for a Master’s 
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Degree11, the subject of AML is close to the author’s heart. It is often said if 
something is working, don’t fix it. However viewing both sides of the AML process 
of prevention and detection through the above activities provided the author with 
a vision that was not aligned to one side or the other. The landscape within AML 
is changing and it is unclear if enforcement or regulators are changing with it (Bell, 
2007).  
 
There are difficulties within the AML environment and many of these issues would 
surface during discussions within the focus group interviews. Issues such as 
regulatory control; deterrence value of sentencing for money laundering and 
proper use of the AML legislation are just some of areas of concern. Indications 
are that the AML system is not effective and a full exploration of the prevention, 
detection and enforcement methods is required. This study through the methods 
of data collection chosen and methods of analysis will provide the answers to the 
research question.  
 
1.5 Context of the study 
The study refers to AML in the context of the UK and focuses on agencies within 
the jurisdictions of England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. As referred to 
in Chapter 3 purposeful sampling was used for both focus group interview and 
questionnaire distribution methods. Sampling was used to select information-rich 
groups, whose experience and knowledge would provide a rich illumination of the 
subject under study. The sample is not representative of the population but those 
chosen to participate have particular characteristics of interest that will best 
                                            
11 “Does Quantity mean Quality? An exploration of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) process” (2004). “Do the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) investigate money laundering effectively” (2005). 
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answer the research question or can provide an insight into this subject area 
(Bernard, 2000). 
 
AML is a global concept. In order to put the subject of the research in a global 
context the literature review takes a wider perspective by looking at events 
outside of the UK and the impact those events had on AML legislation and 
regulation in the UK. Phase 1 of the study which identifies the starting point for 
this research will draw from literature that locates AML in that global context. 
However, when sources of information have been used they have been clearly 
indicated, and were relevant, applied to the UK context. 
 
1.6 Research question, aim and objectives 
The original focus of the research was to measure the cost of money-laundering 
in the UK, however this was amended early in the process and the change in 
focus led to the following research question being developed; “What are the 
factors that influence the effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering policy 
implementation in the UK?”  The rationale behind the change in direction and a 
detailed discussion of the development of the research question are further 
explained in Chapter 2. 
 
In order to fulfil the aim of this research the following related objectives provided 
a focus of direction to ensure a full exploration of the subject:  
  
1. To identify and draw from literature in the AML arena evidence of themes 
that are component activities that could be used as a starting point for this 
research 
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2. To establish a research strategy that can develop the themes identified 
and follow a logical sequence of activities that will answer the research 
question, 
3. To use methods in the gathering and analysis of data that will complement 
the research strategy, that are reliable and valid in respect of the 
researchers philosophical position and can be replicated in future 
research, and  
4. To ensure the research is compliant with all aspects of ethical 
considerations and that the research is ethically and morally sound. 
 
1.7 Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 introduces the research subject and the background to the research. 
The author then provides the motivation for the study followed by the context in 
which the research is set. The final section outlines the research question and 
objectives that will provide direction to the research. 
 
Chapter 2 sets the scene for the research by introducing the AML framework 
within the UK context. This is followed by a discussion of the literature 
surrounding AML and policy on a wider scale. An introduction to the role of FATF 
and their 49 recommendations is discussed with emphasis on the impact FATF 
has on AML in the UK. Next a discussion on literature surrounding the cost and 
measurement of money laundering takes place, with specific interest in areas that 
identify themes that could be used as a starting point for this research.  
 
Chapter 3 begins by outlining the framework and strategy for this research. This 
is followed by a discussion of the research philosophy relevant to this research 
and their various epistemological and ontological assumptions. A discussion of 
how pragmatism impacts on the research is followed by a discussion of the 
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methodological strategy. Each of the four sequential phases of enquiry are 
discussed which includes the methods of enquiry and methods of analysis.  This 
is followed by a discussion surrounding the ethical considerations in this 
research. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods takes 
place thereafter a discussion on the choice of sample and the administration of 
the data collection process is presented. Finally the method of analysis is 
presented and the importance of establishing validity and reliability in the 
research methods.  
 
Chapter 4 presents each phase of analysis separately. Phase 1 discusses the 
analysis that led to the identification of themes from literature. These include 
analysis of themes within the FATF recommendation and analysis of themes from 
methods used to measure the cost and effectiveness of money laundering. Phase 
2 discusses the analysis of the focus group data that determine the verification of 
themes. Phase 3 will discuss the analysis of the questionnaire responses which 
utilises exploratory factor analysis to determine the factors of influence and One 
way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) to determine group comparisons. Phase 4 
discusses the analysis of the verification of components from phase 3 using a 
sample of individuals who participated in the original focus groups. Finally a 
discussion of the analysis results from question 13 of the questionnaire. This 
question asks respondents what they would change in the AML framework. 
 
Chapter 5 brings the results of each phase of the analysis together to provide a 
conclusion to the research. A further discussion will focus on the contributions of 
the research and the implications of the research on current policy, regulation 
and practice. 
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1.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has presented an overview of the research programme. The 
background to the research and the initial motivation has been justified. The 
objectives to reach the aim of the research have been outlined including a 
presentation of the Anti-Money Laundering environment. This introduction offered 
an insight into a complex maze of elements within AML and AML policy which will 
now be dissected through discussion in Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 2 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
Chapter 2 is divided in two parts. The first part relates to the legal and regulatory 
framework that applies to money laundering and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) 
policy. These are explored and discussed. A history of developments over the 
past two decades is also presented, which include looking at how global events 
impacted on local activities in respect of AML policy and practice. Further in this 
section the association between organised crime, terrorist financing and money 
laundering is explained. The second part of Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
literature around money laundering measurement and cost of AML policy. 
Theoretical concepts developed in Chapter 1 are applied and an introduction to 
the elements that provide a starting point for this study is also made. The research 
gaps that the study has identified from literature are further presented. Finally the 
chapter concludes with a summary of the most important issues facing AML 
practitioners.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of individuals and organised crime gangs is to generate profit from 
their illegal activities. Money laundering is the process of disguising the illegal 
origin of those proceeds to make them appear to come from a legitimate 
enterprise. This is a critical phase in the criminal’s activity as it allows them to 
enjoy the profits of their crime without bringing them under notice of enforcement 
authorities. The following statement from the Managing Director of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) underlines the importance of having an 
effective AML policy in place.   
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“Money Laundering and the financing of terrorism are financial crimes 
with economic effects. They can threaten the stability of a country’s 
financial sector or its external stability more generally. Effective anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regimes 
are essential to protect the integrity of markets and of the global 
financial framework as they help mitigate the factors that facilitate 
financial abuse. Action to prevent and combat money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism thus responds not only to a moral imperative 
but also to an economic need”  
 
(Min Zhu, 2013:1). 
 
The relationship between terrorist financing and money laundering as suggested 
above is apparent. In summary the financing of terrorism is the financial support, 
in whatever form, of terrorist activity and of those who participate, plan or 
encourage terrorism (Tupman, 1998). There is also another relationship that 
needs to be included here and that is ‘organised crime’. Organised crime activities 
involve mainly the provision of illegal goods and services. Drug trafficking, 
cigarette smuggling, Prostitution, kidnapping for profit, extortion, human 
trafficking and VAT fraud are some of the criminal activities that  “organised” 
crime gangs are involved (Levi, 2007). Money laundering is the common 
denominator for organised crime and terrorist financing and is a necessary 
activity/requirement if either of those two activities are to be successful. Anti-
Money Laundering and AML policy is the subject of this thesis; however, as both 
organised crime and terrorism are so closely aligned to that activity and for the 
reasons described above, they will be discussed here in the context of money 
laundering activity.  
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2.2 The concept of money laundering 
Money laundering is not a recent phenomenon but has however become a global 
one. There is no indication that money laundering is decreasing despite the 
legislative changes internationally to counter the problem (Levi and Reuter, 
2006).  Further, the introduction of legislation to combat terrorist money 
laundering suggests an increased global threat to social, economic and political 
stability. Money laundering can be the Achilles heel of criminal activity in that the 
state require robust prevention policies. It is incumbent therefore that all 
jurisdictions have in place stringent money laundering policy; that prevents and 
detects the flow of dirty money through its financial systems and a resourceful, 
skilled enforcement regime, to deal with those who attempt to use it. As Howard 
Davis the chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) suggested: 
 
“The reputation and legal consequences for financial firms of being 
identified with the proceeds of illegal activity are potentially very 
serious. Management have a strong incentive to avoid such 
consequences and regulations from the UK and other major financial 
centres are agreed on the need to exert as much regulatory pressure 
as is necessary to ensure that responsibilities in this area are taken 
seriously”  
 
(Davis, 200012) 
 
Many academics suggest the term “money laundering” entered popular usage as 
a result of the Watergate scandal in 1973 during the Nixon era (Bauer and 
Ullmann, 2000). Others go further back to the Chicago, gangster days of Al 
Capone who in 1931 was famously convicted of tax evasion, after allegedly 
laundering his crime money through Chinese laundry businesses (Van Duyne, 
2003). Capone was not convicted of the crimes that made him his money 
                                            
12 Howard Davis Chairman of FSA addressing a Money Laundering Conference (2000). 
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(predicate crime) and as such some debate exists as to the origins of money 
laundering (Levi and Reuter, 2006). Nevertheless the term money laundering is 
accepted by governments throughout the world and is in popular usage in film 
and media today.   
 
The 1970’s in the USA was the decade that money laundering controls became 
a significant contributor to the war on drug trafficking. Similarly in the UK the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act (1986) (DTA) became the first notion of a money 
laundering offence. However, criminals could only be prosecuted for laundering 
the proceeds of drug trafficking and not the proceeds of other crimes. This was 
corrected by the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA) when 
suspicions of all crime could be made. Many further changes and introductions 
of new legislation was to emerge13. The introduction of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
(2002) was as a result of the existing legislation not working. Reports were being 
made by banks on suspicions of criminal activity but law enforcement were 
reluctant to prosecute due to the complexities of cases. The UK government 
Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) in 2002 reviewed existing 
legislation and systems and reported through its report, “Recovering the 
Proceeds of Crime”. The result of the PIU report is summarised below and 
suggests that law enforcement was reluctant to prosecute for money laundering 
offences because:  
 
1. Money laundering was felt to be either ancillary to the main crime or was 
too complex to investigate; 
 
                                            
13 Money laundering and terrorist financing in the UK is governed by four Acts of primary legislation: Terrorism Act (2000); 
Anti-terrorism Crime and security Act (2001); Proceeds of Crime Act (2002); Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 
(2005).  
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2. It was necessary to prove that laundered money was directly linked to 
drugs trafficking or other specific crime; 
 
3. The legislation could only be used to prosecute someone for helping 
another person retain the benefit of their crime; and 
 
4. The prosecution had to show that the defendant knew or suspected that 
the other person had benefited from crime (which was almost impossible 
without an admission of guilt). 
 
(PIU, 2002) 
 
The DTA however introduced the first reporting regime for financial institutions. 
Suspicions of criminal activity through the use of bank accounts were reported to 
the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). These reports known as 
“disclosures” are as relevant today as they were when the legislation was 
introduced. Reporting in 2014 is made to the United Kingdom Financial 
Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) which is now part of the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
previously the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Money laundering 
schemes can be very simple or highly sophisticated schemes. As illustrated in 
Figure 2.1 money laundering takes place in three distinct phases of placement, 
layering and integration. Each are explained below:  
 
Placement  
Cash is converted to monetary instruments or is deposited into accounts. This is 
the most dangerous phase for the launderer as it is the stage most easily detected 
by banks or entities governed by regulation. Proceeds of crime are introduced to 
the financial system; this may be in small sums to avoid suspicion and transferred 
to other instruments such as bank drafts.   
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Layering  
Funds are moved to other financial institutions to obscure origins. Once funds 
have entered the system they can be transferred to other accounts. Wire transfers 
to international destinations or investments can easily be made through the use 
of internet banking.   
 
Integration 
Funds are used to acquire legitimate asset or fund activities. The funds have 
reached legitimacy and can now be used to purchase property, vehicles, and 
luxury items or begin new business ventures. (FATF, 2002)  
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Money-Laundering Cycle 
  
   
 
Source: UNODC14 (2006) 
                                            
14 Available at http//www.unodc.org.unodc/money_laundering_cycle.html 
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To understand the importance of the reporting regime the following hypothetical 
scenario is provided by this author: 
 
‘A drug dealer has been dealing for the weekend and has substantial cash in a 
bag at his home. He is unemployed and has no visible means of income so is 
aware that he could not, if required, explain where the money came from. He 
may, or not be aware that to place large amounts of cash into a bank account 
could trigger a suspicious activity report from the bank to UKFIU.  He needs to 
make the money appear to come from a legitimate source. There are numerous 
ways he could do this; a) he could buy a car from an advertisement in the local 
paper for cash; b) he could re-sell the car and obtain a cheque from the buyer 
and lodge the cheque into an account; c) he could place the cash in small 
amounts into a number of friend’s bank accounts; d) he could find a friendly 
business that will take his cash and launder it through their own business; e) he 
could set up his own business and launder the cash through that business; f) he 
could use a solicitor or accountant in any of the above scenarios as a cover for 
legitimacy. Whatever route he decides to take he is trying to avoid any of the 
regulated agencies15 making a report on his activity’. In essence the money 
laundering regulations as described by HMRC are in place to protect the UK 
financial system16. 
 
Once a report is made by the bank or financial entity it is sent electronically to the 
UKFIU were it is examined. The information is stored in a data-base which is 
                                            
15 The regulated sector obliged to make reports are: All banking and financial business (some exceptions), Bureaux de 
Change, Estate Agents, Lawyers (providing advice in relation to financial or real estate transactions), Accountants, Casino 
operators, Dealers in high value goods (including auctioneers) were a transaction involves accepting a cash payment of 
15,000euro or more, Company formation businesses, Insolvency practitioners, Tax advisors (The money laundering 
Regulations; 2003/3075).  
16 Introduction to the Money Laundering Regulations (www.hmrc.gov.uk), (2014). 
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accessed by all UK police forces that can then use that information to begin 
investigations or further advance on-going investigations. Not all international 
agencies follow the UK process but have similar processes in place as advised 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  
 
The formation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989 was a turning 
point for all nations in the establishment of corroborative doctrine to tackle money 
laundering head on. The FATF is an inter-governmental body established by the 
G-7 Summit in Paris in 1989. FATF is a policy making body with an objective to 
develop a co-ordinated international response. One of the first tasks of FATF was 
to develop recommendations that set out measures that national governments 
should put in place to implement effective anti-money laundering programmes. 
The FATF remit in response to world events (such as 9/11 attacks in USA) 
evolved. Setting standards, promoting effective implementation of legal, 
regulatory and operational measures against money laundering, terrorist 
financing and other related threats to the international financial system (FATF, 
2014).  
 
The FATF is one of many international bodies that consult and exchange 
information to ensure action when the international financial system is at stake17.  
These bodies in addition to the FATF either set rules or have responsibilities to 
monitor distinct business such as Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)18 or the 
Insurance Industry (Alldridge, 2003). One of the most important of these was the 
United Nations office on drugs and crime, based in Vienna which sought to 
                                            
17 International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank; Egmont Group; International Organisation of Security Commissioners; 
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (Levi and Reuter, 2006: 295) United Nations.   
18 FIUs receive reports from regulated entities on suspicions of money laundering and terrorist financing 
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internationalise the problem of transnational organised crime.  This prompted all 
nations to sign up to the United Nations Convention against Organised Crime in 
Palermo, Italy in December 2000. This convention created three protocols that 
targeted action and co-operation relating to crime, arms trafficking and 
manufacturing and people trafficking. All member states were to implement by 
29th December 2003.  
 
The first recommendations set by FATF in 1990 were made up of 40 
recommendations that set out the basic framework for anti-money laundering to 
be applied universally, and became the global standard in this area (FATF, 2002). 
The recommendations were revised in 1996, 2001, 2003 and 2012. At each stage 
the revised outcomes were due to a change or renewed threat to the financial 
systems around the world. The most significant change came about after the 9/11 
attacks in USA. In response to a call for a co-ordinated and rapid response to 
detect and prevent the misuse of the world financial systems by terrorists, the 
FATF extended its role beyond money laundering. 
 
The focus saw the 40 recommendations being extended by a further 8 special 
recommendations specifically designed to set new international standards to 
combat terrorist financing (FATF, 2002). Each member country was advised to 
adopt these new standards into their legislation. The FATF announced:  
 
“The FATF works to identify emerging methods and trends used for 
laundering money. Terrorists finance their operations through criminal 
activity, or they may also use funding from legal sources. In either 
case, terrorist groups utilise financial networks in the same way other 
criminal groups do. That is, they move funds; and hide connections 
between the source of their funding and the perpetrators, organisers, 
and sponsors of their activity”  
(FATF, 2002:1).  
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FATF will monitor each of its member countries to ensure progress in 
implementation of its recommendations. FATF further, evaluates money 
laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter measures globally. 
Publishing measures in collaboration with other international stakeholders to 
ensure the international financial system is protected from abuse. 
  
Each time the FATF revisited or made recommendations to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing, the European Union (E.U.) provided direction 
to each of its member states19. The EU implemented the FATF 40 
recommendations as revised in 2003, and recommendations on terrorist 
financing into the Third ML Directive.  In the UK the Third Directive was 
implemented by means of the Money Laundering Regulations (2007). The main 
objectives of the Third Directive was to; a) apply the AML compliance regime to 
the financing of terrorism (also with funds obtained legitimately); b) to introduce 
strict new requirements for the identification of the ultimate beneficial owner of 
firms (to clamp down on the use of offshore companies) and; c) to highlight the 
importance of taking a risk sensitive approach to AML compliance (high 
standards of due diligence in high risk situations) (EU Directive; 2005).  In setting 
the research in context it is the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) and The Money 
Laundering Regulations (2007) that apply to this research.  
 
 
 
                                            
19 The E.U. anti-money laundering legislation is found in the following Directives: First ML Directive 91/308/EEC, 10 
January 1991; Second ML Directive 2001/97/EC, 4 December 2001; Third ML Directive 2005/60 EC, 26 October 2005. 
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2.3 Defining money laundering 
Despite the simplicity of the money laundering process which is to “clean dirty 
money”, it appears to be one of the most difficult concepts to define. That is borne 
out by the many competing definitions that abound from various organisations 
and jurisdictions around the world. Unger (2006) found 18 definitions of money 
laundering. 
 
Most Countries apply the definition (in some form or another) adopted by the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988) (Vienna Convention)20:   
 
 The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from [drug trafficking] offense or offenses or from an act of 
participation in such offense or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who 
is involved in the commission of such an offense or offenses to evade the 
legal consequences of his actions; 
 
 The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership or offenses or 
from an act of participation in such an offense or offenses. 
 
The Vienna Convention adds that money laundering also involves: 
 The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of 
receipt that such property was derived from an offense or offenses… or 
from an act of participation in such offense or offenses. 
 
The above definition however restricted the investigation of money laundering 
unless the predicate offence was a drug trafficking offense. Over the years the 
international community has extended the predicate offences to include a wide 
                                            
20 Money laundering and Terrorist Financing: Definitions and Explanations (2003:1-2). (www1.worldbank.org) 
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array of offences as possible. The definition of predicate crime is significant as a 
crime in one country may not be a crime in another country. For example how the 
USA and Japan list their predicate crimes. Most countries don’t list the crimes but 
define them as ‘serious crimes’. The critical question being, “What is considered 
to be the predicate crime”? That which is on the USA and Japanese list or that 
which is viewed as a ‘serious crime’ elsewhere (Masciandaro, Takats and Unger, 
2007).  
 
There are a whole array of arguments and further discussions that can be drawn 
from the definition of money laundering and the predicate offence. For the 
purposes of this study it is important to be aware that some jurisdictions require 
the predicate offence proven before the money laundering offence. Neither do 
those jurisdictions provide in their legislation or definitions a stand-alone money 
laundering offence. 
  
The above issue is provided for in the UK definition of money laundering as it is 
drawn from the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) and refers to a number of 
offences of money laundering which are summarised below21: 
 
 The conversion or transfer of property for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising its illicit origin or of assisting any person to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions 
 
 The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of criminally 
derived property 
 
 The acquisition, possession or use of criminally derived property  
                                            
21 Part 7 of Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) sets out: money laundering offences and offences of failing to disclose suspected 
money laundering. www.gov.uk (2014) 
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What is useful when viewing the POCA is that ‘criminal conduct’ is also explained 
within the legislation as: all conduct which constitutes an offence in any part of 
the United Kingdom, which means that an all crimes approach is adopted in 
respect of predicate crimes committed in the UK. Offences committed outside the 
UK are relevant if the laundering took place within the UK. For many jurisdictions 
the inclusion of predicate offence causes difficulties in money laundering 
prosecutions. Predicate crime or predicate offence as it is sometimes called is 
the substantive crime that pre-dated the money laundering activity. For example 
a drug trafficker places the proceeds of his crime into the financial system after 
he has sold/supplied his drugs. The predicate offence is “supplying controlled 
drugs”. Many jurisdictions prefer to prosecute the substantive offence first and 
there-after the money laundering offence.  
 
What is unique within the UK legislation is the opportunity to prosecute both 
offences jointly or separately. Proving that the proceeds of the crime are the 
benefit of criminal conduct (the predicate offence) can be carried out using 
circumstantial evidence. Case law in the UK has provided law enforcement with 
the means to use many strands of evidence to prove “stand alone” money 
laundering offences. This negates the need to wait for a conviction in relation to 
the criminal conduct (i.e. the underlying predicate offence). 
 
The UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) offers guidance to Prosecutors in 
deciding how to prosecute substantive offences and money laundering offences. 
The guidance offers four types of money laundering prosecutions: 
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Mixed cases in which money laundering can be charged or included on an 
indictment in which the underlying/substantive offence is included. The subsets 
of which are ‘own proceeds’ or ‘self-laundering’ when the defendant in a money 
laundering case may also be the author of the predicate crime; Laundering by a 
person other than the author of the predicate offence. Secondly, there are cases 
when money laundering is the sole charge for indictment or the easiest charge to 
prove. The subsets of which are ‘Own proceeds’ laundering and laundering by a 
person other than the author of the predicate offence22. Defining the predicate 
offence becomes an important pre-requisite to defining money laundering. 
Interpol and FATF offer the following similar definitions:  
 
“Any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally 
obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from 
legitimate sources”.  
www.Interpol.int (Interpol, 2014)  
 
Rather than define money laundering FATF describes money laundering as: 
 
“The processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. 
This process is of critical importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy 
these profits without jeopardising their source”.  
 
www.fatf-gafi.org (FATF, 2014) 
 
Harmonisation of predicate crime definitions is necessary if there is to be co-
operation and corroboration across jurisdictions in the fight against money 
laundering and terrorist financing. Some countries particularly underdeveloped 
                                            
22Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) guidance notes found at 
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/proceeds_of_crime_money_laundering/#a02 
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countries where corrupt dictatorships exist23, have no incentive to prosecute their 
own money laundering offences never mind responding to mutual legal 
assistance requests from other countries for foreign offences. As a result 
countries with different predicate crime definitions can ignore foreign crimes. The 
consequences leave a plethora of environments suitable for money laundering in 
countries worldwide (Masciandaro, Takats and Unger, 2007).   
 
2.4 Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing 
Organised crime like money laundering appears to have a number of competing 
definitions. One of the difficulties of defining organised crime is described by 
Lunde (2004): 
  
“Attempts by law enforcement and other agencies to provide a single 
definition of organised crime have been confounded by the fact that 
activities of the criminal underworld are, by their nature kaleidoscopic, 
constantly responding to shifts in the market conditions and exploring 
the myriad of money-making opportunities provided by the legitimate 
over-world” 
 
(Lunde; 2004:8).  
 
This was an area recognised by Tupman (1998) who prior to the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks in USA had already linked terrorism, organised crime and 
money laundering and makes the following observations: 
 
 
 
                                            
23 Cases such as Marcos of Philippines; Suharto of Indonesia; Mabut of Zaire; Abacha of Nigeria, who have laundered 
billions of dollars abroad (Masciandaro, Takats & Unger; 2007, page 230) Added to that list can include Gaddafi of Libya 
and Mubarak of Egypt. 
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“The IRA has had to follow the changing fashions of organised crime 
to continue raising money. At one time armed robbers were the 
aristocracy of organised crime and for a period the IRA obtained its 
funding by robberies…like organised crime the IRA flirted with drugs 
and now has followed organised crime into a much lower risk area of 
cross border fraud and counterfeit products”  
 
 
(Tupman, 1998:310).  
 
From the makeup of an organised crime gang, it should be appreciated that the 
type of activity they would be engaged in would reap substantial funds that would 
need to be laundered (Levi and Reuter, 2006).  
 
The reference for European Union (EU) countries as a definition of organised 
crime comes from Article 2 of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime, referred to as follows:  
 
“An Organised Criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or 
more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with 
the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences 
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit; 
 
(a) ‘Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable 
by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or more 
serious penalty; 
 
(b) ‘Structured group’ shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for 
the immediate commission of an offence or does not need to have 
formally defined roles for its 15 members, continuity of its membership 
or a developed structure”.  
 
(United Nations, 2004:2) 
 
Furthermore organised crime is defined by Interpol as: “any group having a 
corporate structure whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal 
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activities, often surviving on fear and corruption” (Interpol, 1988 cited in Lea, 
2007). 
 
The main similarities in these definitions are the use of group structure and the 
type of criminal activity that refers to either “serious crime” or criminal activity that 
infuses violence or the fear of violence. Hauck and Peterke (2010) put forward 
the suggestion that the term ‘organised crime’ is highly uncertain and unclear:  
 
“On the one hand the term can be used to refer to certain types of 
more sophisticated criminal activities embedded, in one form or 
another, in complex illicit markets. Arms, drugs and human trafficking 
are often correlated with a set of ‘enabling activities’ such as (the threat 
of) violence, corruption and money laundering”  
 
 
                                                     (Hauck and Peterke, 2010:408-409)  
   
They go on to suggest that because the types of offences are ‘serious crimes’ the 
term should relate more typically to ‘organised criminality’ than ‘organised crime’. 
This vagueness in definition is agreed by Lea (2007) who would go one step 
further to suggest definitions of organised crime are outdated and barely 
resemble a few words that cover a wide range of criminal activity.  
  
The National Crime Agency (NCA) who took over from the Serious and Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA) in the UK on 6th October 2013 define organised crime by 
including ‘organised crime groups’: “Organised crime can be defined as serious 
crime planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together on a 
continuing basis” (NCA, 2014). The NCA describe the main motivation of the 
establishment of organised crime as ‘monetary gain’ and are called organised 
crime groups due to the multiple criminal activities with other criminals.  
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Like money laundering, organised crime can be located in the early 1900’s in the 
USA through the activities of Italian immigrants and mafia like figures that 
dominated the major cities such as New York and Chicago. The Volstead Act in 
1919 that was more commonly known as ‘Prohibition’ was the forerunner to the 
emergence of organised criminal activity in America. A black market was created 
by the effects of ‘prohibition’ for alcohol. The Italian immigrants as well as 
dominating the alcohol trade and making vast fortunes, became the dominating 
force and the central authority in organised criminal activity in the country. This 
description falls into Lea’s (2007) understanding of organised crime which is 
based on family and close community.  One has only to look at the portrayal of 
mafia families in films such as ‘The Godfather’ (1972) and ‘The Sopranos’ (1999) 
to understand trust and family loyalty was a key component. The consequences 
to those that crossed that loyalty was also well known. Memberships of these 
groups was tight. Cohesive groups that if not already related through blood 
became the family and acted like a close knit community of criminality, with similar 
thinking (Newburn, 2007; Lea, 2007). 
 
Traditional organised crime structures such as tight-knit mafia family structures 
may be something confined to the movies, there are still examples of family units 
operating as such. In the UK one of the most recent crime families under 
investigation was the Adams family or Clerkenwell Crime Syndicate as they were 
also known: Allegedly one of the most powerful organised crime families in the 
UK24. Other notorious UK organised crime gangs include in the 1950s -1960s 
                                            
24 For a more detail on the Clerkenwell Crime Syndicate see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clerkenwell_crime_syndicate  
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Ronald and Reggie Kray (known as the Kray twins25) and The Richardson Gang26 
run by Charlie and Eddie Richardson in South London in the 1960s.  
 
More recently a description of crime threats were released by various government 
agencies around the world to inform law enforcement and are also available on 
internet pages to the general public. Crime threats recently released by NCA 
suggest the following crimes are a threat to the UK from organised crime27.  
 Child sexual exploitation and abuse 
 Counterfeit currency 
 Cyber crime 
 Drugs 
 Firearms 
 Fraud 
 Human trafficking 
 Identity crime  
 Intellectual property crime 
 Kidnap and extortion 
 Money laundering 
 Organised theft 
 Organised crime groups 
 People smuggling 
 
(NCA, 2014) 
 
For the majority of these crimes, money laundering is the common denominator. 
Just as money laundering has become a global phenomenon with technology, 
internet banking, transport, communication and open borders so organised crime 
has evolved to become its partner. Whereas organised crime is associated with 
profiting with substantial sums of money through the above activities, terrorist 
financing is better known for the small amounts used to commit terrorist attacks. 
                                            
25 For more detail on the Kray twins see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kray_twins 
26 For a more detail on the Richardson Gang see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Richardson_Gang 
27 National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime (May, 2014) 
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For example the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005 
costing approximately $10,000 in total (Levi and Reuter, 2007).    
 
Terrorist financing and money laundering share similar characteristics such as 
money laundering involving the movement of funds through legal channels to hide 
their original origin; terrorist financing involving the use of both legal and illegal 
funds to finance their operations and conceal their source (World Bank, 2003). In 
both cases concealment is necessary. As regards terrorism small amounts of 
money can be used for terrorist activities and it is those small amounts that are 
harder to detect.   
 
FATF who sets the standards for combatting terrorist financing (CTF) does not 
define terrorist financing in light of its 8 special recommendations on terrorist 
financing (FATF, 2012). However, FATF advises countries to follow and 
implement the (1999) United Nations International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism28. Schott (2006) suggests the 
financing of terrorism is a simple concept and provides the following definition: “It 
is the financial support, in any form, of terrorism or of those who encourage, plan, 
or engage in terrorism” (Schott, 2006: 1.1). Terrorism itself is more difficult to 
define as the term is described as having significant political, religious and 
national implications from country to country. This is a vast area of debate which 
would take up more space than provided in this thesis. For the purposes of this 
study the definition provided in the UK by the Terrorism Act (2000) and discussion 
around that definition will apply here:  
                                            
28 The UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism (1999), which provides the definition 
of Terrorist Financing. For a full view of the definition follow www1.worldbank.org section B “What is Terrorist Financing”? 
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“The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or 
an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, 
or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a 
political, religious, racial or ideological cause; and it involves or 
causes: 
 
 serious violence against a person; 
 serious damage to a property; 
 a threat to a person's life; 
 a serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or 
 serious interference with or disruption to an electronic system”. 
 
(www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism.html) 
 
After the July bombings in London in July 2005 terrorism was again on the 
agenda for government legislators. The Counter-Terrorism Act (2008) came into 
force in the UK in November 2008 and mainly applies to the banking sector. In 
terms of terrorist financing it provides for more enhanced due diligence prior to 
entering into a business relationship with a client. The legislation also provides 
for monitoring individuals and entities, to provide specific documents or 
information. The legislation specifically relates to individuals with relationships in 
countries outside of the UK. The emphasis in this legislation is the threat to or 
risk to the national interests of the UK, from nuclear, radiological, biological or 
chemical weapons (JMLSG, 2013).   
   
Terrorist groups come in various shapes and sizes with differing structures, 
ideologies, motives and activities, seeking to cause widespread disruption, fear 
and intimidation to achieve their aims. Violence or the threat of violence is 
apparent as is the intimidation of those who do not agree with their ideals and 
motivation of those who may be sympathetic to them (Schott, 2006). Often their 
aim is to change government policies or governments themselves.  What is an 
important question for this part of the thesis relates to the link between organised 
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crime and terrorist financing and “How terrorists are funded”?  It is in this direction 
that the discussions will follow. 
   
A debate recognised by Tupman (2009) suggests there is no difference between 
terrorist money laundering and all other forms of money laundering. A debate he 
suggests has been ignored by FATF. The argument hinges around the use of a 
predicate offence for what he describes as ‘normal’ money laundering and the 
offence of terrorist financing, which occurs subsequently. Takats (2007) includes 
terrorist financing as one of the predicate offences in his model for predicate 
crimes linked to money laundering “Terrorists need to transfer funds from their 
base to different jurisdictions in order to finance terrorist attacks” (Takats, 2007: 
197). Both forms of money laundering are characterised by the movement of illicit 
fund transfers. The following figure 2.2 illustrates the two forms of money 
laundering.  
 
Figure 2.2 Forms of Money Laundering 
Traditional money laundering 
Illegal money _________to___________ Legal purposes 
 
Terrorist Financing 
Legal money _________to____________ Illegal purposes 
 
Source: (Masciandaro, Takats and Unger, 2007:198) 
 
Takats (2007) further suggests if you combine both illegal crime money and legal 
money then the need for laundering decreases. He uses the example that if a 
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terrorist is drug dealing he doesn’t need to launder the funds rather he can 
transport it to the place he needs to use it. Both the above statements appear to 
conflict with each other. Even in traditional or normal money laundering there can 
be a mix of clean money with dirty money in a laundering process. The 
perpetrator is using the clean funds of a business to act as a cover for the dirty 
money that is being filtered through it. To all intents and purposes one cannot 
distinguish which is clean and which is dirty. The clean is facilitating the dirty and 
this is within the knowledge of the perpetrator. Concealment is part of the offence 
and law enforcement only have to show that the process of the mixing takes place 
with the knowledge and actions of the launderer. 
 
Terrorist financing can also be a mix of legal funds and illegal funds. There are 
two issues here; firstly legal funds are suggested to come from charitable 
donations (Schott, 2006; Levi and Reuter, 2007; Takats, 2007). A donation to a 
terrorist organisation is an offence in the UK by virtue of the Terrorism Act (2000). 
Persons can collect for charities and it is a matter for law enforcement to establish 
the legitimacy of that charity and the purpose of the donations. Secondly in order 
to finance their activities terrorist organisations are also involved in organised 
criminal activity (Lea, 2005; Tupman, 2009). Of course small sums or even large 
sums of money can be transported to the destination of activity.  
 
The purpose of the legislation and the regulation in money laundering and 
terrorist financing is to prevent the financial system from being used to launder 
funds and increase the risk of being caught with crime money. The disruption 
tactics of Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) to search for cash, of 
vehicles, and individuals at ports and border crossings adds to the preventative 
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measures being taken. For the above reasons ‘traditional’ or ‘normal’ money 
laundering and terrorist financing of money laundering as Tupman (2009) 
suggests are one and the same process.  
 
Experts have agreed that the trade in drugs is a significant financial contributor 
to terrorist organisations (Masciandaro, 2001, 2004b; Schneider, 2004). In 
Afghanistan the Taliban in support of Al Qaeda are heavily involved in opium 
production and heroin trafficking. Huge sums of money are required to be 
laundered and that money is used for firearms purchase and support of terrorist 
training around the world (Masciandaro, 2007).  
 
Terrorists are involved in many other activities of criminality (Rider, 2004; Schott, 
2006). Within the UK in Northern Ireland the criminal activity of terrorist 
paramilitaries is well recorded. On a statement of income and expenditure going 
back nearly two decades a terrorist organisation, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
was involved in cigarette smuggling, robberies, protection rackets and with 
overseas contributions amassed a turnover over £20m (Tupman, 1998).  There 
is no doubt laundering of those sums of money needs to take place.  
 
The IRA like other terrorist organisations is a well-structured and organised unit 
with varying responsibilities levelled out to lieutenants from various departments; 
for example: procurement of weapons, training, welfare, funding, punishments 
and active service units. It should be noted that in order not to be one-sided in 
this discussion the Loyalist organisations have similar structures and operations 
to the IRA but do not appear to be as well recorded literally.    
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Lilley (2006) suggests terrorists have learned the art of laundering the funds of 
their criminal activities, from their organised crime counterparts. Tupman (2009) 
strengthens this argument; “The IRA were not primarily in business for the 
purposes of making money but needed ways of making money in order to stay in 
business” (Tupman, 2009: 196).  The link between organised crime and terrorism 
can be explained using the Northern Ireland situation as an example. Terrorism 
in Northern Ireland has evolved significantly over this past decade. A discussion 
with the main Republican and loyalist terrorist groups throughout the 1990’s was 
successful in that each ceased their terrorist campaign and engaged in a political 
process. This resulted in a devolved Government in May 2007 with power sharing 
between the Nationalist and Unionist Political Parties. Transfer of Policing and 
Justice Powers from Westminster to the Northern Ireland Executive was 
completed in April 2010.   
 
The completion of this process left a void within the organisation and the foot 
soldiers were left behind. Many hierarchical members of the organisations were 
placed in prominent posts within government while others on the fringes were left 
to their own devices. In short the leaders of the organisations became the 
spokespersons for their Political wings of the organisations. Some went into 
Government and brought their hierarchy with them. Other leaders controlled local 
community groups and also had access to the vast amounts of money from 
European Union grant funded schemes.  
 
Terrorists or (community representatives as they were now called) were able to 
negotiate social, economic and political environments to suit their members. The 
structures within the ranks of the organisations remained but were now no longer 
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called terrorist or paramilitary organisations. For the foot soldiers who did not 
know any better they had formed themselves into criminal gangs. Robbery, 
extortion, drugs, kidnapping, loan sharking, counterfeit goods, fuel smuggling, 
cigarette smuggling and VAT fraud did not diminish but increased (OCTF, 2002). 
 
As a result of organised criminal activity some very high profile cases have 
emerged: 
 A robbery at the Northern Bank in Belfast, Northern Ireland when £26m 
in cash was stolen and families of bank staff held hostage in order that 
the crime could be carried out29. 
 
 Gun smuggling operation between Florida in United States and UK and 
Ireland for the use by criminal gangs in their criminal activities outside of 
their organisations30. 
 
 Cash in transit robberies while ATM cash machines are being 
replenished netting hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling31. 
 
These crimes were typical of organised crime carried out with military precision 
and had all the hallmarks of the previous structures contained within paramilitary 
organisations. As a result of the peace process, re-grouping of terrorist 
organisations as suggested by the Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF) and 
Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) are heavily 
involved in organised crime (OCTF, 2013). This therefore changes the thinking 
of law enforcement in how they tackle organised crime. As Tupman (1998) 
suggests: 
 
 
 
                                            
29 Northern Bank Robbery (2004): The crime that nearly ended the peace process (theguardian.com) 
30 Lax Florida Laws attracted IRA (2000): The Register Guard National newspaper (news.google.com)    
31 Armed Robbery and Cash in Transit (2002): 134 attacks in the past year (0ctf.gov.uk) 
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“The greater the devotion of manpower resources to fundraising 
activities, the greater the likelihood a political group will become an 
organised crime group, in fact, though not in name. Both the Mafia and 
the Triads started out with political aims, but became something quite 
different”  
 
(Tupman, 1998:310)    
 
The experience in Northern Ireland demonstrates the need to appreciate the 
development of crime in a transitional context. Political policy and economic 
factors have contributed to the changing nature of organised crime in Northern 
Ireland since 1998.  Paramilitaries have taken advantage of new physical and 
social spaces, which have opened up following the peace process. However the 
transition has also seen the development of crimes perpetrated by those foot 
soldiers once committed to terrorist ideologies, now organised into their own 
organised crime groups.  
 
Outside the UK world leaders encourage contact and discussions with terrorist 
organisations globally (Hamas, Hezbollah, ETA, FARC and Taleban are just a 
few of the terrorist groups involved). In conflict resolution the Northern Ireland 
peace model gives an indication of the consequences for those terrorist 
structures. If terrorist organisations are preparing to withdraw from conflict to a 
peaceful solution there has to be an outlet for the foot soldiers in the negotiations 
or they will, as in the Northern Ireland case suggests, turn to the new terrorists, 
that of organised crime gangs. As Tupman (2009) suggests the next move is to 
measure the response by law enforcement and the reaction to policy of the way 
the new business i.e. terrorist/organised crime business is structured. 
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2.5 The UK Experience for Anti-Money Laundering 
POCA is Law Enforcements body of instructions to prohibit the concealing, 
arranging or acquiring of criminal property by offenders and to prosecute 
them. “In the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the UK possesses one of the 
world’s most comprehensive pieces of criminal asset legislation” (Bell; 
2007:33). Further AML provisions are provided to the regulated sector of 
financial institutions (accountants, lawyers, banks; key actors who must 
disclose all suspicions of money laundering transactions. Failing to do so 
may make them liable to prosecution themselves. The Money Laundering 
Regulations (2007)32 (MLR’s) are the instructions to these key actors to put 
in place preventative mechanisms and reporting regimes for persons 
suspected of money laundering through their institutions. The appropriate 
officer is generally called the money laundering reporting officer (MLRO). 
Any suspicious reports of money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) are 
reported to the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the UK 
Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU). Regulated entities are generally 
supervised by a competent authority such as Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) or other professional bodies such as Chartered Association of 
Accountancy Practice (CAAP or in the case of Solicitors the Law Society. 
Her Majesties Revenue and Customs (HMRC) provide a full list of 
responsibilities of supervising authorities33.  
 
For the purposes of this research the term ‘policy’ will incorporate those pieces 
of legislation and regulation that are provided as the AML provisions in the UK. 
                                            
32 Secondary regulation is provided by the Money Laundering Regulations (2003) which was replaced by the Money 
Laundering Regulations (2007). 
33 HMRC supervision responsibilities and AML controls are provided at www.hmrc.gov.uk 
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Policy is generally decided from the results of statistical data (Fleming, 2009) so 
it is not improper to suggest that the changes in money laundering policy in the 
last ten years has been significant because the crime figures in that area 
suggested weaknesses that warranted change. Government’s justification for this 
move suggests “protecting the financial sector from operational and reputational 
risks" helps to make the UK less attractive to potential launderers (Harvey 
2007:5).   
 
The driving force behind POCA was a report commissioned by Tony Blair by the 
Cabinet Office. The aim was to deter people from crime by reducing the returns 
that could be anticipated, to disrupt criminal networks and markets and to improve 
crime detection rates and create significant revenue flows (PIU 2000).  
 
As a crime deterrent, the legislation is designed to embed in criminals the fear 
that should they be prosecuted and convicted for an offence under this legislation, 
they could be sentenced to a period of imprisonment. In addition any assets they 
have obtained as a result of that criminal activity can also be confiscated. This 
enhances a previous period of legislation when confiscation although possible 
was cumbersome and unsuccessful. The consequences were such that criminals 
should not only lose their liberty but also the profit of their criminal activity through 
confiscation.  
 
The POCA legislation further suggests that any proceeds confiscated are 
returned to Government Treasury with a percentage returning to law enforcement 
and the prosecution service to enable them to fight further crime. A term aptly 
named ‘incentivisation’. This suggests that the incentive to fight acquisitive crime 
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can come from an economic or enforcement perspective. Research by Sproat 
(2007) in trying to determine if this new ‘policing of assets’ has become the new 
‘assets of policing’, suggests that this is not the case. “Policing of assets recovers 
very little, if any, new assets for policing above and beyond that spent on the 
policing itself” (Sproat, 2007:291). Although Sproat also took into account the cost 
of compliance to financial institutions in 2007, this cost/benefit analysis of money 
laundering, remains even now a thorny issue for compliance entities and the 
benefits attached.     
 
The consequences of the money laundering regulations ensure that not only do 
financial institutions submit reports of suspicions of money laundering and 
terrorist financing but also: solicitors, accountants, estate agents, financial 
advisors, casinos and high value dealers.  Not all of these entities can bear the 
brunt of the cost for analysis systems that apply ‘know your customer’ procedures 
and ‘risk based approaches’ to compliance, as some of the major financial 
institutions. So a fractured system is inevitable were reporting appears 
sophisticated at one end and antiquated at the other.  
 
Harvey and Lau (2009) provided little comfort for regulated entities in their study 
of reputational management of those entities, listing statutory requirements and 
having to bear the cost of reporting because of ‘covering their backs’ being a 
common theme, also discovered in this research. Reputation also does not 
appear to be high on the agenda for some recent large financial institutions who 
can bear the brunt of compliance costs. Most notably was the fine of $1.9B meted 
out to HSBC in 2013 for regulatory and compliance failings34. HSBC had for 
                                            
34 Source www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20673466 
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several years by passed the compliance regime and laundered money for 
terrorists in Sudan and Somalia as well as drug kingpins in Columbia. Smaller 
fines were also meted out to other large banks for similar offences35.  
 
Sanctions are divided into two areas such as – country based sanctions and list 
based sanctions. The country based sanctions refer to embargoes on countries 
such as Iran, Cuba and Syria. The list based sanctions refer to individuals and 
entities, such as drug traffickers, terrorists, weapons proliferators and corrupt 
leaders. Financial institutions operating a risk based approach need to check 
customers using the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. Sanctions apply 
to commercial and financial transactions, direct or indirect on a list of prohibited 
transactions. This risk based approach applies to individuals and companies and 
is based on an entities compliance program. What is confusing about the above 
scenarios is that AML legislation is designed to prosecute those, who did exactly 
what HSBC, RBS and others have done. The result is ‘fines’ for sanctions 
breaches but ‘no prosecution’ for laundering terrorist and criminal funds. The 
reputation of those banks appear yet, to be intact. What needs to happen before 
bank customers react?  As a result of a recent IT mishap concerning RBS in the 
UK over a weekend in August 2012 (when customers could not access ATM 
machines or current accounts)36 revenues for the first six months thereafter to 
30th June fell 8% to £13.2bn. There appears to be no disclosures from HSBC that 
being fined $1.9bn for laundering millions of dollars for terrorists and drug dealers 
had an effect on the numbers of customer accounts. What consequences arrive 
                                            
35 Fines by Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). Lloyds Bank fined $350m in 2009 Standard Charter Bank fined $645m 
in 2012; RBS fined $100m in 2013. 
RBS Group were also fine £5.6m in 2009 by FSA/FCA sanction systems for not having adequate systems and controls in 
place to prevent breach of UK financial sanctions.    
36RBS sets aside £125m to compensate customers over computer glitch: www.bbc.co.uk/news  
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as a result of the above activity is yet to be seen. This author suggests, if large 
financial institutions who do have the funds to spend on compliance costs are not 
prosecuted, what sort of compliance regime will smaller entities put in place and 
will they have the incentive to be compliant?  
 
The above discussions have shown that organised crime, terrorist financing and 
money laundering are inextricably linked. It is clear from the discussions that 
money laundering plays a decisive role in the movement of money from both 
organised crime and terrorism. Whether it is to clean money that has derived from 
crime or move money for the purposes of terrorism or terrorist acts. The reporting 
role that applies to financial institutions for reporting suspicions of money 
laundering is vital to the success of prevention, detection and advancing 
investigations in this regard. The effectiveness of the AML policy that directs 
those rules has implications on organised crime and terrorism and becomes an 
important driver in directing this research. The second part of Chapter 2 extends 
the legal and regulatory framework to the literature debate on the measurement 
of money laundering and the cost of the effectiveness of AML policy. 
 
2.6 Literature Review  
The choice of literature that has been viewed to develop this thesis has been 
limited to two specific areas: literature surrounding research on estimations of the 
scale of money laundering and literature surrounding the evaluation of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of AML policy. This choice has been determined in 
one respect by the research question; “What are the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of AML policy implementation in the UK” and another by the 
literature available in this area. Much of the literature surrounding the 
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effectiveness of AML policy implementation, is in fact part of a larger body of legal 
and political work on the money laundering landscape. This includes but is not 
limited to terrorist financing, organised crime and asset recovery. Some sources 
simply describe the relationships between AML bodies, the bigger AML and 
criminal justice framework, other sources focus on the implementation of AML 
and compare it from one country to another. Finally, for the purposes of this study 
a small group of authors explore the two areas mentioned above. It is this group 
which is of greatest interest to this research and the discussions below largely 
focuses on, with others mentioned as necessary. There were two key elements 
to bear in mind when reviewing this AML literature: The prevention of money 
laundering emphasises counter measures put in place to deter money laundering 
and the second the detection of money laundering which relates to the 
effectiveness of those measure in place (detection also includes the investigation 
of money laundering). 
 
The activities of money laundering and its role in concealing criminal or terrorist 
funds is by nature, a secretive activity. This makes the estimation of money 
laundering and the cost to society difficult to establish.  Launderers do not appear 
to record their criminal activities or keep books on the amounts of money they 
obtain for laundering (Schott, 2006). In addition money laundering is a global 
enterprise that to reliably estimate on a global scale would be problematic. “To 
estimate risk, a figure for the total number of persons who launder money is also 
needed. No such estimate is available, so an indicative calculation is all that can 
be offered” (Levi and Reuter, 2006:363). Those difficulties have not however 
prevented attempts to measure the scale of money laundering. See also, IMF 
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(1998), Thomas (1999), Walker (1999a, 1995), Reuter and Truman (2004), 
Schneider (2007), Unger (2007).  
 
Evaluating the effectiveness of the AML regime also provides similar problems. 
By using traditional or modern methods to assess the effectiveness of 
countermeasures requires access to statistical output data. Researchers are 
reliant on data from law enforcement, regulators and government departments 
that is available and current. In addition the evaluation comes from assessing if 
a reduction in money laundering activity has occurred. The inability to quantify 
this sum creates difficulty in understanding the impact policies have had on 
money laundering activity (Harvey, 2005; Vettori, 2013). See also Harvey (2004, 
2005), Van Duyne (2006), Bosworth-Davies (2007), Ross and Hannan (2007), 
Sproat (2007), Ferwarder (2009), Harvey and Lau (2009). 
 
One common limitation within the literature is the lack of conceptual clarity in part 
due to the inconsistent use or lack of guiding theories, models or frameworks.  
The following sections will discuss the literature suggested within the current 
research topic and apply the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
2.7 Estimating the scale of money laundering 
Estimating the scale (or measurement of) money laundering is necessary as 
Biagioli (2008) suggests because: 
 It gives a measure of the phenomenon and its potential impact on the legal 
economy, not only in terms of its power of influence on the economic and 
financial system, but also in terms of stability of the system itself. 
Separating legal money from crime money is one of the challenges here.  
 It may influence risk assessment within the financial sector: such as risk 
on financial products, financial transactions and customer due diligence. 
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Exposure to particular country risks must also be taken into 
consideration37. 
 By estimating the scale of the problem an evaluation of what 
countermeasures to put in place can be made. This is an important aspect 
of the evaluation as a balance must be made as to the measures adopted 
and the cost of doing so. 
 
(Biagioli, 2008:90). 
 
In theoretical terms deterrence, rational choice and economic regulation all have 
important roles to play in relation to the above reasons to estimate money 
laundering. Theorists believe that crime is reduced through the use of deterrents 
(Siegel, 2009; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001). In AML the goal of deterrent is 
channelled through the prevention of money laundering, regulation and the SAR 
reporting regime. Criminals will think carefully before using the financial system 
in both general and specific terms. As Lyman and Potter, 2009 suggest: 
  
“Deterrence theory is based on the belief that potential criminals will 
think before they act, if the likelihood of getting caught and or punished 
then deterrence theory holds that crime can be prevented by threat of 
punishment...in addition the penalties should be severe enough that 
there will be no repeat offenders”   
 
(Lyman and Potter’ 2009:269) 
 
Similarly for all crimes including money laundering, the decisions in which 
potential criminals make exemplifies the theory of criminality known as rational 
choice (weighing up the benefits and consequences of action). People are free 
agents who possess free will to make decisions regarding all aspects of their 
                                            
37 Brent (2002 provided similar concerns in developing his ‘five directions money laundering model’ for the flow of 
laundering funds through economically developing countries.  
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lives. Harsh and quick punishment is a deterrent policy in this area. “It is likely 
that the offender understands that his actions could result in his arrest and 
possible imprisonment” (Lyman and Potter 2009:62). The benefits of the AML 
regime to make it effective must exceed the costs of implementation and the 
organisation should feel safer and protected from risk (Cornish and Clarke 2014). 
Therefore a robust AML regime implemented with good supervision and 
enforcement in the financial sector should make an effective deterrent to criminals 
and prevent money laundering. In addition proper AML enforcement by financial 
institutions can be a key stage for detection of money laundering. However such 
evaluations as suggested by Biagioli (2009) can only be made if the estimations 
of the scale of money laundering are correct.  
 
There are no systematic estimates of the scale of money laundering either 
globally or in the UK. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1998 estimated 
that the aggregate amount of laundered funds, globally to be two and five per 
cent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP).  Those figures would suggest 
between US $590 billion and US $1.5 trillion (Schott, 2006). Walker (1998) 
suggested US$2.85 trillion per annum. More recent figures suggest: Baker 
(2005); US$1 trillion per annum and Reuter and Truman (2004); US$45-280 
billion. For OECD countries Schneider (2007) estimated at US$1.1 trillion 
(Biagioli, 2008). 
 
The estimations above indicate the wide diversity in variables used or methods 
chosen and in some cases suggest that these figures are based purely on 
assumptions. These estimates do not provide any method of research that 
identifies how the figures were obtained. “There is a lack of defined methodology 
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that has hampered previous empirical research in this area” (Van Duyne et al, 
2005). It is acknowledged that some academics have criticised previous 
measurement attempts. “They attempt to measure a fata morgana, a reflection of 
air that gives the illusion of being water” (Van Duyne, 2006:32) “Purists want to 
measure and model precisely and innovators want to measure the immeasurable 
even if there is a risk of criticism” (Unger, 2007:32) This makes the identification 
of the correct variables for measurement more important. Thomas (1999) 
criticised empirical approaches in measuring the grey economy (of which money 
laundering plays a part) as measured without theory and urges for proper theory 
that can be tested (Unger,2007:32).  
 
However despite the criticisms above as Harvey (2005b) points out “The alarmist 
notion of the volume of money laundering being of major significance cannot be 
objectively challenged” (Harvey, 2007:2). As a consequence this research 
examines money laundering measurement to identify appropriate variables, 
based upon the characteristic indicators relevant to the UK landscape.  
 
Whilst it is necessary to recognise the previous methods those criticisms do not 
deter from the fact that the characteristics of money laundering and the various 
features used are important. It is also important to recognise that previous 
research was carried out outside the UK and some differences may occur. Whilst 
section 2.3 discussed the various definitions of money laundering this research 
will adopt the following definition of money laundering: “Money laundering is the 
processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin”. (FATF, 2003:1)  
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Laundering the proceeds of crime will not amount to money laundering unless 
that crime is listed in the schedule of predicate crimes for that purpose.  Limitation 
of the definition in this way is important because of the number of competing 
definitions from various agencies and countries and the crimes listed in one 
country may not amount to a laundering offence but would do so in another 
country. In addition the terms ‘scale of money laundering’ and ‘cost of money 
laundering’ will mean money obtained through criminal activity that is laundered 
through the UK.  
 
A discussion of a number of the methods that attempt to estimate the ‘scale of 
money laundering’ are provided below. Whilst this research is not intending to 
reproduce these models, the research will benefit by drawing appropriate themes 
that can be identified as key determinants of money laundering. This includes but 
is not necessarily limited to the following; a) Walker (1995, 1999a) who attempted 
to measure the global cost of money laundering using a seven step model; b) 
Thomas (1999) who looked to measure money laundering by looking at the 
difference in the national economy between expenditure and income. c) Tanzi 
(1996) who a used a model called ‘demand for currency approach’, which 
suggested the more money that was hidden from view the more money should 
be printed.  d) Unger (2007) who conducted a study on behalf of the Dutch 
Ministry of Defence based on a modified Walker model; e) Van Duyne (2006) 
who conducted a study of money laundering and predicate crime in Serbia to 
attempt to identify the “hidden economy”; f) Schneider (2007) who attempted to 
estimate the shadow economy/money laundering for 145 countries by linking the 
study to capital flight (the hot money method); and g) Masciandaro (2007) who 
conducted a study of money laundering from an economic perspective looking at 
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the causes and effects of money laundering through a demand and supply 
framework. A discussion of each of these methods are provided:  
 
The following areas of research concentrate on estimations of the shadow 
economy and referred to by Tanzi (1996), Thomas (1999), and Schneider (2007). 
Shadow economy activity is known by various names: shadow, informal, hidden, 
black, underground, grey, clandestine, and illegal and parallel (Fleming et al, 
2000). Generally this refers to legal or illegal goods and services in the market 
that escape detection in the official estimates of GDP.  The majority of these are 
based upon statistical discrepancies that are seen to occur in a number of 
macroeconomic variables. The first is the data discrepancy approach described 
by Thomas (1999). This measurement of money laundering is carried out by 
using discrepancies in statistics or unusual value movements as one of the 
indicators of money laundering. As described in Unger (2007) Thomas suggests 
the shadow economy creates a difference between income and expenditure in 
the national accounting figures. If expenditure exceeds income then the excess 
must have been earned in the black market economy. The aggregate of people 
cannot spend more than they earn. Thomas looked at the working population and 
measured the difference between them and the official employment statistics. He 
suggests the shadow economy is based on that difference.  
 
Another method similar to Thomas (1999) above, by Tanzi (1996) used the 
demand for currency approach. This approach like the Thomas discrepancy 
model was used to demonstrate both the shadow economy and money 
laundering. For the shadow economy he assumed that hidden transactions are 
undertaken using cash in order to avoid observable traces for the authorities. An 
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increase in the shadow economy would necessitate the demand for more cash 
and hence increased the demand for currency. Tanzi calculated that even 
accounting for natural demand such as income, price level, payment habits and 
interest rates that any access could account for shadow economy growth.  
 
The work of Schneider 2007 focuses on the estimation of the size of the shadow 
economy. Similar work has been discussed above relating to Thomas (1999) and 
further accounts can be found in the work of Masciandaro (2007). Although 
Masciandaro uses what he terms a macroeconomic approach to analyse the 
relationship between crime, money laundering and value. This approach extends 
the theoretical model of Becker (1968) to one that includes disciplines associated 
with economic, legal and social science approaches. In essence it shows that the 
costs of money laundering activities depend on the effectiveness of the anti-
money laundering regulation. Transaction cost increase as the regulations 
improve and enforcement is successful. The public benefits increase as each 
improvement in the effectiveness of the AML regulation increases given its cost 
(Masciandaro in Unger, 2013). 
 
For Thomas a number of measures are taken, for example: the difference 
between income and expenditures measures of GDP, the balance of payments 
differences can be measured between capital inflows and outflows, money supply 
differences can be observed between demand for, and supply of currency and 
finally anomalies can be observed in price changes in properties. 
 
Schneider (2007) measured the shadow economy using a DYMIMIC (dynamic 
multiple-indicators multiple causes) model to estimate the shadow economy for 
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145 countries. The benefits of the model approach considers multiple cause 
variables such as: regulation, taxation and prosecutions for the shadow economy 
and multiple effects such as: demand for money, less official growth and or 
increase in crime rates. The choice of cause indicators are not reinforced 
theoretically and this has already been identified as a weakness in many of the 
methods used in measurement of the cost of money laundering. Statistical 
analysis is then used to decide the groupings of cause and effect variables 
(Unger, 2007). One of the interesting developments in this research will be the 
impact offences such as counterfeit goods, cigarette and fuel smuggling and tax 
evasion which are determined as criminal activity will dominate the discussions.   
 
Walker (1995) provided the first recognised model to estimate money laundering 
in and throughout Australia. He further extended his model to estimates of global 
measurement of money laundering Walker 1999a, 1999b, 2002). His work is 
described by Unger (2007) as most promising for global measurement of money 
laundering. However his attempted to measure the extent of money laundering 
occurring on a global basis has been criticised as using an ad hoc equation which 
was lacking solid theoretical or methodological background (Reuter and Truman, 
2004; Van Duyne 2006). However, “It still provides a relevant point of departure 
for further improving the measurement of money laundering” (Unger 2007:42). 
Despite these shortcomings, this model (questionnaire material was supplied to 
this author by Walker) provided a good starting point for this study. Walker’s 
(2007) research was the first of its kind for global measurement of money 
laundering and has since been used by other researchers in the same field. His 
approach to quantifying money laundering applied a standard economic theory in 
which he develops an international input-output model (Schneider, 2010). For the 
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purposes of this research Walker’s model has identifiable variables that could be 
included in this study for research in the UK. Walker believed all crime was 
relevant for measurement of money laundering as all crime could have some 
monetary benefit that could be laundered.  
 
Although Walker’s was a pioneer study that measured money laundering for all 
countries for the first time he relied on his own knowledge and experience to 
calibrate his model which led Unger (2007), to suggest that his cryptic sounding 
formulas were from trial and error estimation. Estimates were provided of the 
proceeds from these crimes and the probability of them being laundered. An 
attractiveness index was then developed that expressed the opportunities and 
risks of financial institutions presented by each country. The model defined the 
type of data and analysis required for global money laundering and suggests an 
effective crime prevention strategy. The model however lacked valid data and 
appeared to rely on the same information per country. Walker also relied on his 
own low, medium or high scores to measure all crimes per country (Schneider, 
2010; Reuter 2007).  
 
“The vagueness of such estimates is a result of both 
disagreements as to how money laundering is conceptualised, 
as well as weaknesses in the techniques used to quantify it. As 
a consequence, estimated changes in the volume of money 
laundering cannot be used a s a measure for judging the 
effectiveness of global anti-money laundering law enforcement 
regime such that aggregate figures provide little added value for 
policy makers”  
 
                                                           
 
                                                           (Schneider, 2010:474-475) 
 
 
75 
 
Despite the criticisms Unger (2007) argues that Walker’s model is a positive 
example of multiple frameworks of economics and criminology. She extends 
Walker’s model by applying a theoretical underpinning using Tinbergen’s ‘Old’ 
‘Gravity model’ (Schneider, 2010). The gravity model looks at the export flow from 
one country to another. It calculates the GDP for both countries and the distance 
between them. Using a modern version of the ‘gravity model’: the attractiveness 
of money laundering is factored on secrecy laws, attitudes to AML, corruption and 
crime. The results suggested by Schneider (2010) provide plausible estimations 
of money laundering and organised crime. The main benefit however is the first 
theoretical foundation of the Walker model.   
 
Van Duyne (2006) looked at the relationship between money laundering and 
predicate crime in Serbia from (2000-2005) by hypothesising a link between crime 
for profit activity and counter activities by law enforcement. He conceptualised 
three categories of crime actually occurring, reported crime and sanctioned crime 
or crime investigated and prosecuted. The study met with difficulty due to lack of 
proper accounting records and crime recording in Serbia. The research was 
widened to search for data by using case studies and surveys of various law 
enforcement and government agencies to better determine the analytical work 
that was carried out.  
 
Keeping to the crime for profit theme the study also looked at the household 
sector income and expenditure for evidence of the black economy. If the 
household spend was systematically beyond its means then there were reasons 
to speculate were the deficit came from in the event that it was not from savings.  
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The third area that the study looked at was international trade flows, through 
balance of payments data. It was in this area that he found major differences in 
inflows and outflows, pointing to a number of countries identified as major 
recipients of funds which could not be matched to any viable product or service 
in term of imports and exports. Van Duyne supplied material to this author from 
the above study, to assist this research. 
 
Reviewing the above literature provided a broad scope of activity around 
measurement of money laundering that identified activities for inclusion in this 
research. Measurement of money laundering took into account macro activities 
such as shadow economy and national accounting figures and micro activities 
such as SAR process and crime types. Some of the difficulties identified in both 
areas relate to reliability of data, access to data, theoretical underpinning and 
guesstimates.  
 
Finally, ‘measuring money laundering at a European level’ a new project assigned 
by the European Commission to Eurostat in 2010 has produced, for the first time, 
up to date data on AML activities.  
 
“This deeper and more evidence-based knowledge has the 
potential to enrich analysis of the phenomenon and thus to 
enable a first cost/benefit analysis of national and European anti-
laundering systems. While this is the Commission’s long-term 
ambition, it will however take some years to implement, as the 
cost/benefit issue is complex and has barely begun to be 
explored at international level”.      
  
                                                                                           (Eurostat, 2010:4) 
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2.8 The cost and effectiveness of AML policy 
The measurement of money laundering and the cost and effectiveness of AML 
policy are inextricably linked. This section provides an extension of the work on 
estimations on the scale of money laundering. The priority for the UK government 
is that effective AML legislation will make the UK less attractive to money 
laundering activity. As far as preventing that activity is concerned much of the 
emphasis in AML policy has been placed on the role of financial institutions and 
their money laundering compliance regime. However the effectiveness of AML 
policy also impacts on the success of the enforcement authorities at detecting 
and prosecuting money laundering. As such some discussion will be directed 
toward the relationship between financial institutions and law enforcement 
through the SAR regime. As money laundering activity continually evolves it is 
important to get a current perspective of this phenomenon.  
 
Direction from FATF in assessing the effectiveness of AML/CTF, emphasised the 
extent to which financial systems and economies mitigate the risks and threats of 
money laundering, financing of terrorism and proliferation. FATF suggest this 
assessment could be related to (a) policy or legislation; (b) a law enforcement 
initiative; or (c) implementation of a specific set of measures to mitigate those 
risks FATF, 2013). FATF describe the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of 
country by country AML/CTF, that “Financial systems and the broader economy 
are protected from the threats of money laundering and the financing of terrorism 
and proliferation, thereby strengthening financial sector integrity and contributing 
to safety and security” (FATF, 2013:14). As Ferwarder (2008) suggests FATF 
recommendations should provide a country with a complete framework for 
successfully combating money laundering. For example a response to a ‘name 
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and shame’ threat by FATF to non-compliant countries in 2001 had a positive 
effect. The response being that 50% of those countries reviewed their 
international compliance standards rather than face the cost to reputation by 
being non-compliant (Reuter and Truman 2001). 
 
As outlined in the introduction there are a number of prominent academics who 
have conducted research in this area of AML risk. The following literature 
discusses the roles of the financial institutions and their responsibilities in terms 
of compliance policy, and how the integrity of the financial system and reputation 
of financial institutions impact on those roles and responsibilities. A further 
examination will draw inference from those discussions and examination of the 
effectiveness question of AML policy.   
  
Reuter and Truman (2005) have questioned the extent to which AML controls has 
reached prominence since September 11, (2001) in USA and globally. As a result 
of those controls ask ‘how well is the system doing?’ In response they suggest: 
“The success of the system should be judged not by how much it reduces money 
laundering but by how much it reduces the activities of money laundering” (Reuter 
and Truman, 2005:58)   The AML system itself may deter activity that would 
otherwise be reported but what can also occur is a change in method to launder 
that money (such as a much more hands on approach by drug traffickers to use 
cash couriers). The consequence is that the choice to complete the activity is 
made more difficult as the risk of detection is increased by this change in method. 
Weighing up the benefits and consequences of the action are traits of rational 
choice, whether the criminal takes into consideration those risks is determined by 
many reasons. Lyman and Potter (2007) suggest crime is committed for political, 
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economic, psychological, social and physical means. Organised crime and 
financial incentives play an important role in determining whether a criminal will 
engage in crime (Akers, 1999; Lyman and Potter, 2007). However, Wright, (2010) 
would argue that the choice to commit crime has to make two further 
considerations: 1. Many criminals when committing crime are under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs and with this temporarily impaired incapacity cannot make 
rational choices. 2. Most crimes including serious ones do not occur penalties as 
they do not result in an arrest or conviction, therefore the effect of deterrent 
through severity of punishment is reduced (Wright, 2010). 
 
Research by Ferwarder (2009) questioned if AML policy reduced crime. He 
developed a theoretical model which suggested the criminalisation of money 
laundering had a negative effect on the crime rate. He extended Becker’s (1968) 
‘economics of crime’ model which explains criminal behaviour under the 
assumption of rational choice to include the effect of money laundering. This 
extension suggests that anti-money laundering policy deters potential criminals 
from committing money laundering and crimes in general. Using indicators drawn 
from AML policies and mutual evaluation reports of the World Bank, FATF and 
IMF for 17 countries he concluded that “AML policy deters potential criminals from 
illegal behaviour and therefore lowers crime rates” (Ferwarder, 2009: 923).  
 
Reliance on the results of this research however lie with the quality of the 
evaluation reports used for development. The FATF in April, 2009 reviewed and 
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re-issued the assessment criteria for evaluating money laundering38 which 
suggested the previous criteria was somewhat flawed. 
 
Ferwarder further concludes by suggesting the quality of the evaluation reports 
from FATF and IMF could be improved in the future to further improve the results 
of the research methodology. This however does not detract from the importance 
of the evaluation reports as Dawe, presented in Unger (2013) also used the World 
Bank, IMF and FATF evaluation reports for all countries as benchmarks for 
conducting a National ML/CTF risk assessment. The results also fall in line with 
the work of Chong and Lopez (2007) who found that tougher money laundering 
regulation that criminalise feeding activities and improve disclosure are linked to 
lower levels of money laundering. Although there is little work focusing on the 
theory of optimal money laundering regulation, the theory of regulation in other 
areas such as crime and the regulation of legal markets can help formulate 
testable theories about money laundering regulation (Chong and Lopez, 2007).   
 
The effectiveness of AML policy can also be related to cost and benefits of the 
regulatory system itself. Concerns have been expressed by financial institutions 
about the cost of AML compliance and the benefits from such a compliant process 
(Bosworth-Davies, 2007). And as Harvey (2005) points out little has been done 
to properly assess the extent to which those measures are effective or 
appropriate. Costs can relate to tangible operating costs such as physical 
resourcing for the compliance regime. Benefits can relate to the success of the 
cost-flow such as intangible reputational benefits from customers and 
                                            
38 www.fatf-gafi.org FATF reference document. AML/CTF Evaluation and Assessments. Handbook for Countries and 
Assessors April (2009). 
81 
 
competitors and to the tangible benefits from avoiding sanctions and fines for not 
complying with the regulations. Frustrations would suggest a conflict in the roles 
between their commercial interests (such as servicing the needs of clients and 
customers) and being governments ‘unpaid policemen’ (Harvey, 2004; Levi, 
2007). 
 
Theoretically, as crime theory would suggest it is impossible to eliminate criminal 
behaviour completely, so in relation to financial crime an equilibrium situation is 
required were the costs equal the benefits. Similarly from an economic crime 
theory perspective investing in the system should reap greater benefits than an 
alternative method. For AML the benefits of devoting resources to a system of 
prevention should be greater than devoting resources to another activity (Biagioli, 
2008).   
 
The balance it would seem has to be drawn between the requirements of having 
a robust compliance system that thwarts the efforts of criminals and terrorists to 
launder money, and the cost of complying with those regulations. A third need 
arises that relates to the same financial institutions that police the AML system 
as Reuter and Truman (2005) have noted:  
 
“The AML system has worthy goals but it also imposes real 
costs. The obvious ones…government expenditure the 
SAR programmes (are a small part) Firms subject to the 
reporting requirements have to invest in systems to identify 
customers and transactions and to deliver reports. They in 
turn subject customers to costs and inconvenience by 
requiring additional information and time for verification”.  
                                                          
                                                              (Reuter and Truman, 2005:59)  
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The interest from the financial institution perspective surely has to relate to a 
business decision to manage risk within their institutions. That risk relates to 
damage to their reputation and integrity by failing to comply with the AML 
regulations.  Further, they risk fines and sanctions from the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) if found to be failing in their task or in breach of their obligations.  
Risk in AML activity as suggested by Harvey (2005) impacts on the reputation 
and integrity of the financial system. To evaluate the effectiveness of those rules 
and regulations Harvey sought to evaluate using ‘second best’ measures of 
reputation, such as, SARs, prosecutions and asset recovery. Ross and Hannan 
(2007) identified risk as appearing as an explicit AML regulatory consideration 
from the revised FATF recommendations in 2003; specifically recommendation 5 
which stated that financial institutions should apply customer due diligence 
measures on a risk sensitive basis depending on the level of customer and 
transaction (FATF, 2003). Recommendation 24 follows this up by implying that 
countries should extend AML/CTF monitoring and compliance to designated non-
financial institutions on a risk sensitive basis (Ross and Hannon, 2007).  
 
The AML/CTF strategy recommended by FATF in 2003 would allow financial 
institutions and reporting entities to self-regulate based on a managing risk 
model.  Each area of their business could be assessed for risk and action taken 
to mitigate that risk. Considering that the priority for money launderers is to look 
for weaknesses in the financial system a risk strategy would put in place 
mechanisms to continually review all the systems.  
 
FATF acknowledges the difficulties of applying risk-based concepts to AML/CTF 
domain as described by Dawes (as cited in Unger, 2013): that money laundering 
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and terrorist financing are difficult to record as they maintain many processes 
hidden from normal activity. (Dawes, as cited in Unger 2013). Dawes further 
suggests that different stakeholders in AML/CTF communities see money 
laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks from different perspectives. By 
building on the business model of risk using key indicators of threat (demand for 
money laundering), vulnerability (structures, processes and weaknesses in the 
AML system) and consequences (cost, damage to reputation) a build-up of 
information on typologies, case studies, money laundering methods and patterns 
could be developed and continually reviewed for use in assessing customer 
business and transactions (Reuter and Truman, 2004; Fleming, 2005; Bosworth-
Davies, 2007; Ross and Hannan, 2007; Dawes in Unger 2013). For this model to 
be successful would need the co-operation of the regulators and three conditions 
of risk in place: 
 
a) Agreement about the risk being decided upon 
b) Must be an explicit agreed model of the attributes that will contribute to 
the assessment of risk 
c) Those responsible for delivering and refining a risk based decision model 
must have access to knowledge about the outcomes of assessment 
 
(Ross and Hannan, 2007:110) 
 
The outcome from this model does not accurately equate with the results of 
Harvey’s observations, however there are some similarities. There is a potential 
reduction in costs if specific areas of high risk are targeted than lower risk areas, 
Less ‘defensive reporting’ as staff become more knowledgeable about money 
laundering trends and most importantly reputational risk becomes a factor of all 
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the reduced risk. Many previous reviews of the AML/CTF regime have criticised 
the degree of exchange of information and co-operation between law 
enforcement agencies, regulators and financial institutions (KPMG, 2003; 
Fleming, 2005; Lander, 2006). The benefits from improved relationships, 
improved feedback and communication include greater quality SAR reporting, 
more effective matching of data and overall general performance of reporting 
entities (Ross and Hannon, 2007; Unger and Van Wararden, 2009; Van Den 
Broek, 2011).  Any criticism from the use of this model could potentially come 
from small or medium size businesses who have been caught by the expanded 
regulation to report. Cost to these entities may be more visible and less attention 
paid to risk which makes them more vulnerable to being targeted for money 
laundering. 
 
The ideal measure of success of the above model would be a reduction in money 
laundering activity. However as previously suggested it is difficult to quantify the 
amount of money laundering activity. As a result given that by its very nature, it 
is clandestine it is also difficult to quantify the deterrent effect of those procedures 
on that activity. Money laundering activity could be effected by the expansion of 
the reporting entities. It could be anticipated that more SAR reports would 
generate an increase in convictions and asset recovery and therefore provide a 
prevention and deterrent effect to criminal launderers (Harvey 2007). 
Theoretically the model by following the ‘economics of crime’ should apply cost 
and risk to the launderer. In reality the cost of the regulation follows Stigler (1971) 
and Becker’s (1968) position by the institution absorbing the cost of compliance 
and ultimately any benefit going to law enforcement and government. Much of 
the discussions above suggest the consequences are correct in that the private 
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interest frustrations of regulated entities surrounding cost and potential reactions 
are counterproductive (Unger 2013).  
 
While deterrence is most often associated with crime control it is also a major part 
of regulatory enforcement (Clarke, 2000; Simpson, 2002).  
 
“A crime control model can involve consideration of future 
conduct and remedies through rehabilitation, restorative justice 
and mediation. Deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation are 
all concerned with future conduct…deterrence which equates 
with a crime control strategy, and regulation are part of an overall 
enforcement strategy emphasising crime prevention and 
deterrence”. 
 
                                                                             
                                                                           (Croall, 2003:47) 
 
Money laundering is harmful, it makes crime pay, alters the cost/benefit 
calculation of those engaged in crime and encourages crime activity (Becker, 
1968). In order to protect citizens governments act on behalf of society, the 
economy and politics and require information from the private sector. The legal 
framework for money laundering (POCA) that applies to the UK has already been 
discussed in Chapter 2a. This sets out the criminal and regulatory requirements 
for both law enforcement and regulated institutions for reporting suspicions of 
money laundering. This responsibility places on regulated entities an external 
policing role in which they would have to monitor and report upon the activities of 
their customers. Levi (2007) suggests “have been involuntarily co-opted into 
becoming unpaid agents of the state”. (Levi, 2007:162)    
 
Much of the debate surrounding regulatory control in AML exists with the 
influence from regulators, namely the FCA (previously FSA). Regulatory 
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enforcement is generally related to co-operative compliance strategies which 
includes persuasion, education and advice. This is in contrast to the policing style 
that emphasises conflict, arrest and prosecution (Croall, 2003). Some suggest 
that regulators in AML arena have too much power and that supervision of 
financial institutions becomes intrusive, cumbersome and controlling (Bosworth-
Davies, 2007). The main question that arises from this regulatory control is “How 
much of compliance co-operation from financial institutions is down to integrity, 
reputation, cost, customer care concerns or ‘keeping ourselves right’ for the 
regulator”?   
 
The last decade has seen many fines and sanctions against financial institutions 
for banking and compliance failures (provided at section 2.4)39. The fear is that 
due to the build-up of fines against financial institutions that the above statement 
is true. The implications of which mean an increase in poor quality reports and a 
disgruntled less motivated partner in the fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing. From within an economic paradigm of welfare economics the 
role of the regulator is to act in the public interest (Ricketts, 2006). One has to 
question if the public interest is foremost in their minds if their behaviour has a 
negative impact on the prevention and deterrent effect of money laundering 
activity. In addition Takat’s (2007) who agrees that excessive fines force banks 
to report transactions which are less suspicious, argues that there should be a 
reduction in fines for non-compliance and a levy for all reports made (in other 
words charging banks to make reports).  
                                            
39 The most recent fines: 
16th June 2014 – Credit Suisse International £2.4m Misleading financial promotions 
16th June 2014 – Yorkshire Building Society £1.5m Misleading financial promotions 
23rd May 2014 – Barclays Bank £26m Gold fixing 
23rd January 2014 – Standard Bank PLC £7.7m Anti Money laundering failing  
For further detais see: www.fca.org.uk 
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The public interest argument can be compared with the policy to prevent money 
laundering from a good governance perspective. Tensions identified by Van Der 
Broek and Addink (2011), relate to legal rights of clients over reporting information 
and client confidentiality and the replacement of the rule based approach to a risk 
based approach that requires active participation from institutions. This change 
from more government led design and functioning of rules in the rule based 
system has developed to a dilution of the public and private sectors that can 
impact on preventative accountability.  
 
Harvey and Lau (2009) from interviewing compliance officers expected a positive 
correlation between compliance and reputation however, found the opposite in 
that respondents suggested that compliance was driven by fear rather than as a 
benefit to the bank. Harvey and Lau also found that disclosure of the costs of 
compliance in annual reports was frowned upon due to the potential backlash 
from shareholders. The above points to a move away from the role of regulators 
as acting in the public interest to improve overall allocative efficiency, to acting in 
their own best interests (Ricketts, 2006). This can be further examined by 
considering the concerns of Bosworth-Davies who imparts: 
 
“In my considered judgement, there is absolutely no possibility or 
likelihood whatsoever that any banker of stature in the financial 
sector will ever be prosecuted for money laundering in the UK. 
We may have to face the possibility of difficult regulatory findings, 
but no-one in my circle believes that the government will bring 
criminal charges against the board member of a leading British 
bank…” 
     
                                                                        (Bosworth-Davies, 2007:196)  
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Protection of bankers is one of a number of points Bosworth-Davies makes in 
relation to government influence in AML activities. He points to government 
wanting reporting entities to go beyond their statutory duties by reporting 
suspicious activity reports (SARs) as opposed to suspicious transaction reports 
(STR). This he suggests was in order that governments get more information on 
tax offences and offshore movements of funds. Which they were unable to obtain 
from voluntary disclosure. The above would indicate a manipulation of the AML 
regime, not to prevent or deter money laundering, but to provide a “means of 
providing government with greater access to information about tax evaders and 
others who seek to keep their assets out of the reach of the government, the so 
called, undeclared economic activity” (Bosworth-Davies, 2007:207).  
 
In light of the above comments it is evident that to effectively fight money 
laundering governments need to be able to distinguish between normal, healthy, 
financial transactions, from those that hide profitable, criminal activity. In terms of 
money laundering transactions the exchange of information between the private 
sector and public sector is crucial. Good quality reports from financial institutions 
are essential for law enforcement to analyse, develop and follow up.  Economic 
theory suggests if one group has more or less information than the other then the 
system skews. As markets should be efficient distortion as in this case occurs 
with the imbalance of information. Imperfect information then causes power 
imbalances and distorts the market (Wilson, 2008). In AML the co-operation and 
coordination of investigations relies on the FIU capacity to transform SAR 
information into intelligence. According to Deleanu (as cited in Unger, 2013) the 
danger is the balance of power has changed to law enforcement from the private 
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sector and the product (intelligence) could be used by governments for purposes 
other than the prevention and detection of AML offences.  
 
Pressure is placed on financial institutions to conform to government legislation 
through the regulatory authorities. In some respects as suggested above this is 
seen as being done for economic reasons as opposed to social welfare reasons 
of crime prevention and deterrent. Whether those institutions would consider their 
reporting role and the cost of that role if regulation was not in place, remains to 
be seen. However, “it is the responsibility of reporting institutions to identify and 
assess the money laundering risks and take measures to manage and monitor 
those risks” (British Bankers Association, 2006:129).  
 
2.9 Research Gap 
The research gaps referred to in this section are drawn from observations from 
existing empirical literature that have been reviewed to answer the research 
question: “What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of AML policy 
implementation in the UK”? This author has not found previous research that sets 
out to discover the influencing factors in AML policy implementation. To clarify 
this statement, AML is a very wide subject area and there has been much 
valuable research conducted from which this research has drawn. The previous 
sections have described the money laundering landscape in terms of both the UK 
and from a global perspective.  
 
The concept of money laundering and the legislation and regulation that 
encompass it have evolved substantially over the past decades. Academics have 
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questioned over that time the adequacy and relevancy of the policy regarding 
money laundering (Levi and Osofsky, 1995; Van Duyne 2006; Harvey, 2008; 
Ferwarder, 2009) to the extent that it is enforced by both the regulated industry 
and law enforcement. Levi and Osofsky (as others)  emphasised the need for 
greater communication between policy makers, legislators and practitioners, to 
ensure there were no practical holes causing unnecessary obstacles, to attain 
the goals of underlying confiscation legislation (Levi and Osofsky, 1995; 
Bosworth-Davies, 2007; Ross and Hannon, 2007).  
 
Bell (2007), evaluation of the UK, Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) sets the scene, 
that puts into context the subject of this research, the findings from this research, 
and the contribution that this research will achieve by filling those gaps. Bell 
suggests “There is no group which performs the role of detailed analysis of the 
legislation and making recommendations for change” (Bell, 2007:42).  
 
This research makes a substantial contribution to knowledge and enhancement 
of theory, by following a robust, methodology that incorporates significant 
stakeholders in the AML environment. This research becomes the voice that Bell 
refers to; of the stakeholders in AML and the identification of underlying issues 
and the drivers of future policy (Bell, 2007). 
 
The research gaps referred to in this section can be divided into two areas. The 
first relates to lack of theory that underpins the relationship between crime and 
policy in AML.  This view has been acknowledged extensively: Levi (2005), Van 
Duyne (2006), Reuter (2007), Unger (2007), Harvey (2009), Verghage (2009), 
Schneider (2010), The second gap identified relates to knowledge through lack 
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of access to data. Previous research has acknowledged the difficulties of 
obtaining access to expert’s knowledge and experience and having to rely on 
statistical data (which in many instances is unreliable, out of date or missing) Van 
Duyne (2006), Ferwarder (2009), Verhage (2009).  
 
There is a lack of literature available on the link between money laundering crime 
and policy of which to draw relevant theory. A reason may be that AML is a fairly 
recent research subject that has not yet established an appropriate theoretical 
footing in which to bed the research. Many recent studies around AML appears 
to concentrate on the success or failure of the money laundering concept. 
Academics have looked to try and evaluate that success or failure through studies 
linked to the measurement and cost of money laundering. Other studies reflect 
on designing economic models to interpret guessed and suspected effects of 
money laundering and the costs and benefits of regulatory compliance. Further 
studies incorporated the risks and benefits in AML/CTF compliance with the 
justification for compliance costs based on asset recovery strategy. Some of the 
above research did not assume any theoretical position while others applied their 
own thoughts to what was relevant. The scale of money laundering dominates 
the literature and it is from this aspect that research gaps relating to theory are 
drawn.  
 
It is assumed that measuring the scale of money laundering at regular intervals 
would give an indication of the effectiveness of the AML regime. Much of the 
literature around the area of money laundering measurement focuses on varying 
methodologies and the identification of significant variables. Harvey (2004). 
Walker (1999, 2004, 2007), Van Duyne (2006), Unger (2007).  
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Walker’s work in measuring the cost of money laundering appears to dominate 
academic thinking and criticism. Criticism relates to two areas: the first relates to 
the approach used (Reuter 2007, Schneider 2010), due to the perceived lack of 
theoretical underpinning for the research and the second to the methodologies 
used to measure money laundering (Unger 2007, Ferwarder 2009). Describing 
Walker’s research (Unger 2007) who is a strong defender of Walker’s work 
suggests most literature on money laundering is pure speculation and without 
solid empirical background.  
 
More recent empirical work on the effectiveness of AML policy embraces models 
of econometrics, based on a cost/benefit approach such as rational choice utility 
model. This provides a new perspective on the economic analysis of money 
laundering Masciandaro, (2004, 2007), Takats and Unger (2007), Ferwarder 
(2009), Schneider (2010). The methodologies used to measure money 
laundering appear to have taken on a mainly quantitative route although some 
authors such as Fleming who looked at asset recovery effectiveness used mixed 
methods of quantitative survey and statistical data analysis and qualitative 
interviews. Biagioli (2008) suggests that quantitative issues raised by anti-money 
laundering have not found answers…“we have to invest in looking for new and 
more efficient ones…through building integrated and shared attitudes and 
methodologies can we tackle issues of measurement and evaluation of impact” 
(Biagioli, 2008:94).  
 
One of the main difficulties acknowledged by those conducting research in AML 
relates to getting access to data from experts (Verghage, 2010, Van Duyne 
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2006). It is with this criticism in mind that questions the validity of previous 
research if the data wasn’t available, and brings into question the vagueness of 
estimates of the scale of money laundering and generalisation of results for 
interpretation (Schneider, 2010). In light of this, such estimates cannot be used 
as a measure for judging the effectiveness of AML policy.  With this in mind, the 
strategy employed in this research has been formulated to close the gap that 
hindered previous research in this area. This includes gaining access to key 
expert groups from the AML industry. The research strategy is fully discussed in 
Chapter 3 and can be viewed visually on Figure 3.1.  
 
The literature is also sparse in describing and communicating the relationship 
between the above key agencies and subsequently a void is produced in relation 
to understanding the experiences and activities within the bigger AML picture. 
(Levi and Reuter, 2006, Verhage, 2009). Table 2.1 provides a summary of the 
research gaps: 
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Table 2.1 Summary of research gaps 
Research gaps Relevant authors 
Theory 
 
 Based on lack of underpinning 
theory 
 Based on extension of deterrence 
and rational choice theory and 
economic regulation theory  
 
Schneider (2010) Harvey (2009) 
 
Verhage (2009) Reuter (2007) 
 
Unger (2007) Van Duyne (2006) 
 
 Levi (2005) 
Knowledge 
 
 Based on lack of data available 
previously 
 Based on use of key stakeholder 
groups 
 Based on robust methodology 
strategy 
 Based on inclusion of ex-
offenders data 
 
 
Harvey (2009) 
 
Verhage (2009) 
 
Ferwarder (2009) 
 
Van Duyne (2006) 
 
Fleming (2005) 
 
 
Data in this research comes from a unique mix of key stakeholder groups: law 
enforcement, prosecutors, accountants, money laundering reporting officers 
(MLRO’s)40 and ex-offenders which has not been recorded previously in this area. 
The research extends to mixed methods of data collection as previously outlined. 
Capture of the data from these groups will enhance knowledge and provide a 
unique insight into the relationships between the anti-money laundering and 
crime fighting agencies in the UK.   
 
 
                                            
40 MLRO refers to Money Laundering Reporting Officer 
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2.10 Chapter conclusion 
This Chapter in order to answer the research question “What are the factors that 
influence the effectiveness of AML policy implementation in the UK” sets out to 
map the AML landscape and present a picture of how it has evolved over the past 
two decades. Legislation and regulation has been extended and enhanced to 
deal with economic, social and environmental changes that impact on society on 
a global scale. The UK has its own comprehensive legislation comprised of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) and Money laundering Regulations (2007). Further 
terrorist legislation compliments the primary legislation and in some cases is in-
corporated into it. 
 
The sections in this chapter have described the various components that under-
lies AML and AML policy and discussed the practical implications of those com-
ponents. The introduction at section 2.1 set the scene by introducing an overview 
of the chapter, this was followed at section 2.2 by a closer look at how money 
laundering had evolved since the 1930’s and the use of predicate offences prior 
to the money laundering offence itself. Discussion in this section also provided a 
description of the money laundering process and a hypothetical scenario was 
introduced to help explain the reporting process. The impact of the FATF was 
discussed and how recommendations from that organisation are incorporated 
into legislation around the globe. The importance of the FATF role in setting AML 
policy should not be underestimated. The EU follows FATF recommendations 
and issues directives to its member states to compliment legislation and enhance 
regulation.  
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 Defining money laundering has its own difficulties as shown in section 2.3. Many 
definitions exist and issues of what crimes are predicate crimes for money laun-
dering differ from country to country. Harmonisation of predicate crimes is identi-
fied as a necessity to improve co-operation and corroboration across jurisdic-
tions.  
 
The link between organised crime and terrorism has been thoroughly discussed. 
Section 2.4 has shown that both types of organisations are involved in crime ac-
tivity and require to launder criminal funds. Reference has been made that de-
scribes the move from terrorism to organised crime due to the military type struc-
tures already in place. The link between the groups in terms of loyalty to each 
other makes these groups difficult to penetrate. Further discussion explains why 
terrorist financing was included in the money laundering legislation and what con-
stitutes an offence. Some examples of the type of offences committed by these 
groups are presented. 
 
Section 2.5 discusses the UK experience for anti-money laundering and concen-
trates on the POCA legislation and money laundering regulations. Aspects of the 
deterrent effect of the legislation is presented including the dual penalties of sen-
tencing and confiscation. Some debate exists about the incentivisation scheme 
and that the benefits of asset recovery will not reach the intended heights ex-
pected by government. Some suggestion is made that the cost of policing the 
money laundering regulations outweigh the benefits returned through asset re-
covery. Recent fines for regulatory and compliance failings on a number of large 
banks was also discussed. With no prosecutions pending this action undermines 
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the very purpose of the legislation which was designed to prevent money laun-
dering activity, and questions the message this sends out to other smaller report-
ing entities. 
 
The second part of Chapter 2 offers the literature review. The introduction at sec-
tion 2.6 is followed by a discussion of the scale of money laundering in section 
2.7. This section explains the clandestine nature of money laundering that makes 
it a difficult activity to measure. The section goes on to discuss how several aca-
demics have attempted to measure the scale of money laundering and the vari-
ous techniques used. Criticisms of the methods used are presented, however 
estimations are accepted as a best guess from a difficult subject area.  
 
Section 2.8 discusses the efforts made to understand and evaluate the effective-
ness of AML policy. Much is made of the risks associated with money laundering 
and how those risks impact on AML activity and the reputation and integrity of the 
institutions themselves. Further discussions are directed to state involvement in 
manipulating regulatory activities to suit indifferent needs and regulatory influ-
ence through sanctions and fines.   
 
Section 2.9 discusses the identification of research gaps in the literature that lead 
to the contribution of this study. Gaps were identified that contribute to both theory 
and knowledge in AML research. Gaps such as, the lack of theory in previous 
research in AML which is acknowledged as missing and knowledge gained 
through the use of methods that can draw unique data from key experts that in-
clude ex-offenders. The chapter conclusion at section 2.10 is presented.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explain and substantiate the research framework 
used in this study. The next section outlines the framework and strategy for this 
research followed by the research questions. Following a review of the literature 
and the identification of the research gap in chapter two, this chapter will discuss 
the research philosophy and the various epistemological and ontological 
assumptions that led to a Pragmatic approach, as the choice appropriate for this 
research. The methodological strategy is then described.  
 
Section 3.4 commences with an explanation of the 4 phases of enquiry that use 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to address the research question. This is 
followed by a discussion surrounding the ethical considerations in this research. 
Section 3.5 discusses the use of mixed methods using qualitative methods of 
enquiry with expert focus group interviews and quantitative methods of enquiry 
using questionnaire surveys. A discussion on the choice of sample and the 
administration of the data collection process is presented which is followed by the 
method of analysis and the importance of establishing validity and reliability in the 
research methods. Figure 3.1 presents a visual image of the research framework 
Chapter.  
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Figure 3.1 Visual presentation of the Research Framework 
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Figure 3.1 describes the sequential nature of the research design and how each 
phase leads and informs the next phase. The research follows a carefully 
constructed strategy that has been designed to overcome the difficulties 
highlighted and discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2 referred to in Table 
2.1. How we conduct research is influenced by our own assumptions of how 
knowledge is obtained (we assume information exists to be collected and we 
assume there is a link between that data and knowledge). Those assumptions 
then influence the choices we make as to how our research will be conducted. 
Although it is not always obvious what data is needed or what data can be 
obtained, the relationship between the research question and the knowledge 
required to address that question should follow approaches and techniques to 
better understand the research problem.  
 
Justifications of the techniques used however, need to be made in light of those 
assumptions of how we see the world and our theoretical perspective (Saunders, 
2007; Cresswell, 2007; Pole and Lampard, 2003). In doing so this research 
follows the adoption of Crotty’s (1998) four question framework presented at 
figure 3.2, were competing approaches are informed through their ontological, 
epistemological and methodological positions. Each element informs the next 
with the choices of methods being applied. The framework has been expanded 
to include the ethical considerations that became so prominent in this research 
and will be discussed later in the chapter (Cresswell, 2003).   
 
3.2 Ontology; Epistemology; Methodology 
Considering each position briefly, ontology is “our own view of the nature of reality 
or being” (Saunders, 2007:1) and the researchers assumptions about the way the 
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world operates, “claims about what is knowledge” (Cresswell, 2003:6) and how 
we make sense of it. Ontology therefore informs the methodology of “what 
processes the research should focus on”.  
 
Figure 3.2: Elements of the research framework 
 
 
 
(Crotty, 1998:4) 
 
Epistemology is related to knowledge “how we know what we know” (Crotty, 
1998:8). Knowledge for everyone is consumed by theory and beliefs we have of 
the source and construction of knowledge. Epistemology is therefore concerned 
with providing the philosophical grounding to ensure that the decisions we make 
about knowledge choices are sufficient and reliable. (Crotty, 1998; Saunders, 
2007). Epistemology therefore informs the methodology about “what kind of 
knowledge the research should focus on” (Pole & Lampard, 2005). 
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Crotty (1998) recognises that ontology and epistemology are dependent on each 
other and difficult to separate when discussing “the construction of meaning” 
(ontology) and “the construction of a meaningful reality” (epistemology) as 
separate concepts.  Both therefore tend to merge together.  
 
Methodology as in epistemology plays an important role in distinguishing the way 
the research is conducted by combining the way we think and act to the way we 
gather knowledge Pole and Lampard (2002). The methodology is viewed as the 
gateway to knowledge for the research and becomes the strategy or action plan 
for the choices of methods made to gain that knowledge and achieve the 
objective of the research Crotty (1998). Section 3.3 further explores how 
Pragmatism combines the three elements, ontology, epistemology and 
methodology. 
 
3.3 Pragmatism 
It is difficult to envisage a strategy or research design without consideration of 
ontology, epistemology and methodology as briefly described above. In addition 
the research question underpins the thought processes around those three 
areas.  Research is carried out and informed by considering the background of 
theory, methodology assumptions and choice of methods (Crotty, 1998). 
Methodology and methods choices are based mainly on the nature of the 
research question. However methodological choices need to be justified; based 
on a set of assumptions about the philosophical position of the researcher; the 
subject question and integrated into the research design (Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Saunders et al, 2007). With reference to this thesis that question is:   
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“What are the Factors that Influence the Effectiveness of Anti-Money 
Laundering Policy Implementation in the UK”? 
 
This author adopts realist ontology and the philosophy of “Pragmatism” as the 
epistemological position for this research. There is a benefit to the role and place 
for realistic pragmatism in mixed method research (Lipscomb, 2011). The term 
“ontology” is the study of “being” denoting both the study of “what is” and “what 
exists” and the study of “what it is to be, or exist” (Crotty, 1998; Lawson, 2004). 
The combination of knowing “what is” (ontology) and “what it means to know” 
(epistemology) sit within the research framework to drive the methodology and 
methods strategy (Crotty, 1998).  
 
There are many ontologies and epistemology perspectives however realist 
ontology accepts that a reality does exist and that this is independent of any 
cognitive process (Crotty, 1998).  This research will benefit from realist ontology 
as the researcher accepts the existence of the situation that created the research 
question. For example that AML policy was created as a result of human 
interaction, that through observation and interaction the stakeholders construct 
the situation that allows them to manage their role within that framework. As 
Crotty suggests: “social reality is regarded as the product of processes by which 
social actors together negotiate the meanings for actions and situations” (Crotty, 
1998:96). With this in mind the importance of a compatible epistemology to frame 
the research is necessary.    
 
As an epistemology, pragmatism offers the capability of practical application and 
the utilisation of methods that can work effectively to produce the required results 
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(Crotty, 1998). Table 3.1 provides a summary of the elements of the Pragmatist 
Philosophical Paradigm:  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of the Pragmatist Philosophical Paradigm 
 
 Paradigm Pragmatist 
Methods Mixed methods - Quantitative + Qualitative 
Logic Deductive + Inductive 
Epistemology Both objective and subjective points of view. 
Axiology Values play a large role in interpreting results. 
Ontology Accept external reality. Choose explanations that best 
produce desired outcomes. 
Causal 
Linkages 
There may be causal relationships but cannot be pinned 
down. 
 
(Source: Adapted from Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998:23) 
 
Pragmatism is acknowledged as an American philosophy founded by Charles 
Sanders Pierce and William James with further transformation by John Dewey. 
Although there are many streams of the pragmatist philosophy they also have 
many common characteristics. Pragmatist’s emphasis the practical nature of 
knowledge, as an instrument for getting things done; “the issue of what works 
most effectively” (Crotty, 1998:72). How we deal with a problem is determined by 
the practical application of our thoughts. Thoughts guide action and the results 
are tested by the practical consequences of our beliefs. (Crotty, 1998; Saunders 
et al, 2007) Many of the terms used within the pragmatist’s philosophy in 
describing the practical application are relevant to this research. Terms such as 
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experience, reflection and verification will become evident as the research 
progresses. The application of methods for this research as suggested above 
needs to be practical and effective. From a pragmatist viewpoint using ideas as 
instruments and using the methodological principle that analysis in certain 
contexts need certain kinds of action draws the research to the use of a mixed 
method design.   
 
Pragmatism was not the first choice as a philosophical position for this research 
and much thought had gone into the use of positivist position. The researcher has 
come from a policing background. As a Detective within Economic Crime Bureau 
much of the process of investigations had to go through a sequence of activities. 
Each segment of an investigation had its own box and each was put together like 
“building blocks” to build a case. Positivists conduct research in a scientific 
manner and maintain the objective of explaining the problem in a logical manner. 
In some respects the author was drawing from his own experience to answer the 
research question but by doing so was also restricting the methods that could be 
used in the research design.  
 
Pragmatism offered a flexible approach that uses the strengths of discipline within 
the quantitative and qualitative techniques that will give greater validity to the 
results (Greene, 2008). The research now has a logical, sequential, organised, 
process with outcomes determined through a sound philosophical underpinning 
using natural (qualitative) and scientific (quantitative) methods to build and 
produce reliable results (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002; Saunders et al, 2007). 
Section 3.4 will discuss the research strategy and the use of mixed methods 
design for this research.  
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3.4 Research Strategy 
The strategy is designed to provide the research with a complete picture of 
activities that roll out in a sequential manner to achieve the objective of the 
research question. “What are the Factors that Influence the Effectiveness of Anti-
Money Laundering Policy Implementation in the UK: Exploring Money Laundering 
Crime and Policy”?  
 
As the research question suggests, this research is exploratory. Pragmatism 
compliments the use of mixed methods design and the strength of mixed methods 
this author sees as the best method of “design quality” to achieve the expected 
outcome for this research (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008). 
 
The following aims identified in chapter 2 would assist the researcher towards 
finding the appropriate solution to this question. These are provided in Table 3.2.   
 
Table 3.2 Aims of this research 
1. To identify and draw from literature in the AML arena evidence of themes 
that are component activities that could be used as a starting point for this 
research. 
2. To establish a research strategy that can develop the themes identified 
and follow a logical sequence of activities to a position where the results 
will produce an answer to the research question. 
3. To use methods in the gathering and analysis of data that will complement 
the research strategy, that is reliable and valid in respect of the 
researcher’s philosophical position and can be replicated for future 
research.  
4. To ensure the research is compliant with all aspect of ethical 
considerations and that the research is ethically and morally sound.  
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In order to fulfill the aims of this research an exploratory sequential research 
design is appropriate. The key dimensions of the research are therefore set out 
in four phases. Each phase in the research strategy builds on the dataset of the 
previous phase. 
 
Phase 1 Theme Development 
Deals with establishing themes from literature as a starting point for this research. 
Phase 2 Focus Groups 
Deals with the collection and analysis of data from Focus Group Interviews.  
Phase 3 Questionnaires 
Deals with the collection and analysis of data from Survey Questionnaire.  
Phase 4 Component Verification 
Deals with the verification of the results of Phase 3 through a “verification group”.  
 
By following this strategy and the utilisation of mixed methods the approach 
considers a solution that is practical, actionable and verifiable. It is also expected 
that through the use of multiple methods the reliability of the data will be improved 
(Cresswell, 2003; Greene, 2005). Figure 3.3 outlines the strategy for this 
research.  
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Figure 3.3 Research Strategy for this Research 
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that can achieve various aims, including corroborate findings, generating more 
complete data, and using results from one method to enhance insights attained 
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therefore compliment the sequential nature of this research by applying practical 
applied research, integrating different perspectives to help interpret the data. The 
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foundation for subsequent quantitative research. This will be achieved through 
questionnaire development, questionnaire distribution and determination of the 
statistical associations from the analysis of that data (Greene, 2005). This will be 
followed by a fourth phase to verify the results of the quantitative analysis.  
 
The author acknowledges his contribution to the research methods chosen and 
accepts sometimes change is necessary within those chosen methods to achieve 
the required results. The research strategy initially consisted of one to one 
interviews of individuals from five groups: law enforcement, accountants, 
prosecutors, MLROs and criminal offenders followed up with a questionnaire to 
a sample population from the same agencies. As discussed in section 3.7 Ethical 
Considerations; the interview of offenders and the questionnaire distribution in 
prison establishments created ethical and logistical difficulties. The strategy was 
reviewed and changed to conduct focus group interviews with all groups including 
ex-offenders and follow up questionnaires would be distributed to all groups 
except the offenders group. The ex-offenders group would however be included 
in the verification of components process at phase 4 of the strategy. 
 
From a pragmatist perspective the author is part of the research process. His 
knowledge in the subject area can provide access to participants and 
understanding of the terminology used during interviews. The contribution 
extends to the practical investigative background that employs practical applied 
research techniques (Saunders et al, 2007).  
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3.5 Mixed methods 
Mixed methods, in which quantitative and qualitative methods are combined, are 
valuable, because they can capitalise on the respective strengths of each 
approach (Curry, Nembhard and Bradley, 2009). This is confirmed by Cresswell 
(2009) who suggests that qualitative and quantitative components may be 
performed concurrently or sequentially, and emphasis may be placed on either 
component or equal weight given to both.  
 
A number of authors who have written about research methods and used mixed 
method design include: Teddlie and Yu (2007), Tashakkori and Teddlie (2009), 
Cresswell and Clark (2011). Dawson et al (2002) who provide a broad discussion 
of the subject. Mixed methods are used when the single method of quantitative 
approach or qualitative approach is inadequate. As previously suggested a 
quantitative approach may follow an objective positivist perspective, however this 
method would not be able to gain the multiple perspectives and understandings 
from respective participants in a focus group. Likewise a qualitative approach 
may follow a subjective interpretivist approach but have difficulty applying 
statistical analysis to the research problem. Therefore this research would benefit 
from the combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to 
develop a complete picture of the research problem (Bryman, 2006). It is 
important to demonstrate that mixed methods is appropriate for this research 
design by determining the strengths and limitations of mixed methods in each 
phase of this research. Phase 2 focus group interviews, and phase 3 
questionnaire development and distribution, apply both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques in their design and analysis. A short summary 
demonstrating the strengths and limitations to deploying a mixed method design 
111 
 
for both phase 2 and 3 is provided below. 
 
Phase 2 - focus group interviews involves the interview process and subsequent 
text analysis. The strength of the method is the interaction of participants in each 
group, the ideas and opinions that the method produces and the emerging results 
from the text data analysis (Hair; 2003). For phase 3 survey questionnaire and 
statistical analysis the validation of themes from the interviews is necessary. The 
limitations of the method refer to the small number of participants and the 
interpretation of data being dependent on the researcher. However in this 
research the number of focus groups involved provided a mix of ideas from five 
different agencies and the number of participants within each group were within 
the range (4-6) recommended by Fowler (2009). 
 
Phase 3 Questionnaires follow phase 2 with the development of the questionnaire 
and the use of statistical analysis to identify the underlying factors. The strength 
of this method refers to the conduct of the research that if it is carried out correctly, 
the result will be a precise illustration of the research problem. The quantitative 
element within mixed methods research is based on a deductive approach that 
emphasises the principles of scientific reasoning, moving from theory to data and 
the need to explain causal relationships between variables through quantitative 
data collection methods. A large sample size is required to generalise 
conclusions and apply controls to ensure the validity of data.  
 
A mixed method approach in which data collection involves both text information 
as well as numeric information, captures the best of both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches (Cresswell, 2003). For this research mixed methods 
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helped answer the research question by integrating data from relevant literature, 
expert stakeholders in focus group interviews, survey’s and participant 
verification of the results. By mixing both qualitative and quantitative data the 
breadth of data and depth of understanding of the subject and corroboration is 
increased. This provides a more robust method than the use of either approach 
on its own. Table 3.3 provides a reminder of the mixed methods employed in this 
research.  
 
Table 3.3 Triangulation of Methods in this Research 
Phase 1  Qualitative Method  Identification of Themes 
Phase 2 Qualitative Method  Focus Groups to validate themes 
Phase 3 Quantitative Method  Survey Questionnaire 
Phase 4 Qualitative Method    Focus Group participants to confirm 
interpretation of results 
 
 
In evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in mixed method research the strengths of both methods 
encapsulate the objective of the research to produce a reliable replicable method 
of research to answer the research question. The limitations previously discussed 
relating to the elements of mixed methods design have been mitigated by the 
actions taken in the steps of the research process by the methodical approach to 
data collection, analysis, record keeping and ethical considerations. The nature 
of the research question required a mixed method designed of data collection 
and analysis that would produce reliable, trustworthy and dependable results.  
 
Reliability and validity in mixed method research is the extent to which the 
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research study, process and findings, can relate to a quality research that is 
defensible to the research community (Onwiugbuzie and Johnston, 2006). Each 
phase of the research acknowledges the importance of validity and reliability and 
can defend those elements through the processes of investigation and analysis.  
 
3.6 Reliability and Validity 
The research starting point from introducing the literature to the study was the 
identification of themes relevant to the AML process. The conduct of focus group 
interviews and the collection and analysis of data is reliant on the credibility, skill 
and competence of the researcher and the ability to draw correct inferences from 
the data (Cresswell, 2003, Onwiugbuzie, 2006).  
 
Credibility, transferability and dependability in this research came from: the 
processes of the adoption of themes from the literature review that surrounded 
the money laundering environment and not influenced from the authors own 
knowledge. The method of presentation of themes to the focus groups through 
question prompts; the collection of data from the focus group interviews with a 
digital recorder; methodical analysis of the data by reading, re-reading, reducing, 
cross checking and finally re-analysing through the software programme 
NVIVO9. The threat of bias was reduced by applying open-ended questions 
which allowed free flow of discussion without influence from the researcher. The 
participants were experienced and knowledgeable within their own areas of law 
enforcement financial investigators, accountants, prosecutors, MLRO’s and ex-
offenders and would provide a richness of data. The participants attended 
voluntarily and were advised of the confidentiality and anonymity of the process. 
They could also leave the process at any time. As a result of the above criteria in 
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this respect contamination was not an issue.  
 
The quantitative methods in phase 3 involved questionnaires and statistical 
analysis.  Validity therefore as previously suggested emphasised the instrument 
of measurement (the questionnaire) and the interpretation of that data (statistical 
analysis) measuring what it is supposed to measure (Saunders et al, 2009).  
Survey questionnaires were designed using data, validated from the qualitative 
method of focus group interviews and text analysis. The data was further 
validated by focusing on questionnaires from previous academic study in the AML 
area and testing the questionnaire through consultation with experienced 
members of the target group (Hair et al, 2003). These are valid questions 
because they have come from other studies and have already been published. 
Table 3.7 in section 3.8.1 provide examples when themes were drawn from 
published work. Table 3.19 in section 3.8.3.2 provides an example of how 
published academic questions have been utilised in this research. 
 
In terms of construct validity which refers to the items within the questionnaire 
measuring hypothetical constructs or concepts (Creswell, 2009), in this research 
were identified through a valid and robust analysis process in the qualitative 
phase of this research. The pilot study for the questionnaire validated the survey 
instrument after pre-testing by 14 participants. As Cresswell (2009) suggests 
construct validity also includes the result of the scores serving a useful purpose 
or having positive consequences when used. 
 
 The object of this research was to establish to what extent the factors that 
influence the effectiveness of AML policy in the UK could be determined. The 
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results would provide a strong underpinning that identifies what is important and 
can make a difference for policy makers and regulatory agencies in the AML 
arena, as well as other contributions to research as previously discussed in this 
chapter.  
 
The statistical analysis method used in this research presented a number of 
testing methods to determine the validity of the data collected from the 
questionnaire.  “Quantitative research uses quantitative methods of assessing 
the construct validity of instruments” (Onwiugbuzie and Johnston, 2006). A 
Chronbach Alpha tests the internal consistency that each of the items measures 
the same latent variable reliably. This is further discussed in the analysis chapter, 
section 4.4.6.   
 
Reliability in research refers to the extent a research can be replicated and 
produce similar results (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). According to Golafshani, 
(2003) the term reliability is generally used to test or evaluate quantitative 
research, however should be used in all research. This pragmatic research 
employs both qualitative and quantitative methods at particular points and as 
such requires reliability to produce good quality research. The quality concept in 
qualitative study has the purpose of generating understanding whereas reliability 
is used to evaluate quality in quantitative research with the purpose of explaining 
(Patton, 2001).  
 
In this mixed method research design the consistency of the research is achieved 
when the steps of the research are verified. On the qualitative phase this is 
carried out through analysis of the items of raw data, the data reduction reports 
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and process notes as in the case with the focus group interview transcript 
analysis (Campbell, 1996). On the quantitative phase this was carried out through 
testing and re-testing the questionnaire through pilot and data instrument of 
measures for consistency through statistical analysis.  
 
Finally, to conclude the interpretation and validation of the results from the 
quantitative analysis a further phase of qualitative analysis took place. This 
triangulation of methods identified aspects more accurately than one single 
method and provided corroboration of themes from literature through focus 
groups interviews, surveys, and statistical analysis and in the final analysis using 
individuals to verify the components. The triangulation of methods the author 
feels contributed significantly to the research and is fully discussed at section 
3.8.3.12. As Morgan (1988) contends;  
 
“To often the tendency is to throw every possible variable into the 
analysis, then retreat too our armchairs and speculate about what 
created the results, asking the participants is a better strategy“  
 
 
(Morgan, 1988:35).  
 
Equally important in interaction with participants is the ethical conduct of the 
research to ensure participants are not harmed or exploited (Liamputtong, 2011).  
Section 3.7 discusses the ethical considerations in this research. 
 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations form an important part of any research. Northumbria 
University Code of Ethics Policy has been followed throughout all stages of this 
research and approval sought. (Copy of approval letter provided at Appendix 3.1). 
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Amended Ethical approval forms have been completed and approved at each 
change in the research process as appropriate. The seven key ethical issues as 
discussed by Yates (2004) in terms of access, gatekeepers, informed consent, 
deception, right to privacy, right to withdraw and self-presentation have also been 
considered. Due to the participation of ex-offenders in this research and the 
potential problems that entailed, two interviews of the author have been 
conducted as part of the Ethics Committee annual audits.   
 
Ethics considerations in this research began at an early stage of the construction 
of the research strategy. Part of the initial strategy consisted of interviewing 
stakeholders in the AML environment that could significantly influence the AML 
process. One of those groups (the subject of this section) was offenders, who 
were at that time, incarcerated in prison establishments.  
 
The research method was to interview a selected number of offenders who were 
incarcerated for acquisitive crime; for example crime that produced a monetary 
benefit such as selling drugs. Individuals had been identified to participate in the 
interviews and contact was made with prison establishments to provide the 
necessary consent. The ethical questions that arose from this process (such as 
questions that might extract an incriminating response) and the logistics of 
conducting the interviews safely, suggested a review was necessary. Focus 
group interviews of all the groups was chosen as an alternative method that would 
provide similar data to that expected in the first strategy, however some ethical 
considerations still remained.   
 
Special consideration was given to two areas that involved former criminals 
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participating in the research. The first was in relation to the focus group interviews 
in phase 2 of the research and the second in relation to distribution of 
questionnaires to a similar population in phase 3 of the research.  
 
Dealing with the first issue involved an introduction through a third party to a 
former prisoner who was now working within a government community scheme. 
He would eventually be one of the participants in this ex-offender group. A 
meeting was arranged with him to discuss the research and the objectives of the 
focus group interviews. A suitable venue was offered at a local community centre 
and a list of the other participants who would be in attendance was made 
available. The author was aware of the background of the participants of this 
group (they were well known to him from his previous policing background) 
however, this was not a deterrent to completing the interviews.  An introductory 
email was forwarded to each of the participants along with an Informed consent 
form that introduced the research and purpose of the research. The form also 
detailed the ethical parameters that guided the research as part of the 
Northumbria University Ethics considerations and the anonymity and 
confidentiality aspects of research participation in general (Copy of informed 
consent form attached at Appendix 3.2).  
 
The second area for consideration related to the distribution of questionnaires to 
offenders within a prison environment. A number of options for distribution to this 
group were considered. Questionnaires were distributed in hard copy through 
one point of contact within the prison administration office or the questionnaires 
would be completed on line either via the survey monkey41 link or via email. After 
                                            
41 Survey monkey is an online survey site that provides templates for survey design and implementation. Data recorded 
by the survey monkey site can further be exported into programs such as SAS or SPSS for statistical analysis. 
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discussion with the prison authorities it was suggested providing hard copy 
questionnaires to the prisoners was the most appropriate method to get 
responses. The on-line method would create too many complications with 
prisoner access to internet and potential for abuse.  
 
Through the administrative contact a questionnaire was sent to the prison 
administrative office. They would distribute the questionnaire to 30 individuals 
and collect the questionnaires via the same process. The questionnaires would 
be forwarded from the same contact. Organisational consent would be obtained 
along with consent of the participants. The latter would be provided by completing 
a consent question on the questionnaire itself. There would be no necessity for 
any contact whatsoever between the researcher and the participants. The 
questions were not in a format that allowed participants to display answers that 
might incriminate themselves or divulge any information not relevant to the 
research.   
 
After a four week wait no responses were forthcoming. Discussions with the 
administrator indicated the mistrust of offenders completing questionnaires in 
prison. Although this was a disappointing response that ex-offenders would not 
be represented in the questionnaire it did not detract from the final responses 
received from other groups. The total responses were 272. Furthermore the 
results of the analysis of the questionnaire would be presented to one of the 
original participants of that group for verification and comment.  
 
All hard copy data collected for analysis is retained in secure cabinets and data 
held in databases that are password protected. At the conclusion of the research 
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the material held in various devices will be disposed of as instructed in the 
University Data management policy.   
  
3.8 Methods 
This research required a practical data collection process that flowed from each 
phase of the exploratory sequential design. Figure 3.4 provides a visual 
description of the research design and the methods used in each phase of the 
research. This is followed by a discussion of the processes at each stage. Prior 
to the detailed discussions on each of the four phases, it was proper to briefly 
review the sampling strategy for each phase. Each of the approaches used will 
be further discussed at each phase. Table 3.4 summarises the sampling 
procedures for each of the primary data phases.  
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Figure 3.4: A visual representation of the Methods at each Phase 
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transcripts 
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Sample from 
each focus 
group 
Comments 
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Table 3.4 Summary of sampling procedures for primary data  
Four phase sequential 
research 
Sampling 
procedures/methods  
Authors and Groups   
Phase 1 - Theme 
Identification 
Informal Thematic Analysis  
Six research models 
estimating money 
laundering and 
effectiveness in AML. FATF 
recommendations in AML 
prevention, detection and 
enforcement. Purposively 
selected giving a 
geographical spread and a 
wide spectrum in relation to 
AML processes. Dated 
between 1991 and 2011.  
Walker (1999) (1999a) 
(2005) 
Van Duyne (2008) 
Fleming (2005) 
Pietschman &Walker 
(2011) 
Ferwerda (2008) 
Unger (2007) 
FATF (1991) (2003) 
Phase 2 – Focus Groups  Invite to four stakeholder 
groups in AML environment 
responsible for prevention, 
detection and enforcement 
of AML. An additional group 
of ex-offenders also invited 
to participate. Purposive 
sampling of those with 
experience, knowledge in 
AML area. Communication 
by phone and email. 
Detailed explanation in 
section 3.8.2.  
Law Enforcement group 
Investigators of financial 
crime 
 
Forensic accountants who 
investigate financial crimes. 
 
Prosecutors 
 
MLROs from banks 
 
Ex-offenders 
Phase 3 - Questionnaires  Purposive sampling with 
participants from four 
groups of organisations law 
enforcement, accountants, 
prosecutors and MLROs. 
The four groups are from a 
wider population of those 
selected for focus groups in 
phase 2 as their roles were 
within the selected criteria 
of AML. Detailed 
explanation in section 
3.8.3. 
Same groups as phase 2 
selected through the use of 
working groups and 
associations in the UK of 
which the author was a 
member. 
Link to survey monkey 
allowed participation in 
questionnaire and 
maintained anonymity and 
confidentiality for 
respondents. 
 
Phase 4 – Component 
Verification 
A selection of individuals 
(one from each group that 
participated in the focus 
groups interviews) 
purposive sampled. Their 
task was to answer three 
questions relating to the 
results of phase 3 
questionnaire analysis.  For 
validation of those results. 
Detailed explanation in 
section 3.8.4. 
One member from each of 
the original focus groups.  
 
Selected by email and 
phone to participate.  
 
No prior selection, simply 
who was available from 
each group at the time.  
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Phase 1 was the starting point for this research. The objective of phase 1 was to 
identify theme categories. Theme is defined in Collins English dictionary as “an 
idea or topic expanded in a discourse…discussion.” (www.collinsdictionary.com). 
In the context of this research themes are significant activities within the AML 
framework that describe how money laundering is prevented, detected and 
enforced. Once identified, themes are presented through focus group interviews 
to key stakeholders to discuss the significance of each theme and validate their 
inclusion in this research. There are a number of considerations in the choice of 
method for theme identification: firstly, the methods used to select appropriate 
themes need to follow a robust process; secondly, the data needs to be analysed 
thoroughly and interpreted in light of what is known about the issues being 
explored. The process applied if replicated should attain the same results (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006).  At the conclusion of this phase the themes identified need to 
provide an accurate understanding of the bigger picture. 
 
There are many methods of document and text analysis, some of which were 
considered for this part of the study. These are presented in Table 3.5. However, 
were found unsuitable due to the many differences in selection of data. Some 
methods such as grounded theory are designed to select data to develop theory; 
others are methodological processes as opposed to a method and did not fit with 
the theoretical perspective of the researcher and the research being conducted. 
The reasons for this relate to the pragmatic perspective of this research and the 
flexibility required to select data through a combination of objective and subjective 
processes.  
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Table 3.5 Qualitative approaches to Analysis42 
Author Approaches 
 
Merriam (1998) 
Ethnographic Analysis 
Narrative Analysis 
Phenomenological Analysis 
Constant Comparative Analysis 
 
Bernard (2000) 
Hermeneutic/Interpretative Analysis 
Narrative/Performance Analysis 
Discourse Analysis 
Grounded Theory Analysis 
Content Analysis 
Cross Cultural Analysis 
 
The method chosen for this phase ‘theme identification’ follows an informal 
method of ‘thematic analysis’ that uses the researchers judgement, as a key tool 
in determining crucial themes, but also the stability of a formal process of theme 
analysis.  
  
The meaning of theme follows Ryan and Bernard (2003) inventory of meaning 
from 1932 to the present era. (Ryan and Bernard, 2003:86-87)  They suggest that 
Opler (1945) provided the first definition of theme:  
 
“In every culture are found a limited number of dynamic affirmations, 
called themes, which control behaviour or stimulate activity. The 
activities, prohibitions of activities, or references which result from 
the acceptance of a theme are its expressions…The expressions of 
a theme, of course aid us in discovering it”  
 
 
 (Opler, 1945:198-199). 
 
Opler describes three principles of thematic analysis. The first suggestion is that 
themes are discoverable because they are visible as expressions in data and 
                                            
42 For more detail on each of these approaches to analysis see: Merriam (1998) and Bernard (2000). 
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expressions mean nothing without a reference to themes. The second principle 
suggests some expressions of a theme are more agreeable than others and 
stand out whilst others are less visual. The third principle suggests themes are 
culturally, related or intertwined. Each of these principles can be applied through 
the following measures:  
 
“The importance of any theme is related to…how often it 
appears…how pervasive it is across different types of cultural ideas 
and practices… how people react when the theme is violated and the 
degree to which the number, force, and variety of a theme’s expression 
is controlled by specific contexts”  
 
 
(Ryan and Bernard, 2003:87).   
   
It is with the above principles in mind that the search for themes in literature 
began. The key criteria for selection that informed the literature search came from 
the research question “What are factors that influence the effectiveness of AML 
policy implementation in the UK”. Although the research in AML is pertinent to the 
UK system the search for literature extended beyond the UK, as the subject 
matter has a global consequence and global interpretation. The criteria for 
selection therefore relates to all processes within the AML environment around 
prevention, detection and enforcement. 
  
3.8.1 Phase 1 Theme Identification 
This author conducted a narrative literature review provided with the assistance 
of internet, Northumbria University library and Queens University library for 
related books, journals, manuals and articles on money laundering, anti-money 
laundering, AML policy, organised crime and terrorism. The author’s supervisors 
also provided assistance in supplying and directing sources for this study. The 
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aim was to draw from established literature around money laundering and money 
laundering policy, relevant themes that could provide the theme categories for 
this research.  
 
There is a wide range of literature that relates generally to crime and financial 
crime, however data in the field of AML is limited (Masciandaro, 2004; Verhage, 
2011). The author needed to find material that concentrated on AML processes, 
that was specific and could be used to feed directly into, and drive the focus group 
phase of this research. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Section 2.2 researching 
the history of money laundering provided a map of events with specific points of 
reference. Those reference points provided a beginnings to the search for 
documents relevant to the AML environment, which through analysis would 
accurately describe the themes required.  
 
As suggested above, three main areas in the AML literature were identified that 
would assist this research.  
a) FATF recommendations: These recommendations represent the consensus of 
49 member countries and their evaluation of preventative measures to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing.  
b) The scale and measurement of money laundering: These are estimates of the 
cost of money laundering in terms of crime data and crime prevention.  
c) Cost of the effectiveness of AML: This represents research on the 
effectiveness of AML policy and includes regulatory impact on reporting 
institutions. 
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Themes were determined from all of these areas to ensure a full representation 
of key aspects of AML environment.  
 
The first event deemed significant was the creation of FATF in 1989. Documented 
in 1991 were the FATF recommendations for combating money laundering and 
later extended in 2003 to include terrorist financing. Those recommendations 
were deemed important because they were the first real assessment of AML 
processes and requirements for governments to put in place AML measures. A 
flow of activity followed the FATF recommendations and a number of related 
Directives came from the European Union to fellow member states. Merging the 
measures within the Directives into existing legislation would apply reassurance 
globally that all countries were playing their part to implement AML policies.  As 
documented in Chapter 2 each time FATF reviewed their recommendations or 
added further recommendations the EU would follow up with a new Directive.  
 
The FATF Recommendations are based on the discussions and consultations of 
representatives of 49 Countries. The remit of those representatives was to 
identify areas within the money laundering environment that required immediate 
action to prevent and detect money laundering activity on a local and global level 
(FATF Report, 2003).  
 
The literature review in chapter 2 discusses the extent of the FATF influence in 
the AML/CTF arena, however a short explanation of each theme identified from 
the FATF recommendations is presented here: 
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1. Legal systems 
Legal systems refer to the extent that all countries should apply a Money 
laundering offence to all categories of crime and not only serious offences. In 
addition a wide list of predicate offences should be included in their Legislation.  
 
2. Restraint and Confiscation 
Restraint and Confiscation refers to the extent that Countries should adopt 
measures to prevent the dissipation of assets by criminals and third parties. 
Measures should be implemented to seize, freeze and confiscating property and 
cash that has been derived from money laundering offences. 
 
3. Money Laundering Prevention 
Money Laundering Prevention refers to the extent that Countries should ensure 
Financial Institutions conduct proper due diligence on all account holders and 
cash transactions within their institution. This extends to obtaining appropriate 
identification documentation and carrying out enquiries to ensure the account 
holder is who they say they are. Further instructions apply to dealing with 
politically exposed persons and Government officials. Reporting of suspicions of 
money laundering by all institutions is required and adequate administrative 
processes and policies are to be put in place to ensure all staff are aware of their 
responsibilities. 
 
4. Regulation and Supervision  
Regulation and supervision refers to the extent that all financial institutions should 
be regulated and supervised to ensure they are compliant with all FATF 
recommendations. At the same level all designated non-financial institutions such 
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as casinos or money exchange bureau’s should be effectively licenced, regulated 
and monitored to they are effective and compliant in anti-money laundering.  
 
5. Law Enforcement Powers 
Law Enforcement powers refer to the extent that Countries should set up 
Financial Investigation Units (FIU) in order that timely analysis and dissemination 
of reports from financial institutions and other regulatory bodies are carried out. 
That specialist financial investigation officer should be trained to conduct money 
laundering investigations and have access to all information or make application 
to receive information from financial institutions.  
 
6. International Co-operation 
International co-operation refers to the extent that all Countries should act 
expeditiously and co-operate fully, with flexibility, on all matters of mutual legal 
assistance, requests for information and extradition with other Countries. Co-
operation extends to requests for bank documents, seizing and freezing of assets 
and may include asset sharing between jurisdictions.   
 
The six themes identified from the FATF recommendations provided a key 
starting point for this research, however as previously indicated, each phase of 
this research informs the next phase. The importance of phase 1 in deriving the 
correct themes for phase 2 is paramount. In order to ensure nothing was missed 
a further analysis of literature that reviewed the measurement and effectiveness 
of money laundering was undertaken.  
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The second area deemed relevant to this study followed a review of literature 
were authors attempted to measure the scale of money laundering. This was an 
area the author had previously examined, as his first preliminary look at money 
laundering literature was in order to estimate the cost of money laundering in the 
UK. In terms of measurement the work of Walker (1999, (2005) in particular is 
substantial and has been followed by a number of the more recent authors 
containing similar reference material. 
 
The third area viewed related to research that measured the cost of the 
effectiveness of AML policy.  Policy includes regulation for reporting entities. The 
methods chosen to evaluate this area included the use of traditional and modern 
methods. Traditional methods looked at output indicators that measured the 
obligations and controls introduced by AML regulation. Modern methods of 
sophisticated analysis used economic studies, prompted by banks and the 
regulation imposed on them and comparing costs and benefits of the different 
legislative options.   
 
The rationale behind viewing all of this literature: FATF recommendation; scale 
of money laundering and cost of AML effectiveness would ensure that a broad 
perspective of money laundering concepts were considered. Whilst it is accepted 
that it is the author’s choice of variables from this literature it is not a random 
choice and is based on justification and objectivity. The literature chosen is 
comprehensive and relevant to the research. In addition the method of analysis 
will compare choices from each area. By identifying and validating those variables 
through analysis those themes could feed directly into the focus group interviews. 
As Pole and Lampard (2007) suggest: 
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  “Existing data may be used in a variety of ways during the early stages 
of a research project; they may provide a starting point or a 
benchmark, or they may alternatively contribute to aspects of the 
research…”  
 
(Pole & Lampard, 2007:8) 
  
Table 3.6 presents the areas of research literature used to identify themes that 
present the AML process from 1999 to 2012. These include the FATF AML policy 
recommendations, Literature that identified criteria for the measurement of the 
scale of money laundering and literature that concentrated on AML policy 
effectiveness. Not all of the literature available is included. In terms of selection 
and sampling the number of data sources are relevant. Braun and Clarke (2006) 
suggest the samples used can be small or large as long as reviewing additional 
data would not lead to the identification of additional themes. This is 
acknowledged as one of the disadvantages of this method as what is unknown 
or not seen cannot be validated. (Bernard, 2000; Braun and Clarke, 2006). The 
response to this issue is to ensure that the analysis selects thoroughly and 
robustly what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the research (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). It is expected that to have analysed a larger number of research 
literature in the three areas would not have produced any more meaningful and 
useful themes.  
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Table 3.6 Sample choice of literature for theme selection 
Author Literature choice for 
identification of themes 
Methods 
Walker J (1999; 
1999a; 2005) 
Scale of money 
laundering 
“Measurement of money 
laundering” To identify methods 
and trends in money laundering 
in and through Australia since 
1995 
Survey questionnaires 
Van Duyne P (2008) 
Scale of money 
laundering 
“In search of crime-money 
management in Serbia” 
Interviews with groups 
from Public and Private 
agencies and statistical 
analysis from 
government records 
data 
Fleming M. H (2005) 
AML policy 
“UK Law Enforcement Agency 
Use and Management of 
Suspicious Activity Reports: 
Towards Determining the Value 
of the Regime” 
Interviews, 
questionnaires and 
document analyses. 
Statistical analysis of 
Government records 
Ferwerda J (2008) 
AML policy 
“The Economics of Crime and 
Money laundering, Does Anti-
money laundering Policy 
reduce crime”? 
Case studies 
Analysis of mutual 
evaluation reports on 
money laundering using 
quantitative statistical 
analysis 
Unger B (2007 
Scale of money 
laundering 
“The Scale and Impact of 
Money Laundering”  
Measuring money flows in 
Netherlands 
Quantitative techniques 
and statistical analysis 
of Walker model above 
FATF 
recommendations 
AML policy 
FATF 1990, 2004, 2009 40+9 recommendations 
to be incorporated into 
member country 
legislation and 
regulation 
 
The process of identifying themes as suggested above was based on a loose, 
informal thematic analysis system. The emphasis was on the reading of literature 
and pinpointing characteristics in those areas that previous researchers (Walker, 
1999; Van Duyne, 2008; Fleming, 2005) and others, had looked to include as 
measurement variables in their research. “In the informal mode, investigators 
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simply read the text and note words or synonyms that people use a lot” (Ryan 
and Bernard, 1998:98).  
 
The focus of the analysis was not on the unit of text as in content analysis, when 
counting specific words or occurrences takes place, but a wider context of what 
area would derive the answers to the research question. In this research each 
specific area used was important. For example Walker (1999) determined “crime 
types” as an important variable: Crime types brings into question ‘predicate 
offences’ and ‘stand-alone money laundering offence’. What this research was 
looking for was dominant features that have wider implications. The analysis of 
the literature focused on characteristics in AML that were repetitive; and that all 
themes being equally valid for the focus group interviews in phase 2. “Whatever 
style of documentary analysis a researcher adopts, there is a common need to 
document the link between the research findings and the documents from which 
they have been derived, and more generally for the researcher to validate their 
conclusions” (Pole and Lampard, 2007:165). 
 
Table 3.6 above lists the most prominent research in the area of money 
laundering measurement; however as previously suggested the work of Walker 
(1999) received most attention from academics as he was the first to attempt an 
estimate of the global cost of money laundering. Research carried out by Walker 
related to measurement of the effectiveness and cost of money laundering and 
his attempt to make estimations based on variables around AML process. By 
analysing his work and drawing from his estimation method it was possible to 
identify particular areas he used as measurement variables.  By coding that 
information it was possible to compare and contrast those elements with other 
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research that attempted to estimate money laundering. Drawing comparisons of 
the variables applied by academics in this area provided reliability that the correct 
variables had been chosen for this research.  
 
At this preliminary stage of the research it was important not to restrict the 
identification of themes by being too specific. The themes identified required to 
be from a wider concept within the AML framework to allow full discussion of the 
themes at stage 2. A detailed discussion of the literature relating to money 
laundering measurement has already been provided. Chapter 4 will provide the 
results of the analysis from phase 1 Theme development. A number of examples 
are provided in Table 3.7 to show the sequential system of analysis.  
  
Table 3.7 Examples of Theme Identification 
Author Theme Theme Theme Theme 
Walker (1999) 
Used a number of variables in his 
attempt to estimate the cost of 
money laundering 
 
SARs 
 
Crime 
Types 
 
 
Spend 
 
 
Van Duyne (2008) 
Research into Serbian crime money 
interviewed groups and individuals in 
relation to organised crime and 
money laundering 
 
 
SARs 
 
Crime 
Types 
 
 
Spend 
 
 
Fleming (2005) 
Research into the value of the SAR 
reporting regime interviewed groups 
of experts and individuals; carried 
out statistical analysis and document 
analysis 
 
SARs 
 
 
Crime 
Types 
 
 
 
Spend 
 
Asset 
Recovery 
 
Restraint & 
Confiscation 
 
FATF (1991) (2003) 
40+ 9 Recommendations from FATF 
on AML/CTF 
 
SARs 
 
 
Crime 
Types 
 
 
Spend 
 
 
Restraint & 
Confiscation 
 
 
The above examples show a number of themes that can be identified as recurrent 
throughout the analysis and therefore suitable for phase 2 focus group interviews. 
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The inclusion of asset recovery and restraint and confiscation in the Fleming 
(2005) and FATF recommendations literature is because both are loosely related 
to the terms ‘spend’ ‘crime types’ and ‘SARs’ so at this stage are suitable to stand 
alone as a theme for phase 2 focus groups (asset recovery is part of the restraint 
and confiscation process as such will be included under the term restraint and 
confiscation). Validation of each theme is provided through recurrence in the 
analysis of relevant literature that concentrates on money laundering 
measurement and AML Policy effectiveness.  Each theme could now be directed 
to phase 2 focus group interviews for confirmation. 
 
3.8.2 Phase 2 - Focus Groups  
 
The objective of phase 2 is to determine which themes identified in phase 1 
should form the constructs that would assist the development of a survey 
questionnaire. A number of questions arise from that statement. 
 
 What research method would achieve the objective of phase 2? 
 
 Who would have the knowledge to determine the choice of themes? 
 
 How do you access participants who would have information to assist the 
research? 
 
There are a number of methods that could be used, however only one that this 
researcher believes would achieve the objective. From a pragmatist perspective 
people’s knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, experiences and 
interactions are meaningful properties of the social reality which the research 
question is designed to explore. A legitimate way of generating data from these 
elements is to interact with people, talk to them and listen to their stories and 
experiences (Pole and Lampard, 2005). The method chosen to achieve this was 
136 
 
focus group interviews “Focus groups are useful when it comes to investigating 
what participants think, but they excel at uncovering why participants think as 
they do” (Morgan, 1998:25).  
 
The purpose of the focus group interviews is for knowledgeable participants who 
work in the AML arena to discuss their experiences relative to the themes 
provided; to provide acknowledgement through those experiences of the 
validation of the themes for this research. “The research question should focus 
on how participants describe and make sense of particular elements of their 
lives” (Cassell and Symon; 2004:14)  
 
Focus group interviews as a method to gather data is preferred in some cases 
and avoided in others, (Morgan 1988) so it is vitally important to justify the use of 
focus groups in this research to answer the research question “what are the 
factors that influence Anti-Money Laundering policy implementation in the UK” 
AML policy is unique to particular sectors of AML regime so it is important to 
explore those areas with individuals who have a closeness to the subject.  
 
One of the practical strengths of focus groups is the fact that they are 
comparatively easy to conduct when other methods such as individual interviews 
can be prohibitive. Individual interviews reaching the numbers of participants 
involved in focus group interviews would have been time consuming. Individual 
interviews would also have involved drawing up a full list of questions that could 
not have entered the full extent of the AML process without becoming 
cumbersome and in any event inflexible. 
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Procedurally focus groups have strengths in their ability to explore topics “focus 
groups can also provide fertile ground for eliciting anecdotal material and are 
therefore “seed beds” for germinating vignettes for use in questionnaires” 
(Kitzinger, 2005:59 quoted in Lliamputtong, 2011:90). In addition focus group 
interviews are at an advantage as they can produce valuable data with little direct 
influence from the researcher (Morgan 1988). The lack of control however can 
lead to less control over the data generated unless the direction of discussion can 
be restricted. Thus it is important to keep the discussions within the parameters 
of the research question and the object of the focus group. One way of doing this 
is by using a list of question prompts to keep the discussions on track. The 
research interview should not be based on a formal set of interview questions to 
be asked, word for word (Cresswell, 2007) and as such: 
 
“The interview should use an interview guide listing topics which the 
interviewer should attempt to cover in the course of the interview, and 
suggesting probes which may be used to follow up responses and elicit 
greater detail from participants”  
 
 
(Cassell and Symon, 2004:15).  
 
Preparation for the focus group interviews involved setting out a plan of action. 
Morgan (1998) sets out four basic steps which can be further broken down into 
particular decisions:  
 Planning 
 Recruiting  
 Moderating 
 Analysing  
 Reporting 
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The planning phase considered practical considerations such as: what groups 
should participate; number of participants; location; recording data; dates and 
times of sessions; questions and ethical considerations (Stewart, Shamdasani 
and Rook, 2007; Morgan, 1998). Each step will be covered during the discussions 
below.  
 
Recruiting participants for the focus group interviews took into account the aim of 
the research, its theoretical, epistemological and methodological position. The 
researcher’s ‘worldview’ (Cresswell, 2009) in terms of ‘set of basic beliefs to guide 
action’ (Guba, 1990) has been well documented in section 3.3. The author has 
influence in the research process. Questioning who should be recruited and why 
subjects the research to issues of reliability. However, from an epistemological 
perspective key experts hold the knowledge and experience of “what it means to 
know” through their observation and interaction in the subject area.  
 
Pragmatism offers the practical application of methods that work effectively to 
produce the required results. Flexibility is necessary and the recruitment of 
participants from five groups in differing dimensions of the AML process will 
provide the knowledge required for phase 3 of the research. As suggested by 
Morgan (1998) and Liamputtong (2011) focus groups rely on purposive sampling 
strategy to ensure the correct participants are chosen according to the aims of 
the research. “Purposive sampling method adds power to focus group research 
because it selects “information-rich cases” which can best generate the desired 
data” (Liamputtong, 2011:51) 
 
139 
 
The number of focus groups necessary for the research to obtain the saturation 
of information necessary was considered by following Kreuger (1994) and 
Morgan (1998) suggestions of using between three to five groups. The 
determination in deciding on how many groups were required extended to the 
underlying diversity in what people had to say, when the groups become 
repetitive then the stage of theoretical saturation has been reached (Morgan, 
1998; Liamputtong, 2011). However, this research required the voice of each of 
the diverse groups from different organisations, and in that respect the number 
of groups was predetermined as five groups. Morgan also draws attention to the 
practicalities of managing focus groups (delivering the required data; enough 
participants; appropriate samples; relevant questions; background of participants 
and ethical issues) whether small or large as the decision to the number of groups 
is based on the needs of the specific project (Morgan, 1998). Each group brings 
their own knowledge and opinions from their area of expertise.  
 
As each group is from a different area of the AML process (prevention, detection, 
enforcement and ex-offenders) it was necessary to ensure the objective of the 
focus group was always in sight and enough data was obtained to provide a 
reliable answer to the research question (Liamputtong, 2011). The goal of the 
focus groups was to validate existing themes extracted from the literature and 
through discussion identify further relevant themes; therefore the repetition of 
similar views across the groups emphasises their validity of the existing themes 
as important constructs for the questionnaire survey. Stopping the discussions 
after the second or third focus group interview because of repetition would not 
have given this research the answers it required and would have lost the rich 
source of data that underlined the responses in the discussions.  
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In addition to the number of groups, the number of participants is also important. 
The number of participants for each group according to Kreuger and Casey 
(2000) should be between six and ten participants. Smaller groups they suggest 
have greater potential to produce greater results as more opportunity exists for 
discussion by individuals. Smaller groups are preferable as they allow individual 
views to be heard and discussed. The five groups involved in this research 
contained an average of 4 to 5 participants per focus group. 
 
“Smaller groups provide more room for all participants to speak and to 
explore the discussed issues in greater detail and this often leads to 
more relevant and interesting data”  
 
(Liamputtong, 2011:42)  
 
The final consideration in this area was the group composition. It was quite 
apparent that the topic in this research was the draw that would get maximum 
interaction from participants. Each group’s composition required an interest in 
common that would create comfort within the group and enhance a more fluid 
discussion among participants. (Morgan, 1998; Liamputtong, 2011). Each group 
had the topic of interest within their background and experiences but each group 
had a different perspective from that environment and it was that perspective that 
was a valuable commodity for this research. 
 
“In focus groups, the topics are discussed in a “known context” 
because people who shared experiences are brought 
together…because of the shared experiences, focus groups, highlight 
the collective view rather than the individual view, although the 
individual experiences are also clear in the discussions”  
 
(Liamputtong, 2011:37) 
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For recruitment it was important in terms of sampling that the focus groups used 
were representative of the investigative issue. For example (main areas of anti-
money laundering population). The sample consisted of five groups from the 
target audience: law enforcement and prosecutors represented the enforcement 
population with accountants and banker’s representing the regulatory population. 
Ex-offenders were used from a crime perspective. Each group were chosen 
because they would provide a broad perspective of the AML process (Patton, 
2002).  
 
“The goal of focus groups is to gain insight and understanding by 
hearing from people in depth, and this requires selecting a purposive 
sample that will generate the most productive discussions in the focus 
groups”  
 
(Morgan, 1998:56).  
 
As will be discussed below a key individual from each group nominated the 
participants for their own group to attend the focus group interview. This was 
based on their familiarity, interest and knowledge of the subject.  
 
Adding the ex-offenders to the focus group interviews added a rich source of data 
that had not been accessed in this area relating to this subject. The original plan 
was to visit offenders in prison to interview them, however, the ethical 
considerations around this were difficult with concern from the ethics committee 
for the safety of the researcher and potential compromising of the participants 
when interviewed. The inclusion of offenders or ex-offenders was still an area 
worth pursuing and after visiting a University summer school in Turkey and as a 
result of presenting this research an opportunity arose for communicating with an 
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ex-offender in Belfast. A student also present at the summer school was in 
contact with an ex-offender who was researching a PhD in Belfast. Contact was 
made with this person and a meeting arranged when this research could be 
discussed. As a result of that meeting the focus group with a number of ex-
offenders took place. The inclusion of this group added an extra dimension to the 
research profile. AML is not just about the voice of those from Regulators and law 
enforcement and this inclusion provided insights that might never have been 
found. In one such example a discussion with this group extended to an area 
around one of the themes (shadow economy). Discussions related to crimes such 
as cigarette smuggling and tax evasion which were classed by this group as 
acceptable crimes. This suggestion of acceptable crime provided an added 
dimension to the underlying explanation of the shadow economy which may not 
have been drawn out in other studies. It also adds to the discussion around the 
theoretical underpinning of this research that crime is committed based on an 
individual’s weighing up of the costs of committing a crime and benefits obtained 
from crime. If a criminal does not believe a particular activity for example cigarette 
smuggling is criminal then his choice to commit that offence is obscured by his 
negative reaction to the crime. This position perplexes the rational choice position 
as he cannot weigh up the costs and benefits of the crime based on his belief that 
it is not a crime. Merging data such as this with data from other groups provides 
a unique insight into the thought processes of the different groups. 
 
Recruitment of participants for the focus groups was easier for this researcher 
than for previous researchers in this area. “Recruitment may be the least 
glamorous aspect of focus groups, but it is absolutely essential to their success” 
(Morgan, 1998: 85). As mentioned in other empirical studies in the Literature 
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Review in Chapter 2, Levi (1999), Levi and Reuter (2006), Van Duyne (2008), 
Unger (2009), Verhage (2010), suggest access to participants has proved 
problematic. Van Duyne (2007) noted difficulty trying to secure participant 
engagement in his research in Serbia with meetings being cancelled or 
participants just not turning up. Apart from the general difficulty of recruiting 
participants for focus groups in any research (Morgan, 1998; Liamputtong, 2011) 
much research in money laundering estimations, as discussed earlier, records 
similar problems, thus many of the methods used are statistical methods of data 
analysis based on figures provided by government agencies (Masciandaro, 2007; 
Schneider, 2010). The reason may be that access to participants for any other 
method of qualitative research prohibits that approach. However this research 
found the recruitment of experts from four of the focus group areas; law 
enforcement, accountants, prosecutors and MLROs was made easier due to his 
previous professional background, membership of relevant associations and 
networks (Kreuger, 1994; Morgan, 1997).  
 
Recruitment was made by phoning a contact within each group that was known 
to the author. To avoid bias in recruitment the author had no part in deciding who 
would participate in the interviews. A contact was sufficiently placed within each 
organisation to make decisions on: agreement to proceed with the interviews; 
where the interviews should take place and when and who should participate in 
the interviews within that organisation. The key individual would nominate 
participants who were knowledgeable on the subject, who would freely discuss 
their experiences and give opinions, and have at least 2 hours free on the date 
of the interviews. A letter outlining the research was followed up by an email. An 
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informed consent form was included in the email for each participant and was 
presented prior to the interviews commencing. 
 
In comparison to the recruitment of the four groups above setting up the ex-
offenders focus group was fraught with difficulties. The main difficulty related to 
ethics (as previously explained and further discussed in the ethics section 3.3). 
The concerns surrounded the safety of the researcher, the location of the meeting 
and the conduct of the focus group that would not compromise the position of the 
participants. Ethics approval was sought and approved by the University’s Ethics 
committee and the focus group with ex-offenders was arranged within one month 
in November 2011.  The meeting took place in a local Community Centre and 
was the final focus group out of the five groups. All of the focus groups 
procedurally followed the same format as listed in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.5 Focus Group Format 
Introductions 
Collection of the informed consent forms  
Introduction as to the purpose of the focus group interview and the fact it would 
be tape recorded and notes taken 
Introductory question asked what was important to the group about money 
laundering 
Discussions relating to question prompts and any further 
questions/discussions that flowed from the discussions 
All interviews completed after approximately 1 hour duration 
 
Prior to the focus group interviews in June 2011 a lengthy discussion took place 
with an ex-law enforcement representative with extensive experience in the AML 
industry. Those discussions took place during the evenings over a seven day 
period while working together in Bosnia & Herzegovina. The discussions 
centered on the themes previously drawn from literature and the AML process. 
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This colleague was a previous head of AML department in the West Midlands 
Police in UK and had vast experience in the AML process. This interview was not 
part of the initial research design but the opportunity presented itself after 
discussions with him about the research. What he provided was reassurance that 
the experts within the focus groups would have knowledge in the area sought. He 
also viewed questions already developed for use in the focus groups and through 
our discussions advised reducing them to a more manageable format.  
 
A decision was taken to utilise the revised version of the question prompts for the 
focus group interviews. The focus group interviews could have proceeded without 
question prompts with only the moderator directing the process, however, a 
pragmatist perspective provides for researcher involvement and having question 
prompts is both practical and a legitimate course of action. In addition the 
flexibility of a pragmatist perspective allows the creation of ideas and instruments 
that gets “what needs done” in the research (Morgan, 1998; Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 2009; Liamputtong, 2011).  
 
The purpose of the discussions was to identify question prompts for use in the 
focus group interviews. This would invite discussion around particular areas if the 
flow of the conversations became stifled or went in an unrelated direction. The 
purpose of the inclusion of the ‘expert view’ was to add validity to the interview 
process and ensure the correct questions prompts were prepared to provide 
depth of conversation and a rich capture of data. The pre-test ensured any 
mechanical problems were alleviated (Sarantakos, 1997).   
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An example of the type of question drawn from the discussions with the expert is 
produced below at Figure 3.6. Prior to this multiple questions had been 
considered to aid the flow of discussions, however this would have made the flow 
of the discussions in the focus group more like a question and answer session 
with a group instead of insightful discussion, opinions and antidotal discussion 
(Fowler, 2009; Morgan, 1998). Figure 3.6 below provides a list of original 
questions which has been reduced to one single question. This final question 
became one of the actual question prompts. 
 
Figure 3.6 Example of original group of questions  
Example of four questions being reduced to one question 
Q1 “Does the legal system make it too difficult to prosecute money laundering 
offences”? 
Q2 “Does the cost of investigation money laundering act as a deterrent to law 
enforcement investigating the crime”? 
Q3 “Is appropriate training provided to the judiciary and stakeholders in the 
investigation process to ensure successful prosecutions”? 
Q4 “Is the use of SAR’s an effective method of identifying money laundering 
and the methods used”? 
Final question prompt used 
“Is the preventative process effective”? 
 
 
Reducing the number of questions from four to one allowed more effective 
discussion and kept interruptions to the discussion flow to a minimum. Flexibility 
within the focus group itself allows the re-introduction of any question that might 
provide additional data for analysis as Liamputtong (2011) suggests: “most 
interview guides consist of fewer than a dozen questions, although the moderator 
is frequently given considerable latitude to probe responses and add new 
questions, as the actual interview progresses” (Liamputtong, 2011:62).   
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The process setting up all the focus groups was time consuming and challenging. 
Many phone calls and emails were needed to the various participants to arrange 
dates and times when everyone would be available together was time consuming. 
Coupled with the logistics of finding suitable accommodation that all participants 
could travel to within a reasonable distance and time was frustrating. Contact was 
made with a colleague who was using interview methods to conduct research on 
behalf of the Police Service of Northern Ireland with a request to make use of his 
accommodation. Through that correspondence, contact was made with the 
Rehabilitation Centre for ex law enforcement officers located ten kilometers from 
Belfast City Centre.  The use of a room at this facility and the location of the facility 
itself left it unsuitable to conduct the interviews with the five groups and also in 
terms of cost, to the researcher.  
 
Through delicate negotiation a representative of each of the groups provided a 
room within their own offices to conduct the interviews. As each of the 
representative groups were located in Belfast this arrangement provided the 
necessary logistical stability to conduct the interviews. Table 3.8 provides details 
of the interview locations. The interviews were carried out over a four week period 
in all of the above locations and conducted consecutively. The data was recorded 
from each of the focus group interviews using a digital recorder and was 
converted to an audio file saved on computer (Kreuger, 1994). 
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Table 3.8 Details of focus group interview locations 
Focus Group Location 
Law Enforcement Conference room at Knocknagoney 
Police Station 
Accountants Conference room of an Accountants 
firm in Belfast 
Prosecutors Conference room of the Public 
Prosecutors Office in Belfast 
Financial Institution Conference room of a major Bank in 
Belfast 
Ex-Offenders      Conference room of a local 
     community Centre in Belfast 
 
Copies of the files were made to prevent loss of the data and protected in 
accordance with Newcastle Business School procedures on data security. Each 
interview lasted approximately one hour. Table 3.9 provides a description of the 
participating groups the number of participants and gender. Although the 
procedure for the implementation of each focus group was similar, each had their 
own challenges. 
Table 3.9 Participating Focus Groups 
 
CATEGORY NUMBER OF 
PARTICIPANTS 
GENDER 
Group 1 
Law Enforcement 
6 5 – Male 
1 - Female 
 Group 2  
 Accountants 
  5 4 - Male 
1 - Female 
 Group 3 
 Prosecutors 
  5 2 – Male 
1 -  Female 
Group 4 
Financial Institutions 
3 2 – Male 
1 - Female 
 Group 5 
 Ex-Offenders 
  4 4 - Male 
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The law enforcement group was the first focus group and all participants were 
eager to tell their story and give their views on the subject. The author was the 
moderator for all of the focus group interviews. There was an obvious ease within 
the room and no feeling of awkwardness or tension. The passion for the subject 
by some individuals was sometimes overwhelming with some gestations and 
raised voices.  In some instances with this group it was easier to let the discussion 
flow continue, even if going off tangent, rather than stop the discussion to change 
direction and lose the momentum that was created. Pragmatism offers that 
observation choice within mixed methods, to get the best result from the method 
(Saunders, 2007).  
 
The accountants group was also passionate about the subject. One thing that 
was clear with this group as in all of the interviews was that each relayed the 
subject from within their own perspective and their own environment. This is one 
of the strengths of focus groups, to integrate different perspectives to help 
interpret the data ( Morgan, 1998; Saunders et al, 2007). Concern from this group 
about the role and activities of other groups within AML: for example SOCA not 
taking on “Mr. Big” criminals or Prosecutors not prosecuting “stand-alone” money 
laundering offences could have been construed as criticism and that their own 
role was the most important. However some groups were self-critical, for 
example; accountants were critical in relation to the lack of effort by members of 
their own organization, in making suspicious activity reports (SARs). That aspect 
showed them reflecting on their own role, within the focus group discussions and 
the importance of commenting on that issue. 
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The Prosecutors group did not appear as enthusiastic as the first two groups and 
a possible reason for that is prosecutors deal with many different types of crimes 
not only money laundering. So they may not have closeness to the subject as 
some of the other groups. However Prosecutors are the only ones who prosecute 
money laundering so it was important to get their perspective. Use of the prompts 
was more relevant for this group in order to get the discussions targeted in the 
right areas.  
 
The Money Laundering Reporting Officers although very courteous (as were all 
the groups) appeared to be very busy and on first introduction explained the need 
to get to a further meeting after the focus group. The focus group still lasted the 
1 hour that was initially suggested but the statement left a slight bitter taste of 
“let’s get this over with” quickly. The discussions flowed very well and the 
dominance of one speaker had to be managed to allow other opinions to come 
through.  Seating for focus groups as suggested by Hennink (2007) should be in 
a circle format were participants can face each other. This arrangement helps 
discussion and alleviate dominance by any one speaker by allowing the 
moderator to gesticulate away from the speaker to another participant.  
 
The format of all the focus groups in this study was seating around a conference 
table. This format had the same effect as the circular format and the moderator 
on this occasion was able to turn his vision to another participant for their views. 
To further manage this the moderator also directed questions to other participants 
in the first instance.  
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The ex-offenders group was one of the most worrying groups to visit. Even with 
the reassurance from my contact for my safety, the area the focus group was 
being held and the participants involved had potential for difficulty for an ex-Police 
officer. In addition expectations of the participants knowledge in the area of AML 
was very low, expectations of their interest was also very low, however the fact 
that four persons attended showed that expectations can sometimes be wrong. 
Although the data from this group provided material not previously obtained from 
a criminal perspective in AML, much time was spent explaining some of the 
processes of which they were uncertain.  
 
Much of the difficulty in managing the focus groups was eased by the author 
taking the role of moderator. One of the positive impacts of taking this role was 
having knowledge of the subject under discussion. Combining roles of researcher 
and moderator in focus groups can also be seen as problematic. Moderator 
collects the data and has an immediate impact on the quality of the data (Morgan, 
2007). Expression, body language, tone of voice, dress and social status can all 
produce bias as well as the way questions are asked. However bias as moderator 
can be reduced. The moderator in the focus groups in this study was aware of 
the negative attributes above and maintained a neutral position.  
 
Questions were asked in a manner that did not influence the answer but allowed 
the discussions to flow. Bias cannot be fully alleviated however it can be 
substantially reduced as the author accepts in this study. As knowledge of all the 
systems within the AML process was a pre-requisite to taking this role. Being 
flexible in the approach to each group and seeing the strengths and weaknesses 
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of individuals within each group and adapting to that composition can be very 
beneficial: 
 
“The task of the moderator is to stimulate the participants to engage 
actively in the discussion of the topic, the moderator also needs to be 
flexible enough to manage the group to proceed in the direction the 
focus group should take…moderator is not only a leader but a 
navigator”  
 
(Liamputtong, 2011:60). 
 
In order to validate the themes drawn from literature consideration was made to 
present the themes on cards in front of the participants, for their comment. 
However, this process presented a difficulty as presenting the themes directly to 
the participants may imply influence. What was required was the validation of the 
themes through the discussions rather than the participants being presented with 
a list. The question prompts for focus groups (provided at Appendix 3.3) were 
used as the instrument of enquiry to allow the themes to emerge through the 
discussions. Analysis of the data would determine if the themes were validated 
or not. 
  
Table 3.10 provides an example of the use of a question prompt in a focus group 
interview to draw out a response that validated a theme. The theme that is 
validated is suspicious activity report (SAR). The question prompt does not 
mention the word SAR but is designed to question the particular area within the 
AML arena that the SAR would sit. “Is the AML preventative process effective”? 
The sample from the response indicates that SAR was recognised as an 
important issue in the preventative process. While the question prompts could 
also be said to influence the outcomes and identify the themes, it is the 
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discussions that follow the prompts that highlight the relevancy of the theme as 
in the example provided. The research benefits in validity if, it is shown, that the 
themes emerge from analysis of the discussions from the focus group data. All of 
the groups discussed the SAR process and the quote used in the example below 
is taken directly from the data provided by group D, MLROs.  A sample of 
quotations is provided at Appendix 3.4. All of the themes were identified and 
validated through reading and highlighting text that surrounded a theme area. 
These were provided in quotes from the text and compared between groups for 
validation. Method of analysis is fully discussed at section 3.8.2.1. 
 
 
Table 3.10: Example of Theme validation in Focus Groups. 
 
THEME                Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)    
 
PROMPT “Is the AML preventative process effective”? 
 
DISCUSSION “Well it’s seen as something we have to do and I suppose there 
are negative aspects to it in that, we don’t really see any 
positive outcomes from the SAR process.  Whilst it’s 
recognised that it’s important, but I think it is generally deemed 
to be an exercise because there’s not a lot of feedback as to 
how useful it actually is”. 
 
   
 
At times even when a question prompt didn’t stimulate discussion of a theme, 
what did emerged was a rich vein of data that disclosed thoughts, behaviors and 
underlying dimensions that are valuable insights to the undercurrent of AML 
arena.  
 
A full analysis of the results is presented in Chapter 4 Section 4.3 however the 
example below gives a representation of data that came from one question. The 
extract has been deliberately cut from the text from group E ex-offenders as the 
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response offers a unique insight into many aspects of AML process from group 
E perspective. The response relates to a question about levels of money 
laundering put to the ex-offenders focus group interview. The example is provided 
to show the response which is much wider than the question intended, however 
the response is drawn from knowledge and experience and puts the question in 
context of the bigger AML picture, providing more valuable information than if the 
flow of the discussions had been stopped mid-way. The text has not been edited 
in order to maintain the character of the respondents’ comments. “Too much 
editing and cleaning tends to censor ideas and information” (Morgan, 1998:167).    
 
Focus Group Interview – Example of a Question prompt response: Group 
E Ex-Offenders: 
 
Question Answer 
“Do you think that there are 
levels of money launderers, 
and how many are there 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I mean if that did happen here because if you 
take, and I’ll not mention the guy’s name but, 
you know there’s a guy and he’s still operating 
here, but I mean he was the money launderer 
for the provos, I mean he was the one that set 
the (inaudible) and he’s still doing it, you 
know, and if he doesn’t buy the companies he 
buys in till them.  So legitimate companies 
know who they are but they still allow him to 
buy in so that he can, you know what I mean, 
so that, I mean that, there’s no question that 
went on, the provos were very sophisticated 
at it cos they had him doing it, and he still does 
it, you know, whereas I suppose loyalist 
organisations it’s a bit like you said, you know, 
if they got a couple of bob you know it was 
kept in a tin box in the house 
So there’s no question that  happened that 
way like, and you know in fact I was just 
talking to somebody today and they 
mentioned the guy and it was over a property 
and this guy owned the property and when he 
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Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So would you say that street 
level stuff isn’t really 
touched? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
told me who it was I said, he was offered 
money for it cos they wanted to demolish it, 
and the company was a well-known company 
and I said to him do you realise who he is, and 
he went no and I says, well you should know, 
cos the guy was in an official republican, and 
I said to him well he’s the guy that launders 
the money for the provos, and obviously that 
organis-, or that large company, they’re 
involved in that.  And (inaudible) pitch at 
(inaudible), not that long ago, that same 
company.  So I mean, but, Continued 
and I mean it, I had even forgot about this 
conversation, but that’s so, so you’re right, 
and there’s another case, I don’t know if 
you’re aware of this case, in Birmingham, the 
Johnstons and the Bergers, they were West 
Indians and Africans.  And if you remember, 
do you remember the young woman was 
killed in the, in the hairdressers, it turned - 
  Well it was the Johnstons and the Bergers, 
and the Johnstons and the Bergers both were 
up to their necks in crime, but, I can’t 
remember which ones it was but one set of 
them actually, they put all their money into big 
companies and they had this guy was, he was 
one of the family, he put all the money in, he 
invested it all, and the other ones spent their 
money like that, so they were prostitutes, 
cars, all that sort of stuff, and bling, and they 
were running about.  And the ones that were 
doing all that were actually complaining 
because all the other ones had all the money 
and they were doing, you know what I mean.  
And, so, there was this like sort of thing you 
know, one group was saying, them fucking 
bastards, they get everything and the peelers 
don’t touch them and they’re lifting us all the 
time - and they were having this sort of like 
war between themselves, and that’s what was 
happening, because one was doing it very 
well and they were, they were spending it as 
quick as they got it.  So they were going out, 
spending it on women and all that sort of stuff. 
And that’s, that’s a classic example of what 
you’re talking about - in terms of in 
Birmingham. 
But, but, just on your question there, I think it 
seems to be that there must be, you know, 
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Continued 
 
which you could probably say about most 
laws, a law for one and a law for another 
because it seems like that sort of lower level 
involvement in reaping the benefits of crime 
isn’t addressed through money laundering the 
same way that higher stuff would be because 
if that was the case you don’t hear them 
recovering assets off people that’s maybe 
making two or three grand occasionally, it’s 
the assets of people that seemingly have you 
know four houses and, Continued 
and you know an apartment abroad and a 
couple of cars and you know, putting it in their 
wife’s name and all the rest of it, so…and I 
didn’t know until you said that about the 
cigarette people, but you can bet most of 
that’s not in their names, it is in their wives’ 
name or somebody else’s name or family 
names….Well it’s, I’m not saying legitimate, 
but it seems like you know if the law is to tap 
into the higher echelons of it they maybe feel 
that if you take that out you, in some indirect 
way do away with the lower stuff. 
 
Section 3.8.2.1 describes the method of analysis for the focus groups. The report 
from the analysis results of the focus groups will be discussed in chapter 4.  
  
3.8.2.1 Method of approach to analysis of focus group data 
The objective of this analysis is to search the transcripts of the recorded 
conversations from the five focus groups, looking for validation of the themes and 
any emergent themes. As Morgan (1988) suggests there is no single solution to 
the problem of analysis and each topic and the objective of analysis will benefit 
from its own method. The frameworks of Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2007) suggest 
several qualitative analysis techniques for focus group data, these include: 
Constant Comparison Analysis - Keywords-in-Context - Classical Content 
Analysis - Discourse Analysis. For a detailed analysis of each method see, Potter 
and Wetherell (1987), Glasser and Strauss (1992) Morgan (1997) Fielding and 
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Lee (1998). The purpose of the focus group interviews in some respects 
determines the analysis techniques. As the purpose of the focus group interviews 
was to record the discussion of opinions, experiences and activities of experts 
from the AML arena an amalgamation of the techniques above that appeared 
most appropriate were used. Using a combination of each method adds validity 
to the results of the analysis process that nothing is missed. Table 3.11 provides 
a summary of those methods: 
 
Table 3.11 Summary of analysis techniques used for focus group text 
Selective Coding – The researcher develops one or more themes that express 
the content of the groups. 
 
Key Word text - Represents an analysis of the culture of the use of the word and 
conceptualising of words that are considered central to the development of 
themes and theory. 
 
Discourse Analysis 
Examines the use of words and phrases to ascertain how individuals account for 
experiences, events and locations. 
 
Advantages of using the three methods 
The techniques can be used across groups, between groups and within groups 
(Fielding and Lee, 1998). 
An effective approach to understand the phenomena (Ke and Wenglensky, 
2010). 
Flexibility of use of methods (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Can be used on large data sets (Greg, 2012). 
Interpretation of themes is supported by the data collected (Greg, 2012). 
The methods allow for different activities to emerge from the data (Johnny, 2009). 
The practicalities of the use of the methods are advantageous (Morgan, 2009)  
 
Disadvantages of using the three methods 
Each come from different disciplines within Qualitative research and could be 
viewed as contradictory (Greg, 2012). 
Requires high level experience and patience on the part of the researcher (Ke 
and Wenglensky, 2010). 
Discovery and verification of themes can be merged together and cause 
confusion (Charmaz, 1988). 
Flexibility can make it difficult to concentrate and focus on the analysis objective 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Limited interpretative power if analysis excludes theoretical framework (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). 
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The researcher has a background in the AML area and could understand and 
account for the terminology and context of the data. As Onwuegbuzie (2009) 
suggests: “no framework has been provided that delineates the types of 
qualitative analysis techniques that focus group researchers have at their 
disposal” (Onwuegbuzie, 2009:4). The amalgamation of several techniques is a 
valid strategy to use.  
 
Each interview was transcribed with the assistance of a software package 
‘Dragon naturally speaking’. Although time consuming it was a process that 
provided a closeness to the data for analysis purposes (Kreuger, 1994; Morgan, 
1988).  Each transcript was also secured to prevent loss by photocopying and 
retaining a copy on an external hard drive. Transcripts were re-read to ensure 
clarity and accuracy.  
 
 After transcription the method of analysis began by re-reading each groups 
transcript to get a clear understanding of the flow of the discussions. Transcribing 
previously provided closeness to the data that allowed preliminary highlighting of 
relevant sections of the text. These were marked with a highlighter and notes 
made to the side of the text as to which theme the text related. A cross reference 
table was used to highlight agreement or dissent within and between the groups. 
(Kreuger, 1994; Wilkinson, 2004). Kidd and Marshall (2000) suggest the focus of 
analysis should also be on the individual and the group instead of only the unit of 
analysis. Information contained within the text on consensus and dissent between 
individuals and groups can increase the richness of the data (Kitzenger, 1994; 
Sim, 1998). This suggests: “Information about dissenters would increase the 
descriptive validity, interpretive validity and theoretical validity associated with the 
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emergent themes, which in turn, would increase understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest” (Onwuegbuzie, 2009:5).  
 
Microsoft Word “search and find” was also used to ensure nothing was missed 
by highlighting themes and identifying their occurrence in the text. The portion of 
that text was re-read to provide the context of the discussion and its relevance.  
The text was produced as a list of quotations from each group that either 
discussed a key theme or introduced a new theme (Morgan, 1998; Liamputtong, 
2011). The sample of quotes is presented at Appendix 3.4. 
 
The five focus groups produced an average of 10,000 words of text per focus 
group. The above technique would provide the necessary familiarity with the data 
to identify recurrent themes, similarities between the groups and highlighted text 
for future use in generalisation of the text.  However, in order to ensure reliability 
of the manual text analysis method the software technique NVIVO9 was utilised. 
This analysis method provided additional validity for the manual process 
described as all data had to be inputted on to the NVIVO software. In addition the 
software would only deliver results based on the instructions given. Despite being 
a quicker process the author could only direct responses from the software based 
on the information already gleamed.  
 
The use of NVIVO did not produce any additional themes for this research. The 
use of Computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) offers a 
number of advantages to the researcher in relation to the analytical approaches 
adopted. (Saunders et al, 2003). The additional use of this technique and manual 
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scrutiny would apply the rigor and trust required to produce quality results in 
qualitative analysis (Welsh, 2002; Cresswell, 1998).   
 
In order to set up the data, each coded interview transcript was imported and set 
up as a case. The themes drawn from literature were also imported so that any 
comparisons would be made between the cases (Themes and transcripts). Each 
of the prompt questions was set up as a query and the data extracted using 
NVIVO9. The results provided all responses in that subject area (as questions 
were not put directly to each group in the same manner i.e. word for word, but 
rather questions around the subject area). Results were also obtained by running 
an extraction using terminology from the manual analysis (these were areas 
highlighted during reading and re-reading) and themes drawn from literature. 
(Gibbs, 2004). This set of results contained responses from participants who 
quoted a particular word or phrase during the focus group interviews.  
 
The results have been recorded on Microsoft Excel and Microsoft Word for 
inclusion in the research and for security of data. This provided all text that used 
those themes and related descriptions within all the focus group transcripts. It 
was up to the researcher to label those context statements for and 
compare/merge them with the original themes. The above processes of re-
reading, highlighted text coding, word search and NVIVO ensured nothing was 
missed and the results would became the constructs that will provide the basis 
for the development of the survey questionnaire.  
 
Described below at Tables 3.12, 3.13, 3.14 and Figure 3.7 are examples of the 
three areas of analysis that produced the results. Linking the extract in the 
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transcript to the themes shown in the examples does require knowledge of the 
activities of money laundering. This is an advantage held by this author and 
makes interpretation of the discussions easier. It also allows labelling of the 
appropriate theme to encompass the detail in the text. Table 3.12 provides an 
example of how one group discusses a scenario around the movement of money 
from criminal activity, which can be categorised around the theme “criminal 
spend”. The text is part of a larger group of text that categorises two groups of 
criminals and how they spend their criminal money. One group of criminals spend 
their ill-gotten gains as they get it and could be termed self-launderers, whilst 
another group who may be organised crime gangs or individuals who gather 
substantial criminal funds and require the services of professional money 
launderers. The discussions in this area are an acknowledgement that criminal 
spend is an important activity for inclusion as a theme in this research. 
 
 
Table 3.12: Example of theme validation “Criminal Spend”. 
 
TRANSCRIPT 
“I would say there is professional money launderers at the top end, there has to be, 
whether it’s laundering cash or just laundering cheques or money that’s come across 
a computer screen that’s just bouncing around different accounts.  I mean there has to 
be.  Someone who launders money, big sums, it’s going to be pretty much a full time 
job, and they’re going to take their cut for that”. 
 
VALIDATED THEME 
Criminal spending 
 
 
Table 3.13 provides an example of how one group discusses a scenario around 
training staff on AML to satisfy regulators. One of the issues identified was the 
power regulators had to arrive unannounced in financial institutions to inspect 
their compliance procedures. The effect this had on banks was they were more 
concerned to show they were doing everything that was required of them. They 
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were more fearful of the regulator finding fault than they were in making 
suspicious reports. The importance of this affect can be categorised as a new 
theme “regulatory control”.  
 
Table 3.13: Example of introduction of new theme 
 
TRANSCRIPT 
“So we do find it beneficial and you know one of the things that we have to do is 
demonstrate competency so if the regulator, if the FSA are coming in, as they have 
done and asked to see what type of training we provide and how do you measure 
competency, yes there’s a bank of questions that the person has to answer”. 
 
VALIDATED THEME 
Regulatory control 
 
 
 
Table 3.14 provides an example of how the analysis of the focus group transcripts 
validated the SAR theme using the quotation method. Each quotation discusses 
the aspects of the SAR regime highlighting suspicious reports as significant. 
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Table 3.14: Example of the use of quotations to validate the SAR theme 
 
 
GROUPS 
 
Group 1 Law Enforcement 
“It’s a resource issue.  If you could spend four or five hours on every SAR, well then 
you’re going to pick up more criminality.  Whereas if you have 20 minutes to spend on 
it, or ten, you know boils down to”. 
 
Group 2 Accountants 
“But in a lot of cases that is determined largely by the information and explanations 
given to us.  So we’re not sitting there, you know, suspiciously looking at all our clients 
thinking, is he a drug dealer, is he a money launderer” 
 
Group 3 Prosecutors 
“I think, when it comes to banks and you know estate agencies and places like that, I 
think as regards their SARS obligations you know I’d say they’re fairly much compliant 
with it, and I don’t think there’d be a difficulty there but, the likes of car dealerships and 
places like that, it’s a different kettle of fish there, where they’re much more localised”. 
 
Group 4 MLROs 
“I don’t know what you’re like, but business managers are not as quick to send in SARs 
as the retail staffs are, the branch staff, they are very clued in”. 
 
Group 5 Ex-offenders 
“I would presume if people knew about it, it would be the ultimate deterrent, because 
if I’m earning 20 grand a year and I go and make a lodgement of ten grand, knowing 
that that’ll kick start some sort of investigation, there’s no way in a million years if I 
know that I’m going to go in with ten grand”. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 displays the SAR query search within NVIVO and the potential 
elements are displayed on the feeds directly from that request. Each feed can be 
examined to ensure nothing was missed in the previous examination of the data. 
On examination of figure 3.7 the results can be followed to view the full text in 
each feed, for example: reporting, number of SARs and deterrence is displayed 
below in a number of the tentacle’s flowing from the center.  
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Figure 3.7: An example of the results of an NVIVO search on “SAR” that 
identified text  
 
 
 
The results of the text data analysis on NVIVO show that the focus group 
interviews have validated a number of themes that originated from literature. On 
some occasion’s text within the transcripts described activity that fell outside of 
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the original themes. For example in table 3.15 the term compliance describes 
activity closely aligned to SAR; the term penalties describe activity closely aligned 
to policy/enforcement and similarly with opportunity and crime prevention. When 
the context of a discussion in the interviews described an activity that is closely 
associated to an original theme, that description was maintained under that 
original themes as their meaning and/or activity was similar. Described as ‘theme 
maintained’ in the example below in Table 3.15.  
 
Table 3.15: Examples of Theme Labeling when the activity discussed had 
similar characteristics to the original theme. 
 
 
DESCRIPTION   THEME 
Compliance    Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) 
Theme maintained 
Penalties Policy/Enforcement 
Theme maintained 
Opportunity   Crime types 
Theme maintained 
Crime Prevention Policy 
Theme maintained  
 
 
The methods described above have produced a set of themes that arrived from 
analysis of the text from focus group discussions. Table 3.16 provides a full list 
of those themes. What will be noted is that included in the table will be themes 
that have been confirmed from the original set from phase 1 and additional 
themes that have emerged from the discussions, in the focus group interviews. 
Chapter 4 provides a full discussion of the analysis and results for focus group 
interviews, however, it is important to show the sequence of the analysis method 
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within this section. The table shows the agreement between each group of the 
confirmed themes. 
  
Table 3.16: Full list of Themes from Analysis of the Focus Group     
Interviews. 
 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Identifiable Themes 
confirmed from original set 
Identifiable Themes in 
addition to original Set 
Focus Group 1 
Law Enforcement 
SAR  
Crime Types 
Public  Interest 
Shadow Economy 
Cost v Benefits 
AML Legislation 
Enforcement 
Penalties 
Prosecution 
Focus Group 2 
Accountants 
Crime Types 
Expenditure 
Suspicious Activity Report  
Confiscation 
Enforcement 
Income 
Legislation 
Deterrent effect 
Opportunity 
Level of Criminals 
Focus Group 3 
Prosecution 
Service 
Restraint of Assets 
Cost v Benefits 
SAR Process 
Policy/Regulation 
Crime Prevention 
Prosecution Service 
Procedures 
Punishment 
Resources 
Bank Risk 
Complexities of AML cases 
Focus Group 4 
MLRO’s - Banks 
Legislation/Regulation 
Reporting 
SAR Quality 
Investigation Levels 
Level of Crime 
Acceptable Crime 
Incentivisation 
Crime Motivation/Cash 
Focus Group 5 
Ex-offenders 
Crime Spend 
Asset Recovery 
Legislation 
SAR Process 
Policy/Regulation 
Credibility of Criminal 
Crime Deterrent 
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Table 3.17 merges both sets of the above themes as one complete set of themes 
to aid the development of the questionnaire survey in phase 3. 
 
Table 3.17:  Merged set of themes available for Phase 3 – Questionnaire 
Development. 
 
Themes Themes from text analysis 
Legislation AML Legislation 
Enforcement 
POCA Deterrent 
Cost v Benefits 
Punishment 
Prosecution 
Policy/ Regulation 
Crime types 
Punishment 
Criminality Crime prevention 
Levels of criminals 
Public perception 
Crime types 
Opportunity 
Criminal compliance 
Confiscation 
SAR Process Restraint of assets 
SAR/Quality 
Compliance 
Resources 
CJS Reaction 
Spend Acceptable crime 
Motivation/ cash 
Crime spend 
Influence Education of law 
Crime deterrents 
Professionalism 
Resources 
Power/influence 
Others Obligations 
Bank risk 
Incentivisation 
Asset recovery 
Education 
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The themes provided in phase 2 will now link the focus group data to the 
development of the questionnaire survey. In addition to providing the list of 
themes the focus group data will assist in the item and scale construction of the 
questionnaire by using the thoughts, opinions and processes discussed by the 
respondents. Section 3.8.3 focuses on the quantitative method of the mixed 
method design and phase 3 of the research; the development, distribution and 
analysis of the survey questionnaire. 
  
3.8.3 Phase 3 - Survey Questionnaires 
The objective of phase 3 was to develop a rigorous questionnaire using the 
themes identified in phase 2 that would obtain data from a wide audience of 
experts in the AML arena. Statistical analysis of the respondent’s data could then 
be applied to answer the research question.   The focus group interview data 
therefore had two features: the data determined the themes for questionnaire 
development and; through the discussions provided the sources of items for each 
question (Discussed in section 3.8.3.1). The features presented in those items 
and the relationships between them would be determined using the reduction 
techniques in factor analysis (Discussed at section 3.8.3.3).  
 
Statistical analysis can be used to describe a significant relationship between one 
or more variables and reduce those to the most significant and relevant factors 
(Salkind, 2008). The questionnaire is designed to link the themes identified from 
analysis of the focus group data and the research question, to identify the factors 
that influence Anti-Money Laundering (AML) policy implementation in the UK. 
Quantitative methods focus on using specific definitions and carefully 
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operationalising what particular themes and items mean (Salkind, 2008). Using 
the quantitative method in this research provided direction that would lead to the 
reliability and validity of results from questionnaire development and statistical 
analysis. Table 3.18 describes the process of development of the questionnaire 
that was used and is further discussed in section 3.8.3.1.  
 
Table 3.18 Process applied to Questionnaire Development 
 
Themes Themes were validated through analysis 
of focus group interview text 
Questionnaires Viewed from prior academic study 
Questions Questions developed through analysis of 
focus group interview text  
Statistical analysis technique Factor analysis through SPSS 
Statements Statements developed with the 
consideration and inclusion of above four 
processes 
Questionnaire First draft applied to pilot 
Questionnaire pilot 14 Participants involved 
Adopted Questionnaire Completed and accessed through a link 
on Survey Monkey 
 
 
3.8.3.1 Questionnaire design 
The development of the survey questionnaire followed the guidance of Dillman 
(2000, 2009) who sets out a series of considerations for the design and format of 
a questionnaire survey.  
1. What is the specific goal or purpose of the survey? 
 
2. What are the topics in the survey...primary and secondary 
topics? 
 
3. What kind of information do you want from the 
participants…define the concepts? 
 
4. Determine the content of the survey. What is the scope of 
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the study? How does content relate to the topics?  
 
5. Consider question wording and the order they appear.  
 
6. Determine survey length and format, considering time to 
complete the survey and responsiveness of participants to 
design. 
 
7. Consider response categories, multiple choice? Likert 
scale? How should they be grouped together? 
 
8. Make response categories consistent. For example, how 
many points to include on Likert scale? Keep layout and 
amount of these options consistent. 
 
9. Consider question wording to avoid sensitivity or bias. Build 
trust with respondents through the questions. 
 
10.  Minimise apprehension – support respondents through 
completion of the survey by encouragement and confidence 
in anonymity and confidentiality of the survey (Dillman, 
2000). 
 
The questionnaire survey was a self-administered questionnaire which could be 
accessed through survey monkey43. Using this method would provide a quick and 
easy access for participants and practical collection methods for the researcher. 
Sampling choice is discussed at section 3.8.3.5. A sample size of 400 responses 
from the four groups was the target to provide a suitable number of cases for 
factor analysis (Morgan, 1998; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Fowler, 2009). It is 
expected with survey questionnaires that the response rate is generally low. 
Taking into account missing values due to incomplete questionnaires the number 
of responses or N value would decrease. Allowing for the above in this case did 
return 272 responses. The alternative to sampling adjustments is to build 
knowledge through studies that provide results, indicative of a similar population. 
A detailed discussion of small sample size is also provided in section 4.4.1. 
                                            
43 Surveys can be accessed at www.surveymonkey.com 
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3.8.3.2 Data analysis considerations 
The appropriate data analysis technique for analysing the questionnaire data was 
considered before the complete list of statements was developed. Hair, Black, 
Babin and Anderson (2010) provide an extensive classification of the various 
multivariate methods available. Their classification is based on three judgements 
which they suggest the researcher must make about the research, the research 
objective and nature of the data being examined. The answers to the three 
questions will determine the appropriate techniques to use. 
 
1. Can the variables be divided between dependent and independent 
classifications based on some theory? 
 
2. If so, how many variables are treated as dependent in a single analysis? 
 
3. How are the variables, both dependent and independent, measured?  
 
(Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010) 
 
A dependence technique is defined as:  
 
“one in which a variable or set of variables is identified as the 
dependent variable to be predicted or explained by other variables 
known as independent variables”  
 
 
(Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010:13).  
An interdependence technique is:  
 
“one in which no single variable or group of variables is defined as 
being independent or dependent”  
 
(Hair et al, 2010:14).  
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In this research there is no dependent variable to be predicted or explained, 
rather all the variables in the set are analysed simultaneously to identify an 
underlying structure to the set of variables. It should be noted that the term 
‘variable’ and ‘item’ are interchangeable in the context of this research. To identify 
structure the technique best suited to this research was factor analysis. The 
decision to use factor analysis centred on the above justifications and the 
following criteria: aims and objectives of the research and the results the analysis 
would bring to the research. (Pole and Lampard, 2002). Factor analysis is 
discussed at section 3.8.3.7. A final consideration was the transfer of the 
questionnaire data from survey monkey to suitable analysis software. Surveys 
that use survey monkey and Likert scaling measurement allow exporting of the 
data to (SPSS) for direct analysis (Pole and Lampard, 2002; Fowler, 2009).  
 
The questionnaire was split into sections that represented each theme area which 
had previously been identified from literature and confirmed through focus group 
interviews. The themes in each section are therefore a combination of 
corroboration of the literature and focus group analysis. Appendix 3.5 provides a 
copy of the questionnaire. Table 3.7 at section 3.8.1 previously provided 
examples of how themes were drawn from literature and provided the section 
headings in the questionnaire.  
 
Each section of the questionnaire was designed using statements as opposed to 
specific questions. The participants were then asked to agree or disagree with 
the statements provided for each section. Table 3.20 further illustrates each 
question and the scaling used. The process follows Trochim (2009) question 
design considerations, which are summarised as: 
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 Determining the question content, scope and purpose. 
 Choosing the correct response format for collecting information from the 
respondent. 
 Wording the question to get responses related to the issue of interest. 
 
Data for developing statements was provided from three areas:  
1. Previous academic questionnaires. 
2. Focus group interview data. 
3. Questions developed by the author from focus group interviews. 
 
The process adopted was to read through the questionnaires for questions that 
related to the theme areas. The next stage was to merge those questions with 
the previous set of developed questions and related comments from focus group 
interviews. The objective was to develop a statement that would get a response 
linked to the theme area. As discussed in Chapter 2 questionnaires used in 
previous research relating to money laundering measurement were sought from 
academics involved in their own research in the area of AML (Fowler, 2009). The 
focus of the statement development was to generate items that describe specific 
attitudes within the AML process and linked to the themes already identified. 
Table 3.19 provides an example of a question from section 3 of the final 
questionnaire survey. This question is developed from viewing two independent 
questions from separate academic questionnaires related to AML policy 
(provided). A related comment from one of the sources in the focus group 
interviews is also provided. The final question developed for the questionnaire 
relates to the above three occurrences. 
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Table 3.19: Developing Statements for Survey Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaires Question on AML Policy 
Academic questionnaire 1 “There are several reasons for banks 
to invest in compliance. What is, 
according to you, the most important 
goal of compliance!? 
 
Academic Questionnaire 2 “How compliant is your country to 
FATF Recommendations 1-20”? 
 
Focus Group Interview Source for 
section 3 question Survey  
 
“And the likes of the FSA who are well 
financed can regulate with fear I 
suppose, were the banks are taking 
the cost of the resources out of the 
profits.” 
 
Final Questionnaire  
Question 9r - Section 3 
 “Please indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: AML compliance 
costs are reasonable given the 
overriding importance of integrity of 
the financial system”.  
 
 
 
Using statements in the questionnaire allowed the use of substantially more links 
to the themes than individual questions and would contribute more to the 
research objective as the data would be specific to the themes.  By using specific 
questions the respondent would be restricted to answering only the questions 
presented. Having too many questions would have increased the size of the 
questionnaire and the length of time to complete it. In turn this would have 
reduced the response rate as respondents would not be inclined to complete a 
lengthy questionnaire (Fowler, 2009). 
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In addition using closed questions is usually a more satisfactory way of creating 
data as opposed to open questions (Fowler, 2009). The importance of analysis 
and how the questions would be measured was the next consideration:  
 
“Designing a question for a survey instrument is designing a measure, 
not a conversational enquiry….an answer given to a survey question 
is of no intrinsic interest. The answer is valuable to the extent that it 
can be shown to have a predictable relationship to facts or subjective 
states that are of interest”  
 
 
(Fowler, 2009:87).   
 
The self-administered questionnaire was measured using a five point Likert scale 
from strongly agree to strongly disagree with each question labeled to indicate 
the choices available. Table 3.20 provides an example of question 7 included in 
the survey questionnaire to visually demonstrate the format, measurement range 
and design of the questions: 
 
Table 3.20: Example of the format of questions in the Survey 
Questionnaire. 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 Strongly agree                                           Strongly disagree 
Criminals rationally choose to commit an offence 
without considering the risks.        
    
0 0 0 0 0 
Criminals are more aware now of AML policy 
than when it was introduced in 2003. 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
Criminals do not consider AML policy before 
deciding to commit an offence.            
 
0 0 0 0 0 
Money laundering controls are a key component 
in winning the war against organised crime.          
 
0 0 0 0 0 
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This method was more favorable than other methods available such as semantic 
differential which measures polar opposites of a given situation (Pole and 
Lampard, 2002). Using Likert scales as a measurement method in research as 
summed by Bertram (2002) has advantages such as being simple to construct; 
have reliable results and are easy for participants to read and complete. The 
disadvantages include; participants avoiding extreme response items, or 
agreeing statements as they are presented in order to please the researcher, or 
to look more socially favorably. The main component however of using 
questionnaires relate to demonstrating validity and ensuring the questionnaire 
measures what it sets out to measure (Bertram, Pole and Lampard, 2002; Fowler, 
2009).  
 
The questionnaire has 13 questions which consist of measurement in nominal, 
ordinal and interval scales (Salkind, 2008). Question 13 completes the survey 
questionnaire by providing an open ended question asking respondents to 
provide comments as to what they would change in the AML system. The method 
of analysis for this question uses a simple informal method of listing each 
comment and comparing them with the results of phase 4 component verification. 
Those discussions will be provided in the Analysis Section 4.4.1 of Chapter 4.  
 
3.8.3.3 Pilot study 
The object of the pilot study was to purposefully test the various aspects of the 
questionnaire to ensure the format, length and instructions relating to the 
research were clear to the recipients (Saunders, 2009). A further object of the 
pilot study was to ‘time’ the completion of the questionnaire so that clear 
instructions to future recipients would be available. The first draft of the 
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questionnaire was further discussed with a quantitative expert within Northumbria 
University. For validation of the questionnaire the pilot study took the following 
steps:  
 
Step 1   A member of each of the five groups of expert organisations who 
participated in the focus groups was sent an email with a request to participate in 
the pilot. Two additional experts not part of the focus groups were also contacted. 
Seven Doctoral students from Northumbria University were also asked to 
participate in the pilot.  
 
Step 2 Instructions were provided to all participants on how to access the 
questionnaire from an email ‘link’ to survey monkey. A number of participants 
who lived locally received paper copies of the questionnaire. 
 
Step 3   The instructions for participants asked them to view the design and 
format of the questionnaire and comment on any changes that may apply. A 
number of participants were asked to complete the questionnaire and time that 
process. All of the participants were asked to comment on their understanding of 
the statements that applied to each question (Cresswell, 2003; Saunders, 2009).  
 
Purposive sampling was used to identify the individuals to participate in the pilot 
of the questionnaire. The sample is not representative of the population but 
contain the particular characteristics necessary for pilot of the questionnaire. 
Individuals from the focus group interviews were chosen because of their 
knowledge of the subject and because they had already participated in the 
research and therefore had knowledge of the focus of the research. Two 
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participants were chosen because of their independence of the research. One of 
them had knowledge of the subject and the other limited knowledge of the 
subject. Seven doctoral students who used questionnaires in their own research 
would apply their knowledge to test the format and proof read the questions 
contained in the questionnaire. The pilot of the questionnaire was carried out over 
a period of two weeks. There was a 50% return on the pilot out of the 14 
participants. Following return of the feedback, corrections were made to the 
questionnaire in light of those comments. A full list of comments is provided at 
Appendix 3.6; however the main comments are as follows:  
 
a) Changing the abbreviation AML to its full title. 
b) Order of 5 point Likert scale not shown. 
c) Spelling mistakes. 
d) Good structure.  
e) Questions clear. 
f) Put a “thank you” note at the end of the questionnaire.  
g) Timing of questionnaire 
 
The pilot of the questionnaire was a valid process to validate the survey 
instrument (Cresswell, 2003; Fowler, 2009; Saunders, 2009). Re-drafting the 
questionnaire using the feedback from the respondents provided a questionnaire 
that was reliable and effective and that would fulfill the objective of the research.   
 
3.8.3.4 Sampling choice and administration of questionnaires 
Non-probability sampling (purposive sampling) was suitable for this research. 
Other methods included Probability sampling (random sampling), for more on 
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these methods see Pole (2002), Cresswell (2007). Purposive sampling provided 
the use of a sample not necessarily representative of the population, but best 
placed to contribute to the research. The population for this research and included 
for the survey was representatives of four group’s: law enforcement, accountants, 
prosecutors and money laundering reporting officers.  There was no control over 
who, in those groups, would complete the survey. This method ruled out the 
possibility that the end results were biased by the way in which the sample was 
chosen. Table 3.18 describes the non-probability sampling plan using purposive 
sampling technique. 
 
Table 3.21: Sampling Plan 
 
Sampling Method Non-probability sampling 
Purposive sampling 
 
Sampling Groups Law Enforcement 
Accountants 
Prosecutors 
MLRO’s 
 
 Location United Kingdom 
Techniques Survey Monkey 
Email link 
 
Access Working groups 
Associations 
Training Academy 
Financial Institutions 
 
Responses 
 
272 Responses 
 
The surveys were sent to institutions and working groups within the designated 
groups. Experts with working knowledge of the AML process within those groups 
were the target group for the survey. Many emails were sent in order to get the 
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number of responses necessary for analysis. Some duplication was necessary 
as the author had no knowledge of who had completed the survey and some 
respondents will have received multiple requests. Although the author was a 
member of a number of working groups with extensive membership, he had no 
influence or knowledge of whom within those groups would complete the survey. 
 
The questionnaire was accessible through survey monkey and accessed by 
respondents via email link. The responses were collated over a two month period 
prior to exporting on to SPSS for analysis. Exportation could have been carried 
out periodically as the results arrived but the decision was to wait until all 
responses were collated and to export all those responses in bulk to SPSS.  
 
An introduction to the research accompanies the questionnaire on survey 
monkey and outlines the purpose of the research, including the anonymity and 
confidentiality aspects of the research (Bryman, 2012).  Electronic surveys are 
increasingly common and used extensively by academics and market 
researchers (Saunders et al, 2009) and apply the same ethical standards as 
paper based surveys. A final response of 272 surveys had been submitted, which 
accounted for a 53% response rate. Section 3.8.3.5 will explain the method of 
analysis using SPSS. The results of the analysis will be provided in Chapter 4. 
  
3.8.3.5 Analytical strategy for the questionnaire 
 
The objective of the questionnaire survey was to seek responses to statement 
items that were built around the theme concepts identified from the qualitative 
phase of the research. The data has been analysed using SPSS Version 19.0 for 
windows, a statistical package for the social sciences. Typically descriptive and 
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inferential statistics as a statistical analysis method are applied to questionnaire 
or survey data (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). These include correlation 
analysis and other regression analysis techniques (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).  
 
A range of statistical analysis techniques in SPSS were used including; 
descriptive statistics and frequencies to summarise and describe the data trends 
using the means and standard deviation, correlation matrix was used to describe 
the relationship and strength between the variables. The variables examined can 
be positively related, negatively related or not related (Hair, 2010). Thereafter 
factor analysis using principal component analysis and varimax rotation was 
applied.  
 
As the research would produce a large data set of different variables and 
questions a statistical technique that would reduce that set into a more 
manageable state to understand it was required. Factor analysis provided that 
technique. The resulting components became composite of the specific items 
which could be interpreted and explained (the terms factors and components are 
interchangeable but to avoid confusion will continue using the term factor). The 
relevant factors in this research are a facet of the broader evaluative dimensions. 
The Factor scores were saved to test for differences in the groups using 
(ANOVA). All statistical tests were applied using a significance level of five 
percent P<0.05.  
 
Prior to the utilisation of factor analysis techniques a number of assumptions 
should be met. The first relates to the correct data and that the data is interval 
level and normally distributed. The second relates to specification error and the 
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inclusion of the correct variables in the model. The third relates to sufficient 
sample size. As the first two assumptions have been met in the conceptual stages 
of the research, sample size will be discussed next in section 3.8.3.6. The flow 
chart showing the five steps for factor analysis is provided at Figure 3.8. This 
section continues with a discussion of each technique used in this study.  
 
Figure 3.8: Five step Plan for Factor Analysis 
 
Step 1 - Is the data suitable for factor analysis? 
Step 2 – How will the factors be extracted? 
Step 3 – What criteria will assist in determining factor rotation 
Step 4 – Selection of rotational method 
Step 5 – Interpretation and labelling 
 
Source: (Williams, 2010:4) 
 
3.8.3.6 Sample size 
Determining if the data is suitable for factor analysis refers to the size of the 
sample and the strength of the relationship among the variables. (MacCallum and 
Wideman, 1999). The number of respondents to the questionnaire was 272, due 
to missing data 164 subjects were suitable for factor analysis. Missing data 
occurred when respondents failed or refused to answer one or more questions in 
the survey. In this case many of the cases removed were because respondents 
had completed only half the questionnaire. Data screening and missing values 
are fully discussed in Chapter 4 section 4.4.2 however at this stage it is important 
to justify the small sample ratio used in this research.  
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There are many diverse opinions on the issue of sample size. As already 
suggested Tabachnick (2007) rule of thumb guides the sample size to 300 cases 
needed for factor analysis. The sample size as Hair et al (1995) suggests should 
be 100 or larger. The sample size in this study was: n = 164.  A further suggestion 
is to have at least 5 times as many observations as there are variables to be 
analysed (Bryant and Yarnold, 1995; Hair et al, 1995).   However, (Comrey, 1973; 
Sapnas and Zeller, 2002; Zhao, 2008; Winter, Dodou and Wieringa, 2009) 
indicate that it is possible to conduct factor analysis with a smaller sample size. 
There are two categories of recommendations concerning minimum sample size 
in factor analysis. First category: that the absolute number of cases (n) is 
important, second category that the subject-to-variable ratio (p) is also important 
(Zhao, 2008).  
 
For small sample size, Sapnas and Zellar (2002) suggest a sample as small as 
50 is sufficient for factor analysis; Gorsuch (1983) recommends n should be at 
least 100, Kline (1979) supported this recommendation. Such rules of thumb can 
sometimes be misleading and may not take into account some of the complex 
dynamics in factor analysis (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang and Hong, 1999).  
 
In terms of participants required for each variable (subject to variable ratios) 
opinions also differ as Zhao (2009) has suggested:  
 A ratio of 20:1. Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 
(1995), in Hogarty, Hines, Kromrey, Ferron, & Mumford, 
(2005) 
 
 Rule of 10. There should be at least 10 cases for each 
item in the instrument being used. (David Garson, 2008; 
Everitt, 1975; Everitt, 1975, Nunnally, 1978, p. 276, in 
Arrindell & van der Ende, 1985, p. 166; Kunce, Cook, & 
Miller, 1975, Marascuilor & Levin, 1983, in Velicer & 
Fava, 1998, p. 232) 
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 Rule of 5. The subjects-to-variables ratio should be no 
lower than 5 (Bryant and Yarnold, 1995, in David Gar-
son, 2008; Gorsuch, 1983, in MacCallum, Widaman, 
Zhang & Hong, 1999; Everitt, 1975, in Arrindell & van 
der Ende, 1985; Gorsuch, 1974, in Arrindell & van der 
Ende, 1985, p. 166) 
 
 A ratio of 3(:1) to 6(:1) of STV is acceptable if the lower 
limit of variables-to-factors ratio is 3 to 6. But, the abso-
lute minimum sample size should not be less than 
250.(Cattell, 1978, p. 508, in Arrindell & van der Ende, 
1985, p. 166) 
 
 Ratio of 2. "[T]here should be at least twice as many 
subjects as variables in factor-analytic investigations. 
This means that in any large study on this account 
alone, one should have to use more than the minimum 
100 subjects" (Kline, 1979, p. 40). 
 
Source: ZHAO, N. 2009. Minimum sample size in factor 
analysis [Online].  [Accessed 11/03 2014]. 
 
 
Studies undertaken to test these guides suggest there was no minimum level of 
N or N:p ratio necessary to achieve good factor recovery across these conditions 
(Hogarty et al, 2005). The justification for factor analysis method of analysis with 
small sample size and subject to variable ratio is justified. In this research the 
ratio 3:1 applies. See Arrindell, Van Der Ende, Cattell (1978), Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham and Black (1995), Garson (2008). 
 
3.8.3.7 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis is used in this study to analyse interrelationships among a large 
number of variables with regard to their underlying dimensions (factors) (Hair et 
al, 2010). The objective for using factor analysis in this research is to find a way 
to reduce the data contained in a number of original variables to a smaller set of 
variates (factors). Factor analysis will search for inter-correlations of the variables 
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contained in the questionnaire (Salkind, 2008).  
 
Factor analysis is used to better understand the relationships between 
respondents’ views on specific areas of AML environment; legislation, criminality, 
SAR process, spend, influence and other activities. Analysis will combine these 
variables into a smaller number of components or factors by analysing the 
responses to the questionnaire. “By providing an empirical estimate of the 
structure of the variables considered, factor analysis becomes an objective basis 
for creating summated scales” (Hair et al, 2010). The components produced, will 
support the objective of this research to identify the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of AML policy implementation in the UK.  
 
3.8.3.8 Data cleaning and data screening 
Data cleaning and data screening refers to the examination of all the input of data 
on SPSS to ensure the entries are correct and checking for missing values in the 
complete data set, prior to any analysis taking place (Field, 2009; Hair, 2010). 
The data in this research was transferred from another source (survey monkey) 
therefore the data was examined for errors using the frequency tool in the 
descriptive function in SPSS. The frequency table produced provides the range 
for each item and frequencies for each variable. Examining the labels and 
measures for each variable and referring back to the variable view in the data set 
will identify errors and provide reassurance that the data is entered correctly.  
 
Missing values were examined using the descriptive statistics function on SPSS. 
A number of charts and tables produced from this function provided an indication 
of the missing values and missing cases. In addition using the exclude list wise 
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and exclude pairwise tools can identify which cases and which values are 
missing. A decision can be made if the cases should be removed. Bar charts and 
tables are also used to illustrate the responses to each question. The descriptive 
table and frequencies table for each variable produced from SPSS provides an 
excellent summary of the data sample and measures (provided at Appendix 3.7 
and 3.8 respectively). These include N value, mean, standard deviation, minimum 
maximum range and the distribution of data illustrated by Skewness and Kurtosis.  
 
It is difficult to understand why some respondents only completed parts of the 
questionnaire, possibly an error on their part or time constraints or some other 
reason. However in order to produce reliable and valid results, data screening 
was important as missing cases and missing values can distort the results of the 
analysis (Field, 2009; Hair, 2010). As the categorical variables rank order scaling 
questions are being analysed separately they will not be included in the factor 
analysis and will not form part of the correlation analysis.  The types of statistical 
tests carried out in response to the survey questions depend on the type of data 
produced. There are three types of questions included in the questionnaire: 
demographic, rating scale and rank order scaling. The tests appropriate for the 
analysis of each question is summarised in Table 3.22. 
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Table 3.22: Overview of statistical tests used to analyse survey data 
Question number Question(s) Format of response 
category 
 
Data analysis 
technique 
 
Section 1 
Question 1 
Can you indicate 
from which group 
of respondents 
you belong? 
5 choices plus (other) 
 
Pearson chi-squared 
 
Section 1 
Question 2 
Please indicate 
your gender? 
2 choices male-female Pearson chi-squared 
 
Section 1 
Question 3 
Please indicate 
your age range 
from the 
following? 
Choice of range between 
18-61+ 
 
Pearson chi-squared 
 
Section 1 
Question 4 
Thinking from 
your own 
perspective, 
please indicate 
the extent that you 
agree or disagree 
with the following 
statement? 
Rating scale question  
Choice of 5 responses 
Five items on a Likert 
scale 
(Strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree or disagree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree) 
Factor analysis 
Correlation  
Principal component 
analysis 
One way ANOVA 
Differences between 
groups 
Section 2 
Question 5 
Please indicate 
the importance 
you attach to each 
of the following as 
a method of 
laundering 
money? 
Rating scale question  
Choice of 5 responses 
Five items on a Likert 
scale (very important, 
important, neither 
important or unimportant, 
unimportant, very 
unimportant) 
Factor analysis 
Correlation  
Principal component 
analysis 
One way ANOVA 
Differences between 
groups 
Section 2 
Question 6 
Please indicate 
your views on a 
scale of 1-8 which 
of the following 
crimes you 
consider provide 
the most funds for 
laundering 
money? 
Rank order scaling 
Choice from 1-8 
 
Descriptive and 
frequency tests on 
SPSS 
 
Section 2 
Question 7 
Please indicate 
the extent that you 
agree or disagree 
with the following 
statement? 
Rating scale question  
Choice of 5 responses 
Five items on a Likert 
scale (Strongly agree, 
agree, neither agree or 
disagree, disagree, 
strongly disagree) 
Factor analysis 
Correlation  
Principal component 
analysis 
One way ANOVA 
Differences between 
groups 
Section 3 
Question 8 
 
Please indicate 
your views on a 
scale of 1-8 the 
extent that the 
following 
professions are 
likely to be used 
for money 
laundering? 
Rank order scaling 
Choice from 1-8 
 
 
 
Descriptive and 
frequency tests on 
SPSS  
 
 
Section 3 
Question 9 
Please indicate 
the extent that you 
agree or disagree 
Rating scale question  
Choice of 5 responses 
 
Factor analysis 
Correlation  
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(Continued) (Continued) 
with the following 
statement? 
(Continued) 
Five items on a Likert 
scale 
(Strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree or disagree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree) 
(Continued) 
Principal component 
analysis 
One way ANOVA 
Differences between 
groups 
Section 4 
Question 10 
Please indicate 
the extent that you 
agree or disagree 
with the following 
statement? 
Rating scale question  
Choice of 5 responses 
Five items on a Likert 
scale 
(Strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree or disagree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree) 
Factor analysis 
Correlation  
Principal component 
analysis 
One way ANOVA 
Differences between 
groups 
Section 5 
Question 11 
Please indicate 
the extent that you 
agree or disagree 
with the following 
statement? 
Rating scale question  
Choice of 5 responses 
Five items on a Likert 
scale 
(Strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree or disagree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree) 
Factor analysis 
Correlation  
Principal component 
analysis 
One way ANOVA 
Differences between 
groups 
Section 6 
Question 12 
Please indicate 
the extent that you 
agree or disagree 
with the following 
statement? 
Rating scale question  
Choice of 5 responses 
Five items on a Likert 
scale 
(Strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree or disagree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree) 
Factor analysis 
Correlation  
Principal component 
analysis 
One way ANOVA 
Differences between 
groups 
Question 13 Please provide 
your comments as 
to what you would 
change in the AML 
system? 
Open ended question Qualitative method 
  
 
In addition, whilst performing factor analysis a number of tests are considered to 
ensure the factors are determined correctly: Communality of the variables, 
number of factors/number of variables, size of loading and model fit are all applied 
during the factor analysis process, thus ensuring a reliable and validated method. 
Firstly to determine the strengths of the variable relationships the correlation 
analysis is applied. 
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3.8.3.9 Correlation matrix 
The correlation matrix presented under the descriptive feature in SPSS presents 
the intercorrelations between the variables. The dimensionality of this matrix can 
be reduced by visually scanning for variables that correlate highly with a group of 
other variables, but also for others that do not correlate with other groups. The 
removal of the variables that do not correlate from the matrix can reduce down to 
the underlying group of variables or factors (correlation matrix of all the variables 
is provided at Appendix 3.9).  
 
Two further tests using SPSS can test the factorability of the data. Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity recommends significance at (p<0.05) and the Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy should range between 0-1 with 0.7 being 
the cut off value representing factorability. Data that falls below these measures 
should be excluded (Wilkins and Huisman, 2011). Kaisers criterion or eigenvalue 
rule suggest that only factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or more can be retained 
for further analysis. The eigenvalue of a factor extracted represents the total 
variance explained by that factor. Criticism of this technique holds that relied on 
its own, too many factors can be retained. However in combination with Catell’s 
scree test this technique can be refined. SPSS using Catell’s scree test can plot 
the eigenvalues on a chart in the shape of a curve. Once the curve changes 
direction and becomes horizontal Catell suggests retaining those factors above 
the elbow or break in the curve. By applying this method can reinforce Keiser’s 
value but can disregard those factors that are irrelevant or explain less of the 
variance. (Chapter 4 section 4.4.3 will provide details of the actual measures 
within this analysis).  
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3.8.3.10 Principal component analysis  
Out of a variety of methods the principal component analysis method within factor 
analysis is the most commonly used method used to extract or identify the 
underlying factors. These are the smallest number of factors best used to 
represent the inter-relationships among the variables. Determining which factors 
best describes the underlying relationship can be approached from two positions, 
exploratory or confirmatory. In this case it is best approached from an exploratory 
position. Exploratory factor analysis is used in this research and provides the 
solution by allowing experimentation of the data until a satisfactory structure is 
found. There is no prior theory as in confirmatory analysis and factor loadings are 
used to instruct the factor structure of the data, confirmatory analysis is used to 
test the extent a researcher’s a-priori theoretical pattern of factor loadings or pre 
specified constructs represent the actual data. (Hair et al 2010). In this research 
in order to reach a satisfactory number of factors “fit for purpose” a number of 
items that were inconsistent were removed and the data re-run until a satisfactory 
structure was achieved.  
 
3.8.3.11 Orthogonal Varimax rotation method 
PCA (as in this research) uses orthogonal varimax rotation to interpret the factors. 
If left un-rotated the factors would unlikely achieve an adequate interpretation 
(Hair, 2010). Rotating using factor loadings will make the variables/items 
representative of the factor and therefore simplifies the factor structure for 
interpretation and labelling. Orthogonal rotation using varimax provides a simpler 
separation of the factors. Simple structure means a condition in which variables 
load at near 1 and which indicate significance; similarly variables that load near 
0 are not significant. Simple structure therefore simplifies the task of interpreting 
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the factors.  In contrast to orthogonal rotation, oblique rotation which can also be 
used allows correlated factors instead of maintaining independence between 
rotated factors. 
 
The factor loadings in a rotation method are guided by sample size. Factor 
loadings greater than + 0.30 are considered to meet the minimal level of 
interpretation of structure and require a sample size of 350: Loadings greater than 
+ 0.40 are considered more significant and require a sample size of 200. Loading 
+ 0.50 or greater are considered practically significant (Hair et al, 2010). A loading 
>0.40 was the requirement in this research as the sample size was n=164. 
Statistically 0.40 follows the guidelines provided by Hair et al (2010) for significant 
factor loadings based on sample size and ensures practical significance as 0.40 
translates to 20% of variance accounted for by the factor.  
 
As discussed above there are a number of techniques within SPSS that can 
assist in the decision as to the number of factors to retain. These are Kaiser’s 
criterion and Catell’s Scree test. A third test for reliability and validity of factors is 
the Chronbach Alpha test. Chronbach’s alpha reliability test is a measure of 
internal consistency that will show how closely related the set of items are in each 
factor group.  The output is assessed by following the rule of George and Mallery 
(2003) which indicates acceptable values. The values ranged from those greater 
than 0.9 (Excellent), greater than 0.8 (Good), greater than 0.7 (Acceptable), 
greater than 0.6 (Questionable), greater than 0.5 (Poor), and less than 0.5 
(Unacceptable). Chronbach alpha reliability coefficient normally ranges between 
0 and 1. The closer the coefficient was to 1.0, the better the consistency of the 
items (variables) in the scale. Chronbach alpha coefficient increases either as the 
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number of items/variables increase, or as the average inter-item correlations 
increase. The analysis and results of the above methods are produced at Chapter 
4 section 4.4.1.  
 
3.8.3.12 Triangulation of methods 
 
 
At this point in the thesis it is worthwhile considering the direction of the research 
and how phases 1 theme identification; phase 2 focus group interviews and 
phase 3 questionnaires have developed the research. The sequential design 
allows data to flow from one phase to the next to inform and enrich each phase 
in the research. Consideration is necessary at the final phase 4 component 
verification, to apply a method of validation that would result in greater confidence 
in the findings of the statistical analysis. As figure 3.9 above suggests qualitative 
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methods of investigation in phase 1 and phase 2 have been combined with 
quantitative methods in phase 3. Morgan (1997) argues that the combined use of 
quantitative and qualitative methods will contribute “something unique to the 
researchers understanding of the phenomenon under study…known as 
triangulation” (Liamputtong, 2011:93). The triangulation of methods will be 
complete by validating the results using a qualitative method.   
 
Triangulation is often used to cross-check the results from both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  In addition to allowing the 
cross checking of data, using both methods in conjunction with each other allows 
access to different levels of reality. Multiple perspectives become available and 
a broader level of interpretation can add value to the validation process whether 
the results are corroborated or not. The objective of the final phase of this 
research design is to use the triangulation of methods to add validity to the results 
and robustness to the methodological approach (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
Focus groups can be deployed as a follow up to in-depth interviews and individual 
interviews can be deployed as a follow up to questionnaire surveys (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). In this research rather than using a statistical method to confirm the 
results of the factor analysis, more contextual data would be obtained from 
triangulation using a qualitative method. A short survey instrument will be used in 
the final phase of this research. Triangulation of methods therefore will provide 
responses from individuals who are more closely aligned to the subject; provide 
corroboration of the results and provide data that will develop understanding of a 
complex AML concept (Liamputtong, 2011). Section 3.8.4 describes the use of 
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individuals from the original focus groups as the follow up method to confirmation 
of the quantitative results.  
 
3.8.4 Phase 4 Component verification 
Phase 4 component verification is the concluding process used to verify and 
interpret the results of the statistical analysis. As Stewart suggests: “Focus 
groups can also be employed as a confirmatory method” (Stewart et al, 2009: 
590).  
 
Justification for this method can be found in the work of Makhoul and Nakhash 
(2007) that used focus groups to verify the results of quantitative community 
indicators. They suggested the qualitative contribution was more sensitive to the 
contextual meaning than the quantitative approaches; however both approaches 
contributed to the completeness of the phenomenon of interest and provided 
additional pieces of the puzzle. In their research they contend that if they did not 
go back to the original groups to verify the collected data, their intervention 
planning might have missed important issues which required attention 
(Liamputtong, 2011). Using all or some of the original focus group participants in 
the follow up method is widely acknowledged. Patton (2002), Cho and Trant 
(2006) Lambert and Loiselle (2008) Padgett (2008) and Liamputtong (2011). 
 
Using a sample of the original focus group participants in this research will 
contribute something unique to the understanding of AML process and help 
facilitate the interpretation. Each participant has expert knowledge of the AML 
environment; presenting the results to them and asking how the results make 
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sense to them will illicit results that will have more meaning and more depth than 
from a statistical confirmatory method. (Morgan, 1988; Liamputtong, 2011). 
 
3.8.4.1 Survey instrument, pilot test and feedback 
The survey instrument was designed by considering a number of important 
factors Dillman 2010): 
 A short survey instrument was required with open ended questions to allow 
detailed responses 
 
 The main objective being to verify the results through comments in 
response to the above three questions  
 
 The question “do you agree with the result obtained through factor 
analysis” may have provided a yes or no answer but not have given the 
opportunity for extended responses 
 
 The three questions should provide participants the opportunity to relay 
responses that relate to both the research question and verification of the 
factor analysis results 
 
In light of the above considerations three suitable questions were designed that 
would gather the appropriate responses. Once the survey instrument was 
completed it was piloted with one individual with an AML background but 
unconnected to the original focus groups.  The completed survey was returned 
within a couple of days and the first note acknowledged that the factor results 
were significant; in his opinion, and therefore validated. This response 
acknowledged that the questions without directly asking if the factors were valid 
produced the correct response. Further responses relating to all three questions 
were also supplied. No issues were found that required a review of the 
introductory letter or of the three questions. 
 
Following the pilot feedback, phase 4 verification could proceed. The results of 
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the factor analysis were provided to five participants, one from each of the five 
original focus groups of Law Enforcement, Accountants, Prosecutors, MLRO’S 
and Ex-Offenders. Each participant was contacted by email with detailed 
instructions (Copy of the email is provided at Appendix 3.10). Each participant 
was asked to comment on the results of the factor analysis by viewing the labelled 
factors and to answer the following questions relating to those factors in their 
responses. Questions used for the verification process are summarised in Table 
3.23 below.  
 
Table 3.23 Questions to Participants  
 
Question 1 
“In light of the statements underlying each factor how do you see them informing 
policy in the AML arena”? 
 
Question 2 
“Do the statements suggest that current approaches are effective? 
 
Question 3 
“How do you see the interpretation of these results in light of the research 
question”? 
 
 
The responses in some respects were brief and purely acknowledged their 
agreement of the factor results and others provided a more detailed response. 
Following up interviews with the original focus group participants is a recognised 
method. (Morgan, 1998) “The researcher can generate initial data and then go 
on to follow up and obtain more data were necessary to answer the research 
question” (Liamputtong, 2011:94). The results of the verification process are 
provided in the Analysis Chapter 4 section 4.5.  
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3.8.4.2 Examining group differences 
Examining group differences was not an objective for this study. However, in light 
of the use of groups in both the qualitative and quantitative phases and potential 
significant differences between and within the groups, a further analysis was 
necessary. This section describes the method of grouping the respondents from 
the questionnaire and the analysis method used. 
 
Question 1 of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate which group of 
experts they belonged: law enforcement, accountants, prosecutors or MLROs. 
Analysis of Variance (One-way ANOVA) on SPSS provides a method of 
determining the difference between the responding groups who completed the 
questionnaire survey. The data necessary for the assessment was already 
contained within the data file on SPSS from the previous factor analysis. As the 
number of respondents from group B Prosecutors (4 responses) was low they 
were amalgamated into a new group (Enforcement) for this analysis.   
 
The resulting P value can be used to test the null hypothesis that data from all 
groups are drawn from populations with identical means (MacCallum and 
Wideman, 1999 ; Field, 2007; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Wilkins and Husman, 
2011). One–way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests if the means across a 
number of groups are equal. Test statistic “F” represents a standardized ratio of 
variability in the sample means relative to the variability within the groups. The F 
ratio is computed from the ANOVA table and the P value is computed from the F 
ratio. The Sig or P value was calculated on group responses to factors 1, 
Sentencing/Deterrent; Factor 2, Compliance Reporting and Factor 3, Criminal 
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Knowledge. Any value less than 0.05 is significant and any value greater than 
0.05 is not significant.  
 
An ANOVA test show’s if there was a significant difference between the groups 
however the test does not indicate which of the groups differ. In order to separate 
the groups after the initial ANOVA test a Post-hoc test is carried out using Tukey 
“honestly significant difference (HSD)” test comparison.  
 
Question 2 and question 3 of the questionnaire sought responses from 
participants of their age (from an age range 18-61+) and gender. As the data 
relating to these responses was contained within the data file a test was run to 
extrapolate the results from these questions.   A chi-square test is a simple 
procedure on SPSS to produce and present these results. The analysis and 
results of the different groups is provided at Chapter 4 section 4.4.2.  
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3.9 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter outlined the strategy for this research. The strategy took into account 
the research question, the theoretical concept under study and the 
epistemological position of the researcher. A number of aims were discussed to 
provide direction to the research. The strategy took into account the mixed 
method design and separated the research into 4 manageable phases.  
 
Phase 1 
Themes  
Provided the development of themes from literature on money 
laundering measurement as a starting point for the research 
which included FATF recommendations 
Phase 2 
Focus Groups 
 
Provided the collection of data through focus group interviews as 
a validation of existing themes and identification of emergent 
themes 
Phase 3 
Questionnaires 
Provided the collection of data through survey questionnaire and 
statistical analysis using factor analysis 
Phase 4 
Component 
Verification 
Provided the verification of the results of factor analysis using 
individuals from the original focus groups as the verification group 
 
The qualitative phase of the research identified participants for focus group 
interviews from law enforcement, accountants, prosecutors, MLRO’s and ex-
offenders who could provide opinions on Anti-Money Laundering. Meticulous 
methods were employed to collect, analyse and record data. The confirmation of 
themes arose from this analysis. The themes are to assist in the development of 
a survey questionnaire in the quantitative stage of the research. The development 
of the questionnaire survey was assisted with data from similar areas of research 
in the AML area. Statements formed the questionnaire items and these were 
measured using five point Likert scaling. The questionnaire was pilot tested prior 
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to distribution through survey monkey. The results of the survey were exported 
to SPSS and analysed using factor analysis techniques. 
  
The results of the statistical analysis were sent to a representative of each of the 
original focus group participants for their comments. These comments will form 
part of the conclusions to this research in chapter 5. 
 
Reliability and validity throughout the study was delivered through the steps of 
the process and the techniques in the analysis of the data in both qualitative and 
quantitative phases of the research. Chapter 4 will discuss the analysis of each 
of the 4 phases.  
 
 
  
201 
 
Chapter 4: Data analysis results and discussion 
of findings  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presents the analysis and results followed by a discussion of the 
findings of all the data relating to the research question:  
“What are the Factors that Influence the Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering 
Policy Implementation in the UK”? 
 
The following aims assisted toward finding the appropriate solution to the 
question:   
1. To identify and draw from literature in the AML arena evidence of themes 
that relate component activities that could be used as a starting point for 
this research. 
2. To establish a research strategy that would develop the themes identified 
in phase 1 and follow a logical sequence of activities to answer the 
research question. 
3. To use methods in the gathering and analysis of data that will complement 
the research strategy that are reliable and valid in respect of the 
researcher’s philosophical position which can be replicated in future 
research.  
4. To ensure the research is compliant with all aspects of the University 
ethical considerations.  
 
A reminder of the sequential nature of this research relating to the analysis is 
provided below in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: Illustrates the sequential mixed method design 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1 discusses the identification of themes from literature that surrounds 
FATF recommendations, scale and measurement of money laundering and cost 
of the effectiveness of AML policy as a starting point for this research. Phase 2 
discusses the analysis of the focus group interview transcripts that determine the 
verification of themes. Phase 3 discusses the analysis of the questionnaire 
responses which utilise factor analysis to determine significant 
 
Literature Review 
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Reading/highlighting 
Thematic Analysis 
Coding 
Recurring themes 
 
Analysis and findings from each phase of the research informed the   
next phase.  
Phase 1 - Phase 4. 
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Key word search 
Coding 
Quotation method 
NVIVO 19 
Phase 3 
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SPSS 
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Principle Component 
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Verification  
  
Participants from 
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Three questions 
relating to Factor 
results 
 
Comparisons  
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components/factors and one way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) to determine 
group comparisons. Phase 4 discusses the analysis of the verification of factors 
using a sample of individuals who participated in the original focus groups. The 
construction and utilisation of methods in each phase are previously discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Because of the sequential nature of the methods used and in order to fully present 
the findings of this research, the analysis of each phase will be presented 
separately. This will be followed by a concluding section that discusses the 
findings from the verification group in phase 4. In order to achieve the aims of this 
research as discussed in Chapter One and Chapter three, it was important to 
draw relevant themes for inclusion in phase 2 and the sequential design strategy 
that flows into phase 3 and phase 4. The analysis and findings of Phase 1 are 
presented in the following sections. 
 
4.2 Phase 1 Identification of Themes from Literature  
The objective of phase 1 was to provide a starting point for this research by 
identifying themes relevant to the activities performed by stakeholders in the anti-
money laundering environment. The literature review in Chapter 2 has already 
suggested that specific literature relating to Anti Money Laundering policy is 
sparse. However, there is an abundance of literature in three areas from which 
the themes required for this research could be drawn. The first area relates to 
recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 1989); an Inter-
Governmental Organisation that provided Anti-Money Laundering (AML) 
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recommendations on a global basis.  49 recommendations44 were included in the 
FATF literature; however this research analysis drew six themes deemed 
appropriate for this research that encompassed the activity discussed in all of the 
recommendations. Table 4.1 provides the themes drawn from the FATF 
Recommendations. As can be seen from the description on table 4.1 each of the 
themes chosen came from recommendations that encompass a number of 
characteristics within that particular area. Each theme is relevant as 49 countries 
deemed those areas of AML as significant areas to apply to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing.  
 
Table 4.1: Themes drawn from FATF Recommendations 
 
FATF Recommendations Research Analysis Themes 
Recommendation 1,2 Legal Systems 
Recommendation 3 Restraint and Confiscation 
Recommendations 4-22,33-34 Money Laundering Prevention 
Recommendation 23-25 Regulation and Supervision 
Recommendation 26-32 Law Enforcement powers 
Recommendation 35-40 International Co-operation 
 
The second area relates to research that studied the scale and measurement of 
money laundering. The inclusion of this concept can be answered by resolving 
the question “why measure money laundering”? The quantification of money 
laundering is relevant because it provides a measure of the phenomenon and its 
impact on the legal economy, it influences risks to financial institutions through 
their transactions and determines measures to counter money laundering activity 
                                            
44 FATF Recommendations can be found at www.fatf-org 
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(Biagioli, 2008). Therefore the models used to measure that activity incorporate 
many methods and techniques that provided key areas for the identification of 
themes for this study.  
 
The third area relates to the cost of the effectiveness of AML policy. As previously 
suggested research in this area has used output indicators as a means to 
measure and evaluate the effectiveness of countermeasures adopted to combat 
money laundering. The output indicators referred to relate to obligations and 
controls introduced by AML regulations. As in the above ‘scale of money 
laundering concept’ this area also provides key areas for the identification of 
themes for this study. 
 
Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 provided a description of previous research in the AML 
environment relevant to this study. Included in the table was a description of the 
methods used by researchers to obtain data to measure two areas: a) the scale 
of money laundering and b) the cost of the effectiveness of AML policy. Table 4.2 
below provides a similar description however presented in this table is the 
inclusion of themes identified from both areas of literature for this research. The 
column marked ‘Themes’ in Table 4.2 provides a list of the themes identified from 
each authors work. Similarities from each author can be seen throughout this 
column such as crime reports, crime trends SARs and spending activity.    
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Table 4.2: An extension of Table 3.6 Chapter 3  
 
Author Research Themes 
Walker J (1999; 
1999a; 2005) 
“Measurement of money 
laundering” To identify methods 
and trends in money laundering 
in and through Australia since 
1995 
Crime reports    
Crime trends 
Crime types 
Policy 
Regulation 
Organised crime 
Prevention of ML 
Bank secrecy 
Shadow economy 
Van Duyne P (2008) “In search of crime-money 
management in Serbia” 
SAR reports 
Crime reports 
Spending activity 
Policy  
Regulation 
Fleming M. H (2005) “UK Law Enforcement Agency 
Use and Management of 
Suspicious Activity Reports: 
Towards Determining the Value 
of the Regime” 
Asset recovery 
Restraint 
Confiscation 
SAR reports 
Crime reports 
Policy analysis 
Investigation 
Criminal spend 
Criminal behaviour 
Regulation 
Ferwerda J (2008) 
 
“The Economics of Crime and 
Money laundering, Does Anti-
money laundering Policy 
reduce crime”? 
Case studies 
Document analysis 
Crime types 
Policy analysis 
Crime stats 
Interviews 
Victim surveys 
FATF  
recommendations 
AML Policy 
Regulation 
Pietschmann T and 
Walker J, (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Estimating illicit financial flows 
resulting from drug trafficking 
and other transnational 
organized crimes” 
 
 
 
 
Cash movements 
Criminal spend 
Recorded crime 
Crime stats 
Policy analysis 
Drug crime 
Investments 
Proceeds of crime 
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(Continued) (Continued) (Continued) 
Currency demand 
Shadow economy 
Unger B (2007 “The Scale and Impact of 
Money Laundering”  
Measuring money flows in 
Netherlands 
Crime reports    
Crime trends 
Crime types 
Policy 
Regulation 
Organised crime 
Prevention of ML 
Shadow economy 
 
 
The identification of the themes provided in table 4.2 was developed using the 
following process. By reviewing the literature of the authors; noting their 
discussions around methods of measurement; their understanding of AML 
concepts; the AML activity that was deemed relevant for inclusion in their 
research and the organisations they had access to for collecting data. The extract 
provided below from Ferwarder (2008) “The Economics of Crime and Money 
laundering, Does Anti-money laundering Policy reduce crime”? provides a visual 
illustration of this method and the marking up of the themes identified. The 
highlighted portions illustrate the original documentation and the importance of 
‘crime types’, victim surveys and ‘crime statistics’ activities in AML policy 
effectiveness.   
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 (Ferwarder, 2008:908-909) 
 
Since crime is, by definition, an illegal act, it is likely that every method used to measure the actual 
amount (or level) of crime is inaccurate. “Data on the extent and variety of criminal activity pertain 
almost exclusively to crimes in which victims report the offense to authorities” (Levitt and Miles, 
2007:458). This limitation also constrains the empirical part of this paper.5 There are many kinds of 
crime statistics, but basically they can be divided into two groups: police-recorded and based-on-
victim surveys. The first is the amount of crime detected by the police or similar law enforcement 
agencies. The most reliable sources for this kind of data are the European Sourcebook of Crime 
and Criminal Justice Statistics and the crime statistics gathered by Interpol and the United Nations. 
The latter, victim surveys, are statistics that are gathered by interviewing households or individuals 
trying to detect the victims of crime. The most reliable statistic of this kind is the International 
Crime Victims Survey (ICVS). 
 
Both kinds of data have their advantages and disadvantages. Police-recorded crime statistics are of-
ten readily available, are reliable in terms of the right classification of the crime, and are not biased 
by the perceptions of individuals. The downside is that these crime statistics are only measuring the 
amounts of caught crime, which means that crime is always underestimated. However, this will not 
hurt the empirical research if the rate at which actual crimes are 5  
 
My conclusion is that for this research, police-recorded crime statistics are the best possible proxy 
for crime, because of its better availability and because it includes more crimes that are relevant for 
money laundering,7  which is in line with most of the studies in this research field (Eide, 2000:366). For 
this research, the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics is used, since it has 
comparable data on almost all of the countries in the dataset.8 The selected countries are all devel-
oped countries, with many of them in the same region (Europe).  
 
A discussion of each of the areas of literature used has already been provided in 
Chapter 3. Merging both sets of data provided powerful acknowledgement of the 
kind of activity that is important in the AML environment. Section 4.2.1 discusses 
the emergence of the themes for phase 2 of this research.  
 
4.2.1 Final set of themes 
The final set of themes was developed using the following process: FATF 
recommendations apply to a wide range of AML activity and as such provided the 
main theme headings. Themes drawn from literature were allocated under one of 
the main FATF headings. Rather than have too many similar themes a number 
of the AML processes could be allocated under the one heading. Table 4.3 
provides a visual demonstration of the allocation of themes from each location. 
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Table 4.3: Allocation of Themes 
 
 
FATF 
Themes 
 
Legal System 
 
Regulation  
and 
Supervision 
 
Law 
Enforcement 
 
 
Money 
laundering 
Prevention 
 
Restraint and  
Confiscation 
 
International  
Co-operation 
 
 
 
Literature 
Themes 
 
Policy 
Regulation 
 
Crime trends 
Crime types 
Crime reports 
Investigation 
Criminal 
behaviour 
 
Prevention 
SAR reports 
 
Bank secrecy 
Shadow Economy  
Proceeds of crime 
Restraint/Confiscation 
Cash movement 
New 
Themes 
 
Legislation Criminality SAR Process Spend 
 
By merging the themes drawn from literature to the FATF themes it became 
evident that some duplication would occur. In addition some of the FATF themes 
required to be re-labelled to extend the coverage of activity for that theme. For 
example FATF uses the heading ‘restraint and confiscation’, restraint and 
confiscation was also a theme identified from the literature review. As both of 
these activities were similar to cash movements, proceeds of crime and shadow 
economy the heading was re-labelled to include all of these activities under the 
theme heading “Spend”. Similar circumstances applied to the headings “Legal 
system” and “Regulation and Supervision” which has now been changed to 
“Legislation”. “Law enforcement” has now been changed to “Criminality”, “Money 
Laundering Prevention” has now been changed to “SAR Process” and 
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“International Co-operation” has been removed to be included under the umbrella 
“Spend”. The re-labelling does not change the character of the themes but 
enhances the theme by giving it a wider scope of activity that will aid the 
discussions in focus group interviews in phase 2.  
  
The above examples show that a number of themes have been identified 
throughout the analysis and therefore suitable for phase 2 focus group interviews. 
Validation of each theme is provided through recurrence in the analysis of 
relevant literature that concentrates on AML recommendations, money 
laundering measurement and AML Policy effectiveness.  Each theme could then 
be directed to phase 2 focus group interviews for confirmation. This is discussed 
in Section 4.3.  
 
4.3 Phase 2 Focus Group interviews and analysis 
Focus group interviews were made up of five groups from key stakeholders 
involved in the AML process. The groups included law enforcement and 
prosecutor groups from a criminal justice perspective, accountants and MLROs 
from a regulatory perspective and finally ex-offenders from a social behavioural 
perspective. For ease of referencing when discussing the results each group has 
been identified as follows: 
Law Enforcement                             Group A 
Accountants                                     Group B  
Prosecutors                                      Group C 
MLROs                                            Group D 
Ex-Offenders                                    Group E 
 
211 
 
The primary objective of the focus group interviews was to validate and extend 
the themes identified in phase 1 from literature into themes for questionnaire 
development and subsequent analysis. Morgan (1997) suggests, being confident 
whether focus groups are appropriate for a research project or not is to ask “how 
actively and easily the participants would discuss the topic of interest” 
(Liamputtong, 2011:8). Four of the stakeholder groups who participated in the 
focus group interviews were subject experts within the AML process. The 
remaining group ex-offenders provided a new dimension to this area of research 
for data collection. All of the groups were enthusiastic and informative. The 
themes provided for the focus groups from phase 1 include:   
Legislation                Criminality                  SAR Process                    Spend 
 
After analysis of the focus group data the themes were extended to include: 
Influence and Other activities. Section 4.3.1 discusses the process of analysis 
that identified further themes and results. 
 
Legislation   Criminality   SAR Process   Spend   Influence   Other Activities 
 
4.3.1 Analysis and results of Focus Groups interviews 
Question prompts were used to introduce the themes to the groups. The prompts 
also provided a suitable reference to conduct the interviews and regulate the flow 
of discussion. A description of how the focus groups were constructed and 
conducted was provided in chapter 3. Table 4.4 below provides an example of 
the question prompts used.  
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Table 4.4: Example of Question Prompts for Focus Groups. 
 
  
Q1. What are your views on sentencing and confiscation as a deterrent? 
Q2. What are your views on incentivisation - money making exercise or    
deterrent? 
Q3. What is your view on hierarchy of crime i.e. organised crime? 
Q4. Are there levels of money launderers? 
Q5. Are there professional money launderers? 
 
 
The five focus groups produced approximately 60,000 words of transcript. 
Analysis of the transcripts followed the guidance of Morgan (1998) who 
suggested that the analysis applied to focus group data should fit the purpose of 
the research. In this case the purpose of focus groups was to validate themes. 
During this analysis the object was not to search for how many times each theme 
would be used but to look at the theme activity and the importance each group 
focused on that activity through their discussions. Following this process would 
highlight themes for validation.  
 
Analysis of the focus group data provided a series of quotations from the 
transcribed text. (An example of the quotations has been provided at Appendix 
3.4) The quotes were chosen as a direct result of the reading and re-reading of 
the transcripts from each group (the unit of analysis) and highlighting text that 
described a particular theme (the code category). In each example provided a 
direct link can be seen between the theme and quotation in the text. Key word 
search was an additional method used to identify further quotations based on 
themes already provided and to ensure nothing was missed that could impact on 
the results. A further search of the data involved the use of NVIVO software. This 
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technique did not produce any further results however was an additional tool to 
add validity to the process.   
 
The analysis was carried out by the researcher who was also the moderator 
within the focus group interviews (Liamputtong, 2011). As researcher and 
moderator, the role offered a number of advantages and a number of concerns. 
Whilst the role of both can be advantageous in that the direction of the 
discussions can be maintained in a more structured format. The researcher 
knows what he wants from the interviews and can control through questions the 
topics for discussion. A less structured interview would allow the individuals to 
pursue their own interests. A concern with the researcher being the moderator 
may also be seen as too controlling and that loss of rich data relevant to the 
subject may be lost (Morgan, 1998). The researcher being conscious of the above 
concerns provided a semi structured interview that allowed full flowing 
discussion, whilst maintaining a degree of control through the use of question 
prompts. The benefit of this process ensured a clear understanding of 
observation during the focus group interviews. Closeness to the data eased the 
analysis process, as some topical areas were clear from observation and others 
emerged from analysis of the data (Morgan, 1998). Table 4.5 provides an 
example of the process of analysis discussed when themes were highlighted. 
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Table 4.5: Example of Text Analysis highlighting a theme 
 
Quotation Theme 
“Either one of those things should end up 
with a jail sentence of some sort as a 
deterrent…Well if they’re convicted that’s 
deterrent. But if they can’t even get them into 
the court in the first place”. 
 
 
Deterrent 
“I would say there are professional money 
launderers at the top end, there has to be, 
whether it’s laundering cash or just 
laundering cheques or money that’s come 
across a computer screen that’s just 
bouncing around different accounts.  I mean 
there has to be. Someone who launders 
money, big sums, it’s going to be pretty 
much a full time job, and they’re going to take 
their cut for that”. 
 
 
 
 
Level of Money Launderers 
“where we were looking for lots of banking 
information for companies operating in 
Europe and in USA, you know there’s a lot 
of, so clearly there probably, there is a trend 
I think in using Companies more”. 
 
 
Spending 
“I don’t know what you’re like, but business 
Managers are not as quick to send in SARs 
as the retail staffs are, branch staff, they are 
very clued in”. 
 
 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) 
“So we do find it beneficial and you know one 
of the things that we have to do is 
demonstrate competency so if the regulator, 
if the FSA are coming in, as they have done 
and asked to see what type of training we 
provide and how do you measure 
competency, yes there’s a bank of questions 
that the person has to answer”. 
 
 
 
Regulation 
 
 
Table 4.6 provides an example of the emergence of a further theme as developed 
from the transcripts. 
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Table 4.6 Example of analysis of focus group data from Group D that 
introduced a new theme. 
 
 
TRANSCRIPT 
“So we do find it beneficial and you know one of the things that we have to do is 
demonstrate competency so if the regulator, if the FSA are coming in, as they 
have done and asked to see what type of training we provide and how do you 
measure competency, yes there’s a bank of questions that the person has to 
answer”. 
 
EMERGING THEME 
Influence/Regulatory control 
 
 
Table 4.7 provides an example of the process of theme validation within the focus 
group interviews when agreement existed. The example describes two 
processes: firstly the link between the theme and the quote is apparent as the 
quotation describes the deterrent value of sentencing and confiscation. Secondly 
the quotations show agreement between the two focus groups; Law Enforcement 
and MLRO through their discussions.  
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Table 4.7: Example of theme agreement between two groups 
 
Focus Groups Group A and Group D     
 
Prompt 
 
“What are your views on sentencing and 
confiscation as a deterrent”? 
 
 
 
Quote from group A 
Law Enforcement 
 
 
 
“No I think the 2002 legislation made the 
confiscation process a lot easier and a lot 
more wide spreading against the 
criminal… certainly from my role as a 
confiscator that it’s quite clear that they 
fear that more than they ever fear a 
prison sentence.  That in itself the 
confiscation scheme and the 2002 Act 
has certainly made the criminals an awful 
lot more aware of what the powers that 
the police can do and can’t do”. 
 
 
Quote from group D MLRO 
 
“I would distinguish between the two, the 
actual sentence in terms of custody in 
money laundering cases in my 
experience is not of huge deterrent value 
because the sentences tend to be quite 
low.  But it’s the confiscation which I think 
is a huge deterrent that really hits them 
where it hurts, in their pocket”. 
 
 
Theme 
 
 
Deterrence/Legislation 
 
Table 4.8 provides an example were no agreement existed between three of the 
groups. The example given demonstrates disagreement about the levels of crime 
targeted by Law Enforcement. One group suggests targeting a higher level of 
criminal such as drug traffickers and organised crime, while another suggests 
lower level criminals such as burglars, robbers and drug dealers are left alone. 
The third group suggests how the targeting of one level of crime has implications 
on the other levels. Appendix 4.1 provides further examples from the analysis of 
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the transcript were agreement and disagreement appeared between groups in 
the focus group interviews.  
Table 4.8: Emergence of Theme were disagreement existed  
 
 
Focus Groups 
 
 
Group B - Group D - Group E 
 
Prompt 
 
“What is your view on hierarchy of crime 
i.e. organised crime”? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quotation 
Accountants 
 
“My perception is that they still go to 
very immediate and to high level, but 
they probably, I would imagine that the 
legislation’s the same whether I’m 
putting, doing six grand a year of 
homers or doing 60 grand a year.  But is 
there any scope then to make that a 
quicker process, that you know in terms 
of returning time that they get more hits 
with the smaller guy because the 
process is more 
straightforward…Because the smaller, 
below a certain threshold it doesn’t 
seem to get touched at all”. 
 
 
 
 
Quotation 
MLROs 
“Well it’s, I’m not saying legitimate, but it 
seems like you know if the law is to tap 
into the higher echelons of it they maybe 
feel that if you take that out you, in some 
indirect way do away with the lower 
stuff”. 
 
 
 
 
Quotation 
Ex-Offenders 
“And that’s were the legislation seems to 
be used and you know we would love to 
see the legislation, from a professional 
point of view and from a decent member 
of side point of view as well, let’s see it 
hitting the big boys”. 
 
 
 
Theme 
 
Levels of Crime/Criminality 
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However, when there is disagreement as in the case above, this suggests the 
theme is important. The fact that there is disagreement the theme should be 
included and questions can be developed in the questionnaire around that area 
of AML. As suggested by Smithson (2008): 
 
“the main issue of analysis in focus groups should not be on what each 
participant says in a group context, but more on the discourses or 
themes that are produced within the group context”. However 
Wilkinson (1998) argues that “there is considerable potential for new 
techniques to analyse focus group data…that allow researchers to see 
how discourses or themes are jointly formed by participants within the 
group”  
 
(Liamputtong, 2011:175).   
 
 Analysis of the transcribed text from the focus groups took into account the 
dynamics of the groups and the formation of the quotes by individuals that were 
based on discussions within the group setting.  
 
Prompts served as a practical structure for organising the theme introduction to 
the discussions. The prompt guide also facilitated the analysis in the same 
manner when looking for comparisons within the groups (Morgan, 1998). 
However, because the dynamics of each group were different and each 
stakeholder group was from different areas of AML process, the purpose of the 
guide was less rigid than expected. The guaranteed flow of discussions did not 
center on each topic at particular points of the discussions. This meant that the 
results of the analysis was not pre-conceived but through the use of the prompts 
was able to validate the initial themes and emergent themes by using the method 
chosen. (Morgan, 1998; Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook, 2007; Liamputtong, 
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2011)  As a result of the analysis methods the following 6 themes have been 
provided:  
 
Legislation   Criminality   SAR Process   Spend   Influence   Other Activities 
 
The results provided in this analysis maintain the authenticity of the context of the 
interviews. There were two considerations concerning the use of text in 
quotations that require explanation: Firstly in order to maintain the authenticity of 
the discussions, the text has remained as spoken and has not been edited.  
 
“Some editing may increase readability, but it is important that the 
character of the respondent’s comments be maintained, even at times 
they use poor grammar or appear to be confused…focus group 
interviewing is to learn how respondents talk and think about a 
particular issue, too much editing and cleaning of the transcripts is 
undesirable and counterproductive”  
 
 
(Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook, 2007:111) 
 
Secondly, the quotations drawn from the focus group interviews on some 
occasions are presented as individual or personal opinions; however the 
comments are from the lived experiences and perspectives on the topics 
discussed by participants in the groups. Experiences and perspectives are less 
limiting than attitudes and opinions as Morgan (1998) suggests: 
 
“even self-reporting behaviour is more useful as data than are 
opinions… discussions of them produce a livelier group 
dynamic…people are more than happy to compare their different 
experiences…perspective implies a broader basis for specific attitudes 
and opinions”.  
 
(Morgan, 1998:25)      
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Validation as described above in the examples given, provided the themes for 
questionnaire development. In addition to the validation of themes there was a 
wealth of rich data that emerged from the interviews that provided a much deeper 
understanding of the underlying influences that directs decision making within the 
AML environment. Section 4.3.2 will present the results of the focus group 
interviews.  
 
4.3.2 Focus Group Interview Results 
In reporting focus group results Morgan (1998) suggests concentrating on what 
is important in the results and balancing the readability of those results, by 
maintaining the richness of the data uncovered and the summarisation of the 
topics. This section will concentrate on the themes provided by focus group 
interviews and the surrounding data that influenced their inclusion in this 
research. The themes are: 
 
Legislation   Criminality   SAR Process   Spend   Agency influence   Other 
Activities 
In summary, the participants in the focus groups discussed issues that they were 
comfortable with, as the topics were within their own environment. There was 
consensus within the groups on some topics and disagreement on others. The 
findings suggest serious frustration in areas such as legislation, enforcement, 
regulation and prosecution of cases. Participants suggested that a review of 
those areas by legislators should be made, to provide a more efficient AML 
process. The following discussions of each theme highlight the areas referred to 
above.   
 
221 
 
Theme 1 Legislation 
The legislation in the UK in relation to money laundering falls under the Proceeds 
of Crime Act (POCA) 2002. In broad terms legislation provides the rules by which 
society is compliant for the greater good of society. Those rules incorporate the 
enforcement of crime through prosecution and punishment of offenders through 
sentencing. As a prevention tool the legislation also acts as a deterrent to those 
considering an offence under the POCA. Much of the discussion in the focus 
groups around legislation related to the effectiveness of the legislation and how 
the legislation is used by enforcement agencies. Although POCA is seen as an 
important tool in the fight against money laundering by all of the participants in 
the groups there were contrasting views as to how effective the legislation was. 
In terms of sentencing some participants suggested that money laundering was 
seen as an attractive crime due to the disparity in sentencing across the UK. 
Courts were not providing the intended deterrent through sentencing after 
conviction and suspended sentences were seen to be a regular occurrence. 
Among the comments regarding legislation were the following: 
 
“Either one of those things should end up with a jail sentence or some 
sort of a deterrent…Well if they’re convicted that’s deterrent. But if they 
can’t even get them into the court in the first place”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
“I would distinguish between the two; the actual sentence in terms of 
custody in money laundering cases in my experience is not of huge 
deterrent value because the sentences tend to be quite low.  But it’s 
the confiscation which I think is a huge deterrent that really hits them 
where it hurts, in their pocket”. 
 
Quote from prosecutors 
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Most of the participants expressed frustration with enforcement through the use 
of the legislation. Legislation not only refers to law enforcement but all the 
stakeholders that are bound by the legislation and regulation that follows from it. 
Enforcement as discussed by the groups drew issues relating to criminal 
knowledge, techniques and financial restraints that restrict law enforcement in 
doing their job. Among the statements regarding this problem were the following: 
  
“Once it goes cross border it grinds to a halt because the natural 
jurisdictions don’t want to work together.  See your biggest issue for 
us in the level of crime that we’re dealing with is, a lot of it is so slow 
for us to investigate because it is outside the immediate jurisdiction”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
 
“If you’re really going to tackle big style money laundering, there needs 
to be much more co-operation across countries otherwise I think it’s, 
it’s really difficult”. 
 
Quote from accountants 
 
Restraint and Confiscation is part of the POCA and is an important tool in the law 
enforcement armoury. Criminals can be restrained from dissipating their assets 
while an investigation into criminal activity is on-going. If the individual is 
convicted a process is set in place that allows the crown to make application to 
the court to confiscate any assets that the person made from their current criminal 
activity and in some cases previous criminal activity. Many of the participants 
reported frustration with the prosecution service in delivering restraints in a timely 
manner before assets were dissipated by the criminal. Participants agreed the 
confiscation process was effective on its own but needed both the restraint and 
confiscation process to work together to ensure no assets were lost.  Some 
participants reported influences in the confiscation process from various quarters 
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that implied abuse of the system and reported by others as a money making 
scheme for government. The following are comments from groups indicating their 
frustration: 
 
“Without anything, any predicate offence to bolt onto that.  Now that 
has changed a little bit but we’re still having major problems getting 
restraints on both, in what is retrained and the length of time it has 
taken the PPS to do that”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
   
“The last one that I dealt with I’m trying to ring the PPS before the 
barrister rings the PPS to tell them that he’s just done a deal in the 
sum of.  And I’m ringing the PPS to get in first to say he’s trying to do 
a deal here and he shouldn’t be doing a deal”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
 
“the whole issue is to get the money in quickly…and its very 
commercially driven…SOCA that’s the mind-set they need to 
bring…how can I make a profit in this”. 
 
 
Quote from accountants 
 
 
Theme 2 Criminality  
The theme ‘criminality’ incorporates areas that reflect levels of money laundering 
crime, in terms of street level crime and organised crime; and perception of the 
types of crime investigated by law enforcement. The participants held contrasting 
views about the effectiveness of crime targeting by law enforcement. Some 
participants suggest lower level criminals are being targeted by law enforcement 
as they are easy prey. While other groups suggest low level criminals are left 
alone. On the other hand some participants indicated they would like to see more 
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targeting of the crime bosses as only a few high level cases are being brought 
before the courts. Some agreement is provided that suggests the sentencing of 
offenders for money laundering is relatively low and not in keeping with the 
seriousness of the offence as imparted by the legislation. Some of the comments 
that reflect these views are provided below: 
 
“punitive sentencing…Makes money laundering an attractive crime if 
you have the werewithal to provide that service for other individuals, 
for the risk is relatively low but the pay back is high….Ask any criminal 
will he take a suspended sentence”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
 
“I think some of our exposure to cases and, cases in which money 
laundering and legislation is, is the governing legislation.  I think we 
have had, not concern but we have commented certainly in the past 
that money laundering legislation seems to be used against those low 
level drug dealer type criminals, the street dealer type and we haven’t 
seen it as effective against the upper end of the drugs chain”. 
 
 
Quote from prosecutors 
 
 
 
“what I do know is, there’s so many layers of money laundering and 
we’re saying from the guy in the street that sells you a £2 DVD, cos 
they’re coming from somewhere, coming from somewhere to, to the 
higher echelons of money laundering, I don’t, I can’t see how it can be 
effectively policed or controlled or managed”. 
 
Quote from ex-offenders 
 
The perception of crime relates to how the participants in the groups viewed 
particular crimes. This is important as many of the crimes committed relate to 
money laundering crime activities which are acquisitive crimes. POCA legislation 
can only operate when the predicate crime is an acquisitive crime of monetary 
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value. Sometimes this is viewed as a victimless crime as there is no physical hurt 
on an individual as in the case of an assault. Discussion that centred on the public 
perception of money laundering crime and how effectively it was dealt with 
provided an important viewpoint. The suggestion by some participants that 
crimes against the government are acceptable crimes or victimless crime; for 
example smuggling cigarettes or tax evasion, this was in contrast to some groups 
perceptions that they were not equipped to report crimes such as tax evasion or 
benefit fraud. Comments such as: 
  
“The public, there’s a message. There’s a perception of acceptance 
within the community around crimes against Government, tax 
evasion”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
“And then you have individuals, and that’s sometimes staff would 
struggle with the idea that the guy who’s doing the homers45, who’s 
maybe doing 20, £30,000 a year homers, he’s not a criminal, he’s not 
a money launderer.  In their eyes and it’s more educating them to the 
point that that is still tax evasion”.  
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
Participants who are stakeholders who work in direct contact with the public also 
found difficulties with their staff rationalising reporting particular crimes. If the 
crime wasn’t within their remit it was set aside. Comments such as: 
 
“Yeah there’s SARs you can categorise you know as being tax 
evasion, benefit fraud, then the other ones that you have no idea 
what’s behind them ”. 
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
                                            
45 “homers” refers to carrying out work without the knowledge of tax authorities 
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From a community perspective some participants suggested when times are hard 
you turn a blind eye to some activity. Some individuals would see selling drugs 
by an individual as wrong but the same individual selling cigarettes or evading 
tax they seen as legitimate. Comments relating to these issues are provided:  
 
“Now our difficulty is here, if we know that people are doing that and 
they get away with it we usually suspect that they’re police touts, or 
they’re working for the police”. 
 
 
 
“Aye it’s a wee bit like, you know white collar crime, you know what I 
mean, that sometimes people let it go.  For all different reasons like.   
For legitimate reasons as well, in terms of getting the banks and other 
things bad names, you know…” 
 
 
Quotes from ex-offenders 
 
 
Theme 3 Suspicious Activity Reports 
The theme ‘suspicious activity report’ (SAR) was one of the most prolific topics 
discussed within all of the groups. SARs impacted on all areas of AML regime. 
SARs are information reports made by members of financial institutions on 
suspicious transactions within, to and from that institution.  
 
As previously discussed SARs are a reporting regime for suspicions of money 
laundering and terrorist financing as a prevention and detection tool. Reports are 
made from financial institutions, regulatory agencies and high value dealers on 
account holders when there are suspicions of money laundering or terrorist 
financing. The reports are analysed by Financial Intelligence Unit of Serious and 
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Organised Crime Agency (SOCA46) and are forwarded to law enforcement within 
the area of reporting for investigation.  
 
Analysis of the transcribed data from the focus groups identified conflicting views 
on the effectiveness of the SAR system. Views such as: information overload; 
resource intensive; information sharing; effectiveness of the SAR system is 
disputed amongst the groups. Some of the areas disputed related to the quality 
of the reports and the feedback from law enforcement to those that make the 
reports. Some participants saw the banks (who would be the main reporting 
institution) as not the best place to start investigations and looked outside of 
financial institutions to other regulatory institutions for reports. Entities such as 
lawyers, accountants, estate Agents and money service bureaus were 
mentioned.  The comments below reflect those views: 
 
“So I think you need to look wider than the financial institutions yes 
there’s a volume of transactions goes through them, but they’re not 
necessarily the best people to give you those key starting points”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
“I think, when it comes to banks and you know estate agencies and 
places like that, I think as regards their SARS obligations you know I’d 
say they’re fairly much compliant with it, and I don’t think there’d be a 
difficulty there but, the likes of car dealerships and places like that, it’s 
a different kettle of fish there, where they’re much more localised”. 
 
 
Quote from prosecutors 
 
                                            
46 SOCA have been renamed National Crime Agency (NCA) applicable from 13th October 2013 
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One group wanted feedback on the usefulness of SAR reports as opposed to 
another group wanting an update on the law enforcement investigation based on 
their report: 
“I don’t really want feedback on the report, but it would be helpful 
occasionally to know is this useful the way it’s presented or is it 
absolutely no use”. 
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
The main topic that groups agreed on reflected the number of reports made. 
Quality versus quantity which suggested more reports were of less value and put 
a strain on resources within the financial institution and investigative capability of 
law enforcement. The use of resources in the SAR process involves both law 
enforcement and financial institutions. It is the intention here to show that from 
the comments below, banks see the reporting process as a non-profit making part 
of their business, in which they have to resource. Law enforcement likewise do 
not have the resources to analyse all of the SAR reports that come to them from 
SOCA: 
 
“It’s a resource issue.  If you could spend four or five hours on every 
SAR, well then you’re going to pick up more criminality”.   
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
“There’s absolutely no doubt about that, there’s absolutely no doubt 
that the reporting institutions know stuff that we don’t know.  There’s 
no doubt.  Whether we utilise that or whether we exploit that is a 
completely different question”. 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
“It would be nice to see, the levels of SARs drop in a sense…  I don’t 
see any level; I don’t see any visible representation that the legislation 
is catching more people”.  
 
Quote from banking sector 
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The Financial institutions referred to above are guided and supervised by the 
Financial Services Authority47. Some participants referred to the ‘light touch’ of 
regulators, particularly in the area of inspection and monitoring of Bureau de 
Change or Money Service Bureaus, and others of the fear of regulators 
(particularly Banks). Failure to comply with the regulations can lead to fines by 
the supervisory authority; and if facilitating money laundering by failing to make 
reports could be prosecuted and sentenced up to 5 years imprisonment. This fear 
of compliant behaviour prompted the following responses: 
 
“The MSB regulations facilitate money laundering.  In fact you have to 
ask the question why they exist in the first place.” (MSB refers to 
Money Service Bureau) 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
“Well we have an obligation to follow essentially the money laundering 
guidance notes”. 
 
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
 
“I was at a meeting hosted by HM Treasury of MLROs… the whole 
approach was quite theoretical I thought and very much driven by how 
much time do you spend per month as an MLRO in a firm. It’s very 
compliance driven and to me there’s little connection between what 
you do as an MLRO and what you would see as a very worthy fight 
against crime, it’s purely trying to observe the rules”. 
 
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
 
 
                                            
47 Financial Services Authority (FSA) has now become two separate regulatory authorities: The Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) AND The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 1st April 2013.   
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Theme 4 Criminal Spend 
The theme ‘spend’ or spending activity relates to how money flows through the 
financial systems and across borders. In doing so “spend” takes into account the 
level of criminal enterprise as it is assumed there is a difference in the spending 
activities of local criminals and international money launderers. There was 
general agreement from the groups about law enforcement playing catch up with 
money launderers and criminal enterprise. Cross border activity was frequently 
mentioned as a technique to thwart law enforcement investigations. Some 
participants experienced long delays in obtaining information from overseas. The 
importance of greater cooperation across borders was revealed in a variety of 
statements:  
“Looking at the speed of international transfers, which is the big new 
issue, you know we’re chasing money…for years we chased physical 
money, now we are chasing electronic movement of money and we 
are going after it with ILORs”48.  
 
 
“International Letters of Request that take six months to get off the 
desk of the CPS…how many times does money go round the world in 
that time, that’s only to get us to point one”. 
 
Quotes from law enforcement 
 
Some participants felt that not enough emphasis was placed on preventative 
measures relating to criminal knowledge and how simple it was for criminals to 
learn police procedures. Some participants indicated criminals had access to too 
much information through police prosecution files, television and media. Even the 
Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JLSG) guidance notes for banks to 
report suspicions of money laundering were readily accessible to the public. 
                                            
48 (ILROs refer to International Letters of Request)  
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However a small number of participants commented on the choice of the criminal 
to commit a crime regardless of what knowledge was available to them. Similar 
comments included: 
 
“No matter what legislation they introduce the crime will evolve to get 
round that legislation until they produce something to stop it”. 
 
   
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
“You know, that’s the same, not just for financial crime, that’s the same 
for any crime.  You know, the criminal will learn from the police 
techniques. You know the criminal will learn oh my mate was caught 
and here’s how the police caught him, so you know that goes through 
the prison anyway”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
“I would assume that the success of which seems to be in money 
laundering is because money launderers know the policy and know 
the system, and that’s how in my opinion it appears that the law is 
ineffective to do anything about it…I’m guessing there’s billions 
worldwide that is getting through it”.  
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
The views of the types of spending between different levels of criminals varied 
considerably among the participants. Some participants indicated the lower to 
medium level criminals spending ill-gotten gains immediately, whilst high level 
criminals would be more sophisticated at hiding it. Law Enforcement could not 
undertake all money laundering investigations as they did not have the capability 
to do so. It appeared for some participants that the level of criminal also indicated 
the level of sophistication that can be used to remove criminal money from the 
view of law enforcement.   
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“The guys at the top know that people are going to be coming after 
them…they knew that they were being watched, whereas the rest 
thought we can do what we like. There’s a huge shadow economy at 
that level”. 
 
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
 
“Because one was doing it very well and they were, they were 
spending it as quick as they got it.  So they were going out, spending 
it on women and all that sort of stuff”.   
 
Quote from ex-offender 
 
One final area of frustration that was evident among a small number of 
participants related to movement of money through Money Service Bureaus 
(MSBs). Previously as discussed in relation to the SAR theme, MSBs were the 
subject of criticism due to lack of enforced regulation and inspection. As a 
consequence of that failing participants see MSBs as potential for laundering 
substantial sums of money. The following comments air those frustrations: 
 
“I mean I really don’t see in this day and age how a lot of these places 
exist (Money Service Bureau). One of them that were raided there 
about a year, 18 months ago, didn’t even have a bank account. Didn’t 
even have a business bank account and yet there was hundreds of 
thousands of pounds according to surveillance, being exchanged on a 
daily basis here… they are supposed to be regulated and inspected 
by HMRC but I know from experience they just go in, how’s it going 
alright bye. Books weren’t looked at. They are supposed to look at the 
audits and see what’s happening”.  
  
Quote from law enforcement 
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Theme 5 Agency Influence 
The theme ‘agency influence’ takes into account the regulatory stranglehold on 
financial institutions relating to their obligations from POCA. Agency influence 
refers to two entities; firstly the Financial Services Authority (FSA) now the (FCA) 
who are the regulatory supervisor for financial institutions and secondly Serious 
and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) now the National Crime Agency (NCA). 
The remit of the NCA is the civil recovery of criminal assets from prosecutions, 
failed prosecutions and independent civil recovery investigations. There is a 
strong sense among some of the participants particularly in financial institutions, 
that their role in AML was less about catching bad guys and more about applying 
the rules of compliance. It is because of those obligations financial institutions felt 
undervalued and more scrutinised than they should be. Some comments reflect 
that view:  
 
“If the penalties weren’t a factor and it wasn’t regulatory they would do 
it at a minimalistic level”. 
 
 
“The likes of the FSA who are well financed can regulate with fear I 
suppose, were the banks are taking the cost of the resources out of 
profits…the power engagement of staff of how intrusive the FSA can 
be is minimal. It’s only when you get into this role of compliance you 
start to realise just how intrusive they can be”.   
 
Quotes from banking sector 
 
Financial Institutions have to have in place relevant AML training for all their staff. 
Some participants felt the training was a tick box for the FCA in that as long as 
they were showing staff training they were following the rules. One of the potential 
drawbacks of training as presented by a small number of participants was that 
the number of SAR reports increased substantially for two months after the 
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training took place and then dropped back to normal figures. This behaviour 
suggests that reports are made as a means of defence as opposed to quality 
reports based on actual suspicions, as the following observations suggest:  
 
“So we do find it beneficial and you know one of the things that we 
have to do is demonstrate competency so if the regulator, if the FSA 
are coming in, as they have done and asked to see what type of 
training we provide and how do you measure competency, yes there’s 
a bank of questions that the person has to answer”. 
 
 
“an external provider we use instructs the course for us…its extremely 
good at keeping records that it will give us how long it took the person 
to take the course, how many times they were in it, how many attempts 
they did…it’s important we demonstrate that we have delivered that 
training”. 
 
Quotes from banking sector 
 
 
As discussed “Agency Influence” also referred to the government strategy on 
asset seizure through SOCA. The incentivisation scheme refers to cash and 
assets seized under POCA going into the “government tin box”. Confiscated 
money from criminal activity can then fund community and crime fighting 
initiatives such as drug awareness projects in local communities. This venture 
received a positive response from all the groups that removing assets from 
criminals had a deterrent effect due to the financial inconvenience it caused. 
However participants from one group suggested the popularity of civil forfeiture 
placed more emphasis on civil recovery than criminal investigation.  
 
“They SOCA was not a body designed to make convictions, cos they 
weren’t in a criminal court, they were a revenue generating body and I 
think they should have been able to process the people and eventually 
get a conveyor belt of people coming through the courts with 
confiscation orders and giving the money up”. 
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“Because of the nature of work we do…it seems it had some added 
value…somehow ironic that the proceeds you know…criminality is put 
back into support other people to move away from it...trying to sus out 
does it become more important than actually the criminal investigation 
side of things”.   
 
Quotes from accountants 
 
On the other hand a number of participants suggested that due to the 
complexities of money laundering cases the matter should be referred for civil 
recovery by NCA as opposed to investigation by police for prosecution. In some 
cases it was the view of participants (law enforcement and accountants) that the 
agency has no interest. A number of participants suggested civil recovery is itself 
a complicated process even though civil recovery has a lower burden of proof 
than a criminal case. Civil recovery cases are based on the “balance of 
probability” whereas criminal cases are based on “beyond reasonable doubt”. 
The following comments remark on those frustrations:  
 
”there’s a lot of occasions I think why aren’t going civilly against this 
person as opposed to launching a criminal investigation…we pulled a 
case we spent a lot of money on Counsel’s fees to the point of not 
going through the court and SOCA could go for the guy civilly because 
he had the money still…we don’t get anything from…any confiscated 
funds”. 
 
Quote from prosecutors 
 
Theme 6 Other Activities 
As discussed previously in section 4.3.1 there were areas within the AML process 
that were deemed important but were not suitable to be placed as a standalone 
theme. However, as they were important areas to be discussed by the 
participants within the groups they did have an important place within the 
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questionnaire. “Other Activities” became the theme for those areas. The term 
“Other Activities” provided item statements within the questionnaire survey in a 
number of important areas not caught by the other themes. For example; crime 
motive, victimless crime and effectiveness of AML. 
 
Participants generally agreed that criminals rationally chose to commit crime 
based on what they would achieve from the crime and the chances of getting 
caught for the crime. A small number of individuals expressed a new concept 
within this framework; the term “credibility”:  
 
“There may also be a bit of credibility about, around maybe serving a 
prison sentence as well in certain circumstances”. 
 
 
 
  “It’s all, there’s the emotion, there’s the bravado, there’s the legitimacy 
supposedly of what you’re fighting for or against … and it wasn’t a 
rational sort of weighing up pros and cons”. 
 
 
 
“They’ll feel that they don’t want to let other people down by opting out 
of something and that, that’s human nature no matter what age you 
are” 
 
 Quotes from ex-offenders 
There was a strong sense among some of the participants that some crimes are 
acceptable crime and a crime against the Government was not a crime. 
Comments reflecting this view included: 
 
“You know it’s a duty thing. They’re not paying the duty, it’s the 
cigarettes, it’s the fuel, and they’re robbing the state of money rather 
than the individuals”. 
 
 
Quote from ex-offenders 
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“We’re finding a lot more hidden assets, where assets are hidden in 
third party type thing”. 
 
 
Quote from prosecutors 
 
 
 “So you lose your money but, know what, sure -You’re still knocking 
about”. 
 
Quote from ex-offenders 
 
Members of all the groups expressed consensus that the AML regime was not 
effective. A number of participants expressed concern that the policy was 
ineffective because of the varying levels of criminality and targeting by law 
enforcement as “easy touch” as opposed to the more difficult and larger cases`: 
 
“I mean…. is sort of founded on a black economy, it has been for many 
years, you know and people would rather say, buy their fuel cheap, 
their cigarettes cheap, get dodgy DVDs, they get CDs they get fake 
clothes, and that has to, there has to be a level up here for that stuff… 
no it’s not effective”. 
 
 
Quote from ex-offenders 
 
 
“springs to mind with me, you know about people that rob you with a 
fountain pen, you know, I wonder, you know, what sort of, what, what 
drive is there at that higher, top, you know from a policy point of view 
is there, I mean, is there enough of it”. 
 
Quote from ex-offenders 
 
Varying views and agreement were expressed by the groups on the leading 
legislation POCA which constantly needs reviewed and updated. There was a 
strong perception by some participants that the legislation was draconian and 
lends to difficulties in investigation. Several participants agreed it was draconian, 
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but was so, because it was there to punish. Generally there was consensus that 
the legislation could be improved:    
 
“No matter what legislation they introduce the crime will evolve to get 
round that legislation until they produce something to stop it”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
“Doesn’t look particularly effective to me, hear about the high profile 
ones but we all know what’s going on around us on day and daily, so 
how effective is it?” 
 
Quote from ex-offenders 
 
Much emphasis has been placed by the groups on the banking system as an 
effective tool to combat money laundering. The banking system is the first port of 
call for AML. A number of participants agreed that when there is a failing in the 
system the criminal justice system is slow to react. The view from the participants 
that the justice system is slow to react also suggests the ineffectiveness of the 
system as the following comment remarks:  
 
“I think there’s a big issue about the orthodox approach or culture of 
the Criminal Justice System, which doesn’t react quickly to things, 
processes take a long time”. 
 
Quote from prosecutors 
 
There was a general perception that the time restrictions placed on restraint and 
prosecution are too restrictive. In addition, because of the complexities in money 
laundering investigation there should be no penalties for abuse of process in time 
delays in investigation. The following comment reflects that view: 
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“Money can be moved very quickly, the fact that restraint can be put 
on quickly is important, but the criminal process then is playing catch 
up all the time with that, and bank practices are very important in 
controlling the money laundering and being a means of combating it”. 
 
Quote from prosecutors 
 
However there was an indication of one area of AML policy being effective. For 
some participants regardless of the general ineffectiveness of policy agreed upon 
with other groups, the system sometimes does work, even though the motivation 
for the quick reaction in the case referred to below was to seize cash: 
  
“The system works, the system does work in a sense that sometimes, 
because we have had a couple of incidents recently when HMRC have 
reacted to a SAR like very very quickly, like I’m talking In like literally 
within days…But their motivation was that they wanted to do cash 
seizures”. 
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
All participants did agree that the best preventative method was the SAR process. 
They believed that reports were being made, however this needed to be 
measured in terms of quality and quantity. They agreed that money laundering 
had been well documented during this past decade and that individuals were 
aware of what the banks did when money was transacted through bank accounts:  
 
“I would presume if people knew about it would be the ultimate 
deterrent, because if I’m earning 20 grand a year and I go and make 
a lodgement of ten grand, knowing that that’ll kick start some sort of 
investigation, there’s no way in a million years if I know that I’m going 
to go in with ten grand”. 
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“I would assume that the success of which seems to be in money 
laundering is because money launderers know the policy and know 
the system, and that’s how…it appears that the law is ineffective to do 
anything about it…I’m guessing there’s billions worldwide that is 
getting through it”.  
 
 
Quotes from ex-offenders 
 
 
The results of the analysis from the focus group interview discussions presented 
in the above chapter have provided an abundance of material for the 
questionnaire development in phase 3.  The aim of the focus group interviews 
was to use the experiences, perspective, opinions and knowledge from experts 
who are the gatekeepers of the AML process: 
 
 To validate initial themes drawn from literature around Money Laundering 
measurement and AML Policy.  
 To draw out emerging themes from discussions in the focus group 
interviews relevant to the AML process. 
 
As a result of the analysis of the focus group interview discussions that drew on 
the participant’s experiences, opinions, perspectives and knowledge the following 
constructs have been identified. 
 
Legislation   Criminality   SAR Process   Spend   Influence   Other Activities 
 
The five focus group interviews that took place with the expert stakeholders 
discussed issues on AML which were prompted by questions linked to the initial 
themes. Analysis of the transcripts from those discussions validated the initial 
themes and introduced two additional themes. All of these themes are the 
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constructs that would underline the statement items that formed the questions for 
the questionnaire survey. Discussions on the development of the questionnaire 
are documented in Chapter 3. Section 4.4 will discuss the quantitative analysis 
and results of the questionnaire survey conducted in phase 3 of this research.     
 
4.4 Phase 3 Questionnaire analysis and findings 
 
The analysis discussed in this section is drawn from the results of data obtained 
from the questionnaire survey. Section 4.4.1 presents the demographics of the 
survey population. Three areas are discussed in phase 3 - questionnaire analysis. 
Firstly the responses to question 13 of the questionnaire will be explored; 
secondly the analysis of the item responses from the questionnaire will be 
conducted using factor analysis techniques; and thirdly the differences between 
the groups are examined. Each stage is produced in figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Three stages of analysis
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reliable consensus of data for examination. Before examining each stage of 
phase 3 a summary of the demographics is provided at section 4.4.1. 
 
4.4.1 Demographics 
Questions 1-3 on the questionnaire relate to demographics of the respondents. 
Using statistical analysis on SPSS the following demographics of the 
respondents in terms of age and gender were found: The number of respondents 
to the questionnaire was 272. Male responses totaled 212 (77.9%). Female 
responses totaled 51 (18.8%). There was 9 missing data = (3.3%). The age 
ranges for the respondents were grouped into four categories. The data above 
including the group each respondent was attached has been reproduced in 
Appendix 4.3. The author is not making any determination from the above 
demographics however the group demographics as shown may indicate the 
reason for outliers in the distribution of scores in some of the variables. In any 
event the information is supplied to give the reader a casual view of the 
questionnaire population.  
 
The next section examines the responses to the open ended question 13 at 
section 6 of the questionnaire. This question was set to illicit views of respondents 
as to what they would change in AML system. The data from the responses would 
further contribute to the factor analysis results by verifying the underlying 
dimensions identified. The responses to question 13 are discussed below in 
section 4.4.2.  
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4.4.2 Comments and analysis (Question 13) 
The following discussion relates to the responses to question 13 in the 
questionnaire survey. Question 13 of section 6 is the final question in the survey 
questionnaire. “Please provide your comments as to what you would change in 
the AML system”? A number of the comments will be presented here. As the 
comments are anonymous they will not be referenced as opposed to the 
comments from focus groups that are referenced. A full list of the comments from 
the participants is provided at Appendix 4.8.  
 
72 responses were made to question 13 out of a total of 272 responses = 26%. 
After errors and irrelevant comments were removed 67 responses were suitable 
for analysis. From those responses a wide range of areas for change have been 
suggested. 10 respondents 15% indicated that stiffer penalties were needed to 
demonstrate enforcement action. 25 respondents 37% indicated the regulatory 
system was a key area for preventing money laundering and that tighter controls 
were required. 4 respondents 5% indicated a change in tactics and procedures 
for enforcement. Other areas that respondents suggested change included: 
additional training, additional resources, and better co-operation between 
agencies, use of confiscation powers and more emphasis placed on the use of 
Suspicious Activity Reports from all institutions.  Comments reflecting those views 
from question 13 are presented, such as:  
“The current laws and regulations in the UK relating to money 
laundering and the seizing of criminal property are adequate.  What 
needs to be changed is their enforcement.  In particular, there needs 
to be greater use of money laundering confiscation measures against 
corporations (including, but not confined to, banks) involved in 
financial crime.   For example, companies found to have engaged in 
corruption in order to win commercial contracts should face charges of 
money laundering as well as bribery, much more severe sentences 
and more significant confiscation orders”.  
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Comments also suggest a more robust enforcement role from investigators and 
the judiciary to target offenders more severely through prosecution and 
sentencing. A comment from the following respondent goes further:  
 
“Were professionals are involved in ML they should be sentenced 
more harshly (they are not). When regulated entities are discovered to 
be ignoring the AML regulations they should be fined and SHUT 
DOWN, not just fined and allowed to carry on trading. E.G. Coutts 
Bank, Wachovia, etc. Investigating bodies should concentrate more on 
ML investigations as they see cases were (say) drug trafficking is 
concerned it’s easier to go for the commodity. ML cases are NOT 
complicated but there is wholesale ignorance at senior crime 
managers level about the ingredients needed to successfully 
prosecute ML cases”.  
 
 
Comments such as those below also suggest penalties not only refer to the 
criminal element but also for breaches of regulation: “Penalties for institutions that 
do not comply with AML regulations are not sufficient to properly incentivise them. 
Regulators are more concerned with getting a future job with the institutions they 
are supposed to supervise than in doing meaningful oversight”. This view is 
reflected in many instances however several respondents suggest other areas 
need to combine with sentencing to create a more powerful enforcement strategy, 
such as:  
 
“Greater use of the existing AML legal provisions (the ones we have 
are good enough and don't need changing, but they do need to be 
used more).  2. Tougher penalties actually imposed on banks and 
other institutions found to be involved in money laundering.  3. Greater 
use of confiscation and civil recovery provisions.  4. Greater 
enforcement of confiscation orders actually made”. 
 
The suggestion that confiscation should be enforced refers to both sides of the 
process; both as directed in the comment above refer to the confiscation of assets 
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after prosecution and the enforcement of any order made for confiscation by the 
court. Greater emphasis in this area has been suggested by respondents: 
 
“To quote (I think) Louis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI The most efficient 
means of battling organised crime is to act against money laundering.  
With increasingly limited budgets I think law enforcement concentrate 
on other crimes which attract more public attention and which may be 
considered key performance indicators. There are a number of 
specialist financial crime investigators in the UK but I believe they 
focus on the "quick wins" rather than the complex organised groups 
that require time and resources to investigate fully and this needs to 
be reviewed.   In addition, legislation in the UK needs to be reviewed 
in relation to people defaulting on confiscation orders and the lack of 
follow up in liquidating their assets obtained through criminal lifestyle”. 
 
 
One of the most prolific areas of the AML system that respondents discuss is the 
reporting by financial institutions of suspicions of money laundering. Whilst many 
respondents comment that this is an important area for increased action the 
following respondent is quite clear in how the process should be dealt with:  
 
“The SAR process is now so computerised, there is too much 
intelligence in the system. This needs to be filtered and profiled in a 
way that would highlight useful areas of investigation. The 43 forces in 
the UK do not necessarily have a unified approach to the investigation 
of SAR, money laundering or POCA matters, despite efforts to stress 
the importance of POCA. I would like to see money laundering cases 
managed as a target ops proceeds, a syndicate strength using all 
human and technical resources available, including surveillance and 
interception. It is time the facilitators, accountants and solicitors where 
taken out of the loop”.   
 
Communication and co-operation between and within the major stakeholders in 
the AML system opens up a wide area of activity that respondents suggest needs 
action: 
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“More communication with law enforcement agencies. In theory, they 
should write the rule for businesses as they are the ones with the 
knowledge. Change is far too slow if you want to try and keep up with 
recent typologies” in addition “I would suggest that there needs to be 
a more joint agency approach to the problem. This should include 
regular discussion with financial institutions, regulators and law 
enforcement personnel. This would assist in identifying varying 
typologies at an earlier stage”. 
 
Training in AML at all levels including judiciary was an area that respondents felt 
was necessary to achieve that response. “More training and education of the 
legislation and methodology to professionals and the police”. 
 
The final comment encompasses a range of activity which is overseen by a 
change in attitude across the whole area of AML. In several instances the 
comments received indicate an attack or criticism on the AML system without 
much thought as to how the system could be changed. The following comment 
changes that view by referring to the problem and the solution: 
 
“There needs to be a transformation of attitude across the AML 
system, in particular to address the following views: Professionals 
within the regulated sector generally view AML as a costly burden, and 
investment is limited to that which will be sufficient to avoid 
enforcement action or reputational damage. Law enforcement 
agencies have failed to grasp the opportunities to disrupt criminals by 
using money laundering legislation. Investigators view money 
laundering offences as a type of fraud and associate it with lengthy, 
tedious investigations.  Senior management limit their enthusiasm to 
areas such as confiscation and cash seizure, viewing it purely as an 
opportunity to provide an income. AML policy has done little to 
influence these views and is often ignored or circumvented by 
agencies. The level of prosecutions and asset recovery, whilst 
improved under the POCA regime, still falls woefully short of some 
other jurisdictions, providing an irony when lauded by Government. A 
transformation of attitude will be a difficult and lengthy process, one 
which needs to be driven by an AML policy that is more effectively 
implemented”. 
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4.4.3 Summary of question 13 responses 
This section has discussed the responses to question 13 from the survey 
questionnaire “Please provide your comments as to what you would change in 
the AML system”. In general the comments suggested changes in a wide range 
of areas in the AML arena. Such comments included stiffer penalties for money 
laundering offenders, tighter controls in the regulatory system and a change in 
direction for law enforcement in relation to the tactics used to fight money 
laundering. Further comments suggest greater use of confiscation powers; the 
SAR process that incorporates all reporting institutions; training and agency co-
operation. A final comment discussed a change in AML culture by all the 
stakeholders in AML environment that would create a new nexus to address all 
the problems. The next section provides the quantitative statistical analysis of the 
questionnaire responses.  
 
4.4.4 Statistical analysis 
The objective of statistical analysis is to establish a model represented by the 
results of analysis from the questionnaire survey. The themes at each section of 
the questionnaire are merely the concepts that each variable tested follows. The 
themes are not used as dependent variables to test for relationships with the 
independent variables, rather all variables were available for testing using factor 
analysis techniques. The goal of factor analysis as Reitveld and Van Hout (1993) 
suggest is to use factor analysis techniques to: 
  “reduce the dimensionality of the original space and to give 
interpretation to the new space, spanned by a reduced number of new 
dimensions which are supposed to underlie the old ones”  
 
(Reitveld and Van Hout, 1993: 269). 
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The model produced will be tested using a qualitative method, leaving any future 
research using this data for further statistical analysis such as regression or 
confirmatory analysis. Another important point to make in relation to the analysis 
is that this researcher is using the strength of factor analysis techniques as a 
means to provide a model that represents a clear view of the data. This 
researcher will use discretion and common sense in interpretation of the data and 
the techniques used, as these criteria are as important as the statistical tests 
themselves (Wilkinson, 1999). Each stage of the statistical analysis follows from 
section 4.4.5. 
 
4.4.5 Data screening and missing data 
A visual screening of the data on SPSS was undertaken to indicate and eliminate 
any data entry errors and miscoding. The Likert scale variables were checked for 
consistency and no unanticipated or inaccurate values were detected. The Likert 
scales were entered correctly corresponding to the designated coding plan (1 = 
strongly agree; 5 = strongly disagree). The category values also corresponded to 
the values in the designated coding plan.  
 
The analysis began by looking at the descriptive statistics and frequency tables 
to get an understanding of the profile of the data. The statistics produced in SPSS 
made it clear that substantial data was missing and that outliers were present. 
The variable summary table is produced at Appendix 4.2 and is produced in 
descending order to show the multiple missing data from the latter part of the 
questionnaire. A further review of the data view in SPSS confirmed many 
questionnaires were only completed as far as question 6 in section 2. This 
equated to 40% of cases not valid. Figures 4.3, 4.4 and table 4.3 below provides 
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a summary of the missing values. Analysis of these figures show the majority of 
missing values apply to the latter stages of the questionnaire. 31 responses had 
been received in each of those missing questionnaires 38% out of 82 potential 
responses. As too many values were missing from those cases, they were 
deleted. Any further missing values were replaced with a discrete missing value 
999. 
Figure 4.3: Overall summary of missing values 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The 10 most frequently occurring-value patterns 
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Table 4.9: Missing values pattern 
 
 
 
The analysis proceeded to test for outliers with 164 cases which included 89 
metric variables. This was once again carried out using the descriptive function 
in SPSS. All of the scores for each variable were converted to standard scores. 
The sample size was greater than 80 therefore a case is an outlier if its standard 
score is +3.0. Each z-score was viewed on the data editor and checked in 
ascending and descending order for to identify outliers +3.0. There were no cases 
with outliers -3.0 but 21 cases with outliers +3.0. By comparing the descriptive 
output for each variable (mean and standard deviation) and examining the raw 
scores on the data editor no obvious reason was visible to account for the high 
scores. Reviewing the questions that contained outliers did not reveal any further 
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abnormality, however a reason for the heavy tailed distribution in some cases 
may be due to the mixture of distributions in the sub populations (as depicted in 
the population chart at Appendix 4.3). As Tukey (1977) and Dawson (2011) 
suggests in large samples, a small number of outliers is to be expected and may 
not be due to any anomalous condition. Further as the data will be subject to a 
robust statistical test (such as factor analysis) that can resist the effect of outliers 
(Pison, Rousseeuw, Filzmoser and Croux, 2003), the variables were retained.  
 
An example of an outlier on question 4, item 12 “Tax evasion is viewed in some 
communities as a non-criminal offence” produced a z-score outside the +3.0 
range of +4.22 as indicated below on Table 4.10 and on the distribution illustrated 
on Figure 4.5. The mean at 1.96 is within the range of 1-5 and the standard 
deviation at 0.74.  
 
Table 4.10 Example of outlier identified for question 4, item 12 
 
Outlier 4.22641 
 
Question 4, item 12 
Tax evasion is viewed in some 
communities as non-criminal  
offence 
Frequency Per-
cent 
Mean Standard 
 Deviation 
Valid Strongly Agree 38 23.2   
Agree 104 63.4   
Neither agree or  
disagree 
14 8.5 1.96 0.74 
Disagree 7 4.3   
Strongly Disagree 1 .6   
Total 164 100.
0 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution for question 4, item 12 
 
 
 
 
The next phase of the analysis of the results relates to the identification of the 
underlying dimensions of the statement items for each theme. Factor analysis is 
adopted to examine the most important dimensions influencing AML policy 
implementation in the UK. The following section presents that analysis. 
 
4.4.6 Factor analysis (Identification of the underlying 
dimensions) 
 
All categories within the AML range of statements were analysed to examine the 
underlying dimensions using factor analysis. The analysis was carried out 
following the procedures in SPSS. Each section of the questionnaire provided the 
respondents with statement items (for this research items and variables are 
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interchangeable). Items were scaled into a five-point Likert scale using a standard 
set of responses such as: “Please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements.” 1 - Strongly agree through to 5 – Strongly 
disagree. The questions were divided into the 6 sections as shown in Table 4.11.  
 
Table 4.11: Application of Questionnaire Structure 
 
Section                 Theme                   Question Number                  Item Number 
Section 1           AML Policy                               Q4-Q6                             15 items 
Section 2           AML Crime                               Q7-Q8                               8 items  
Section 3           Suspicious Activity Reports      Q9                                   18 items   
Section 4           Spending Activities                    Q10                                 16 items    
Section 5           Agency influence                       Q11                                 16 items 
Section 6           Other areas of AML process     Q12                                16 items 
 
As discussed in section 3.8.3.8 Chapter 3 the descriptive statistics for all the 
variables have been included at Appendix 3.7. Similarly the correlation matrix 
generated for all variables is included at Appendix 3.8. The analysis utilised 89 
variables incorporating policy, crime, SARs, spending activities, agency influence 
and other areas. The descriptive summary suggests the mean values are all 
within the min and max range for each variable. There are indications of positive 
and negative skew in a number of variables particularly ML15, ML32 and ML53. 
Skewness quantifies how symmetrical the distribution is. However in terms of 
symmetrical distribution the skewness is within the range of 1.00 and -1.00 and 
as such is not substantial. Kurtosis quantifies whether the shape of the data 
distribution matches the Gaussian distribution which has a kurtosis of 0.0. ML75 
has an excess kurtosis of 1.11. However in respect of skewness and kurtosis 
factor analysis is a robust technique and as a reduction tool will take account of 
the above values through the factor loadings. 
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Table 4.12: Descriptive summary for significant variables 
Variables N Range Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
ML6 164 4 1 5 2.80 0.83 0.69 0.45 -0.24 
ML15 164 4 1 5 2.12 0.99 0.97 0.85 0.27 
ML25 164 4 1 5 2.73 0.98 0.96 0.22 -0.89 
ML32 164 4 1 5 3.18 0.91 0.83 -0.02 -0.52 
ML48 164 4 1 5 2.38 1.01 1.01 0.45 -0.60 
ML49 164 3 1 4 2.14 0.84 0.71 0.60 -0.02 
ML53 164 4 1 5 3.37 0.97 0.93 -0.44 -0.73 
ML75 164 3 1 4 1.94 0.72 0.52 0.78 1.11 
ML83 164 3 1 4 2.02 0.78 0.61 0.50 -0.01 
ML84 164 3 1 4 2.16 0.87 0.75 0.42 -0.42 
ML85 164 4 1 5 2.21 0.85 0.72 0.55 0.16 
ML86 164 4 1 5 2.51 1.03 1.06 0.50 -0.60 
ML87 164 3 1 4 2.26 0.74 0.55 -0.01 -0.46 
Valid N  164         
 
ML6 = “AML Policy in the UK appears to be effective”  
ML15 = “Financial crime appears to be treated more leniently in court than other crimes” 
ML25= “The regulators are an effective force to ensure reporting institutions comply with regulators” 
ML32 = “The banking system in the UK does a good job in preventing the use of accounts to launder       
criminal money” 
ML48= “Money launderers have to have knowledge of AML policy” 
ML49 = “Money launderers have to be aware of law enforcement tactics” 
ML53 = “The current regulatory AML framework is sufficient to dissuade professionals from being 
involved in money laundering” 
ML75 = “Money laundering is a consequence of another crime such as drug trafficking but is treated 
differently in court sentencing” 
ML83 = “A person convicted of drug trafficking is likely to receive a more sever sentence than the person 
who laundered his money” 
ML84 = “The penalties for money laundering crimes are too lenient”  
ML85 = “Professionals are treated differently in court in sentencing for money laundering“ 
ML86 = “Financial crime which includes money laundering is not seen as a serious problem”  
ML87 = “The disparity in sentencing for money laundering in the UK is too wide“ 
 
 
The correlation matrix was used to determine the strength of the relationships 
between the variables. The closer the correlation coefficient is to 1 the more 
confident a linear relationship and the closer to 0 the weaker the relationship the 
closer to 0 (Hair 2010). The correlation matrix (produced at Appendix 3.8) 
provided a visual presentation of all the variables. In factor analysis the cut off 
value is the eigenvalue of 1, any correlations close to 0 are significant. P< 0.05 
at the 0.05 level. As such it was possible to identify which variables or group of 
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variables correlated with each other, and which ones could be excluded with a 
view to reducing the data dimensionality.  
 
A number of steps were required to produce the following results by excluding on 
each occasion items with factor loadings < 0.40. Confirmation that the test 
variables are inter-correlated are indicated by the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) and 
Bartlett’s tests. On the final analysis the KMO result was 0.783 which exceeded 
Kaisers (1974) value of 0.6. The value also exceeded the expectations of Hair et 
al (2010) who suggested a model was unacceptable if the KMO < 0.5 and a model 
was good if the KMO > 0.8. The KMO result of 0.783 was therefore acceptable. 
Bartlett’s test reached statistical significance (p = 0.000). The above results 
supported the factorability of the correlation matrix and provide reassurance that 
the data and the approach was a suitable method of analysis. Table 4.13 provides 
the results of the KMO and Bartletts test and the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the test variables are not inter-correlated at the five percent significance level. 
  
Table 4.13: KMO and Bartletts Test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.783 
      Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 781.003 
df 78 
Sig. 0.000 
 
 
The results indicate significant variables as produced in table 4.14. The range 
varies from 0.68 indicating positive correlation to 0.00 indicating weak correlation. 
It is clear from the correlation matrix variables ML48 ‘Money launderers have to 
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have knowledge of AML policy’ and ML49 ‘Money launderers have to be aware 
of law enforcement tactics’ that a relationship exists with 46% of subjects 
agreeing the significance of the two items. Similarly on the right side of the matrix 
at variables ML83 ‘A person convicted of drug trafficking is likely to receive a 
more severe sentence than the person who laundered his drug money’, ML84 
‘The penalties for money laundering crime are too lenient’, ML85 ‘Professionals 
are treated differently in court sentencing for money laundering’ and ML86 
‘Financial crime which includes money laundering is not seen as a serious 
problem’, a significant cluster of variables are grouped together. Clearly there are 
intercorrelations between the variables that do not correlate too highly which rules 
out any extreme multicollinearity. In addition the determinant is greater than 
0.00001 at 0.02 which confirms no multicollinearity.   
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Table 4.14: Correlation matrix for significant variables 
VAR ML 
6 
ML 
15 
ML 
25 
ML 
32 
ML 
48 
ML 
49 
ML 
53 
ML 
75 
ML 
83 
ML 
84 
ML 
85 
ML 
86 
ML 
87 
ML6 1             
ML15 0.03 1.00            
ML25 0.22 -0.08 1.00           
ML32 0.42 -0.10 0.29 1.00          
ML48 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.10 1.00         
ML49 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.68 1.00        
ML53 0.38 -0.08 0.39 0.39 -0.06 -0.05 1.00       
ML75 -0.08 0.23 -0.12 -0.15 0.07 0.17 -0.07 1.00      
ML83 -0.09 0.48 0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.16 -0.10 0.34 1.00     
ML84 -0.11 0.31 -0.04 -0.13 0.04 0.02 -0.24 0.45 0.55 1.00    
ML85 -0.12 0.28 -0.17 -0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.19 0.37 0.44 0.49 1.00   
ML86 -0.13 0.38 -0.13 -0.19 -0.07 -0.06 -0.15 0.31 0.43 0.41 0.43 1.00  
ML87 -0.05 0.41 -0.15 -0.19 -0.07 0.00 -0.13 0.36 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.49 1 
a Determinant = .024 
 
ML6 = “AML Policy in the UK appears to be effective”  
ML15 = “Financial crime appears to be treated more leniently in court than other crimes” 
ML25 = “The regulators are an effective force to ensure reporting institutions comply with regulators” 
ML32 = “The banking system in the UK does a good job in preventing the use of accounts to launder criminal 
money” 
ML48 = “Money launderers have to have knowledge of AML policy” 
ML49 = “Money launderers have to be aware of law enforcement tactics” 
ML53 = “The current regulatory AML framework is sufficient to dissuade professionals from being involved in 
money laundering” 
ML75 = “Money laundering is a consequence of another crime such as drug trafficking but is treated differently in 
court sentencing” 
ML83 = “A person convicted of drug trafficking is likely to receive a more sever sentence than the person who 
laundered his money” 
ML84 = “The penalties for money laundering crimes are too lenient”  
ML85 = “Professionals are treated differently in court in sentencing for money laundering“ 
ML86 = “Financial crime which includes money laundering is not seen as a serious problem”  
ML87 = “The disparity in sentencing for money laundering in the UK is too wide“ 
 
 
 
The extraction method employed was Principal Component Analysis (PCA), 
using the criteria to extract factors greater than 1. The first three components 
recorded eigenvalues above 1 and accounted for 58% of the total variance in the 
survey data. Table 4.15 describes the data value for each factor. 
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Table 4.15: Eigenvalues > 1 and Variance per Factor 
Factors Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative 
1 3.728 28.679 27.141 
2 2.040 15.692 44.341 
3 1.744 13.415 57.786 
 
 
The number of eigenvalues49 greater than 1 is the number of factors to include in 
the model for interpretation. To further verify the first three factors Cartell’s scree 
plot50 shows the eigenvalues that are plotted successfully. Figure 4.6 provides 
the scree plot relating to the PCA. Attention should be made toward a spot in the 
graph where the plot levels out. The results for this research imply the knuckle or 
knee joint levels out at component 4, thus suggesting a three factor/component 
solution with eigenvalues >1 as displayed. This preliminary stage in factor 
extraction produced 3 factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
49 Eigenvalue: The eigenvalue of a factor represents the amount of the total variance explained by that factor (Pallant, 
2007). 
 
50 Scree plot: Is a graph plotting each component (X-AXIS) against its associated eigenvalue (y-axis). It shows the 
relative importance of each factor. The graph has a very characteristic shape (there is a sharp descent in the curve 
followed by a tailing off) and the point of inflexion of this curve is used as a means of extraction (Field, 2000). 
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Figure 4.6: Scree Plot of Principal Components Analysis 
 
 
A table describing the 3 factors before and after rotation is provided at Appendix 
4.4. Each component explains less variance that the previous one and this 
indicates the importance of each factor as shown on the table. Once rotated the 
component matrix gives a correlation between an individual variable and a 
particular factor by minimizing the number of factors on which variables have high 
loadings. Table 4.16 refers to the rotated component matrix and the factor 
loadings for each variable. It should be noted that in reaching this conclusion 
exploration took place by experimenting with the numbers (from between 3 – 8 
factors) until the most satisfactory solution was found (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007). Three factors gave the best representation of the underlying dimensions 
of the AML themes. The result that 58% of the common variance shared by the 
13 variables can be accounted for by the three factors.  
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As a final measure of reliability and in order to test the internal consistency that 
each of the items measures the same latent variable reliably, a Chronbach alpha 
test was performed. The output was assessed by following the rule of George 
and Mallery (2003) which indicates acceptable values. The items for each 
component/factor are tested together to test their model fit. The results suggest 
the internal consistencies of the items are between acceptable and good, which 
indicates that reliability is constant. The co-efficient reliability value is also 
included in Table 4.16. The full rotated matrix is provided at Appendix 4.4 which 
consist of the factor loadings for each item onto each factor. The matrix is 
calculated after rotation for further interpretation and includes eigenvalues, 
communalities, variance and cumulative variance.  
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Table 4.16 Rotated Components Matrix Results 
 
Components  Scale items Factor 
loading 
Co-efficient 
reliability 
Sentencing/ 
Deterrent 
The penalties for money laundering crimes 
are too lenient 
 
0.782 0.772 
 The disparity in sentencing for money 
laundering in the UK is too wide 
 
0.781  
  A person convicted of drug trafficking is 
likely to receive a more sever sentence 
than the person who laundered his money 
 
0.740  
 Professionals are treated differently in court 
in sentencing for money laundering 
 
0.710  
 Financial crime which includes money 
laundering is not seen as a serious problem 
 
0.659  
 Money laundering is a consequence of 
another crime such as drug trafficking but is 
treated differently in court sentencing 
 
0.649  
 Financial crime appears to be treated more 
leniently in court than other crimes 
0.603  
    
Reporting/ 
Compliance 
 
The banking system in the UK does a good 
job in preventing the use of accounts to 
launder criminal money 
 
0.786 0.726 
 The current regulatory AML framework is 
sufficient to dissuade professionals from 
being involved in money laundering 
 
0.746  
 AML Policy in the UK appears to be 
effective 
 
0.723  
 The regulators are an effective force to 
ensure reporting institutions comply with 
regulators 
0.685  
    
AML 
Knowledge 
Money launderers have to be aware of law 
enforcement tactics 
0.908 0.806 
 
 Money launderers have to have knowledge 
of AML policy 
0.904  
             
 Rotation converged in four iterations. 
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4.4.7 Results of factor analysis 
The results showed an acceptable factor solution and that each item clearly 
loaded on each factor. The factors were labelled to reflect the interpretation of 
the scale items using the highest scores (Hair; 2010). The underlying meaning of 
the factor can be characterised by the label applied. Thus, according to the survey 
analysis, the dominant dimensions are contained within the three factor solutions 
described.  
 
Factor 1 has seven items that loaded on the sentencing/deterrent factor. Six of 
those items originated from section 6, ‘other areas’ at question 12 of the 
questionnaire. The remaining item from section 1, ‘policy’ at question 4 of the 
questionnaire. The items mainly refer to how money launderers are prosecuted 
and the sentencing for their crimes being too light in comparison with other 
crimes. The label chosen characterises the ‘sentencing’ theme that emerges from 
each of the items. 
 
Factor 2 has four items that loaded on the regulation/compliance factor. Two of 
the items originated from section 3, ‘SARs’, question 9 of the questionnaire and 
one each from section 1, ‘policy’, question 4 and section 4, ‘spend’, question 9 of 
the questionnaire. All items drawn on this factor positively acknowledge the 
strength of AML policy and the regulatory framework to prevent money 
laundering. The label chosen also characterises many of the activities that 
emerge from each of the items.  
 
Factor 3 has 2 items that loaded on the factor ‘criminal knowledge’. Each of the 
two items originated from section 4, ‘spending activities’, at question 10 of the 
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questionnaire. The label chosen does not reflect the original themes from which 
the items originated, however does reflect the underlying characteristics of the 
items for this factor. The items similarly reflect the view that those involved in 
money laundering require knowledge of how law enforcement apply their 
investigative techniques and of the policy itself. 
 
Convergent validity can be accepted as 9 of the 13 items within the factor 
structure have shown a standardised loading of at least 0.7, ranging from 0.603 
to 0.908 in value as indicated in Table 4.16 each being significant at 0.1 per cent 
level. Table 4.17 describes the labelling of items to each factor. 
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Table 4.17: Application of factor labeling 
 
Factor/Label Items 
 
Factor 1 
Sentencing/Deterrent 
 
The penalties for money laundering crime are too 
lenient 
 
The disparity in sentencing for money laundering 
in the UK is too wide 
 
A person convicted of drug trafficking is likely to 
receive a more severe sentence than the person 
who laundered his drug money 
 
Professionals are treated differently in court 
sentencing for money laundering 
 
Financial crime which includes money laundering 
is not seen as a serious problem 
 
Money laundering is a consequence of another 
crime such as drug trafficking but is treated 
differently in court in sentencing 
 
Financial crime appears to be treated more 
leniently in court than other crimes 
 
 
Factor 2 
Reporting/Compliance 
 
The banking system in the UK does a good job in 
preventing the use of accounts to launder 
criminal       money 
 
The current regulatory AML framework is 
sufficient to dissuade professional from being 
involved in money laundering 
 
AML policy in the UK appears to be effective 
 
The regulators are an effective force to ensure 
reporting institutions comply with regulations 
 
 
Factor 3 
Criminal Knowledge 
 
Money launderers have to be aware of law 
enforcement tactics 
 
Money launderers have to have knowledge of 
AML policy 
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4.4.8 Significance of factor loadings and cross-loadings 
The significance of factor loadings have been discussed in Chapter 3 and 
followed the guidelines of Hair et al (2010) with factor loadings >0.40 considered 
acceptable for this study.   
 
By viewing the rotated matrix in Appendix 4.4 cross-loadings can be observed on 
a number of factors. The variables included are: a person convicted of drug 
trafficking is likely to receive a more severe sentence than the person who 
laundered his money, professionals are treated differently in court sentencing for 
money laundering, financial crime which includes money laundering is not seen 
as a serious problem, the banking system in the UK does a good job in preventing 
the use of accounts to launder criminal money, AML policy in the UK appears to 
be effective, and the current regulatory AML framework is sufficient to dissuade 
professionals from being involved in money laundering.  
 
Following the guidelines of Hair et al., (2010), the author addressed the issue of 
cross loadings by reporting the highest factor loading, as each were above the 
recommend communality level >0.50. The guiding principle being that variables 
that cross-load are generally deleted unless theoretically justified to maintain 
them, in addition variables must be 0.50 or above to meet the communality 
guidelines. The author is satisfied these requirements have been met.  
 
4.4.9 Goodness of fit 
Measures of goodness of fit of the three factors are taken from the results of a 
number of areas in the analysis process. The KMO at 0.783 is described as 
‘middling’ degree of common variance and is acceptable; the percentage of 
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variance accounted for 58% of the total variance. Although this value is slightly 
below the 60% recommended by Hair et al (2010), it is also acceptable.  The 
average communality for all 13 variables is 57%. According to Hair et al (2010) 
variables should generally have communalities >0.50 to be retained. Others 
suggest communalities >0.60 should be considered (Field, 2005). The highest 
communality in this study is 0.82; money launderers have to be aware of law 
enforcement tactics and the lowest 0.37; financial crime appears to be treated 
more leniently in court than other crimes. Nine of the remaining variables have 
communalities above 0.50 while two are below the 0.50 level. In conclusion the 
average is acceptable for goodness of fit as each variable is reporting a 
reasonable proportion of variance. Based on those indications all variables are 
retained. 
 
In summary the 3 factors that influence the effectiveness of AML policy 
implementation in the UK can be interpreted as; sentencing/deterrent; 
reporting/compliance and criminal knowledge. The results of the factor analysis 
provided a more thorough understanding of the dimensions of all the variables 
included in the analysis. The following section continues with an examination to 
establish if any significant differences between the groups emerged, that 
responded to the questionnaire and in light of the results of the factor analysis. A 
one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used for this purpose. Section 4.4.10 
provides the results of this analysis.   
 
4.4.10 Examining group differences 
Group analysis determines if there are any significant differences, between and 
within the groups that participated in the questionnaire survey. The differences 
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relate to the three components identified in section 4.4 from factor analysis: 
Sentencing/Deterrent; Reporting/Compliance; AML Knowledge.  In this section 
the report describes the significance between the groups: Group A Accountants, 
Group B Law enforcement, Group C Financial Institution and Group D Ex-
offenders. The fifth group “Prosecutors” was amalgamated into the Enforcement 
group as the numbers of Prosecutors who completed the questionnaire was low. 
The analysis was carried out by applying One-way ANOVA using the software 
SPSS. The results of the analysis can be viewed at Appendix 4.5.  
 
From the ANOVA tests there appears statistically, to be “no difference” between 
the groups and the remaining 2 factors. From the participant view factor 1 and 
factor 2 are accepted. This result in itself provides external validity to the process. 
All four groups are independently and statistically accepting of the remaining 
factors and those factors appear to be important dimensions for all the 
stakeholders. Factor 1 refers to sentencing and factor 3 refers to criminal 
knowledge around AML. Further discussion to conclude the findings from all the 
analysis will be provided in Chapter 5.  
 
4.5 Phase 4 Verification and interpretation of Factor   
results 
 
The objective of phase 4 was for participants to review the results of the factor 
analysis (3 components and their related variables) and respond to three 
questions relating to those results. The process involved using 5 participants (one 
from each of the 5 original focus groups) to comment on the results of the factor 
analysis described in section 4.4. Each participant was randomly chosen from 
each group and no prior notification was made. A copy of the email forwarded to 
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all participants is included at Appendix 4.7. The questions put to participants from 
each group are as follows: 
 
Questions Groups 
 
“In light of the statements 
underlying each factor how do 
you see them informing policy in 
AML arena”? 
 
Law enforcement 
Accountant 
Prosecutor 
MLRO 
Ex-offender 
 
“Do the statements suggest that 
current approaches are 
effective”? 
Law enforcement 
Accountant 
Prosecutor 
MLRO 
Ex-offender 
 
“How do you see the 
interpretation of these results in 
light of the research question”? 
Law enforcement 
Accountant 
Prosecutor 
MLRO 
Ex-offender 
 
 
Reporting the analysis of the individual participants followed a similar process to 
that of the focus groups. Morgan (1998) suggests reporting what is important in 
light of the research question, in this case: “What are the factors that influence 
the effectiveness of the AML policy implementation in the UK”. The five responses 
from representatives of each of the original focus groups: Law Enforcement; 
Accountants; Prosecutors; MLROs and Ex-Offenders were viewed, read and re-
read to obtain familiarity with the material. Responses to each question were 
highlighted for agreement between the respondents, as well as documenting the 
explanations from participants as to the significance of each variable within the 
factors.  
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The questions were put to the participants to draw out responses that would verify 
or not, the factor results. In short, the process confirmed the results of the 
quantitative analysis.  
 
The results of phase 4 verification (question responses) are triangulated (as 
depicted in figure 4.7 below and again in Chapter 5, section 5.5) with the analysis 
from phase 1 theme identification; phase 2 focus group interviews and phase 3 
survey questionnaires.  Discussion of the results from question 13 of the 
questionnaire will also be included as will the results of the group differences from 
the one way ANOVA. The findings are produced in the following section 4.5.1. 
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Figure 4.7 Results of the triangulation of methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 Phase 2 Focus Groups                                              Phase 3 Factor Analysis 
                                                                            
                                                                      
Phase 4 
Component verification 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1 Identification of themes from Literature 
                                                               
 
 
 
 
4.5.1 Results 
The discussions follow each of the three questions that were set for phase 4 
component verification. The findings section will apply the principles of 
deterrence, rational choice and economic regulation theory to evaluate the 
association between AML activities and AML policy.  
 
 
Results 
Sentencing/deterrent 
Regulation/compliance 
Criminal knowledge 
Themes 
Policy 
Crime 
SARs 
Spend 
Agency influence 
Other activities 
Theme identification 
Legislation 
Criminality 
SAR process 
Spend 
Influence 
Other activities 
 
Phase 4 
Verification of results 
from 
Individual part cipants 
 
“Confirmed” 
 
Sentencing/deterrent 
 
Regulation/compliance 
 
Criminal knowledge 
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Sentencing/deterrent 
The 7 statements relating to the sentencing/deterrent component as shown in 
Table 4.16 refers to views surrounding the penalties for money laundering and 
related predicate crimes. The general pattern for the statements suggests a 
difference in sentencing between money laundering and other crimes. Money 
laundering is seen as a lesser offence and therefore treated more leniently in 
court. The consequences suggest money laundering is not seen as a serious 
crime and criminals are not deterred from committing money laundering offences. 
This view corresponds with Becker’s (1968) utility view that the cost from crime 
should outweigh the benefits of crime in sentencing. However the deterrent value 
is not solely on sentencing for money laundering but from the confiscation that 
follows. It is the confiscation that appears a more effective deterrent.  
 
There is however another element to the use of confiscation and that involves the 
dilemma between sentencing and confiscation. It appears that courts are inclined 
to give out lower sentences and prioritise confiscation as prosecutors have 
acknowledged;  
 
“We’ve even had instances where the judges are starting to equate, 
they’re starting to trade off a criminal sentence with a confiscation 
order”  
Quote from law enforcement  
This follows that if fines through confiscation are having a greater impact than 
sentencing there could be many implications relating to practice and policy for all 
the regulated entities and enforcement. 
  
As expected all of the participants agreed with the proposition that the 7 
statements inform policy. This view comes from the position that sentencing for 
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money laundering is too lenient with a reluctance to prosecute professional for 
money laundering. One participant suggested the sentencing policy does not 
reflect the overall importance of money laundering as a serious crime. Another 
participant offered a view by suggesting the sentencing guidelines should be 
pursued through education of Judiciary, guidance through court of appeal and 
sentencing council. There was a suggestion that the results of this study should 
be presented to the Home Office to stimulate a review within the Public 
Prosecution Service and Judiciary. In general the view is that current approaches 
are inconsistent and reduce the effectiveness of legislation. 
 
Evidence of more emphasis being placed on the confiscation side of proceedings 
is voiced by participants in focus groups. Defence barristers are instructed by 
their clients to ‘make a deal’ on the confiscation side rather than appeal the 
sentencing as this participant suggested: 
  
“No I think the 2002 legislation made the confiscation process a lot 
easier and a lot more wide spreading against the criminal… certainly 
from my role as a confiscator that it’s quite clear that they fear that 
more than they ever fear a prison sentence.  That in itself the 
confiscation scheme and the 2002 Act has certainly made the 
criminals an awful lot more aware of what the powers that the police 
can do and can’t do”. 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
The manipulation of the court system in this respect creates distrust between 
enforcement and judiciary. Sentencing and confiscation are weighted against 
each other to provide a fair conclusion to the offender; for example: there are two 
penalties for one crime: A conviction which can include a prison sentence and a 
confiscation of any assets from the crime (from the offender). In light of that 
understanding there appears to be a battle between the forces of law and order, 
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and the defendants defence team in order to get the best deal, according to this 
latest post: 
  
 “The last one that I dealt with I’m trying to ring the PPS before the 
barrister rings the PPS to tell them that he’s just done a deal in the 
sum of.  And I’m ringing the PPS to get in first to say he’s trying to do 
a deal here and he shouldn’t be doing a deal”. 
 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
In relation to the effectiveness of current approaches the following two comments 
relay the views of many of the participants involved in the research:  
 
“Stricter sentencing for serious crime”  
 
and 
 
“More effective enforcement of the existing regulations and laws. More 
accountability within the non-financial regulated sector.  A regulator I 
can believe in”. 
 
Quotes from anonymous respondent from questionnaire 
 
The consensus from respondents to the component sentencing/deterrent was 
generally the same, the sentencing approach was not as effective as it could be. 
For one participant the disparity in sentencing for related crimes such as drug 
trafficking and money laundering did not make sense. Criminals seem to be able 
to work around the controls with emphasis from participants on the use of 
stronger penalties to create a more effective deterrent. 
 
There is consensus within the group that interpretation of the results in light of 
the research question suggests that sentencing on its own is not an effective 
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deterrent. There appears to be a distinction between the money laundering 
offence and the predicate crime in how they are prosecuted and sentenced in 
court proceedings. “No message that money laundering and predicate crimes are 
equal” One participant suggests sentencing is determined by the circumstances 
of the case and is only one component of the overall AML strategy to combat 
money laundering. There is general agreement among the participants that the 
“sentencing factor” is key to improving the overall effectiveness of AML policy. 
 
Reporting/compliance 
 
The 4 statements relating to regulation/compliance results as shown in Table 4.16 
refers to views surrounding the reporting/compliance regime that directs financial 
institutions to make reports on suspicions of money laundering. The general 
pattern of the statements suggests the reporting regime is sufficient for its 
purpose and was effective. One statement refers to the effectiveness of 
regulators to ensure the banks are compliant. The results correspond with 
existing literature that suggests the main reason that banks are compliant is due 
to the consequences of fines and reputational risk generated by non-compliance 
(Verhage, 2011; Harvey, 2004; Masciandaro et al, 2001). 
 
There was a mixed reaction to question 1 by participants concerning the 4 
statements. Some participants agreed with the statements and that this was a 
key area to inform policy in AML, that the statements were an acceptance and an 
understanding of how important an area the reporting regime was. In contrast to 
this view one participant suggested the regime was not sufficient to deter or 
detect professionals involved in money laundering:  
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“The self-regulation by the majority of professional bodies is still an old 
boys network and is both unwilling and unable to detect the offenders 
in their midst”.  
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
Further comments indicate the protection of professionals through “advice and 
guidance” offered to them. Interestingly another some participants suggested the 
regulation should be extended to other entities involved in high value goods and 
Money Service Bureaus (MSBs). The regulation does apply to high value dealers 
and MSB’s but comments suggest very little enforcement in these areas: 
 
“No, no, it’s the regulation is light touch, it’s designed to be light touch, 
it’s not that they are lax in their methodology. The regulation is wrong. 
A sweet shop has to produce better records than an MSB does”.  
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
A suggestion that more checks and surveillance is required for these entities: 
“The MSB regulations facilitate money laundering. In fact you have to 
ask the question why they exist in the first place”.  
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
This message was reinforced by a member of the banking sector who suggested 
the regulators focus on banks because they (banks) are the lead agency for 
making SAR reports. This of course means that if something goes wrong it is 
likely to be within the banking sector. Banks do recognise that compliance is a 
‘cost centre’, not a ‘profit centre’ (Harvey, 2009, 2004; Bosworth-Davies, 2007) 
and the business lost through ‘Know Your Customer’ and ‘Risk Based Approach’ 
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impacts on bank business. This is confirmed by participants from the banking 
sector:  
 
“And the other people, who maybe would be of an older school, see it 
as an imposition because it’s a regulatory requirement, and some of 
the people who they actually potentially have to consider now from a 
SAR obligation are actually people who they were courting quite 
seriously for business”.   
 
Quote from banking sector 
Striking a balance between loss of business and the banks recognition of their 
profit maximisation function and AML obligations has recently seen fines and 
sanctions imposed on banks on a number of high profile cases51. Regardless of 
the frustration in compliance non regulation is not seen as an option however 
discussions did intimate less change leaving more time to get used what currently 
exists.  
“Yeah there’s a benefit of it not being regulated, if it’s there and it sits 
for a while it gives you some degree of stability. You know you can 
start to reinforce the important messages to your operation, I mean 
we’re retail and business but one of our other parties is purely 
business, so their risk based approach is slightly different than ours. 
So if you keep changing legislation it then starts to muddy and people 
then don’t know, I mean what is their focus, what is their policy” 
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
Bosworth-Davies also make this point which he posits that winning the war on 
money laundering will not happen with governments throwing more and more 
regulation at the compliance sectors. Partnership and co-operation within the 
sectors he suggests is the way forward (Bosworth-Davies, 2007). The picture 
emerging from this study is that banks are in agreement with this proposal. 
Encouraging the making of reports by other entities could be made easier as 
                                            
51 HSBC and Barclays bank fines 
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suggested; by supporting joint enterprise with banks and regulators working in 
partnership: 
 
“Remove the threat to MLROs under POCA.  Regulators should be 
more collaborative i.e. engage in constructive discussions with firms. 
Proportionality e.g. having regard to most firms outside of banking, the 
sanctions regime is hugely expensive for very little benefit”. 
 
Quote from banking sector 
 
 
In essence the contrast in the above views suggest that compliance relating to 
banks generally is sufficient but other parts of the banking business and those 
regulated agencies outside of banks is not.    
 
In relation to the effectiveness of current approaches all participants agreed that 
statements associated with the component reporting/compliance indicated 
effectiveness in the reporting system. No further comments from the verification 
group were forthcoming in this respect. However, some recommendations for 
change highlighted regulatory control as deflecting from the original idea of 
compliance and it is this deflection that causes inefficiency in AML system as 
outlined below: 
 
“There is too much focus on regulatory expectation rather than effec-
tiveness of the system itself i.e. Focus on demonstrating to the FSA 
we have met their idea of what is required (not always in line with what 
legislation requires) rather than how effective the organization is in de-
tecting ml. If we look at how much cash is seized vs how much is spent 
on compliance, the current regime appears very inefficient”. 
 
Quote from banking sector 
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These comments are echoed in literature: Bosworth-Davies strongly suggests 
government interference in setting the agenda for regulatory compliance. The 
‘bigger picture’ he suggests is in getting financial institutions reporting ‘suspicious 
activity’ which extended the term ‘reporting suspicious transactions’. The objec-
tive was to identify and repatriate lost billions from tax evasion and market irreg-
ularities. These are the big fish that can add recoverable assets to the govern-
ment coffers (Bosworth-Davies, 2007).   
 
In relation to the interpretation of the results in light of the research question the 
statements within the component reporting/compliance suggest the regulatory re-
porting regime is robust and effective. Most participants agreed with this compo-
nent; however some comments suggest regulatory regime requires change in 
respect of professionals and their potential to be involved in money laundering:  
  
“You cannot rely on a code of conduct and high social standing 
of an office to ensure members will not commit crime”.  
 
Quote from anonymous respondent from questionnaire 
 
 
This news is echoed by other participants who suggest the reporting regime 
should be extended and enforced beyond banks and toward professionals:  
“More time and money needs to be spent in enforcing compliance 
within the small MSB businesses”. 
 
Quote from law enforcement 
 
 
One participant commented that the banks and regulators are praised for their 
contribution to the overall effectiveness of AML policy. Other professionals such 
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as accountants and lawyers are stifled by the AML framework the consequences 
of which they are not looked on in a favorable light. Change is seen as possible 
as one participant imparts that there is no suggestion that the current reporting 
and compliance regulations are either overbearing or unsustainable. There is 
however a strong notion that more can be done jointly by enforcement and 
regulation as suggested in this comment: 
 
“More input from Law Enforcement, a realisation that the financial sec-
tor is a major contributor to UK plc and therefore needs strong regula-
tion to ensure honesty; greater appreciation of lifestyle evidence by 
law enforcement, and a realisation that criminals spend their money 
rather than save it; there is rarely a pot of gold to be recovered, except 
from the launderers (who may of course have indemnity cover to pay, 
rather than losing their own assets”. 
 
Quote from anonymous respondent from questionnaire 
 
 
Criminal knowledge 
The two statements relating to component criminal knowledge as shown in Table 
4.16 refer to views surrounding criminal knowledge of law enforcement 
procedures. The general pattern of the statements suggests knowledge is 
important for money launderers to prevent detection from criminal activity. 
Knowledge about police tactics is easily obtained through details of court cases, 
crime documentaries reported in television and media never mind the vast 
amount of data available through the internet. Participant from the various expert 
groups acknowledge that view:  
 
“I mean if I was a criminal the first people I would employ would be, I 
would employ a good accountant to go through the JMSG guidance 
notes to see were the loopholes are. Or I would put someone inside a 
bank to understand where the bank is weaker, you know, is maybe 
potentially paying lip service” 
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Quote from banking sector 
 
There is consensus from participants that money launderer’s use weaknesses in 
the AML system to their advantage “Criminals will establish very quickly where 
the weak links in particular banks are and will home in on that”. It appears 
however that nothing has changed in the last decade as Bosworth-Davies makes 
the point relaying an interview with a criminal by the Telegraph magazine 5th July 
2003: 
 
“You learn something every day in jail…useful skills…there is not 
much else to do so you talk about crime…you come out and you’ve 
got to start all over again…you’ve got to get money”.  
 
(Bosworth-Davies, 2007:191)  
 
 
That view adds a further dimension to the point that police tactics should be less 
visible and that law enforcement take steps to conceal tactics and be more 
flexible in their approach. Now we must also forbid criminals talking about crime 
in prison. The next comment puts all of the above into perspective: 
 
 
“AML policy acts as a foil to money launderers drive to legitimise ill-
gotten gains and so it will always be their objective to understand, test 
and if possible breach AML procedures”.   
 
Quote from anonymous respondent from questionnaire 
 
 
Is the answer then to create further legislation and regulation to further tighten up 
AML? Generally as agreed with participants AML policy needs to be continually 
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reviewed to prevent it being undermined however many also agreed that policy 
should not be changed:  
 
“In my opinion, there is no need of more regulation but more action 
and consequences for those who practise money laundering. In 
money laundering crimes, the message that crime does not compen-
sate has not reached the public”. 
 
 
Quote from anonymous respondent from questionnaire 
 
 
In relation to the effectiveness of the current approach most participants agreed 
the statement items in the component criminal knowledge were correct in the 
assumption that knowledge of police tactics and knowledge of AML policy can 
influence the effectiveness of policy implementation. However, one participant 
quite rightly pointed out that in answering the question, by viewing the two 
statements they do not confirm or refute the current effectiveness of AML policy. 
On reflection the question is unsuitable for this component because of the context 
of the statements:  
 
“Money launderers have to be aware of law enforcement tactics” and 
“Money launderers have to have knowledge of AML policy”.  
 
(Items from component 3 result) 
The question is suitable for sentencing/deterrent and reporting/compliance 
components as these statements reflect positive and negative items. However in 
response to the participants comment Morgan (1998) suggests interpretation is 
more reliable when carried out by participants other than the researcher. In that 
respect the comment here is accepted and acknowledged.  
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What can be interpreted from this result is that in order to be more effective, it 
would be much better if money launderers knew less about law enforcement 
tactics and AML policy. The caveat to that interpretation lies with the following 
comment that suggests:  
 
 
 
“Just for once, it would be good for the governing bodies would sit 
down with the investigators camp; Counter fraud departments to actu-
ally listen to how they stop us from doing a thorough investigation. 
Times that regulators are a hindrance more than a help”. 
 
 
Quote from anonymous respondent from questionnaire 
 
 
Co-operation and partnership are powerful allies and prevention and enforcement 
groups in AML could benefit from better relationships. It is acknowledged that 
regulatory bodies and enforcement agencies do not see eye to eye in their AML 
function, and why would they? The comments in the discussions in this study 
echo what is suggested in literature; financial institutions are conflicted in their 
roles between recruiting business, making money and informing on their 
customers. They receive very little feedback on the reports they do make (Ross 
and Hannon, 2007), are constantly hounded by regulatory authorities to ensure 
they are compliant and see no evidence that the results are effective. Law 
enforcement on the other side, do not trust banks to make quality reports, feel 
that they protect professionals by turning a blind eye to their activities and area 
evasive when asked for further information. In addition when law enforcement do 
try to prosecute for money laundering they do not have the full support of the CPS 
(Verhage, 2008; Bosworth-Davies, 2007; Harvey, 2004; Levi, 2006). The crux of 
the matter is effectiveness can be improved as indicated by the results of this 
study through co-operation and partnership at all levels. 
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In response to the question “How do you see the interpretation of the results in 
light of the research question” as suggested by a number of participants was 
difficult. The two statements in the component criminal knowledge are not 
reasons that AML policy is effective. Participants commented that money 
launderers react to change in law enforcement tactics. One participant suggested 
that, if through a criminals understanding of AML policy, they are deterred from 
using financial institutions and professionals to launder money, then it could be 
argued that AML policy is effective and limits the channels available to the money 
launderers (Ferwarder, 2009). That follows, as another participant suggests that 
any change in policy, must take account of current police practices and access 
to knowledge by criminals: 
 
“An effective policy must therefore be flexible and as covert as 
possible”. 
 
Quote from prosecutors 
 
 
Knowledge of AML policy and enforcement tactics extends beyond the borders 
of the UK and requires greater co-operation and collaboration from agencies in 
all countries. As literature rightly posits that money moves from one end of the 
globe to the other in seconds so prevention and enforcement needs to be up to 
speed in communicating requests for assistance and unification of policies. It is 
clear this problem exists as the comment suggests:  
 
“Level of accountability on the front-end force needs to be a bit more. 
Make AML laws consistent in 'friendly' countries. Businesses/Firms to 
be encouraged to put more focus on AML controls. The UK accepts 
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this but education of European countries or European parent compa-
nies is required. In Germany there is very much a ""tick-box"" ap-
proach, whereas the UK outside of financial regulation take a very dif-
ferent risk based approach treating everyone on a case by case basis”. 
 
Quote from anonymous respondent from questionnaire 
 
 
Money laundering investigations are changing from simple one man band 
companies to complex multiple companies and bank accounts that stretch over 
many borders. Thus making it more difficult for investigators to track individuals, 
companies and most importantly, money. Prosecutors acknowledge this change: 
 
“just in the last 18 months to two years instead of getting a 
straightforward case were you get an individual or a company, you now 
get companies and they’re chains and there’s groups of them. And it 
seems, I’m not sure if it’s deterring the crime as opposed to making 
them more determined not to get caught. Or not determined, more 
determined to have a limited company to take the fall for it were they 
can’t be hit”.  
 
Quote from prosecutors 
 
 
The discussions above suggest agreement from the participants of the results of 
the factor analysis and the three components of sentencing/deterrent, 
reporting/compliance and criminal knowledge. However as indicated above there 
remains some debate around those activities and areas were the AML provisions 
can be improved.  
 
4.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter presented the analysis and discussion of the results of four phases 
in this research strategy. Each phase within the strategy had an objective that led 
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to the next phase and was sequential in nature. These are summarised as 
follows: 
 
Phase 1 - Identification of themes; determined the themes identified from 
literature that applied to activity around AML environment. These included: 
themes identified from FATF Recommendations that Countries should actively 
apply, in order to prevent and detect money laundering offences; themes 
identified from literature around studies that attempted to estimate the 
measurement and effectiveness of money laundering. Analysis from literature in 
both these areas identified four themes that encompassed much of the activity in 
the AML environment.  
 
Phase 2 – Focus groups; explored the accuracy of these themes by presenting 
them in the form of question prompts to four groups of subject experts and one 
group of ex-offenders. Analysis of transcripts from discussions with the five 
groups identified six constructs that would assist the development of a survey 
questionnaire. Four of the themes that had originally been drawn from literature 
had been verified and two additional constructs identified. A description of the 
analysis process that identified those constructs from the transcripts was 
provided. 
Phase 3 – Survey questionnaire; here the themes were utilised to develop the 
survey questionnaire. Statements relevant to each theme became the focus of 
the questions in each section of the survey questionnaire. Each section of the 
questionnaire drew responses that relied on five-point Likert scales for 
measurement. The exporting of the questionnaire responses to SPSS provided 
the data base for statistical analysis. The data was subject to Principle 
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Component Analysis and argument for analysis using small sample was made. 
Prior to performing PCA the suitability of the data for exploratory analysis was 
assessed. This included Pearson Correlation test looking for correlations that 
existed between the questionnaire items. To further support the viability of 
exploratory factor analysis the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) and Bartlett’s test were 
performed. The KMO result was 0.783.  
 
Applying varimax rotation simplified the structure of the factors and identified 
three components. By viewing the items underlying each component they were 
sufficiently re-labelled to the terms: Sentencing/deterrence; Compliance and 
Criminal knowledge. A reliability test using Chronbach Alpha confirmed the 
factors suitable for inclusion. 
 
One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to determine if there were 
differences between the group respondents and the three factors. The ANOVA 
test found significant differences for factor 2. Post Hoc tests identified which 
groups differed. Accountants differed in their view with law enforcement p = 
0.0016 and Accountants also differed in their view with ex-offenders p = 0.009. 
The remaining groups showed no significant differences which implied 
agreement that the remaining factors are important dimensions for the groups.   
Phase 4 – Verification and interpretation of factors; provided the final confirmatory 
process to verify and interpret the factors identified from phase 3 analysis.  Five 
participants, one member from each of the original focus groups provided 
verification and interpretation of the factor results. The participants responded to 
three questions that referred to Policy, effectiveness of AML and interpretation of 
the results in light of the research question. The responses to these questions 
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were discussed in section 4.5.1 and triangulated with the results of each of the 
other phases. Although there was agreement that the analysis produced the 
correct factors to answer the research question, additional comments identified a 
number of underlying issues that suggest wider implications for AML and AML 
policy effectiveness. Chapter 5 will conclude the results of the research.      
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Chapter 5  Conclusion, Contributions and  
 Research Implications 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter sums up the findings of the research. The chapter opens with an 
overview of the study, an explanation of the subject area and what the research 
sought to achieve. A discussion of the specific findings is followed by a discussion 
of the implications of the research on anti-money laundering policy and practice. 
The chapter also provides the contributions of this research followed by the final 
section that discusses the limitations of the research and the opportunity for 
further research. 
 
5.2 Overview 
This thesis has examined influencing factors that contribute to the effectiveness 
of money-laundering policy and how it is implemented in the UK. AML has 
become a front runner in the fight against organised crime, drug trafficking and 
terrorism, as well as many other serious crimes and as such ML can be found 
operating at both a local level and at an International level. Locally it seems 
criminals will spend the proceeds of crime as they obtain it. All levels will use the 
financial system to launder money, however organised crime gangs and those 
operating at an economically higher level will use the facilities of international 
financial systems to launder their crime proceeds. Globally, AML challenges 
regulatory and enforcement agencies due to the use of the many jurisdictions 
used for money transfers, and through the complex web of companies and 
jurisdictions that organised crime travels. Difficulties extend to the lack of unified 
laws and regulations to tackle the problem. “It is ironic that the international 
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community would fail to produce a single, unified set of rules to take on a criminal 
activity that thrives precisely on exploiting differences in laws and regulations” 
(Morris-Cotterill, 2001:22). Although this study is confined to the UK AML system 
it does reflect on a bigger picture that draws legislation and regulations from 
bodies outside the UK. 
  
Policy changes as the social and economic environment dictates, and as such, 
those changes are not always in the best interests of the stakeholders who 
implement and enforce AML policy. As suggested by Gnutzmann et al (2010) 
money laundering is a globally traded service and that the link in the chain of 
accountability for one financial transaction can be broken by another transaction. 
The suggestion is that policy is decided by the policy makers in determination of 
what they want to achieve from the policy, in essence, capturing profit from 
money laundering. The study draws some reference to what the AML strategy in 
the UK attempts to achieve.   
 
The main aim of this study was to identify and evaluate the drivers that influence 
the effectiveness of anti-money laundering policy implementation in the UK: more 
specifically the research objectives are: 
 
1) To identify and draw from literature in the AML arena evidence of 
themes that are component activities that could be used as a 
starting point for this research 
2) To establish a research strategy that can develop the themes 
identified and follow a logical sequence of activities that will 
answer the research question 
3) To use methods in the gathering and analysis of data that will 
complement the research strategy, that are reliable and valid in 
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respect of the researchers philosophical position and can be 
replicated in future research  
4) To ensure the research is compliant with all aspects of ethical 
considerations and that the research is ethically and morally 
sound 
 
This research adopted a pragmatic approach utilising methods contributed from 
both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. Four phases of activity driven in a 
sequential manner provided the data for each stage. Phase 1 theme 
identification; phase 2 focus group interviews; phase 3 survey questionnaires and 
phase 4 component verification. As stated in the methodology chapter purposive 
sampling was adopted and found suitable for this study.  
 
Engaging with the literature provided the starting point for this research by 
identifying the themes as suitable representatives of the important aspects of 
AML (FATF, 2014, Ferwerda, 2009, Schneider, 2008; Takats, 2007; Unger, 2007; 
Van Duyne, 2006; Masciandaro, 2004; Walker, 1999). Literature in this area was 
structured around estimations of the cost of money laundering, AML policy 
effectiveness and FATF recommendations. One of the key identifiers here was 
the use of the same concepts in each review and this placed certain assurances 
that the themes identified were the correct ones chosen.   
 
Literature provided a backdrop of the legislative and regulation in AML that has 
been discussed over the last three decades. Many definitions of money 
laundering (some competing) have been discussed and the implications of the 
differing interpretations of money laundering and predicate crime definitions 
globally. The evolution of AML policy in the UK has been explained and there has 
been discussion around the influence of external factors such as 9/11, terrorist 
291 
 
financing and the implications of organised crime in terms of asset recovery and 
AML.   
 
5.3 Conclusions 
The results of factor analysis pointed to Sentencing/deterrent; 
reporting/compliance and criminal knowledge as significant components that 
apply to the research question: “What are the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of AML policy implementation in the UK”? and confirmed in the 
phase 4 verification process. However, the results should be clearly set out based 
on all of the data and how those results equate to the theoretical perspective and 
the literature, as alluded to in the previous chapters. This research is not about 
developing new theory around deterrence, rational choice or economic 
regulation. Those subjects are much bigger than this research could offer, 
however the results of this research do contribute to the thinking around those 
theories and particularly to extending the theory on rational choice.  
 
In respect of deterrence theory it is believed by some theorists that crime 
reduction is based on the use of deterrents.  
 
“The goal of crime deterrence, crime prevention, is based on the 
assumption that criminals or potential criminals will think carefully 
before committing a crime, if the likelihood of getting caught and or 
the fear of severe punishment are present. Based on such belief, 
general deterrence theory holds that crime can be thwarted by the 
threat of punishment, while special deterrence holds that penalties 
for criminal acts should be sufficiently severe that convicted criminals 
will never repeat their acts” 
 
(Lyman and Potter, 2007).   
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If such is true then the results of this research has not confirmed this theoretical 
viewpoint: The items within component one sentencing/deterrent refer to the lack 
of clarity in sentencing for ML crime. Further comments within the research both 
in focus group discussions and questionnaire responses suggest sentencing is 
not a deterrent.  What does appear to emerge is that the civil recovery process in 
confiscation is a stronger deterrent than sentencing. 
 
Rational choice theory holds that, people who commit crime first of all consider 
the risks of detection and punishment for the crime as well as the reward of 
committing the crime successfully (Lyman and Potter, 2007; Cornish and Clarke, 
1993). It is not possible to determine this viewpoint without reading the mind of 
the offender or asking them a question about their intentions. It is clear that some 
consideration is undertaken by offenders prior to committing an offence otherwise 
they wouldn’t consider committing the crime in the first place. But does the 
thinking refer to questions such as? what happens if I get caught? What can I get 
out of this? Will I go to prison? Will I get fined? Or, is it something different that 
offenders feel as comments from this research refer to such as ‘bravado’ and 
‘credibility’ of the offender:  
 
“- it’s all, there’s the emotion, there’s the bravado, there’s the 
legitimacy supposedly of what you’re fighting for or against … all that 
comes, and the risk, you know, I know people who knew that if, the 
very first second they stepped out on the street they’re putting their life 
on the line, but they didn’t really think it was going to be taken from 
them, you know….And it wasn’t a rational sort of weighing up pros and 
cons”.  
 
 
Quote from ex-offenders 
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“There may also be a bit of credibility about, around maybe serving a 
prison sentence as well in certain circumstances”. 
 
 
 
Quotes from ex-offenders 
 
One thing is clear from the results of this study: when an offender is detected, 
prosecuted and convicted their thinking does start to evolve. The fear the offender 
considers is not about what the sentence might be, but what confiscation will be 
calculated. The process from this point appears from all parties (i.e. judiciary, 
defence barrister, police and prosecutor) to concentrate on the offender’s assets. 
There has been much discussion in this research about the role of each of these 
agencies in the confiscation process. Each agency competes against the other 
for the best position as noted by some of the comments from participants in this 
study: 
  
“We’ve even had instances where the judges are starting to equate; 
they’re starting to trade off a criminal sentence with a confiscation 
order”. 
 
Quote from Prosecutor 
 
“because if there’s more emphasis on the civil side why is there 
emphasis on the civil side, is it because it’s an easier system, an easier 
way of getting money off people for the government”. 
 
Quote from ex-offender 
 
“But the bottom line of it is, you know the bottom line to your question 
is, confiscation is more of a deterrent than sentencing”. 
 
Quotes from law enforcement 
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If criminal assets are seized, for example, through more use of confiscation, then 
crime will be deterred. However, as Fleming (2006) suggests, assets are only 
available for recovery if they are available and not spent, if the latter, then asset 
recovery will have the effect of a toothless tiger. By stretching this point further, 
there would appear to be consequences for pursuing confiscation. Offenders do 
appear to consider the effect on their lives from losing their assets. More effort is 
put into hiding the assets from enforcement and from the institutions that report 
suspicions of money laundering. Already seen from the comments of the 
respondents, in this research criminals are becoming more proficient at hiding 
assets, making it more difficult for law enforcement to track them. Use of borders 
and multiple bank accounts in multiple jurisdictions adds to those difficulties. In 
addition self-laundering prosecutions may not be possible in some jurisdictions 
due to difficulties with predicate offence definitions (Unger, 2013). Self-laundering 
can be prosecuted in the UK and still (according to this study) prosecutors are 
looking for predicate offences to prosecute which further exasperates the 
relationship between them and law enforcement.   
 
Preventative measures through regulation and reporting suspicions of money 
laundering are part of the effort to reduce money laundering crime. Despite the 
results indicating significant items in the 2nd component (that refer to the banking 
system doing a good job and that it was effective in preventing money laundering) 
many of the comments suggest underlying issues that affect that performance. 
Regulators use strong arm tactics to make banks compliant to the extent that they 
would report a lot less if it wasn’t for the regulators. Reporting of SARs increases 
after bank staff receive training in money laundering awareness, and then drops 
back to normal reporting levels. The fear of fines and sanctions appear to gather 
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more weight, rather than the reporting institutions reputation, to ensure banks are 
compliant and that reporting is maintained.  This view is in line with the view of 
Harvey and Lau (2009) and Chong and Lopez (2007) in their own research in this 
area.  
 
Through enhancement of regulations the costs to banks are certain and 
immediate. Regulation is a non-profit area of business and it is this line that 
perhaps impacts on the resources and efforts put into managing this business. 
Participants from the banking group did not see any benefit to be able to conclude 
that what they did was making a difference. They received little feedback from 
law enforcement on reports that they do make, and this situation frustrates them 
even more. It was the banking group that first suggested participating in a joint 
initiative to plan policy around AML. Braithwaite et al (2007) also agrees with this 
approach:  
“An integral part of a responsive regulatory approach is to provide 
opportunities for dialogue on these matters. A well-executed 
responsive regulatory intervention should allow disaffected actors 
within the regulatory community to express their views, work through 
reservations and grievances and move to a position where they are on 
a better footing for dealing with regulatory authority in the future”  
 
(Braithwaite, 2007:153) 
 
Drawing from the ideas of Masciandaro and Filotto (2001) the costs and benefits 
of regulatory practice around AML need to be addressed. Regulators influence 
policy through their control of the sector. Benefits to institutions include 
unquantifiable assets such as reputation and integrity but costs can be much 
greater as the latest banking fines have shown. These civil remedies form the 
preventative feature for breaches in reporting by financial institutions. That may 
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well be why the results of this study suggest that reporting/compliance is effective 
and significant. However, the call for assistance in compliance goes on. One of 
the responses to this call could come from the government’s incentivisation 
scheme. Currently, law enforcement, prosecution service and government 
receive a percentage of confiscated assets to use for community projects and 
crime fighting initiatives. One of the respondents to comments at question 13 of 
the questionnaire suggests: “Why not pay for our own compliance regime using 
the assets confiscated from offenders? We know that the alternatives are the 
status quo”. 
 
The final component identified from the analysis was criminal knowledge. This 
component featured two items that generally referred to criminal knowledge 
around law enforcement tactics and AML policy.  It is accepted that access to 
knowledge around AML policy is readily available on line or in libraries.  As 
referred to previously, many criminals discuss their cases and criminality in prison 
(Bosworth-Davies, 2007). Police methods of collecting evidence and detaining 
offenders are written in case files and are portrayed on an almost daily basis in 
film and media. As such, the response to the problem will not be contained by 
employing less advertising of those enforcement tactics. Discussions around this 
area also suggested that offenders didn’t look up law books before going out to 
commit an offence, as the following quote suggests:  
 
“You know in the old days you had the, what was termed the ordinary 
decent criminal, the burglars and people like that, getting caught and 
jail was part of their life…they knew it was down the road there 
somewhere…I think they understand there is a chance and they plan 
accordingly” 
 
Quote from ex-offender 
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The discussions suggested offenders be divided into two categories of AML 
offenders: low level criminals that spend money as they get it and high level 
criminals that operate as organised crime gangs and/or are involved in crime that 
reaps substantial criminal funds. In the latter case there is a need for professional 
money launderers.  Both categories also use different types of offences to suit 
their purposes: low level street crime, such as drug dealing, burglary and theft 
that provides small funds versus high level crime, such as drug trafficking, 
cigarette smuggling and fraud that gains substantial funds. 
 
By considering rational choice theory, it may be possible to provide a more 
simplistic view of this position. Human actions are based on rational decisions. 
This suggests an offender will make a rational choice which is informed by the 
probable consequences of that action (Akers, 1990). Offenders in the second 
category are likely to use the cost/benefit decision making process as they would 
have more to lose if prosecuted and their assets seized. Their behaviour changes 
to a more organised offender who employs professional people to hide their 
assets. Professional money launderers require knowledge of AML processes, in 
order to carry out sophisticated money laundering enterprise. Comments in the 
research from all the groups reflect that view.  
 
Changes in AML policy and reducing the visibility of police tactics are both options 
to consider. Tightening up the gaps and making the choices harder for the 
criminal to commit crime are key priorities. Knowledge is more than just about 
police tactics and AML policy; it is about the whole package which encompasses 
all the processes such as: SARs, asset recovery, restraint, confiscation, 
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regulation, training, spending activity, investigation and prosecution. It is possible 
to change the current direction in both policy and practice. The three areas 
identified in this study are significant areas for change and an appropriate starting 
point.  The next section draws from the results the implications for the future in 
AML.  
 
5.4 Implications 
The issues examined in this study and the findings have wide implications for 
AML policy and practice and will be addressed accordingly.  
 
This study relates to the UK context; however as a global phenomenon, money 
laundering is a growth industry that has led to legislative and regulatory changes, 
rules and policies of best practice in order to, and how best deal with money 
laundering. Each country has its own priorities and how they implement their own 
policy fits with those priorities. Despite the international consensus on the most 
effective way to deal with money laundering, Unger (2006) suggests: “It has also 
contributed to jurisdictional arbitrage whereby money launderers can take 
advantage of multiple rules and conflicting agreements” (Unger, 2006:6).  
 
The results of this study can effect changes in the UK but because of the above 
view can have implications for other jurisdictions as well. Looking at the ‘bigger 
picture’ all of the activities within the AML environment are important features to 
prevent, detect and prosecute money laundering. Three areas emerged as the 
most significant in determining the effectiveness of AML policy in the UK. These 
where: sentencing/deterrent; reporting/compliance and criminal knowledge. 
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It is possible to use the data that surrounds these results to determine a model of 
behavior that can be used as a template to enhance current policy and practice 
in AML.  Although it is not possible to pinpoint exactly what changes should occur 
or what additional efforts can be applied to AML, however the following key 
findings emerged from the research and are presented below 
:  
 Prosecution and confiscation is currently and should remain a joint 
approach in AML deterrence (as represented in phase 3 questionnaire 
analysis)  
 
 Asset recovery is a stronger deterrent than prosecution due to the 
offenders’ perceptions of prison and fear of loss of assets (Lower 
sentencing and higher confiscation as discussed by the participants reflect 
this view) (as represented in phase 2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire 
analysis and confirmed in phase 4)  
 
 Emphasis is more on confiscation as opposed to sentencing by offender, 
defense barrister, prosecution, judiciary and police (as represented in 
phase 2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire analysis and phase 4 
verification) 
 
 Two tier offenders operate differently: low level spend and high level 
money launderer (as represented in phase 2 focus groups) 
 
 Offenders consider capture of assets in advance of crime offending at the 
high level category (as represented in phase 2 focus group interviews; 
phase 3 questionnaire analysis) 
 
 Use of professionals with knowledge to evade asset recovery (as 
represented in phase 2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire analysis and 
phase 4 verification) 
 
 Use of multiple companies/bank accounts/jurisdictions to complicate the 
audit trail (as represented in phase 2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire 
analysis)  
 
 SAR process is sufficient and doing its job albeit the cost of doing so and 
the regulatory influence upsets the practitioners (as represented in phase 
2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire analysis and phase 4 verification). 
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 Regulators in the UK appear to be creating the ethic within banks that 
compliance procedures must be adhered to (as represented in phase 2 
focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire analysis and phase 4 verification) 
 
 Knowledge around financial reporting as suggested is reasonably high. 
This would appear to offer some deterrent to making suspicious 
transactions (as represented in phase 3 questionnaire analysis)      
 
 The logistics of SAR administration is a mess/this may be more to do with 
management than policy (as represented in phase  
 
 There will always be resource issues around SAR analysis due to the 
multiple reports and time taken to investigate them (as represented in 
phase 2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire analysis) 
 
 The feedback complaint from banks is a lame excuse as any new 
typologies can be provided during training, however this does not mean 
the relationship and co-operation should not be extended within all AML 
agencies as represented in phase 2 focus groups) 
 
 There appears to be some confusion over the role of SOCA/NCA and the 
level of targeting of offender assets (some suggestion of the easy target 
offender as opposed to the ‘Mr Bigs’ as the legislation intended) (as 
represented in phase 2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire analysis) 
 
 As policing evolves so does the criminal (an example is the increased 
number of cannabis houses producing cannabis, cigarette smuggling, tax 
evasion and human trafficking) law enforcement need to lead on 
typologies and direct intelligence sources and resource allocation (as 
represented in phase 2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire analysis) 
 
 Predicate crime for money laundering is too cumbersome and sometimes 
difficult to prove (‘Mr Bigs’ distance themselves from the predicate crime 
but will not be too far away from the assets) (as represented in phase 2 
focus group interviews; phase 3 questionnaire analysis) 
 
 Stand-alone money laundering cases without predicate crime attached are 
not favored by prosecutors (as represented in phase 2 focus groups) 
 
 There is a view that asset recovery is commercially driven, to get the 
money in quickly (this may be due to the incentivisation scheme were a 
percentage of recovered funds go back to the recovering agency) (as 
represented in phase 2 focus groups; phase 3 questionnaire analysis) 
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 If the above is true then that may account for the targeting of easy pickings 
by SOCA/NCA (as represented in phase 2 focus groups) 
 
 Simplifying the legislation may help speed up the judicial process which is 
seen as torturously long (if a case is too long; from arrest to court 
proceedings then the defendant gets a sentencing consideration due to  
abuse of process (as represented in phase 2 focus group interviews)  
 
 
In summary the common denominator in all of the above features is ‘assets’. The 
above features help recognise that asset recovery is an important dimension in 
the whole of the AML environment. The effect of asset recovery has 
repercussions prior to and post the criminal offence. This is apparent in the 
behavior of the offender: their knowledge of the AML system, and how they 
manage the processes of that system. The criminal objective to obtain and retain 
criminal funds, puts into play a host of activities to ensure that objective is met.  
Activities such as:  
 
 A cover story to account for criminal funds (which may be in his own name 
or a family member or friends name)  
 
 Business, company, bank account  
 Professional accountant, solicitor, financial advisor, bank official, high 
value dealer 
 
 When funds arrive they may be dispersed in to the business and filtered 
through bank accounts and other assets purchased 
 
 Foreign jurisdictions may be used to transfer funds for further criminal 
activity, property or asset purchase and/or assist the laundering process 
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All of the above activities make asset tracing difficult. However trigger points 
based on the study findings around sentencing deterrent, reporting/compliance 
and criminal knowledge may provide suitable solutions to these problems.  
 
Undertaking this study has fulfilled a long term ambition to achieve meaningful 
research. The study has provided this author with personal development in many 
areas and enhanced knowledge academically and in the subject area. Extending 
knowledge in this area will provide a solid base which to impart that knowledge 
to others and advise in policy and best practice to many agencies in the AML 
environment.  
 
There is already a huge interest in this study and this author has already received 
requests to publish the findings when the thesis has been completed.  
 
5.5 Contributions 
This study contributes to theory, methodology and professional practice by 
answering the research question and meeting the objectives set in chapter one. 
This research was driven by the desire to extend AML knowledge. As reviewed 
in chapter two the concept of money laundering has been an area fraught with 
difficulties, particularly in relation to theory and methodology. Criticisms have 
been levelled at previous research in this area as lacking in theoretical 
foundations and the use of methods that use assumptions, estimations and guess 
work to arrive at results, particularly in research estimations of the cost of money 
laundering (Unger, 2007; Masciandaro et al, 2007; Levi and Reuter, 2006; Van 
Duyne, 2006 and Reuter, 1985). Some researchers have based their theoretical 
foundations on ‘economic crime theory’ following Becker (1968). As discussed 
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and developed in section 1.3.3 in chapter one, this assumes the economist’s 
analysis of rational choice whereby a person commits an offence if the expected 
utility gained from committing the offence (for example financial reward) exceeds 
the disutility associated with the action from being caught. This theory suggests 
it is the government’s responsibility to ensure the cost of committing an offence 
exceeds the benefit obtained thereby deterring the offender from committing 
crime (Ferwerda, 2009; Fleming, 2005; Masciandaro, 2004). Many authors such 
as Ferwerda (2009), Walker and Unger (2009), Schneider (2006), Masciandaro 
(2004), Walker (1999) of whom (apart from Fleming who provides a 
comprehensive study on the asset recovery process that draws data from many 
areas using quantitative and qualitative methods of enquiry) developed 
theoretical models of the estimates of money laundering based on econometrics 
and observed data. 
 
In terms of the practical contributions of previous research and in light of the gap 
identified in the literature that highlighted problems gaining access to key actors 
in the AML arena and as a consequence, access to the data that they held 
(Harvey and Lau, 2009; Verhage, 2008; Van Duyne, 2006; Masciandaro et al, 
2004, 2001), this author suggests there has been more use of quantitative 
methods employed in previous research. This can be explained by the extensive 
use of statistics in previous research drawn from official government and law 
enforcement records and much less emphasis on data from experienced, 
knowledgeable stakeholders from the AML arena. Van Duyne (2006) in his 
research in Serbia informed us that appointments with enforcement and 
regulatory agencies were not kept, or cancelled at the last minute, records were 
unavailable and that records that were presented were incomplete.  
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Based on previous criticisms and approaches in the AML arena, this research 
took a different approach. Extending the theoretical views held by deterrence 
theory and rational choice theory as explained in section 1.3.3 chapter one, this 
research included economic regulation theory that discussed the use of 
regulatory control to ensure compliance, and indirectly providing preventative 
AML measures as a part of the explanatory framework. The outcomes of the 
research demonstrates the combination of these theories is compatible. 
Deterrence theory suggests the punishment fitting the crime; rational choice 
theory suggests criminals will determine the cost of committing the crime against 
the benefit from the crime; regulation theory suggests the extent to which 
governments will exert influence through regulation or rules to achieve their own 
objective as demonstrated in section 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 of chapter one.  
 
The combination of theories provided a bigger picture than that previously 
portrayed in the AML arena. Assumptions are made of underpinning theory in the 
effects of money laundering and the cost and scale of money laundering; 
Schneider (2007), Unger (2007), Reuter and Truman (2004), Thomas (1999), 
Walker (1999a, 1995), IMF (1998). This research tested those assumptions by 
applying a rigorous flow of mixed methods from qualitative and quantitative 
disciplines bringing into play key stakeholders from the AML environment and 
triangulating the results (chapter three provides a full description of the methods 
used). In doing so the results suggest that rational choice theory is extended due 
to the emphasis placed on thoughts around deterrence through sentencing and 
asset recovery; regulation deterrence through fines for non-compliance and 
offender behavior and decisions to commit crime. Rational choice follows from 
the effects of money laundering and the cost and scale of money laundering as 
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both play key roles in understanding the deterrent effect of AML policy. Evaluation 
of the efficiency and effectiveness of AML policy is driven by the results of 
statistical data on crime figures, asset recovery and prosecutions. Policy is also 
designed to protect the financial sector from operational and reputational risks 
(Harvey, 2007). Likewise, estimations of the scale of money laundering is 
important as suggested by Biagioli (2008), because it gives a measure of the 
phenomenon and its impact on the legal economy (global economic instability 
through drug trafficking was also behind the development of FATF 
recommendations in 1991).  The results of measurement may also influence risk 
assessment within the financial sector and the evaluation of counter 
measures/preventative measures needed to be put in place. The success of AML 
policy should therefore be a combination of the results of both effectiveness of 
AML policy and estimations of the cost and scale of money laundering. 
 
As discussed in section 1.3.1 Chapter one, Keel (2009) suggests the only 
deterrence to crime is if the punishment fitted the crime. Ferwerda (2009) goes 
further to suggest that legislation should ensure the costs of committing the crime 
(measured in terms of penalties) are higher than the benefits obtained from 
committing the crime. The findings from this research contribute to theory by 
extending the existing literature and showing that rather than criminals being 
influenced by the length of detention upon conviction or the value of their 
confiscation order it is conjointly the combination of sentencing and civil recovery 
(confiscation) that is a more effective deterrent. However, when viewing the 
results from the focus group discussions with key stakeholders a different view is 
presented. The suggestion being that civil recovery on its own is a stronger 
deterrent than incarceration.  
306 
 
By following Keel’s view that “The swiftness, severity and certainty of punishment 
are key elements in understanding the law’s ability to control human behaviour” 
(Keel, 2005:1) would suggest, rightly, that the law relating to AML in the UK was 
designed to deter money laundering. Based on the premise that in order for crime 
to be deterred, laws and enforcement are used to raise an individual’s awareness 
that criminal behaviour will result in punishment. However this author does not 
believe that legislators would have expected that civil recovery/confiscation would 
be a greater deterrent than sentencing, moreover the choice by individuals to 
commit money laundering offences is not bound by the deterrent effect of going 
to prison but by losing the very lifestyle that their criminal activity has funded. 
Evidence presented in this thesis in section 4.5.1 chapter four demonstrates that 
this view changes the behavior of criminals and encourages them to put in place 
mechanisms to hide their assets from enforcement authorities. The following 
comments echo those views:  
 
“We’re finding a lot more hidden assets, where assets are hidden in 
third party type thing”. 
 
“Just in the last 18 months to two years instead of getting a 
straightforward case where you get an individual or a company, you 
now get companies and they’re chains and there are groups of them.  
And it seems, I’m not sure if it’s deterring the crime as opposed to 
making them more determined not to get caught.  Or not determined, 
more determined to have a limited company take the fall for it where 
they can’t be hit”. 
 
                                                                          Comments from prosecutors 
 
In addition a number of activities presented in the thesis suggest a two tier 
spending regime by criminals as opposed to the model currently being used by 
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law enforcement, the National Intelligence Model (NIM)52. The NIM is a model for 
policing that provides strategic direction and tactical resourcing decisions from 
the management of information and intelligence that is received. The model 
works at three levels: level 1 deals with crime at a local or command level; level 
2 deals with crime at a regional level and level 3 deals with serious and organised 
crime that is usually national or international.  
 
Two tier criminals as outlined above suggests a lower level criminal who spends 
his ill-gotten gains as he receives them and a higher level criminal who uses 
professional money laundering facilities. The results from the phase 3 statistical 
analysis did not specifically identify ‘spend’ as a significant component, however 
the theme ‘spending activities’ term does link to component 2 
reporting/compliance and component 3 AML knowledge. Component 2 suggests 
the banking system does a good job in preventing the use of accounts to launder 
criminal money and in addition is sufficient to dissuade professionals from being 
involved in money laundering. Component 3 suggest that criminals as well as 
needing to be aware of law enforcement tactics also need to have knowledge of 
AML policy. Discussions with participants in the focus group interviews 
corroborate these views. The comments below provide a picture of the changing 
face of money laundering that incorporates the use of tactics by criminals based 
on knowledge of AML and law enforcement procedures. A full list of comments is 
provided at Appendix 3.4 which extends the breadth of knowledge and changing 
methods used by criminals to spend their ill-gotten gains. Comments such as:  
 
 
                                            
52 For a full description of National Intelligence Model (NIM) see: www.acpo.police.uk 
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“But they’re learning as the years have gone on from the Proceeds 
of Crime Act because initially the people would have put a wad of 
money in a child’s savings account…Or in his mother’s…Yeah that 
we could have got very quickly.  Now they’re having to think so much 
more smart, smarter that they have to take the money away from 
themselves and their families completely”. 
 
“Once it goes cross border it grinds to a halt because the natural 
jurisdictions don’t want to work together.  See your biggest issue for 
us in the level of crime that we’re dealing with is, a lot of it is so slow 
for us to investigate because it is outside the immediate jurisdiction”. 
 
 
                                                      Comments from law enforcement 
 
 
 “I would say there are professional money launderers at the top 
end, there has to be, whether it’s laundering cash or just laundering 
cheques or money that’s come across a computer screen that’s just 
bouncing around different accounts.  I mean there has to be.  
Someone who launders money, big sums, it’s going to be pretty 
much a full time job, and they’re going to take their cut for that”. 
 
                                                              
                                                              Comment from Accountants 
 
 
 
 “I would presume if people knew about it, it would be the ultimate 
deterrent, because if I’m earning 20 grand a year and I go and make a 
lodgement of ten grand, knowing that that’ll kick start some sort of 
investigation, there’s no way in a million years if I know that I’m going 
to go in with ten grand”. 
 
 
                                                                         Comment from Ex-Offenders 
 
Courts are inclined to balance sentencing and confiscation, criminals and 
defense barristers are aware of this and use the system to their advantage. As 
suggested by a number of the participants in the focus groups in phase 2, 
difficulties arise in getting prosecutions through the court for money laundering 
cases. As a result a civil recovery appears to be preferred to a costly time and 
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resource intensive investigation. The following comments relate to those 
concerns: 
 
“So that’s a question for prosecution services, CPS, PPS.  Why are 
you unwilling to prosecute when we have evidence to prove, especially 
in line with standalone money laundering”. 
 
                                                                  Comment from Law Enforcement 
 
“We haven’t got the information we need to take the prosecution 
decision and we end up withdrawing the charges in those cases.  I 
think that’s just the nature of criminality now that there are quite a lot 
of cases where we do that”. 
 
                                                                           Comment from Prosecutors 
 
“I would distinguish between the two, the actual sentence in terms of 
custody in money laundering cases in my experience is not of huge 
deterrent value because the sentences tend to be quite low.  But it’s 
the confiscation which I think is a huge deterrent that really hits them 
where it hurts, in their pocket”. 
 
                                                                           Comment from Prosecutors 
 
“because if there’s more emphasis on the civil side why is there 
emphasis on the civil side, is it because it’s an easier system, an easier 
way of getting money off people for the government”. 
 
                                                                          Comment from ex-offenders 
 
Criminal benefit becomes a feature of lifestyle as crime is seen to pay; this is in 
contrast to the government policy initiative in 2002 that ‘crime does not pay’ and 
the introduction of the Proceeds of Crime Act.  Evidence from this study (chapter 
4, section 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.7 and provided at table 4.16) suggests from both the 
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quantitative results and the qualitative results that criminals do not fear going to 
prison when sentenced for money laundering crime but do fear losing their assets 
from the confiscation that follows. The combination of component one; 
sentencing/deterrent and component two; regulatory compliance, the implications 
of which suggest regulatory control was having the right effect and banks were 
generally compliant. A model of behavior could be profiled that concentrates on 
AML activity and preventative mechanisms. The implications for future policy 
could be directed around deterrence using the results of this study. Criminal 
thinking prior to and post criminal offences centers around their assets. Potential 
loss of those assets appears to be a greater deterrent than a prison sentence. 
Current sentencing for money laundering offences appears to be too lenient. 
Courts, judiciary and prosecutors appear to play off prison time against 
confiscation. The third component criminal knowledge compliments component 
two (which suggests the regulatory regime is effective) and rather than take the 
risk of losing cash in the banking system criminal will retain their cash. Further 
evidence from the key stakeholders suggest cash being trafficked across borders 
or being retained and spent. Directing thoughts around policy following the 
rational choice theory in the context above can provide a different direction that 
the current policy suggests. Rational choice is extended from each of the three 
theories provided in this research with deterrence being the common thread that 
is drawn from each and that from which preventative measures can be designed.  
Using data drawn from the key stakeholders in this research filled the gap missing 
in previous research and added a unique contribution in this area. Table 5.1 
provides a summary of the research gaps. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of the research gaps 
 
Research gaps Relevant authors 
Theory 
 
 Based on lack of underpinning 
theory 
 Based on extension of deterrence 
and rational choice theory and 
economic regulation theory  
Results 
Deterrence became a common thread 
from each of the above theories that 
complimented each of the significant 
components: 
Sentencing/deterrent 
Regulation/reporting 
Criminal knowledge 
 
Schneider (2010) Harvey (2009) 
 
Verhage (2009) Reuter (2007) 
 
Unger (2007) Van Duyne (2006) 
 
 Levi (2005) 
Knowledge 
 
 Based on lack of data available 
previously 
 Based on use of key stakeholder 
groups 
 Based on robust methodology 
strategy 
 Based on inclusion of ex-
offenders data 
Results 
Mixed methods employed the use 
of qualitative and quantitative 
disciplines. Key stakeholders from 
law enforcement, accountants, 
prosecutors, financial institutions, 
ex-offenders provided a unique mix 
of knowledge for this research. 
Combined with statistical analysis 
of questionnaire survey and 
validated focus groups this 
research filled the gap of data 
missing in previous research. 
 
 
 
Harvey (2009) 
 
Verhage (2009) 
 
Ferwarder (2009) 
 
Van Duyne (2006) 
 
Fleming (2005) 
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The methodology in this research employed a mixed methods approach that 
combined both quantitative and qualitative data capturing the strengths of both 
disciplines to produce reliable and valid results. Triangulation of the methods 
within the qualitative and quantitative disciplines provided rigor to the process.  
 
New insights on AML was gained through the use of mixed methods, particularly 
from using the qualitative data from the expert focus groups, the responses to 
question 13 in the questionnaire and the data from the verification process at 
phase 4. This data added substance to the quantitative results bringing together 
a wealth of knowledge previously missed in other research in this area. One of 
the key contributions from using this methodology was that it provided data 
unavailable in other studies of its kind that opened the door and expand the gaze 
to key elements never elucidated or previously considered. In particular the 
quantitative results concerning ‘reporting/compliance’ suggests the SAR process 
is effective. Generally the expert groups agree with this result, however the 
caveat is that the financial institutions would report less if the regulators were not 
so determined to enforce the regulations through auditing and surveillance and 
the threat of fines. Secondly by linking the third component from the quantitative 
results, ‘criminal knowledge’ the suggestion from ex-offenders is that criminals 
would not use financial institutions in a way that would cause the bank to make 
reports on suspicions of money laundering. This therefore acknowledges the 
result of the third significant component from the quantitative analysis, 
sentencing/deterrence whereby prevention of money laundering is an effective 
deterrent through regulation. As shown in Figure 5.7 access to key groups 
included: accountants, law enforcement, prosecutors, bankers, and ex-offenders.  
313 
 
The combination of experts offered a substantial insight into experiences, 
opinions, motivations, problems and knowledge in the AML environment. The 
data was such a valuable commodity for this study as the experience and 
knowledge of key experts in AML environment (from a qualitative perspective) 
provided the meat to the bones of the quantitative statistical analysis. 
Triangulation incorporated the results of phase 2 focus group interviews with the 
results of the phase 3 survey questionnaires and the verification responses to the 
statistical results in phase 4. As suggested by Bryman and Bell (2007) a broader 
level of interpretation adds value to the validation process. Figure 5.1 provides a 
reminder of the triangulation contribution. 
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Figure 5.1 Results of the triangulation of methods 
 
 
 
 
 Phase 2 Focus Groups                                              Phase 3 Factor Analysis 
                                                                            
                                                                      
Phase 4 
Component verification 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1 Identification of themes from Literature 
                                                               
 
 
 
 
From the professional practice contributions, this study will benefit enforcement 
practitioners in key areas of policy to target ML crime. The outcomes from the 
research in this area indicated at chapter 4, section 4.3.2 (summarised below) 
have shown that asset recovery/confiscation features as a major deterrent to ML 
crime as opposed to prosecution: namely that sentencing is not a deterrent 
particularly as suggested by prosecutors in the focus group interviews that 
sentencing for money laundering tends to be low; that offenders fear losing their 
Theme identification 
Legislation 
Criminality 
SAR process 
Spend 
Influence 
Other activities 
 
 
Results 
Sentencing/deterrent 
Regulation/compliance 
Criminal knowledge 
Themes 
Policy 
Crime 
SARs 
Spend 
Agency influence 
Other activities 
Phase 4 
Verification of results 
from 
Individual part cipants 
 
“Confirmed” 
 
Sentencing/deterrent 
 
Regulation/compliance 
 
Criminal knowledge 
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assets more than prison; that courts are inclined to balance confiscation and 
sentencing of an offender; that prosecutors prefer civil recovery a opposed to 
prosecuting cases and as suggested by the law enforcement group, deals are 
carried out between the judiciary and offenders defense barristers without law 
enforcement consent. Finally, law enforcement need to be aware that criminals, 
in trying to circumvent the system, will look for weaknesses in the system in which 
to take advantage. An example of this was described by a number of the focus 
group participants at chapter 4, section 4.3.2, such as: leaving complex trails of 
companies in multiple jurisdictions to thwart the investigative capabilities of law 
enforcement; moving cash rather than enter the financial system to transfer 
funds; or that individuals have knowledge of law enforcement tactics and money 
laundering legislation. From this perspective money transfers move across the 
globe within seconds whereas law enforcement can take months or even years 
to track them.  
 
Regulation and compliance is a significant feature in the AML process and the 
results of this research confirm and corroborate that view. Comments from key 
stakeholders involved in the AML process suggest that control by regulators is a 
key feature in making financial institutions compliant in making suspicious activity 
reports. The comments further suggest that the fear of fines and sanctions on the 
financial institution as a result of regulatory control increase the pressure to make 
reports and that reputation and integrity of the financial Institution could be 
affected through bad publicity. The following comment puts into perspective the 
power and influence of regulatory control: “if it wasn’t regulatory we would do it at 
a minimalistic level” (focus group comment from bankers in reference to a 
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discussion around making reports of suspicions of money laundering/terrorist 
financing).  
 
The outcomes of the study also suggest that within the criminal knowledge 
framework, that low level criminals spend their cash as they get it, and as such 
are more likely to have cash around them for seizure (but only for a short time). 
High level criminals on the other hand (organised crime and international level 
criminals) are also likely to have large sums of cash, but will use complex 
international companies and financial institutions to launder their cash (as 
indicated by financial institutions, chapter 4, sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. Knowledge 
of the above outcomes can provide law enforcement the opportunity to draw up 
new policy based on this model of behaviour. Table 5.2 provides a summary of 
the areas of contribution for this study. 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of the areas of Contribution 
Area of contribution Contribution 
Theoretical contribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In this thesis Rational Choice 
Theory is extended as illustrated 
below 
 Provides an improved 
understanding of deterrence in 
the AML field of activity that 
directs theory toward sentencing 
and penalties for money 
laundering 
 Implies that asset recovery 
through confiscation provides a 
stronger deterrent than 
sentencing and that the behaviour 
of criminal activity could be 
profiled based on those results.  
Enabling policy changes from 
enhanced theory.  
 Understanding of the role of 
regulatory agencies and the 
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Continued threat of sanctions and/or fines for 
non-compliance 
 Contributions to the 
understanding of offenders 
behavior and their decision to 
commit crime  
Methodological contribution  Provided a sequential flow of 
methods to determine the drivers 
of influence in AML 
implementation in the UK 
 Use of key stakeholders groups 
including ex-offenders to provide 
experience, knowledge and 
opinion in AML processes 
 Combined quantitative and 
qualitative contributes to achieve 
a valid and reliable conclusion to 
the study  
Professional practice contribution Provides practical information about the 
processes practitioners within the 
stakeholder groups see as significant 
aspects of AML: 
 Asset recovery as a key 
(deterrent) component in AML  
 Change money laundering 
prosecutions by reducing the 
requirements for predicate crime 
 Change perceptions of what 
money laundering is by focusing 
on the spending activities of 
criminals at two levels (local and 
international) 
 Identification of a model of 
behavior that will have practical 
implications for enforcement – to 
focus on recovery rather than 
prosecution  
  
 
5.6 Limitations and Further Research 
This study reviewed a large volume of literature around the area of money 
laundering and was subject to many data tools of data collection and analysis. 
Acknowledgement is however made that the study is not without its short 
comings and is open to further avenues of research. 
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The study examined AML viewed through the eyes of key stakeholders in the 
AML process. Literature in the subject area provided the themes to bring to 
the expert focus groups for validation. As the themes are an important starting 
point for this research a more focused approach may have been to draw the 
themes from the focus groups initially and then develop them through a survey 
questionnaire.  
 
The study had intentionally focused on five key stakeholder groups to validate 
the themes identified from literature. As there are further interest groups that 
could have participated in the study future studies may wish to consider 
extending to those groups. Other groups include estate agents, high value 
dealers, financial advisors, casinos and solicitors. Considerations of 
saturation of data and the aims of the research are important aspect in that 
respect. However, a larger group area of key experts may have given the 
research a broader perspective of which to draw opinions, knowledge and 
experience.  
 
Another element within AML area which has drawn attention is the public 
perspective on AML and regulatory compliance. The public perception and 
reaction to financial institutions and recent fines and sanctions relating to 
money laundering is worth considering. The results of this study related 
significant influence from reporting/compliance component and it would be 
useful to add the public dimension to this study.   
 
Another issue worth considering is the confirmation of the model from the 
factor analysis. This study verified the components using a qualitative method 
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provided by representatives of the original focus groups. Future studies may 
wish to continue with the statistical analysis and confirm the components 
using confirmatory factor analysis or other statistical method.  
 
The context of the current study concentrated in the UK, AML environment. 
Further studies could extend globally as the AML environment is a global 
environment and the consequences of behavior globally refers also locally 
and vis-vis.  Future studies could carry out a comparative study in another 
country or several countries and generalising the results from a global 
perspective. 
 
As this study adopted a pragmatic approach as its research philosophy, future 
studies could consider a purely objective or subjective stance. Methods 
employed could come from a purely quantitative or qualitative perspective. 
  
Finally, there are many tools and techniques that could be used to conduct 
similar research in this area. The approach taken attempted to provide a solid 
theoretical base of which to bed the research; a robust, data collection and 
analytical process to answer the research question and the use of the 
objectives to help drive the research and provide direction. This study is just 
one of many areas within the AML environment suitable for investigation. The 
results of this study are significant and in response to the research question 
the factors that influence the effectiveness of AML policy implementation in 
the UK are: sentencing/deterrence; regulation/compliance and criminal 
knowledge.     
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Appendix 3.2 Copy of Informed consent form for focus 
 groups 
 
 
Newcastle Business School 
Informed Consent Form for research participants 
 
Title of Study 
 
“An exploration of Anti-money laundering 
Legislation and how it influences the 
activities of criminals in the UK?” 
Person(s) conducting the research 
 
Samuel Sittlington 
 Programme of study PhD research  
Address of the researcher for 
correspondence 
 
Sam Sittlington PRRT, 100 Holywood Rd, 
Belfast, Co Down, Northern Ireland, BT 
Telephone 07795152451 
E-mail sam@sittlington.com 
Description of the broad nature of the 
research 
 
 
The purpose of this doctoral research is to 
explore the success or failure of current 
anti-money laundering policy by 
understanding the relationship between 
criminal activity and policy making. To 
establish the direction of determination 
between anti-money laundering legislation 
and criminal activity and establish how 
accurately current policy reflects money 
laundering crime. 
Description of the involvement expected of 
participants including the broad nature of 
questions to be answered or events to be 
observed or activities to be undertaken, 
and the expected time commitment 
 
 
This phase of the research is to use focus 
groups to assist in identifying the themes 
and potential questions that will help 
develop a questionnaire for a larger pool of 
professionals and criminals. The focus 
groups will consist of representatives from 
various organisations who are involved in 
the subject background. The details of 
those group dynamics are contained within 
the introductory letter sent to you prior to 
this exercise. It is expected the process will 
take no longer than 90 minutes. Participants 
will be facilitated with a number of prompts 
that have come from previous empirical 
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research in this area and asked to discuss 
thinking around these areas. You will have 
also been provided with a list of those 
themes.  
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept strictly 
confidential (i.e. will not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. individuals and 
organisations will not be identified unless this is expressly excluded in the details given 
above). 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of 
forms and for a variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed 
above. It will not be used for purposes other than those outlined above without your 
permission.  
Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand 
the above information and agree to participate in this study on the basis of 
the above information. 
 
 
Participant’s Signature……………………………………..Date……………. 
 
Student’s signature…………………………………………Date……………. 
 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 
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Appendix 3.3 Question prompts to facilitate focus 
 group interviews 
 
 Introductions 
 Relationship between Policy and Crime 
 Direction of determination 
 Themes from Literature – list – what is important? 
 Is preventive process effective  
 Views on sentencing and confiscation as a deterrent? 
 Views on incentivisation-money making exercise or deterrent? 
 What is your view on hierarchy of crime i.e. organised crime? 
 Are there levels of money launderers? 
 Are there professional money launderers? 
 What would you change in the Proceeds of Crime arena? 
 Is Policy effective – what is important in making policy? 
 Is law enforcement effective- resources-expertise- crime recording? 
 Views on crime – types-greater/lesser evil 
 What questions would you like to ask other agencies/stakeholders? 
 What questions should be asked and around what areas? 
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Appendix 3.4 Sample of quotations from focus group 
  transcript analysis 
 
Focus group quotes – Groups A – B – C – D – E 
Group A Law Enforcement 
“Without anything, any predicate offence to bolt onto that.  Now that 
has changed a little bit but we’re still having major problems getting 
restraints on both, in what is retrained and the length of time it has 
taken the PPS to do that.  They have problems in England that I’m 
aware of with their CPS over there, but they are nothing in comparison 
to the problems that we have with our PPS”. 
 
“The MSB regulations facilitate money laundering.  In fact you have to 
ask the question why they exist in the first place”. 
 
“So that’s a question for prosecution services, CPS, PPS.  Why are 
you unwilling to prosecute when we have evidence to prove, especially 
in line with standalone money laundering”. 
 
“Either one of those things should end up with a jail sentence of some 
sort as a deterrent…Well if they’re convicted that’s deterrent. But if 
they can’t even get them into the court in the first place”. 
 
 “The public, there’s a message. There’s a perception of acceptance 
within the community around crimes against Government, tax 
evasion”. 
 
 “I mean you’ll see murder cases that are prosecuted in the Crown 
Court in less than a year in England, cos they can fast track them.  
Over here you know what it’s like, PPS, we’ve a number of files in at 
the minute and they’ve been in a year and there are no directions yet”. 
 
“There’s absolutely no doubt about that, there’s absolutely no doubt 
that the reporting institutions know stuff that we don’t know.  There’s 
no doubt.  Whether we utilise that or whether we exploit that is a 
completely different question”. 
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Group B Accountants 
“I think some of our exposure to cases and, cases in which money 
laundering and legislation is, is the governing legislation.  I think we 
have had, not concern but we have commented certainly in the past 
that money laundering legislation seems to be used against those low 
level drug dealer type criminals, the street dealer type and we haven’t 
seen it as effective against the, the upper end of the drugs chain”. 
 
“But I would say that professionally as a forensic accountant, as I have 
worked with police forces, one of the things that you know I am very 
aware of is kind of financial constraints that the police operate under, 
and it seemed to me that unless the offence was very large and very 
lucrative, there simply wasn’t the resource to bother investigating it.  
Now this could be completely wrong, but there would have been a time 
when I would have had the feeling that unless there was at least a 
million pounds involved and you, it was relatively simple to investigate 
and get a conviction, there was kind of very little stomach to pursue 
the criminals”. 
 
“I see that from a government’s point of view it’s strategically 
potentially very effective, because I rather suspect that the Mr Bigs 
behind the drugs, racketeering, whatever, probably distance 
themselves from the predicate offences, so I rather have the 
impression that it’s hard”. 
 
“And that’s where the legislation seems to be used and you know we 
would love to see the legislation, from a professional point of view and 
from a decent member of side point of view as well, let’s see it hitting 
the big boys”. 
 
 
 “I would say there are professional money launderers at the top end, 
there has to be, whether it’s laundering cash or just laundering 
cheques or money that’s come across a computer screen that’s just 
bouncing around different accounts.  I mean there has to be.  
Someone who launders money, big sums, it’s going to be pretty much 
a full time job, and they’re going to take their cut for that”. 
 
“Does fuel smuggling hurt society, I mean if there was no fuel 
smuggling would we all be paying less tax, no we wouldn’t that’s just 
a myth the Government plug.  So I mean it wouldn’t happen at all so, 
is fuel smuggling, if people just make money from it and go and buy 
houses and cars, the money’s in the system, it’s back in there, they’re 
paying VAT and everything else, does that really hurt society, as long 
as you know they’re not doing people trafficking or anything like that 
sort of stuff, then I think it does depend on the original offence”. 
 
“Well for a crime you need motivation, you need opportunity, the 
third thing you need is the ability to rationalise it to yourself that 
you haven’t done anything wrong”.  
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Group C Prosecutors 
“Criminals will establish very quickly where the weak links in particular 
banks are and will hone in on that”. 
 
“We haven’t got the information we need to take the prosecution 
decision and we end up withdrawing the charges in those cases.  I 
think that’s just the nature of criminality now that there are quite a lot 
of cases where we do that”. 
 
“We’ve even had instances where the judges are starting to equate, 
they’re starting to trade off a criminal sentence with a confiscation 
order”. 
 
“Well that’s, I mean all the articles that you read talk about it being a 
Draconian piece of legislation, but it is Draconian because it’s there to 
punish, it’s there to punish and to get back the proceeds of crime.  And 
I think that that is where a lot of practitioners perhaps on the defence 
side, and you know possibly the judiciary on occasion find that 
difficult”. 
 
“And I think that’s been our only successful case without a predicate 
offence and that was under the new legislation.  And that was an 
extremely effective way of targeting a terrorist and, but I am quite 
surprised that we haven’t been getting a lot more of those cases”. 
 
 “I would distinguish between the two, the actual sentence in terms of 
custody in money laundering cases in my experience is not of huge 
deterrent value because the sentences tend to be quite low.  But it’s 
the confiscation which I think is a huge deterrent that really hits them 
where it hurts, in their pocket”. 
 
“Just in the last 18 months to two years instead of getting a 
straightforward case where you get an individual or a company, you 
now get companies and they’re chains and there are groups of them.  
And it seems, I’m not sure if it’s deterring the crime as opposed to 
making them more determined not to get caught.  Or not determined, 
more determined to have a limited company take the fall for it where 
they can’t be hit”. 
 
“We’re finding a lot more hidden assets, where assets are hidden in 
third party type thing”. 
 
“I think, when it comes to banks and you know estate agencies and 
places like that, I think as regards their SARS obligations you know I’d 
say they’re fairly much compliant with it, and I don’t think there’d be a 
difficulty there but, the likes of car dealerships and places like that, it’s 
a different kettle of fish there, where they’re much more localised”. 
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“So that’s an area where possibly some people who previously might have 
been acting illegally may have cottoned on to moving into that, I don’t 
know….Immorally”. 
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Group D MLRO’s 
“Well it’s seen as something we have to do and I suppose there are 
negative aspects to it in that, we don’t really see any positive outcomes 
from the SAR process.  Whilst it’s recognised that it’s important, but I 
think it is generally deemed to be an exercise because there’s not a 
lot of feedback as to how useful it actually is”. 
 
 “If the penalties weren’t a factor and it wasn’t regulatory they would 
do it at a minimalistic level”. 
 
“Well we have an obligation to follow essentially the money laundering 
guidance notes”. 
 
“I mean if I was a criminal the first people I would employ would be, I 
would employ a good accountant to go through the JMLSG guidance 
notes to see were the loopholes are.  Or I would put someone inside 
a bank to understand were the bank is weaker, you know, is maybe 
potentially paying lip service”. 
 
 “Yeah there’s SARs you can categorise you know as being tax 
evasion, benefit fraud, then the other ones that you have no idea 
what’s behind them but”. 
 
“The other flip side is sometimes when we would do training staff is, to 
try and manage their expectation.  They need to be careful, you know 
I don’t know what other banks would do, but I would be quite careful 
to make sure our guys realise they’re not police officers”. 
 
 “I don’t know what you’re like, but business managers are not as quick 
to send in SARs as the retail staffs are, the branch staff, they are very 
clued in”. 
 
 “Where the anomalies to that are because then I again go back to the 
regional managers and (inaudible) those three or four branches are 
doing SARs but there, you know, they’re not quality”. 
 
 “It would be nice to see, it would be nice to see the levels of SARs 
drop in a sense because publicly people (inaudible) benefit fraud, 
people would know they’re going to get caught, people would know it’s 
not worth doing in some sense.  I don’t see any level, I don’t see any 
visible representation that the legislation is catching more people”.  
 
  “And the likes of the FSA who are well financed can regulate with fear 
I suppose, where the banks are taking the cost of the resources out of 
the profits”. 
 
“My perception is that they still go to very immediate and to high level, 
but they probably, I would imagine that the legislation’s the same 
whether I’m putting, doing six grand a year of homers or doing 60 
grand a year.  But is there any scope then to make that a quicker 
process, that you know in terms of returning time that they get more 
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hits with the smaller guy because the process is more 
straightforward…Because the smaller, below a certain threshold it 
doesn’t seem to get touched at all”. 
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Group E Ex-Offenders 
“Aye it’s a wee bit like, you know, white collar crime, you know what I 
mean, that sometimes people let it go.  For all different reasons like.   
For legitimate reasons as well, in terms of getting the banks and other 
things bad names, you know…And he got his pension as well”. 
 
“Well it’s, I’m not saying legitimate, but it seems like you know if the 
law is to tap into the higher echelons of it they maybe feel that if you 
take that out you, in some indirect way do away with the lower stuff”. 
 
“But see if you go back to the point you were making, you see about 
the guys supposedly it’s a front, you know, for me someone who gets 
in at a certain lower level of criminality, who then maybe gets a couple 
of schillings and tries to go legitimate, you know, is that a crime, is it 
the fruit of the poison tree, that everything follows on from that initial 
crime is illegal”. 
 
“if somebody actually started doing fag runs and they were making 
money and they decided it’s not worth doing any more, and they go 
and buy a taxi with the money and start to work legit…And then you 
take it all off, you know if you take the taxi off him and take his 
livelihood away, what does he go back till”. 
 
 “There may also be a bit of credibility about, around maybe serving a 
prison sentence as well in certain circumstances”. 
 
“because if there’s more emphasis on the civil side why is there 
emphasis on the civil side, is it because it’s an easier system, an easier 
way of getting money off people for the government”. 
 
“Well we have applied through a community initiative, I just heard that 
recently, because of  the nature of the work we do, conflict 
transformation, so it seems it had some added value by somehow 
ironic that the proceeds of, you know - criminality is put back into…to 
support other people to move them away from it”. 
 
“I mean Belfast is sort of founded on a black economy, it has been for 
many years, you know and people would rather say, buy their fuel 
cheap, their cigarettes cheap, get dodgy DVDs, they get CDs they get 
fake clothes, and that has to, there has to be a level up here for that 
stuff… no it’s not effective”. 
 
“I would presume if people knew about it it would be the ultimate 
deterrent, because if I’m earning 20 grand a year and I go and make 
a lodgement of ten grand, knowing that that’ll kick start some sort of 
investigation, there’s no way in a million years if I know that I’m going 
to go in with ten grand”. 
 
 “- it’s all, there’s the emotion, there’s the bravado, there’s the 
legitimacy supposedly of what you’re fighting for or against … all that 
comes, and the risk, you know, I know people who knew that if, the 
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very first second they stepped out on the street they’re putting their life 
on the line, but they didn’t really think it was going to be taken from 
them, you know….And it wasn’t a rational sort of weighing up pros and 
cons”.  
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Appendix 3.5   Questionnaire pages 1-10 
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Appendix 3.6 Feedback from pilot test of  
 questionnaire 
 
1. Hi Sam 
 
I have had a look at this and I think it is really good. 
A couple of things I noticed:  
 
Firstly, there is a spelling mistake on your covering letter in the Consent and 
Confidentiality section Completing has an extra ‘e’ in it. Also I wondered if you 
need to spell out the AML as Anti Money Laundering first and use the 
abbreviations from then on? 
 
Regarding Question 8, I was wondering why you opted for drop down selection 
rather than for a Likert using the button options as per the other questions? 
 
Regarding Question 9 is the question meant to read as follows: The following 
questions relate to the reporting of suspicions (SAR process) these reports are 
made by etc. etc.? I was just wondering if it should perhaps read as The following 
questions relate to the reporting of suspicious activity these reports are made by 
etc. etc.? 
 
Finally, did you consider putting a ‘Thank you for your participation’ at the end of 
the questionnaire? I know you mention it in your covering page but I think it is 
nice at the end as well as a sort of double thanks! 
 
You are certainly going to be gathering a lot of information as a result of the 
questionnaire, how many participants do you plan to invite to complete it?  
 
Has it been to the Ethics Committee yet? That is always a challenge! 
 
On the whole Sam I think the questionnaire layout etc. is good and it reads well, 
the problems that occur with Survey Monkey electronic questionnaires are 
usually to do with people having problems completing them on line but hopefully 
your pilot will sort out any of those types of issues. 
 
Good luck and feel free to ignore any of my suggestions if you think they are not 
appropriate. 
 
2. Hi Sam 
 See attached pilot questionnaire. I have copied and pasted the document. It may 
be slightly askew but it is readable. Hope its ok. 
 A couple of points, - isn't cigarette smuggling tax evasion? 
 
 When you use the word criminal -You might want to distinguish between low 
level criminality / more serious crime and organised crime. 
 
In Q8 you might want to say when classifying professionals 1-6 starting with one 
as the most serious. 
 
Q11 Police good at identifying assets but not seizing them. 
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 3. Hi Sam 
That is a very good survey questionnaire with good structure. The questions are 
very clear. I listed some suggestions about the questionnaire based on my 
personal perspective. Thanks.  
Feedback for survey questionnaire  
 
1. The title about AML (abbreviation). What is the full name about AML?  
2. Question (1). You can provide an “others” option.  
3. I think you need to use the full stop mark “.” after each statement.   
4. Could you please double check the order for 5-point Likert scales from “strongly 
agree” to “strongly disagree”? You need reference to support why you order like 
this way. Just my personal opinion.  
5. Could you please ask someone to answer this survey questionnaire? I think it 
will take 15-20 mins to finish it.  
Good Luck for your research! 
 
4. Sam 
I understand all the questions ok however they may apply more to someone more 
knowledgeable to the legislation etc., therefore I would be more likely to guess at 
some of the answers, not sure if this is helpful for you 
  
5. Sam 
In truth, I think it would be problematic for the ordinary eight by four prisoner. 
You would need to sit with them to complete it rather than send them in and 
expect them to be completed properly. 
 
6. Sam – I completed your survey and can send it to you. It took me 16 minutes, 
I understood all the questions and they were fine. I think you might need a column 
for “don’t know” which I would have ticked for some of the questions – for those 
answers I just ticked the middle column.  
 
Best wishes 
 
7. Re your survey;- 
 
Q1 include Investigator and Other 
Q5 Include Jewellery + precious metals 
Q6 Include Counterfeit goods 
Q8 Include Businessmen + pawnbrokers 
 
I think there should be some mention about four other ways of laundering, through 
unregulated banking systems, Hawala, Chop etc. Money transfers through 
western Union, etc.  Transfer through pre purchased debit cards. Transfer funds 
by phone. Transfer through virtual reality i.e. second Life. Transfer through 
over/under invoicing. All of which are pretty much unregulated. Clearly there is 
too much emphasis on the regulated sector a fact acknowledged by FAFT. 
 
Generally; readable, understandable and maybe just a bit too long.  
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Appendix 3.7   Descriptive statistics 
VAR N Range Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev 
Variance Skew-
ness 
Kurto-
sis 
ML1 164 4 1 5 2.98 1.04 1.09 -0.11 -1.29 
ML2 164 4 1 5 1.86 0.93 0.87 1.30 1.45 
ML3 164 4 1 5 2.27 1.02 1.04 0.52 -0.52 
ML4 164 4 1 5 2.53 1.00 1.00 0.53 -0.51 
ML5 164 3 1 4 1.63 0.60 0.36 0.52 0.38 
ML6 164 4 1 5 2.80 0.83 0.69 0.45 -0.24 
ML7 164 4 1 5 3.40 1.01 1.03 -0.50 -0.32 
ML8 164 4 1 5 3.10 0.96 0.92 0.13 -0.95 
ML9 164 3 1 4 2.94 0.76 0.59 -0.15 -0.69 
ML10 164 4 1 5 2.98 1.04 1.09 -0.23 -1.21 
ML11 164 4 1 5 3.44 0.97 0.95 -0.53 -0.10 
ML12 164 4 1 5 1.96 0.74 0.54 1.09 2.45 
ML13 164 4 1 5 2.01 0.83 0.69 1.22 2.10 
ML14 164 4 1 5 3.26 1.12 1.26 -0.34 -0.90 
ML15 164 4 1 5 2.12 0.99 0.97 0.85 0.27 
ML16 164 4 1 5 2.77 1.02 1.05 0.17 -1.14 
ML17 164 4 1 5 2.73 0.98 0.96 0.22 -0.89 
ML18 164 4 1 5 4.20 0.96 0.92 -1.46 2.06 
ML19 164 4 1 5 2.66 0.97 0.94 0.45 -0.48 
ML20 164 4 1 5 2.71 0.93 0.86 0.38 -0.93 
ML21 164 3 1 4 1.93 0.70 0.49 0.76 1.31 
ML22 164 4 1 5 2.66 1.04 1.08 0.58 -0.20 
ML23 164 3 1 4 2.27 0.87 0.76 0.57 -0.25 
ML24 164 4 1 5 3.18 0.91 0.83 -0.02 -0.52 
ML25 164 4 1 5 3.23 0.92 0.85 0.11 -0.77 
ML26 164 4 1 5 2.70 0.86 0.74 0.38 -0.58 
ML27 164 4 1 5 2.82 0.93 0.87 0.36 -0.96 
ML28 164 4 1 5 2.01 0.73 0.54 0.73 1.44 
ML29 164 4 1 5 2.10 0.74 0.56 0.83 1.52 
ML30 164 4 1 5 2.37 0.89 0.79 0.74 0.16 
ML31 164 4 1 5 2.53 0.94 0.89 0.62 0.39 
ML32 164 3 1 4 1.73 0.62 0.38 0.73 1.79 
ML33 164 4 1 5 2.30 0.94 0.88 0.81 0.68 
ML34 164 4 1 5 1.92 0.97 0.93 1.28 1.53 
ML35 164 3 1 4 1.57 0.57 0.32 0.53 0.56 
ML36 164 4 1 5 2.88 1.14 1.29 0.13 -1.16 
ML37 164 4 1 5 2.51 1.00 1.00 0.56 -0.45 
ML38 164 4 1 5 2.26 0.87 0.76 0.87 0.63 
ML39 164 4 1 5 2.63 1.02 1.03 0.36 -0.49 
ML40 164 4 1 5 2.38 1.01 1.01 0.45 -0.60 
ML41 164 3 1 4 2.14 0.84 0.71 0.60 -0.02 
ML42 164 3 1 4 2.58 0.81 0.66 0.16 -0.56 
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ML43 164 4 1 5 3.24 1.08 1.16 -0.55 -0.69 
ML44 164 3 1 4 2.10 0.80 0.63 0.63 0.27 
ML45 164 4 1 5 3.37 0.97 0.93 -0.44 -0.73 
ML46 164 3 1 4 1.99 0.77 0.59 0.85 0.96 
ML47 164 4 1 5 2.96 0.98 0.96 0.01 -0.99 
ML48 164 3 1 4 1.77 0.66 0.44 0.68 1.01 
ML49 164 2 1 3 1.87 0.59 0.35 0.03 -0.18 
ML50 164 4 1 5 2.76 1.14 1.30 0.34 -0.95 
ML51 164 4 1 5 2.96 1.05 1.10 -0.14 -1.06 
ML52 164 4 1 5 2.32 0.93 0.86 0.53 -0.12 
ML53 164 4 1 5 2.76 1.06 1.12 0.21 -0.67 
ML54 164 4 1 5 2.68 0.85 0.72 0.11 -0.52 
ML55 164 3 1 4 1.71 0.63 0.39 0.61 0.93 
ML56 164 4 1 5 2.39 0.85 0.72 0.44 0.20 
ML57 164 4 1 5 2.23 0.96 0.93 0.52 -0.44 
ML58 163 4 1 5 2.04 0.84 0.70 0.95 1.36 
ML59 164 2 1 3 1.55 0.58 0.33 0.46 -0.71 
ML60 163 4 1 5 2.31 0.88 0.77 0.50 -0.12 
ML61 164 4 1 5 2.37 0.85 0.73 0.35 -0.15 
ML62 164 4 1 5 2.59 0.96 0.92 0.49 -0.23 
ML63 164 3 1 4 2.58 0.76 0.58 -0.06 -0.32 
ML64 164 4 1 5 3.15 1.15 1.32 -0.23 -0.97 
ML65 164 4 1 5 2.54 1.00 1.00 0.33 -0.49 
ML66 164 3 1 4 1.62 0.60 0.36 0.58 0.38 
ML67 164 3 1 4 1.94 0.72 0.52 0.78 1.11 
ML68 163 3 1 4 2.07 0.86 0.74 0.51 -0.32 
ML69 164 4 1 5 2.13 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.38 
ML70 164 4 1 5 3.82 0.92 0.85 -0.48 -0.31 
ML71 164 4 1 5 2.99 0.93 0.86 -0.16 -0.62 
ML72 164 4 1 5 3.24 1.00 0.99 -0.12 -0.95 
ML73 164 4 1 5 2.71 0.98 0.97 0.23 -0.71 
ML74 164 4 1 5 1.99 0.73 0.54 0.68 1.27 
ML75 164 3 1 4 2.02 0.78 0.61 0.50 -0.01 
ML76 164 3 1 4 2.16 0.87 0.75 0.42 -0.42 
ML77 164 4 1 5 2.21 0.85 0.72 0.55 0.16 
ML78 164 4 1 5 2.51 1.03 1.06 0.50 -0.60 
ML79 164 3 1 4 2.26 0.74 0.55 -0.01 -0.46 
ML80 163 4 1 5 2.52 0.95 0.91 0.35 -0.38 
ML81 163 3 1 4 2.09 0.91 0.83 0.47 -0.57 
ML82 164 4 1 5 3.16 1.05 1.11 -0.34 -0.91 
ML83 164 4 1 5 1.96 0.70 0.50 1.13 3.04 
ML84 164 4 1 5 2.77 1.02 1.04 -0.03 -1.06 
ML85 163 4 1 5 2.51 1.05 1.10 0.45 -0.57 
ML86 164 3 1 4 1.73 0.74 0.54 1.03 1.38 
ML87 163 4 1 5 3.65 0.84 0.70 -0.81 0.92 
ML88 164 3 1 4 1.77 0.66 0.43 0.67 1.03 
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ML89 164 4 1 5 1.71 0.77 0.59 1.45 3.64 
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Appendix 3.8 Correlation matrix for all variables 
VAR ML1 ML2 ML3 ML4 ML5 ML6 ML7 ML8 
ML1 1.00 0.26 0.14 0.15 0.24 0.33 0.14 0.06 
ML2 0.26 1.00 0.10 -0.03 0.05 0.14 -0.06 -0.09 
ML3 0.14 0.10 1.00 0.22 0.11 0.19 -0.50 0.10 
ML4 0.15 -0.03 0.22 1.00 0.32 0.11 0.06 0.16 
ML5 0.24 0.05 0.11 0.32 1.00 0.30 0.01 0.00 
ML6 0.33 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.30 1.00 -0.06 0.33 
ML7 0.14 -0.06 -0.50 0.06 0.01 -0.06 1.00 0.04 
ML8 0.06 -0.09 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.33 0.04 1.00 
ML9 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.18 0.08 -0.20 
ML10 0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.23 -0.12 -0.09 0.05 -0.05 
ML11 -0.18 -0.26 -0.20 -0.06 -0.16 -0.25 0.15 -0.02 
ML12 -0.12 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 
ML13 -0.16 0.11 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.18 0.02 0.02 
ML14 -0.25 -0.09 0.06 -0.05 -0.13 -0.07 -0.08 0.16 
ML15 -0.09 0.18 0.08 -0.12 0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 
ML16 0.29 0.05 0.18 0.24 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.09 
ML17 0.12 -0.06 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.21 0.03 0.11 
ML18 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.08 -0.01 0.20 0.04 0.14 
ML19 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.31 0.23 0.28 0.00 0.20 
ML20 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.31 0.18 0.13 0.03 0.12 
ML21 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.16 -0.04 
ML22 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.07 
ML23 0.11 0.06 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.04 0.18 
ML24 0.27 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.44 -0.07 0.29 
ML25 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.23 -0.09 0.05 
ML26 -0.02 0.07 -0.14 0.02 -0.06 -0.10 0.06 -0.18 
ML27 0.11 -0.09 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.11 0.04 0.16 
ML28 0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 
ML29 0.05 0.09 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.01 
ML30 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 
ML31 0.03 0.01 0.23 0.08 0.02 0.19 -0.10 0.15 
ML32 0.07 0.14 -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.02 
ML33 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.03 
ML34 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 
ML35 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 
ML36 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 
ML37 0.05 -0.10 -0.09 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.06 
ML38 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.03 
ML39 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.02 
ML40 0.08 -0.01 0.16 0.07 0.20 -0.01 -0.11 -0.15 
ML41 0.06 -0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.18 0.03 0.06 -0.08 
ML42 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.20 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 
ML43 0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.10 -0.02 
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ML44 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.02 -0.04 -0.10 
ML45 0.25 0.00 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.39 -0.03 0.20 
ML46 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.03 
ML47 0.01 -0.13 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.23 
ML48 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.04 -0.02 
ML49 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 
ML50 -0.12 0.12 -0.09 -0.15 -0.12 -0.17 0.05 -0.10 
ML51 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.15 -0.14 0.14 0.04 
ML52 -0.05 0.11 0.00 -0.07 -0.19 -0.10 -0.03 -0.21 
ML53 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.23 -0.18 0.06 -0.19 
ML54 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.23 
ML55 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.14 0.16 -0.13 0.12 -0.18 
ML56 0.07 0.05 -0.14 -0.18 -0.10 -0.03 0.18 -0.14 
ML57 -0.10 0.14 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.22 -0.09 -0.24 
ML58 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 
ML59 -0.10 0.21 0.02 -0.12 0.11 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 
ML60 -0.06 0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.13 0.00 -0.23 
ML61 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.11 -0.13 0.05 -0.21 
ML62 0.01 0.04 0.10 -0.12 -0.12 0.06 0.01 0.10 
ML63 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.13 -0.12 0.10 -0.25 
ML64 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.10 
ML65 -0.19 -0.16 -0.12 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.18 
ML66 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.08 -0.11 -0.03 
ML67 -0.05 -0.07 0.06 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 
ML68 -0.13 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.08 -0.13 -0.06 -0.12 
ML69 -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.07 
ML70 0.09 -0.30 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.20 
ML71 0.11 -0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.09 0.16 0.02 0.06 
ML72 0.22 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.09 0.37 0.07 0.31 
ML73 -0.10 -0.23 0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.11 0.01 -0.03 
ML74 -0.18 -0.14 0.00 0.09 -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 
ML75 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.11 
ML76 -0.15 -0.07 -0.02 -0.16 -0.07 -0.11 -0.04 0.01 
ML77 -0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.11 0.01 0.01 
ML78 -0.20 0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.11 -0.13 -0.01 -0.08 
ML79 -0.17 0.12 -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 
ML80 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.13 0.11 -0.03 0.06 0.05 
ML81 0.08 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.01 
ML82 -0.10 -0.10 0.07 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
ML83 0.28 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.05 -0.04 
ML84 0.00 0.10 -0.15 -0.06 -0.07 -0.25 0.06 -0.16 
ML85 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.11 0.08 -0.02 
ML86 -0.11 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.12 -0.12 
ML87 0.10 -0.09 -0.02 0.10 0.11 -0.05 0.10 0.05 
ML88 0.15 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.48 0.22 -0.01 -0.03 
ML89 -0.08 -0.06 -0.15 -0.05 0.02 -0.14 0.02 0.05 
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ML9 ML10 ML11 ML12 ML13 ML14 ML15 ML16 ML17 
-0.03 0.02 -0.18 -0.12 -0.16 -0.25 -0.09 0.29 0.12 
-0.02 0.05 -0.26 0.09 0.11 -0.09 0.18 0.05 -0.06 
-0.03 0.00 -0.20 0.13 -0.04 0.06 0.08 0.18 0.18 
-0.03 -0.23 -0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.12 0.24 0.07 
0.07 -0.12 -0.16 0.05 -0.04 -0.13 0.04 0.02 0.12 
-0.18 -0.09 -0.25 -0.11 -0.18 -0.07 -0.03 0.20 0.21 
0.08 0.05 0.15 -0.09 0.02 -0.08 -0.12 0.11 0.03 
-0.20 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.16 -0.05 0.09 0.11 
1.00 0.17 0.25 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.24 -0.01 -0.05 
0.17 1.00 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.09 -0.12 0.00 
0.25 0.17 1.00 0.16 0.17 0.33 0.07 -0.08 -0.24 
0.15 0.11 0.16 1.00 0.63 0.28 0.20 -0.01 -0.13 
0.20 0.06 0.17 0.63 1.00 0.35 0.09 -0.05 -0.11 
0.13 0.14 0.33 0.28 0.35 1.00 0.24 -0.14 -0.13 
0.24 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.24 1.00 -0.16 -0.06 
-0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.16 1.00 0.24 
-0.05 0.00 -0.24 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 0.24 1.00 
-0.01 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.12 0.14 0.21 
-0.04 -0.26 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.37 0.33 
-0.10 -0.22 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.16 -0.05 0.25 0.17 
0.11 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.08 -0.03 0.11 -0.12 -0.06 
-0.07 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.23 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.10 
0.02 -0.11 -0.13 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.10 0.11 0.33 
-0.11 -0.16 -0.14 -0.10 -0.17 -0.15 -0.09 0.26 0.29 
-0.08 0.01 -0.14 -0.12 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.23 0.12 
0.19 0.11 0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.06 
0.11 0.04 0.12 -0.12 0.01 -0.01 -0.14 0.13 0.14 
0.18 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.03 0.19 -0.05 -0.13 
0.15 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.15 -0.01 0.20 -0.06 0.00 
0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.07 0.08 
0.12 -0.13 -0.12 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.12 
0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.16 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.05 0.00 
0.01 -0.20 0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.16 
0.08 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.16 -0.15 
0.06 -0.07 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.01 
0.03 -0.08 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.11 -0.07 -0.09 
0.16 0.02 0.22 -0.05 -0.03 0.24 0.09 0.05 0.08 
-0.10 -0.17 -0.02 0.05 0.13 -0.03 0.19 0.04 -0.04 
-0.09 -0.23 -0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.12 0.12 0.08 0.06 
0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.03 
0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.11 0.08 -0.10 0.07 -0.01 0.00 
-0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.11 -0.11 0.18 
0.12 -0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.12 0.12 
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0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.25 0.21 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 
-0.14 -0.07 -0.15 -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.09 0.31 0.37 
-0.08 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.29 
0.09 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.22 0.23 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.18 
0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.04 -0.04 
0.18 0.22 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.22 -0.16 -0.25 
0.15 0.04 0.44 -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.00 
0.09 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.04 -0.08 0.10 -0.01 -0.11 
0.30 0.23 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.01 -0.13 
0.16 0.19 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.09 -0.04 0.02 
0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.25 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 
0.19 0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 
0.26 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.14 -0.21 -0.22 
0.10 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 
0.00 0.11 -0.06 0.19 0.05 0.02 0.13 -0.04 -0.07 
0.07 0.13 0.10 0.33 0.25 0.15 0.19 -0.07 -0.11 
0.11 0.07 0.19 0.28 0.15 0.16 0.22 -0.02 -0.17 
0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 
0.18 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.05 -0.14 
0.17 0.09 0.06 -0.14 0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 
0.18 -0.10 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 
0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 0.03 
0.05 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.22 -0.06 -0.10 
0.09 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.07 -0.15 -0.04 
0.06 -0.12 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.01 
-0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.23 -0.24 -0.10 -0.18 0.12 0.32 
0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 0.10 0.17 0.03 0.07 
-0.11 0.00 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.28 0.41 
0.22 0.04 0.25 0.09 0.14 0.23 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 
0.11 -0.08 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.18 -0.05 -0.02 
0.12 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.46 -0.06 0.03 
0.13 0.12 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.31 0.34 -0.04 -0.04 
0.25 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.26 0.04 -0.15 
0.27 0.21 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.38 0.39 0.00 -0.14 
0.20 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.23 0.41 -0.01 -0.14 
-0.15 -0.01 -0.11 0.10 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 
-0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 
0.03 0.04 0.13 -0.05 0.05 0.11 -0.11 0.05 0.11 
-0.03 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 -0.19 -0.26 0.12 0.23 0.10 
0.09 0.22 0.09 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.01 
0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.18 0.02 -0.16 0.16 0.10 0.09 
0.20 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.15 0.08 0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
0.14 0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.18 
-0.07 -0.09 -0.22 -0.02 -0.10 -0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.12 
0.15 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.10 -0.06 
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ML18 ML19 ML20 ML21 ML22 ML23 ML24 ML25 ML26 
0.08 0.17 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.27 0.25 -0.02 
0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.11 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.07 
0.16 0.19 0.14 -0.12 0.07 0.20 0.17 0.10 -0.14 
0.08 0.31 0.31 0.03 0.09 0.24 0.18 0.04 0.02 
-0.01 0.23 0.18 0.13 -0.10 0.24 0.21 0.02 -0.06 
0.20 0.28 0.13 0.00 -0.07 0.13 0.44 0.23 -0.10 
0.04 0.00 0.03 0.16 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.09 0.06 
0.14 0.20 0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.18 0.29 0.05 -0.18 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.11 -0.07 0.02 -0.11 -0.08 0.19 
-0.11 -0.26 -0.22 0.09 0.21 -0.11 -0.16 0.01 0.11 
-0.05 -0.13 -0.07 0.15 0.03 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 0.01 
-0.06 -0.11 -0.04 0.10 0.17 -0.01 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 
-0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 0.23 0.02 -0.17 -0.03 0.06 
0.05 -0.09 -0.16 -0.03 0.19 -0.09 -0.15 -0.12 -0.01 
-0.12 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.07 
0.14 0.37 0.25 -0.12 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.23 0.05 
0.21 0.33 0.17 -0.06 0.10 0.33 0.29 0.12 0.06 
1.00 0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.02 
0.06 1.00 0.40 0.09 0.01 0.41 0.31 0.07 -0.05 
0.06 0.40 1.00 0.05 -0.08 0.47 0.18 -0.01 -0.05 
-0.08 0.09 0.05 1.00 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.12 0.07 
0.15 0.01 -0.08 0.05 1.00 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.03 
0.00 0.41 0.47 0.06 0.10 1.00 0.30 0.11 -0.27 
0.06 0.31 0.18 -0.02 -0.05 0.30 1.00 0.28 -0.06 
0.12 0.07 -0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.11 0.28 1.00 -0.10 
0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.27 -0.06 -0.10 1.00 
0.12 -0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.06 0.14 
-0.16 -0.03 0.04 0.24 -0.14 0.01 -0.12 -0.25 0.06 
-0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.33 0.11 0.11 -0.03 -0.09 0.10 
0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.18 -0.03 0.03 -0.11 0.19 
0.11 0.24 0.20 0.17 -0.05 0.23 0.12 0.04 -0.18 
0.04 0.11 0.04 0.15 -0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.13 
-0.15 0.16 0.25 0.12 -0.18 0.22 0.23 0.00 -0.04 
0.02 -0.09 0.01 0.08 0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.14 0.12 
-0.06 0.18 0.00 0.19 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.21 0.13 
-0.04 -0.06 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 0.08 
0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.11 -0.04 0.06 
0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.05 
0.07 0.19 0.16 -0.03 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.03 
0.03 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.07 -0.02 
-0.01 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.01 
0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.04 
0.19 0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 
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-0.01 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.02 -0.16 0.12 
0.19 0.22 0.17 -0.23 0.06 0.24 0.40 0.23 -0.17 
0.13 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.26 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.20 
0.28 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.32 0.11 0.01 
0.12 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.16 0.17 
0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.14 0.16 
-0.09 -0.13 -0.16 0.16 0.00 -0.14 -0.17 -0.21 0.20 
0.11 0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.18 -0.10 
0.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.19 -0.16 0.09 
0.12 -0.12 -0.20 0.10 0.20 -0.17 -0.20 -0.05 0.21 
0.13 -0.04 -0.07 0.18 0.22 -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 0.08 
-0.24 -0.04 0.07 0.25 -0.07 0.07 0.02 -0.15 0.12 
0.19 -0.19 -0.13 0.01 0.17 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 0.16 
-0.06 -0.07 -0.10 0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.14 -0.22 0.21 
0.10 -0.09 -0.19 0.08 0.26 -0.17 -0.08 -0.04 0.07 
-0.13 0.09 -0.04 0.15 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.14 0.19 
0.03 -0.13 -0.11 0.09 0.14 -0.14 -0.22 -0.19 0.23 
0.17 -0.10 -0.11 0.14 0.10 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 0.12 
0.08 -0.04 -0.12 0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.03 
0.12 -0.12 -0.09 0.06 0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 0.19 
0.14 -0.03 -0.22 0.03 0.09 -0.18 -0.06 -0.07 0.24 
-0.03 0.10 0.11 0.30 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.17 -0.06 
-0.01 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.13 
0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.17 -0.14 -0.15 -0.08 0.11 
-0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.02 
0.08 0.22 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.02 -0.11 -0.05 
0.11 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.11 -0.20 
0.26 0.27 0.15 0.11 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 
0.20 0.27 0.16 -0.15 0.05 0.31 0.34 0.19 -0.17 
0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.13 0.17 0.07 -0.15 0.02 0.05 
0.02 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.05 -0.12 -0.19 0.05 
-0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.16 
0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.05 0.18 
-0.05 -0.10 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.09 0.05 
-0.05 -0.02 -0.11 0.19 0.12 -0.14 -0.20 -0.18 0.10 
0.03 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.12 -0.20 -0.16 -0.02 
-0.07 0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.12 0.05 -0.09 -0.07 
0.12 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.16 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 
0.07 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.08 
-0.04 0.24 0.18 0.11 -0.11 0.16 0.27 0.15 -0.04 
-0.04 -0.14 -0.14 -0.08 0.16 0.10 -0.02 0.09 0.10 
0.01 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.09 
-0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.15 -0.20 0.09 
0.18 0.09 -0.05 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.15 
-0.08 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.29 0.21 -0.09 -0.05 
-0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.08 0.06 
362 
 
 
ML27 ML28 ML29 ML30 ML31 ML32 ML33 ML34 ML35 
0.11 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
-0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.14 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 
0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 0.23 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 
0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.08 0.06 0.13 -0.01 0.01 
-0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.08 
0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.19 0.08 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 
0.04 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
0.16 0.03 0.01 -0.17 0.15 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.11 
0.11 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.06 
0.04 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.13 -0.02 -0.20 0.07 -0.07 
0.12 0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.13 
-0.12 0.23 0.17 0.09 0.01 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.17 
0.01 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.12 
-0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.13 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 
-0.14 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.20 -0.04 0.08 
0.13 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.16 0.04 
0.14 -0.13 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.16 -0.15 -0.01 
0.12 -0.16 -0.05 0.00 0.11 0.04 -0.15 0.02 -0.06 
-0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.07 0.24 0.11 0.16 -0.09 0.18 
0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.20 0.04 0.25 0.01 0.00 
-0.10 0.24 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.19 
0.09 -0.14 0.11 0.18 -0.05 -0.07 -0.18 0.05 0.02 
-0.02 0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.23 0.02 0.22 -0.03 -0.01 
0.09 -0.12 -0.03 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.23 -0.09 -0.04 
0.06 -0.25 -0.09 -0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.14 -0.21 
0.14 0.06 0.10 0.19 -0.18 0.13 -0.04 0.12 0.13 
1.00 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.18 -0.11 0.09 
0.03 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.12 0.35 0.14 0.07 0.22 
-0.06 0.50 1.00 0.12 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.16 0.28 
-0.02 0.00 0.12 1.00 -0.08 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.17 
0.01 0.12 0.08 -0.08 1.00 0.13 0.20 -0.02 0.19 
0.00 0.35 0.27 0.04 0.13 1.00 0.12 0.17 0.20 
-0.18 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.12 1.00 0.02 0.02 
-0.11 0.07 0.16 0.04 -0.02 0.17 0.02 1.00 0.30 
0.09 0.22 0.28 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.02 0.30 1.00 
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.15 
-0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.04 0.08 
-0.06 0.10 0.10 0.04 -0.08 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.01 
0.03 0.08 0.19 0.12 -0.02 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.00 
-0.03 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.16 
-0.04 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.19 
-0.10 -0.04 0.16 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 
0.02 -0.24 -0.11 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.02 
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-0.04 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.21 0.16 
0.17 -0.22 -0.22 0.05 0.03 -0.07 0.07 -0.28 -0.20 
0.11 -0.04 0.14 0.05 -0.06 0.21 0.01 0.08 0.15 
0.06 -0.08 0.12 -0.13 0.03 -0.05 0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
-0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.17 0.43 
-0.12 0.29 0.37 0.06 0.02 0.25 -0.01 0.28 0.27 
0.14 0.18 0.25 0.14 -0.16 0.13 -0.02 0.24 0.06 
0.14 0.11 0.00 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.06 0.03 
-0.04 0.21 0.20 0.06 -0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.20 0.09 
0.15 0.08 0.10 0.10 -0.16 0.15 -0.20 0.16 0.08 
0.11 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.11 -0.17 0.05 0.03 
-0.12 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.26 0.15 0.19 
-0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.14 -0.08 0.07 0.02 
-0.01 0.21 0.19 0.10 -0.28 0.17 -0.07 0.33 0.07 
0.19 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.24 -0.14 0.10 0.27 
-0.12 0.17 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.30 
-0.13 0.24 0.13 0.06 -0.13 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.14 
-0.14 0.19 0.17 0.15 -0.14 0.05 0.06 0.22 0.14 
0.18 0.05 0.11 0.12 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.10 
0.13 0.06 0.14 0.16 -0.07 0.04 -0.23 0.01 0.14 
0.22 -0.06 -0.01 0.23 -0.08 0.09 -0.21 0.05 0.14 
-0.04 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.27 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.23 
0.07 0.13 0.17 -0.04 0.13 0.24 -0.01 0.22 0.32 
0.09 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.11 -0.13 0.08 0.20 
-0.09 0.20 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.10 0.09 
-0.01 0.24 0.23 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.06 -0.01 0.08 
0.06 -0.32 -0.25 0.02 0.17 -0.13 -0.02 -0.12 -0.24 
0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.05 0.39 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.07 
0.01 -0.14 -0.14 -0.03 0.18 -0.02 0.07 -0.12 -0.15 
0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.00 0.08 
-0.10 0.31 0.31 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.19 
-0.11 0.10 0.26 0.06 0.01 0.22 0.28 0.16 0.16 
-0.07 0.13 0.21 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.17 
0.07 0.14 0.20 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.12 
-0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.03 
-0.03 0.11 0.10 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.11 
-0.01 0.06 0.12 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.11 -0.09 0.03 
0.00 0.11 0.11 -0.04 0.22 0.17 -0.03 0.19 0.20 
-0.04 -0.24 -0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.04 
-0.16 0.09 0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.11 0.18 -0.05 0.07 
0.04 -0.12 -0.08 0.13 -0.17 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.11 
-0.05 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.16 
-0.02 0.20 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.28 0.03 0.37 0.36 
-0.14 -0.14 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.06 -0.11 
-0.12 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.14 
0.11 0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.14 
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ML36 ML37 ML38 ML39 ML40 ML41 ML42 ML43 ML44 
-0.01 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.09 -0.03 
0.07 -0.10 0.10 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.05 
-0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00 
0.05 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.07 -0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.10 
0.07 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.20 0.18 0.20 -0.01 0.11 
-0.04 0.03 0.09 0.13 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.02 
0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.05 0.10 -0.04 
-0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.15 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.10 
0.03 0.16 -0.10 -0.09 0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.12 0.08 
-0.08 0.02 -0.17 -0.23 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 
0.08 0.22 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 
0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.25 
0.08 -0.03 0.13 0.06 -0.12 0.08 0.07 -0.04 0.21 
0.00 0.24 -0.03 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 
0.11 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.07 
-0.07 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 0.12 -0.02 
-0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.18 0.12 0.07 
-0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.19 -0.01 
-0.06 0.07 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.10 
0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.07 
0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.17 0.19 0.06 0.01 0.10 
0.00 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.02 0.00 
0.04 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.14 
-0.01 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.02 
-0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.16 
0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.12 
0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.04 
0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.24 0.16 
0.05 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.07 0.05 0.16 -0.11 0.17 
0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.15 
-0.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.06 
-0.01 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.14 
0.06 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.08 
0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 0.21 
-0.15 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.19 -0.03 0.02 0.16 
1.00 0.06 0.19 0.24 -0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.22 0.02 
0.06 1.00 0.17 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.34 0.16 0.02 
0.19 0.17 1.00 0.62 0.05 0.21 0.15 0.05 0.01 
0.24 0.06 0.62 1.00 -0.08 0.02 0.19 0.06 0.00 
-0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.08 1.00 0.67 -0.03 0.02 0.02 
-0.01 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.67 1.00 0.02 0.03 0.10 
0.09 0.34 0.15 0.19 -0.03 0.02 1.00 0.22 0.10 
0.22 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.22 1.00 -0.03 
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0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.10 -0.03 1.00 
0.03 0.05 0.06 0.13 -0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.15 -0.02 
-0.20 0.21 -0.06 -0.08 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.03 0.14 
0.11 0.35 0.13 0.13 -0.06 -0.07 0.14 0.09 -0.05 
-0.28 0.12 -0.06 -0.15 0.19 0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.16 
-0.07 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.05 -0.04 0.29 
0.22 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.11 -0.01 
0.08 0.29 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.13 -0.01 0.03 -0.18 
0.14 -0.09 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.05 
0.04 0.14 0.07 0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.13 -0.02 
0.07 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.08 -0.05 
-0.09 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.09 -0.07 -0.02 
-0.01 0.26 0.06 0.13 -0.02 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.04 
0.26 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.19 0.17 0.16 
-0.08 0.07 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.09 -0.03 0.07 
-0.02 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.21 0.05 -0.15 0.20 
0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 -0.01 0.10 0.24 0.14 0.10 
0.12 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.08 
-0.01 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.16 -0.03 0.07 0.09 
0.05 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.11 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.16 
0.03 0.19 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.19 0.01 
0.13 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.15 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 
0.07 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.00 -0.06 0.12 
0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.15 -0.05 
0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.16 0.12 0.06 -0.14 0.11 
-0.06 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.20 -0.01 -0.07 0.09 
0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.19 -0.17 
0.08 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.20 0.04 
-0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.13 0.11 -0.07 
-0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.13 -0.02 
0.09 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.14 -0.04 0.16 
0.10 0.23 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.09 
0.02 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.03 -0.04 
0.09 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.09 
0.21 0.23 0.16 0.12 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.17 -0.01 
0.06 0.14 0.17 0.15 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.04 
0.13 -0.07 -0.04 0.12 -0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.14 0.01 
0.08 0.12 0.13 0.22 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.04 
0.24 0.19 0.06 0.22 -0.12 -0.12 0.19 0.12 0.02 
0.11 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.29 0.29 0.05 0.07 0.02 
0.12 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.24 -0.22 0.17 0.02 0.04 
-0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.31 0.32 -0.11 0.07 0.08 
-0.14 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.16 0.00 -0.07 0.13 
0.20 0.25 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.33 0.37 -0.06 
0.00 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.09 -0.11 0.21 
-0.18 0.17 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.14 0.08 -0.08 0.13 
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ML45 ML46 ML47 ML48 ML49 ML50 ML51 ML52 ML53 
0.25 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 
0.00 0.01 -0.13 0.12 0.05 0.12 -0.07 0.11 0.00 
0.23 -0.02 0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 
0.11 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.03 -0.15 0.00 -0.07 -0.09 
0.09 0.04 0.18 0.15 0.03 -0.12 -0.15 -0.19 -0.23 
0.39 0.01 0.24 0.05 -0.03 -0.17 -0.14 -0.10 -0.18 
-0.03 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.14 -0.03 0.06 
0.20 0.03 0.23 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.04 -0.21 -0.19 
-0.14 -0.08 0.09 -0.06 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.30 
-0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.22 0.04 0.16 0.23 
-0.15 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 0.24 0.44 0.21 0.15 
-0.08 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.13 0.15 -0.02 0.14 0.02 
-0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.10 
-0.13 -0.04 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.20 0.09 -0.08 0.10 
-0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.05 0.10 0.00 
0.31 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.04 -0.16 0.08 -0.01 0.01 
0.37 0.29 0.23 0.18 -0.04 -0.25 0.00 -0.11 -0.13 
0.19 0.13 0.28 0.12 0.01 -0.09 0.11 0.00 0.12 
0.22 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.01 -0.12 
0.17 0.00 0.17 0.04 0.01 -0.16 0.08 0.03 -0.20 
-0.23 0.14 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.16 -0.06 0.09 0.10 
0.06 0.26 0.15 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.12 0.20 
0.24 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.06 -0.14 -0.02 -0.15 -0.17 
0.40 0.10 0.32 0.04 -0.05 -0.17 -0.09 -0.19 -0.20 
0.23 0.04 0.11 -0.16 -0.14 -0.21 -0.18 -0.16 -0.05 
-0.17 0.20 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.20 -0.10 0.09 0.21 
0.17 0.11 0.06 -0.01 -0.12 0.14 0.14 -0.04 0.15 
-0.22 -0.04 -0.08 0.03 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.08 
-0.22 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.37 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.10 
0.05 0.05 -0.13 0.02 0.06 0.14 -0.10 0.06 0.10 
0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.01 -0.09 -0.16 
-0.07 0.21 -0.05 0.17 0.25 0.13 -0.08 0.10 0.15 
0.07 0.01 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.20 
-0.28 0.08 -0.14 0.17 0.28 0.24 -0.06 0.20 0.16 
-0.20 0.15 -0.14 0.43 0.27 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.08 
0.03 -0.20 0.11 -0.28 -0.07 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.04 
0.05 0.21 0.35 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.29 -0.09 0.14 
0.06 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.07 
0.13 -0.08 0.13 -0.15 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.09 
-0.05 0.15 -0.06 0.19 0.04 0.07 -0.09 0.09 -0.03 
-0.02 0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.10 0.07 -0.13 0.07 0.00 
0.10 0.22 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 
0.15 0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.11 0.03 -0.05 0.13 
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-0.02 0.14 -0.05 0.16 0.29 -0.01 -0.18 0.05 -0.02 
1.00 0.00 0.29 -0.07 -0.05 -0.20 0.09 -0.15 -0.19 
0.00 1.00 0.18 0.57 0.16 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.11 
0.29 0.18 1.00 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.25 0.08 
-0.07 0.57 0.08 1.00 0.31 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 
-0.05 0.16 0.04 0.31 1.00 0.07 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 
-0.20 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.12 0.28 0.37 
0.09 -0.02 0.10 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 1.00 0.30 0.14 
-0.15 -0.09 -0.25 -0.04 0.04 0.28 0.30 1.00 0.15 
-0.19 0.11 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.37 0.14 0.15 1.00 
-0.06 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.20 0.32 
-0.15 0.25 0.03 0.43 0.17 0.13 -0.09 0.08 0.06 
0.02 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.32 
-0.15 -0.01 -0.18 -0.01 0.15 0.49 0.12 0.47 0.33 
-0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.31 
-0.16 0.21 -0.07 0.32 0.30 0.24 -0.19 0.11 0.08 
-0.09 0.17 -0.04 0.18 0.15 0.27 0.10 0.23 0.22 
-0.15 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.30 0.14 0.21 0.19 
-0.02 0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.03 -0.07 0.18 
-0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.05 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.30 0.30 
0.07 0.16 0.07 0.11 -0.06 0.30 0.13 0.03 0.51 
-0.23 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.00 -0.01 0.19 
-0.09 0.21 -0.08 0.25 0.15 0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 
-0.09 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.25 -0.04 -0.05 0.22 
-0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 
-0.04 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.14 0.01 0.15 0.05 -0.07 
0.31 -0.02 0.10 -0.18 -0.23 -0.30 -0.06 -0.11 -0.18 
0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.01 
0.29 0.09 0.11 0.13 -0.02 -0.29 -0.05 -0.17 -0.25 
-0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.04 -0.08 0.20 0.05 -0.11 0.19 
-0.16 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.23 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.20 
-0.12 0.25 0.14 0.10 0.22 0.33 -0.10 0.06 0.07 
-0.23 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.14 
-0.21 0.01 0.16 -0.07 0.15 0.27 0.10 0.15 0.19 
-0.17 -0.05 0.09 -0.08 0.10 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.25 
-0.11 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.19 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.24 
0.16 -0.19 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.07 -0.02 -0.12 
-0.18 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.11 
0.15 -0.06 0.23 -0.14 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.13 
0.06 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.04 -0.12 0.00 0.05 -0.06 
0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.07 
0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.19 0.18 0.03 -0.05 0.20 -0.03 
-0.27 0.11 -0.21 0.25 0.31 0.19 -0.07 0.14 0.11 
0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.08 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.02 -0.01 
0.09 0.22 0.06 0.25 0.07 -0.01 -0.15 -0.07 -0.16 
0.06 0.15 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.09 0.03 
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ML54 ML55 ML56 ML57 ML58 ML59 ML60 ML61 ML62 
0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 
-0.03 0.01 0.05 0.14 -0.07 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 
-0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.10 
-0.02 0.14 -0.18 0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 
0.00 0.16 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.12 
-0.08 -0.13 -0.03 -0.22 0.04 -0.03 -0.13 -0.13 0.06 
0.03 0.12 0.18 -0.09 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 
-0.23 -0.18 -0.14 -0.24 -0.02 -0.09 -0.23 -0.21 0.10 
0.16 0.01 0.19 0.26 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.09 
0.19 -0.05 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.07 -0.05 
-0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.23 0.03 -0.06 0.10 0.19 0.01 
-0.01 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.33 0.28 0.14 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.15 0.14 
-0.06 -0.25 0.03 0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.15 0.16 0.02 
0.09 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.06 
-0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.21 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 
0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.22 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.17 0.04 
0.13 -0.24 0.19 -0.06 0.10 -0.13 0.03 0.17 0.08 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.19 -0.07 -0.09 0.09 -0.13 -0.10 -0.04 
-0.07 0.07 -0.13 -0.10 -0.19 -0.04 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 
0.18 0.25 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.02 
0.22 -0.07 0.17 -0.02 0.26 0.03 0.14 0.10 0.18 
-0.12 0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.17 0.02 -0.14 -0.22 -0.01 
-0.18 0.02 -0.11 -0.14 -0.08 -0.02 -0.22 -0.21 0.08 
-0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.22 -0.04 -0.14 -0.19 -0.22 -0.08 
0.08 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.03 
0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.19 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 0.18 
0.06 0.17 0.01 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.19 0.05 
0.16 0.13 0.03 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.11 
0.13 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.12 
0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.28 0.12 0.04 -0.13 -0.14 -0.03 
0.11 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.05 0.04 
-0.17 0.26 -0.08 -0.07 -0.14 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.07 
0.05 0.15 0.07 0.33 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.22 0.05 
0.03 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.27 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.10 
0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.26 -0.08 -0.02 0.14 0.12 -0.01 
0.02 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.07 
0.11 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.04 
0.05 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.09 
0.13 0.14 -0.02 0.10 0.12 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.05 
0.11 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.16 
0.11 0.09 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.24 0.06 -0.03 
0.08 -0.07 0.09 0.17 -0.03 -0.15 0.14 0.11 0.07 
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-0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.09 
-0.06 -0.15 0.02 -0.15 -0.04 -0.16 -0.09 -0.15 -0.02 
0.20 0.25 0.12 -0.01 0.06 0.21 0.17 0.12 0.08 
0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.18 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.00 
0.05 0.43 0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.32 0.18 0.11 0.07 
0.07 0.17 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.30 0.15 0.13 -0.05 
0.15 0.13 0.10 0.49 0.06 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.14 
0.07 -0.09 0.13 0.12 0.00 -0.19 0.10 0.14 0.03 
0.20 0.08 0.07 0.47 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.21 -0.07 
0.32 0.06 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.08 0.22 0.19 0.18 
1.00 0.06 0.28 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.15 0.19 -0.04 
0.06 1.00 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.39 0.24 0.19 0.08 
0.28 0.07 1.00 0.11 0.25 0.14 0.25 0.29 0.15 
0.17 0.12 0.11 1.00 0.06 0.17 0.28 0.20 0.03 
0.16 0.05 0.25 0.06 1.00 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.21 
0.00 0.39 0.14 0.17 0.15 1.00 0.33 0.23 0.04 
0.15 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.09 0.33 1.00 0.65 0.07 
0.19 0.19 0.29 0.20 0.07 0.23 0.65 1.00 0.20 
-0.04 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.20 1.00 
0.15 -0.03 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.26 0.18 
0.32 -0.07 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.02 0.17 0.07 0.09 
0.18 0.18 0.04 -0.07 0.14 0.15 -0.01 0.11 0.18 
0.10 0.21 0.07 0.01 0.23 0.28 0.06 0.03 0.08 
0.21 -0.01 0.19 0.08 0.25 0.13 0.31 0.32 0.21 
0.05 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.22 0.05 0.07 
0.09 -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.13 
0.02 -0.18 0.05 -0.30 -0.06 -0.25 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 
0.12 0.00 0.11 -0.03 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.10 
-0.13 -0.14 -0.08 -0.38 -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.12 0.06 
0.23 -0.06 0.11 0.08 0.19 -0.04 0.24 0.26 0.04 
0.12 0.19 -0.04 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.13 
0.04 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.00 0.36 0.27 0.30 0.11 
0.10 -0.02 0.20 0.21 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.16 
0.11 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.23 0.18 
0.17 0.03 0.11 0.38 0.04 0.22 0.25 0.40 0.17 
0.11 -0.01 0.20 0.27 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.19 
-0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.10 
0.09 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.11 
0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 
-0.02 0.20 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.10 
0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 
-0.11 0.18 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.06 
0.13 0.31 0.03 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.21 0.08 0.11 
0.11 0.01 0.16 0.26 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 0.08 -0.08 
0.04 0.28 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.25 0.06 -0.04 0.03 
-0.01 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.07 
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ML63 ML64 ML65 ML66 ML67 ML68 ML69 ML70 ML71 
0.05 0.05 -0.19 0.21 -0.05 -0.13 -0.07 0.09 0.11 
0.01 -0.02 -0.16 0.15 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.30 -0.07 
-0.02 -0.04 -0.12 0.12 0.06 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 
-0.06 -0.11 0.04 0.09 -0.06 -0.08 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
-0.13 -0.08 0.06 0.13 -0.13 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.09 
-0.12 0.07 0.05 0.08 -0.06 -0.13 0.06 0.16 0.16 
0.10 0.04 0.19 -0.11 0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.13 0.02 
-0.25 -0.10 0.18 -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 0.07 0.20 0.06 
0.18 0.17 0.18 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.06 -0.11 0.13 
0.13 0.09 -0.10 -0.04 0.10 0.01 -0.12 0.03 -0.09 
0.14 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 
0.15 -0.14 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.23 -0.08 
0.14 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.11 0.12 -0.24 -0.05 
0.00 0.05 0.05 -0.10 0.16 0.09 0.09 -0.10 0.10 
0.10 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.22 0.07 0.07 -0.18 0.17 
0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.15 -0.02 0.12 0.03 
-0.14 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.32 0.07 
0.12 0.14 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.08 0.11 0.26 
-0.12 -0.03 0.10 0.18 -0.05 -0.05 0.22 0.19 0.27 
-0.09 -0.22 0.11 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.09 0.10 0.15 
0.06 0.03 0.30 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.11 
0.03 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.17 -0.09 0.02 0.05 -0.07 
-0.16 -0.18 0.05 0.17 -0.14 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.02 
-0.17 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.15 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.04 
-0.17 -0.07 -0.17 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.11 0.11 0.02 
0.19 0.24 -0.06 0.13 0.11 0.02 -0.05 -0.20 -0.02 
0.13 0.22 -0.04 0.07 0.09 -0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.04 
0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.24 -0.32 0.00 
0.14 -0.01 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.23 -0.25 0.05 
0.16 0.23 0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.05 
-0.07 -0.08 0.27 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.17 0.39 
0.04 0.09 0.07 0.24 0.11 0.04 0.19 -0.13 0.05 
-0.23 -0.21 0.12 -0.01 -0.13 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.17 
0.01 0.05 0.18 0.22 0.08 0.10 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 
0.14 0.14 0.23 0.32 0.20 0.09 0.08 -0.24 0.07 
0.05 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.08 
0.01 0.19 0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.12 
0.01 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.08 
0.11 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 
-0.11 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.16 -0.07 0.12 
0.07 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.20 -0.03 0.17 
0.08 0.02 -0.10 0.00 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.05 
0.04 0.19 0.01 -0.06 0.15 -0.14 -0.07 0.19 0.20 
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0.16 0.01 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.11 0.09 -0.17 0.04 
-0.01 0.07 -0.23 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.04 0.31 0.01 
0.02 0.16 0.02 0.21 0.17 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 
-0.16 0.07 0.12 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.10 0.05 
-0.05 0.11 0.06 0.25 0.11 0.09 -0.01 -0.18 0.02 
0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.14 -0.23 0.02 
0.11 0.30 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.13 0.01 -0.30 0.04 
0.14 0.13 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 0.15 -0.06 -0.02 
0.30 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.11 0.08 
0.30 0.51 0.19 0.09 0.22 -0.01 -0.07 -0.18 0.01 
0.15 0.32 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.12 
-0.03 -0.07 0.18 0.21 -0.01 0.14 -0.04 -0.18 0.00 
0.25 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.11 
0.26 0.23 -0.07 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.00 -0.30 -0.03 
0.26 0.25 0.14 0.23 0.25 0.01 0.15 -0.06 0.22 
0.08 0.02 0.15 0.28 0.13 0.11 0.08 -0.25 0.11 
0.28 0.17 -0.01 0.06 0.31 0.22 0.07 -0.12 0.01 
0.26 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.32 0.05 0.09 -0.10 0.10 
0.18 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.07 0.13 -0.08 0.10 
1.00 0.19 -0.04 -0.05 0.25 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.11 
0.19 1.00 0.07 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 
-0.04 0.07 1.00 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.06 0.30 
-0.05 0.07 0.21 1.00 0.17 0.11 0.20 -0.18 0.23 
0.25 0.23 0.18 0.17 1.00 0.14 0.19 -0.04 0.21 
-0.05 0.01 0.16 0.11 0.14 1.00 0.29 -0.13 0.03 
0.05 0.07 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.29 1.00 0.03 0.26 
-0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.18 -0.04 -0.13 0.03 1.00 0.20 
0.11 0.05 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.03 0.26 0.20 1.00 
-0.14 -0.20 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.38 0.19 
0.13 0.37 0.10 0.06 0.28 0.15 0.25 -0.02 0.13 
0.16 0.09 0.34 0.10 0.31 0.24 0.23 -0.19 0.25 
0.12 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.34 0.11 0.06 -0.17 0.10 
0.22 0.08 0.21 0.04 0.46 0.13 0.16 -0.13 0.23 
0.10 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.34 0.19 0.27 -0.08 0.07 
0.17 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.16 -0.09 0.18 
0.23 0.13 0.12 -0.02 0.37 0.05 0.13 -0.29 0.09 
0.05 -0.02 -0.11 0.05 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.14 
0.11 -0.01 0.20 0.39 0.18 0.05 0.16 -0.02 0.28 
0.01 0.14 0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.05 
-0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.10 
0.05 0.07 -0.23 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.15 0.07 -0.05 
0.06 -0.05 0.11 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.12 -0.10 0.12 
0.08 0.07 0.21 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.13 -0.17 0.14 
0.05 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.23 0.18 
0.01 0.04 0.15 0.16 -0.07 0.18 0.16 -0.04 0.17 
0.17 0.00 0.15 -0.01 -0.07 0.15 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 
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ML72 ML73 ML74 ML75 ML76 ML77 ML78 ML79 ML80 
0.22 -0.10 -0.18 -0.10 -0.15 -0.16 -0.20 -0.17 0.06 
0.01 -0.23 -0.14 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.12 -0.02 
0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.03 
-0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.07 -0.16 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 0.13 
0.09 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 0.11 
0.37 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.04 -0.03 
0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.06 
0.31 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 0.05 
-0.11 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.27 0.20 -0.15 
0.00 0.04 -0.08 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.21 0.05 -0.01 
-0.12 0.25 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.17 -0.11 
-0.06 0.09 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.23 0.21 0.10 
-0.08 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.06 
-0.04 0.23 0.00 0.18 0.31 0.16 0.38 0.23 -0.08 
-0.04 0.09 0.18 0.46 0.34 0.26 0.39 0.41 -0.01 
0.28 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 
0.41 -0.10 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.07 
0.20 0.07 0.02 -0.09 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.07 
0.27 0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 0.04 
0.16 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 0.07 
-0.15 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.19 -0.04 -0.03 
0.05 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.05 0.06 
0.31 0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.14 -0.12 0.12 
0.34 -0.15 -0.12 0.00 -0.13 -0.05 -0.20 -0.20 0.05 
0.19 0.02 -0.19 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.18 -0.16 -0.09 
-0.17 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.18 0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.07 
0.01 0.06 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 
-0.14 -0.01 0.31 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.06 
-0.14 0.10 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.12 
-0.03 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.10 -0.03 0.01 
0.18 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 
-0.02 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.01 
0.07 -0.12 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.02 -0.11 
-0.12 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.05 -0.09 
-0.15 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.03 
-0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.06 0.13 
0.04 0.09 0.06 0.23 0.15 0.05 0.23 0.14 -0.07 
0.03 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.16 0.17 -0.04 
0.09 -0.01 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.12 
-0.03 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 
0.03 0.06 0.15 0.18 -0.02 0.10 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 
0.13 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.10 
0.11 0.13 -0.04 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.04 -0.14 
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-0.07 -0.02 0.16 0.09 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 
0.29 -0.04 -0.16 -0.12 -0.23 -0.21 -0.17 -0.11 0.16 
0.09 0.05 0.06 0.25 0.15 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.19 
0.11 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.01 
0.13 -0.04 0.08 0.10 0.03 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.06 
-0.02 -0.08 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.19 -0.01 
-0.29 0.20 0.10 0.33 0.22 0.27 0.47 0.33 0.09 
-0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.10 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.07 
-0.17 -0.11 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.22 0.11 -0.02 
-0.25 0.19 0.20 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.24 -0.12 
-0.13 0.23 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.11 -0.02 
-0.14 -0.06 0.19 0.24 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.06 
-0.08 0.11 -0.04 0.23 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.01 
-0.38 0.08 0.12 0.31 0.21 0.18 0.38 0.27 -0.01 
-0.07 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.07 
-0.11 -0.04 0.14 0.36 0.20 0.10 0.22 0.20 0.06 
-0.06 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.07 
-0.12 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.21 0.23 0.40 0.29 0.00 
0.06 0.04 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.19 -0.10 
-0.14 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.17 0.23 0.05 
-0.20 0.37 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.13 -0.02 
0.01 0.10 0.34 0.10 0.21 0.27 0.18 0.12 -0.11 
0.04 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.05 
-0.02 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.46 0.34 0.32 0.37 -0.05 
-0.05 0.15 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.06 
0.05 0.25 0.23 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.13 -0.03 
0.38 -0.02 -0.19 -0.17 -0.13 -0.08 -0.09 -0.29 -0.09 
0.19 0.13 0.25 0.10 0.23 0.07 0.18 0.09 -0.14 
1.00 -0.08 -0.13 -0.09 0.04 -0.04 -0.14 -0.13 -0.03 
-0.08 1.00 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.07 
-0.13 0.17 1.00 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.20 0.31 -0.05 
-0.09 0.19 0.32 1.00 0.58 0.43 0.43 0.46 -0.05 
0.04 0.24 0.27 0.58 1.00 0.51 0.42 0.48 -0.15 
-0.04 0.19 0.30 0.43 0.51 1.00 0.44 0.50 -0.07 
-0.14 0.22 0.20 0.43 0.42 0.44 1.00 0.51 -0.12 
-0.13 0.20 0.31 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.51 1.00 -0.03 
-0.03 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.03 1.00 
0.09 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.28 0.11 0.04 0.17 0.06 
0.02 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.20 
0.15 0.02 0.10 0.14 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.06 
0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.24 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.10 -0.05 
0.04 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.12 -0.06 
0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.19 -0.06 0.03 
0.08 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 
 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 
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ML81 ML82 ML83 ML84 ML85 ML86 ML87 ML88 ML89 
0.08 -0.104 0.278 -0.002 0.052 -0.106 0.099 0.145 -0.083 
0.07 -0.096 0.065 0.103 0.003 -0.047 -0.092 0.174 -0.063 
-0.04 0.065 0.168 -0.145 0.037 -0.089 -0.02 0.081 -0.146 
-0.02 0.125 0.128 -0.064 -0.059 -0.065 0.101 0.114 -0.048 
0.03 -0.029 0.222 -0.072 0.046 0.041 0.111 0.475 0.02 
-0.03 -0.02 0.234 -0.246 0.113 -0.023 -0.049 0.217 -0.141 
0.02 -0.002 0.051 0.056 0.079 0.12 0.102 -0.007 0.019 
0.01 0.019 -0.036 -0.163 -0.018 -0.119 0.048 -0.032 0.054 
-0.01 0.025 -0.031 0.088 0.037 0.204 0.136 -0.071 0.147 
-0.05 0.042 -0.161 0.216 0.065 0.078 0.06 -0.089 -0.022 
0.02 0.13 -0.074 0.086 -0.055 0.087 0.043 -0.215 0.043 
0.12 -0.053 -0.006 -0.033 0.179 0.208 -0.053 -0.015 0.037 
0.14 0.052 -0.187 0.083 0.022 0.148 -0.047 -0.095 0.079 
0.07 0.109 -0.263 0.053 -0.16 0.079 0.075 -0.114 0.04 
-0.02 -0.105 0.119 0.045 0.156 0.084 -0.008 0.105 0.037 
-0.02 0.054 0.231 -0.112 0.103 -0.071 0.011 -0.052 -0.099 
-0.06 0.114 0.101 -0.011 0.085 -0.072 0.179 0.121 -0.061 
0.12 0.067 -0.038 -0.039 0.005 -0.053 0.176 -0.08 -0.065 
0.05 0.123 0.244 -0.136 0.117 0.04 0.092 0.213 -0.007 
0.13 0.056 0.183 -0.135 0.124 -0.065 -0.046 0.167 0.044 
0.13 0.046 0.108 -0.076 0.158 0.056 0.101 0.142 0.122 
0.19 0.125 -0.112 0.157 0.008 0.031 0.066 0.014 0.066 
0.16 0.226 0.163 0.103 -0.041 0.024 0.055 0.288 0.062 
-0.07 0.117 0.268 -0.02 -0.004 -0.147 0.042 0.205 0.008 
-0.04 0.061 0.148 0.09 -0.004 -0.203 0.099 -0.09 -0.082 
-0.00 0.08 -0.04 0.097 0.091 0.092 0.147 -0.048 0.064 
-0.00 -0.036 -0.162 0.041 -0.045 -0.023 -0.138 -0.123 0.108 
0.11 -0.235 0.087 -0.12 0.116 0.204 -0.138 0.121 0.09 
0.11 -0.081 0.059 -0.084 0.14 0.157 0.031 0.085 -0.039 
-0.04 0.036 -0.028 0.131 0.098 0.085 0.085 0.048 0.11 
0.22 0.044 0.087 -0.165 0.061 0.104 0.019 0.127 0.093 
0.17 0.043 0.109 -0.049 0.076 0.283 0.118 0.136 0.142 
-0.03 -0.066 0.181 0.011 0.052 0.028 0.122 0.169 0.037 
0.19 0.046 -0.047 -0.002 0.117 0.365 0.064 0.106 0.002 
0.205 -0.043 0.067 -0.112 0.161 0.361 -0.108 0.138 0.139 
0.08 0.237 0.113 0.116 -0.006 -0.142 0.199 0.004 -0.176 
0.12 0.193 0.042 0.014 -0.046 -0.051 0.249 0.077 0.165 
0.13 0.056 0.142 -0.002 -0.009 0.046 -0.044 0.035 -0.068 
0.22 0.222 0.155 0.064 0.015 -0.03 0.028 0.016 -0.031 
-0.06 -0.118 0.286 -0.239 0.311 0.054 -0.02 0.096 0.045 
-0.06 -0.115 0.289 -0.224 0.315 0.163 -0.058 0.193 0.143 
0.01 0.194 0.05 0.165 -0.112 0.004 0.331 0.086 0.082 
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-0.058 0.122 0.071 0.019 0.072 -0.074 0.367 -0.113 -0.075 
0.04 0.015 0.022 0.042 0.083 0.131 -0.057 0.209 0.133 
-0.176 0.148 0.063 0.11 0.015 -0.272 0.087 0.09 0.058 
-0.046 -0.056 0.06 0.007 0.117 0.113 0.069 0.218 0.149 
-0.033 0.227 0.129 -0.039 -0.021 -0.212 0.203 0.059 -0.021 
0.006 -0.144 0.055 -0.074 0.191 0.25 -0.075 0.25 0.025 
0.07 -0.033 0.044 -0.064 0.177 0.313 0.005 0.071 0.028 
-0.002 0.028 -0.122 -0.009 0.031 0.185 0.051 -0.008 -0.024 
-0.026 0.026 -0.001 0.01 -0.052 -0.072 0.07 -0.146 0.066 
0.023 -0.084 0.048 -0.016 0.2 0.141 0.018 -0.071 -0.092 
0.112 0.126 -0.063 0.073 -0.028 0.106 -0.006 -0.161 0.027 
0.088 0.054 -0.02 0.014 -0.113 0.127 0.105 0.037 -0.008 
0.129 -0.109 0.195 -0.046 0.179 0.314 0.007 0.283 0.184 
0.302 0.058 -0.026 0.079 0.016 0.034 0.161 0.02 0.131 
0.046 0.132 -0.064 0.076 -0.017 0.173 0.262 -0.021 0.053 
0.145 -0.03 -0.04 0.061 0.049 0.258 -0.009 -0.053 0.066 
0.165 -0.008 0.079 -0.034 0.254 0.357 -0.068 0.246 0.115 
0.139 -0.127 0.07 -0.002 0.18 0.209 0.105 0.058 0.086 
0.078 -0.099 -0.019 -0.04 0.165 0.077 0.079 -0.042 0.028 
0.11 -0.074 0.097 -0.079 0.055 0.11 -0.076 0.028 0.065 
0.105 0.007 -0.058 0.051 0.057 0.082 0.047 0.014 0.168 
-0.007 0.139 -0.062 0.074 -0.05 0.072 0.09 0.036 -0.003 
0.2 0.048 0.098 -0.234 0.107 0.214 0.007 0.154 0.148 
0.391 0.086 0.084 -0.085 0.072 0.24 0.042 0.161 -0.012 
0.181 -0.022 -0.087 -0.068 -0.002 0.165 0.008 -0.07 -0.068 
0.05 0.023 0.037 -0.03 -0.033 0.107 0.089 0.182 0.148 
0.163 -0.068 0.074 -0.153 0.119 0.127 -0.034 0.163 0.1 
-0.02 0.081 -0.015 0.074 -0.103 -0.17 0.227 -0.044 -0.025 
0.277 -0.046 0.097 -0.054 0.116 0.14 0.183 0.167 -0.061 
0.093 0.017 0.147 0.011 0.05 0.035 0.012 0.077 -0.136 
0.075 0.126 0.021 0.053 -0.062 0.099 0.097 0.008 0.073 
0.165 0.012 0.098 -0.072 0.116 0.161 -0.018 0.114 0.005 
0.133 0.052 0.141 0.011 0.24 0.164 0.126 0.119 0.08 
0.279 0.051 -0.006 -0.05 0.07 0.073 0.127 0.021 0.042 
0.11 0.061 -0.09 0.023 -0.004 0.133 0.008 -0.082 -0.05 
0.042 0.098 -0.073 0.057 0.006 0.123 0.191 -0.075 -0.101 
0.172 0.063 -0.083 -0.051 0.104 0.122 -0.064 -0.09 -0.103 
0.06 0.195 -0.079 0.064 -0.051 -0.063 0.027 -0.108 -0.123 
1 0.109 -0.042 -0.007 -0.065 0.197 0.034 0.038 0.04 
0.109 1 -0.126 0.322 -0.314 -0.155 0.338 -0.085 0.007 
-0.042 -0.126 1 -0.304 0.37 0.131 0.079 0.237 0.051 
-0.007 0.322 -0.304 1 -0.361 -0.159 0.188 0.015 -0.061 
-0.065 -0.314 0.37 -0.361 1 0.25 -0.037 0.104 0.034 
0.197 -0.155 0.131 -0.159 0.25 1 0.084 0.057 0.037 
0.034 0.338 0.079 0.188 -0.037 0.084 1 -0.026 0.015 
0.038 -0.085 0.237 0.015 0.104 0.057 -0.026 1 0.214 
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0.04 0.007 0.051 -0.061 0.034 0.037 0.015 0.214 1 
Determinant = 6.807E -024 
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Appendix 3.9: Email to participants in phase 4 
Results of Research: “What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of 
AML policy implementation in the UK?” 
 
Introduction 
Your first introduction to this research was your participation in focus group 
interviews. The purpose of discussion within those focus group interviews was to 
identify the themes around AML that would assist in developing a questionnaire. 
A useful addition to this research was the valuable material that came from that 
discussion which adds substance to the final results.  
Focus groups consisted of five groups that are described as stakeholders to the 
AML process. 
 
A questionnaire was developed and circulated to a larger group of AML 
stakeholders. The results from those questionnaires were analysed using 
multivariate analysis tool (factor analysis) and are described below.  
I have chosen one participant from each of the five original focus groups to 
comment on the findings.  
 
Factor analysis is used to simplify large amounts of data by reducing it to a 
smaller number of underlying dimensions or components (factors). It is mainly 
used in questionnaire analysis were large amounts of data has been caught. The 
data reduction method is used to reduce the large number of related variables 
(statements used in the questionnaire under the construct headings) into a 
smaller number of factors which may be highly correlated. The findings below 
relate to three factors that have been identified using this method. The items 
relating to each factor follow the factor label. 
 
As a final validation of the research results I would appreciate your comments on 
the findings below by considering the following questions: 
 
“In light of the statements underlying each factor how do you see them informing 
policy in AML arena? 
 
“Do the statements suggest that current approaches are effective? 
 
“How do you see the interpretation of these results in light of the research 
question? 
 
Factor 1 Deterrence/Sentencing 
 
Factor 1 refers to variables that influence the effectiveness of the POCA as a 
deterrent through sentencing, namely: 
 
 The penalties for money laundering crime are too lenient. 
 The disparity in sentencing for money laundering in the UK is too wide. 
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 A person convicted of drug trafficking is likely to receive a more sever 
sentence than the person who laundered his money. 
 Professionals are treated differently in court in sentencing for money 
laundering. 
 Financial crime which includes money laundering is not seen as a serious 
problem. 
 Money laundering is a consequence of another crime such as drug 
trafficking but is treated differently in court sentencing. 
 Financial crime appears to be treated more leniently in court than other 
crimes. 
Factor 2 Reporting/Compliance  
 
Factor 2 refers to variables that influence the effectiveness of the POCA through 
the reporting and compliance regulations namely: 
 
 The banking system in the UK does a good job in preventing the use of 
accounts to launder criminal money. 
 The current AML framework is sufficient to dissuade professionals from 
being involved in money laundering. 
 AML Policy in the UK appears to be effective. 
 The regulators are an effective force to ensure reporting institutions 
comply with regulators. 
Factor 3 AML Knowledge 
 
Factor 3 refers to variables that influence the effectiveness of the POCA through 
the Criminal knowledge of AML, namely: 
 
 Money launderers have to be aware of law enforcement tactics. 
 Money launderers have to have knowledge of AML policy. 
Your participation once again is very much appreciated. 
Sam Sittlington PHD Candidate 
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Appendix 4.1 Example of agreement and disagreement 
 between groups 
 
Provided below are quotations that represent examples from transcript analysis 
were agreement and disagreement appeared in the focus group interviews. Each 
theme is presented along with a number of associated concepts or processes 
that also emerged from the transcript analysis. The quotations are based around 
the following themes:  
Legislation – Criminality – SAR Process - Spend - Influence - Other 
activities 
Theme 1 Process 
Legislation Punishment/deterrent 
Enforcement/Prosecution 
Restraint and Confiscation 
 
Agreement from groups on Punishment/Deterrent 
Group A 
“Either one of those things should end up with a jail sentence or some sort of a 
deterrent…Well if they’re convicted that’s deterrent. But if they can’t even get 
them into the court in the first place”. 
 
Group B 
“I think in the foreword of POCA was it Tony Blair said first, we want to be, it has 
to be an effective deterrent to take money off criminals and secondly we have to 
do it within the framework of the law, and the second part seems to really strangle 
the first part”. 
 
Group E  
“You know in the old days you had the, what was termed the ordinary decent 
criminal, the burglars and people like that that, getting caught and jail was a part 
of their life…they knew it was down the road there somewhere. .Now I’m not too 
sure whether I would agree 100% with…..said with regards they don’t think 
they’re going to get caught….I think they understand there’s a chance and they 
plan accordingly”. 
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Disagreement 
Group C  
“Well that’s, I mean all the articles that you read talk about it being a Draconian 
piece of legislation, but it is Draconian because it’s there to punish, it’s there to 
punish and to get back the proceeds of crime.  And I think that that is where a lot 
of practitioners perhaps on the defence side, and you know possibly the judiciary 
on occasion find that difficult”. 
 
Agreement from groups on Enforcement/Prosecution 
Group A  
“Once it goes cross border it grinds to a halt because the natural jurisdictions 
don’t want to work together.  See your biggest issue for us in the level of crime 
that we’re dealing with is, a lot of it is so slow for us to investigate because it is 
outside the immediate jurisdiction”. 
 
Group B 
“If you’re really going to tackle big style money laundering, there needs to be 
much more co-operation across countries otherwise I think it’s, it’s really difficult”. 
 
Group C 
“Where we were looking for lots of banking information for companies operating 
in Europe and in USA, you know there’s a lot of, so clearly there probably, there 
is a trend I think in using companies more”. 
 
Group D  
“Criminals will establish very quickly where the weak links in particular banks are 
and will home in on that”. 
 
Group E  
“see the business person ….., he’s not stupid, you know he’s an intelligent man, 
went to ….., has third level education, got involved in his own business and then 
has now used his skills to do that for the ….., and still did it to this day”. 
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Agreement from groups on Restraint and Confiscation 
Group A 
“Civil recoveries, we’re making good use of that now, case in point…individual 
in… currently the subject of a SOCA investigation…getting taunts in the street 
that his properties are going to be taken from him. SOCA’s going to take you 
house, take you pubs…become a figure of ridicule”  
  
Group B  
“the whole issue is to get the money in quickly…and its very commercially 
driven…SOCA that’s the mind-set they need to bring…how can I make a profit in 
this”. 
 
Group C  
“I think there are quite a few cases where a felon would be happy enough to plead 
guilty to whatever charges are before the court because they know they’re not 
looking at substantial jail time whatever, but when it comes to taking their assets 
off them…that’s when the real fight comes”   
 
Theme 2 Process 
Criminality Crime levels 
Perception of Crime 
 
Agreement from groups on Crime Levels 
Group A  
“punitive sentencing…Makes money laundering an attractive crime if you have 
the wherewithal to provide that service for other individuals, for the risk is 
relatively low but the pay back is high….Ask any criminal will he take a suspended 
sentence”. 
 
Group B  
“I think some of our exposure to cases and, cases in which money laundering 
and legislation is, is the governing legislation.  I think we have had, not concern 
but we have commented certainly in the past that money laundering legislation 
seems to be used against those low level drug dealer type criminals, the street 
dealer type and we haven’t seen it as effective against the, the upper end of the 
drugs chain”. 
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Group C  
“They basically used to say we can do what we like, because they’ll never get to 
us.  The view they had was that SOCA had about, say for example 20 people 
fielding thousands of calls and queries and they just said look, it’ll get lost 
somewhere.  And they only ever go after the very big fish, they’ll never be caught, 
they’ll never be bothered with small and medium crime.  And they say medium 
crime is where the money’s made”. 
 
Disagreement  
Group D  
“What, what power would they need.  What power would a law enforcement 
agency need to be able to prosecute more people? My perception is that they still 
go to very immediate and to high level, but they probably, I would imagine that 
the legislation’s the same whether I’m putting, doing six grand a year of homers 
or doing 60 grand a year.  But is there any scope then to make that a quicker 
process, that you know in terms of returning time that they get more hits with the 
smaller guy because the process is more straightforward…Because the smaller, 
below a certain threshold it doesn’t seem to get touched at all”. 
 
Group E  
“what I do know is, there’s so many layers of money laundering and we’re saying 
from the guy in the street that sells you a £2 DVD, cos they’re coming from 
somewhere, coming from somewhere to, to the higher echelons of money 
laundering, I don’t, I can’t see how it can be effectively policed or controlled or 
managed”. 
 
Agreement from groups on Perception of Crime 
Group A 
“The public, there’s a message. There’s a perception of acceptance within the 
community around crimes against Government, tax evasion”. 
 
Group B  
“There are professional money launderers at the top end, there has to be, 
whether it’s laundering cash or just laundering cheques or money that’s come 
across a computer screen that’s just bouncing around different accounts.  I mean 
there has to be.  Someone who launders money, big sums, it’s going to be pretty 
much a full time job, and they’re going to take their cut for that”. 
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Group D  
“And then you have individuals, and that’s sometimes staff would struggle with 
the idea that the guy who’s doing the homers, who’s maybe doing 20, £30,000 a 
year homers, he’s not a criminal, he’s not a money launderer.  In their eyes and 
it’s more educating them to the point that that is still tax evasion”. 
 
Group E  
“Now our difficulty is here, if we know that people are doing that and they get 
away with it we usually suspect that they’re police touts, or they’re working for the 
police”. 
 
Theme 3 Process 
SAR Process SAR Quality/feedback 
Compliance 
Resources 
 
Agreement from groups on SAR Quality/Feedback  
Group A  
“So I think you need to look wider than the financial institutions yes there’s a 
volume of transactions goes through them, but they’re not necessarily the best 
people to give you those key starting points”. 
 
Group C  
“I think, when it comes to banks and you know estate agencies and places like 
that, I think as regards their SARS obligations you know I’d say they’re fairly much 
compliant with it, and I don’t think there’d be a difficulty there but, the likes of car 
dealerships and places like that, it’s a different kettle of fish there, where they’re 
much more localised”. 
 
Agreement from groups on Compliance 
Group A  
“The MSB regulations facilitate money laundering.  In fact you have to ask the 
question why they exist in the first place.” 
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Group C  
“I was at a meeting hosted by HM Treasury of MLRO’s from various accountancy 
firms… what struck me an academic guy from the treasury, the whole approach 
was quite theoretical I thought and very much driven by how much time do you 
spend per month as an MLRO in a firm. It’s very compliance driven and to me 
there’s little connection between what you do as an MLRO and what you would 
see as a very worthy fight against crime, it’s purely trying to observe the rules”. 
 
Group D  
“Well we have an obligation to follow essentially the money laundering guidance 
notes”. 
 
Agreement from groups on Resources 
Group A  
“It’s a resource issue.  If you could spend four or five hours on every SAR, well 
then you’re going to pick up more criminality.  Whereas if you have 20 minutes to 
spend on it, or ten, you know boils down to”. 
 
Group C 
“You should have centralised unit’s data mining information, you know from 
private industry.  You have the large utility providers.  You know if you turned 
round and had a series of search fields, you could take out cannabis houses 
across the UK”. 
 
Group D  
“These thousands and thousands of disclosures that are running around and the 
questions are, is law enforcement able to manage it and what are they able to do 
with the information?” 
 
Theme 4 Process 
Spending Activities Audit trail/Law enforcement tactics 
Crime Spend 
 
Agreement from groups on Enforcement Tactics 
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Group A  
“You know, that’s the same, not just for financial crime, that’s the same for any 
crime.  You know, the criminal will learn from the police techniques. You know 
the criminal will learn oh my mate was caught and here’s how the police caught 
him, so you know that goes through the prison anyway”. 
 
Group C  
“I know from speaking to some of our investigators we deal with and what they 
would actually say is that crime is actually spiralling out of control but they just 
can’t do anything about it”. 
 
Group E  
“But see if you go back to the point you were making, you see about the guys 
supposedly it’s a front, you know, for me someone who gets in at a certain lower 
level of criminality, who then maybe gets a couple of schillings and tries to go 
legitimate, you know, is that a crime, is it the fruit of the poison tree, that 
everything follows on from that initial crime is illegal”. 
 
Agreement from groups on Criminal Spend 
Group C  
“Even the SFO can’t take on cases because they haven’t got the staff…the 
medium stuff that’s where the monies made, because nobody is going to come 
after you. The guys at the top know that people are going to be coming after 
them…they knew that they were being watched, whereas the rest thought we can 
do what we like. There’s a huge shadow economy at that level”.  
 
Group D 
“I mean I really don’t see in this day and age how a lot of these places exist 
(Money Service Bureau). One of them that were raided there about a year, 18 
months ago, didn’t even have a bank account. Didn’t even have a business bank 
account and yet there was hundreds of thousands of pounds according to 
surveillance, being exchanged on a daily basis here… they are supposed to be 
regulated and inspected by HMRC but I know from experience they just go in, 
how’s it going alright bye. Books weren’t looked at. They are supposed to look at 
the audits and see what’s happening”. 
  
Group E  
“and they were having this sort of like war between themselves, and that’s what 
was happening, because one was doing it very well and they were, they were 
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spending it as quick as they got it.  So they were going out, spending it on women 
and all that sort of stuff”. 
 
 
Theme 5 Process 
Agency Influence Regulation 
Training 
 
Agreement from groups on Regulators  
Group B  
“They SOCA was not a body designed to make convictions, cos they weren’t in 
a criminal court, they were a revenue generating body and I think they should 
have been able to process the people and eventually get a conveyor belt of 
people coming through the courts with confiscation orders and giving the money 
up”. 
 
Group C  
”there’s a lot of occasions I think why aren’t going civilly against this person as 
opposed to launching a criminal investigation…we pulled a case we spent a lot 
of money on Counsel’s fees to the point of not going through the court and SOCA 
could go for the guy civilly because he had the money still…we don’t get anything 
from…any confiscated funds”. 
 
Group D  
“If the penalties weren’t a factor and it wasn’t regulatory they would do it at a 
minimalistic level”. 
 
Group E  
“Because of the nature of work we do…it seems it had some added value by 
somehow ironic that the proceeds you know…criminality is put back into support 
other people to move away from it...and I am trying to sus out does it become 
more important than actually the criminal investigation side of things”.   
 
Training 
Training was not an issue that was important for groups other than Group D 
(MLROs) but was an issue that affected how banks operated in light of regulation.  
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Group D  
“The other flip side is sometimes when we would do training staff is, to try and 
manage their expectation.  They need to be careful, you know I don’t know what 
other banks would do, but I would be quite careful to make sure our guys realise 
they’re not police officers”. 
 
Group D 
“So we do find it beneficial and you know one of the things that we have to do is 
demonstrate competency so if the regulator, if the FSA are coming in, as they 
have done and asked to see what type of training we provide and how do you 
measure competency, yes there’s a bank of questions that the person has to 
answer”. 
 
Group D 
“an external provider we use instructs the course for us…its extremely good at 
keeping records that it will give us how long it took the person to take the course, 
how many times they were in it, how many attempts they did…it’s important we 
demonstrate that we have delivered that training”. 
 
Theme 6 Process 
Other activities Crime motive 
Victimless crime 
Criminal Behaviour 
Asset Recovery 
Effectiveness 
 
Other activities became a mix of issues that although important were not 
substantial enough on their own merits to warrant individual constructs. The five 
themes have been combined to form other activities construct 6. 
Group E  
“There may also be a bit of credibility about, around maybe serving a prison 
sentence as well in certain circumstances”. 
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Group E 
“- it’s all, there’s the emotion, there’s the bravado, there’s the legitimacy 
supposedly of what you’re fighting for or against … all that comes, and the risk, 
you know, I know people who knew that if, the very first second they stepped out 
on the street they’re putting their life on the line, but they didn’t really think it was 
going to be taken from them, you know….And it wasn’t a rational sort of weighing 
up pros and cons”. 
 
Group E 
“They’ll feel that they don’t want to let other people down by opting out of 
something and that, that’s human nature no matter what age you are” 
 
Agreement from groups on victimless crime 
Group E commented: 
“You know it’s a duty thing. They’re not paying the duty, it’s the cigarettes, it’s the 
fuel, and they’re robbing the state of money rather than the individuals”. 
 
Agreement from groups on criminal behaviour 
Group B  
“I see that from a government’s point of view it’s strategically potentially very 
effective, because I rather suspect that the Mr Bigs behind the drugs, 
racketeering, whatever, probably distance themselves from the predicate 
offences, so I rather have the impression that it’s hard”. 
 
Agreement from groups on Asset Recovery 
Group B 
“As somebody mentioned as well, in a recent case which we can’t mention but 
you and I know, we had to present it to SOCA and the same thing happened that 
happened all the way through, it was actually so simple and so big nobody could 
believe it….They were looking for something more complicated and smaller”. 
 
Group C  
“We’re finding a lot more hidden assets, where assets are hidden in third party 
type thing”. 
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Group E 
“So you lose your money but, know what, sure -You’re still knocking about”. 
 
Agreement from groups on Effectiveness of AML policy 
Group A  
“No matter what legislation they introduce the crime will evolve to get round that 
legislation until they produce something to stop it”. 
 
Group B  
“Well for a crime you need motivation, you need opportunity, the third thing you 
need is the ability to rationalise it to yourself that you haven’t done anything 
wrong” 
 
Group C 
“I think there’s a big issue about the orthodox approach or culture of the Criminal 
Justice System, which doesn’t react quickly to things, processes take a long 
time….So that the, because, because money can be moved very quickly, the fact 
that restraint can be put on quickly is important, but the criminal process then is 
playing catch up all the time with that, and you mentioned about bank practices, 
bank practices are very important in controlling the money laundering and being 
a means of combating it”. 
 
Group E  
“Outsider looking in doesn’t look particularly effective to me, hear about the high 
profile ones but we all know what’s going around us on day and daily, so how 
effective is it?” 
 
Group E  
“I mean…. is sort of founded on a black economy, it has been for many years, 
you know and people would rather say, buy their fuel cheap, their cigarettes 
cheap, get dodgy DVDs, they get CDs they get fake clothes, and that has to, 
there has to be a level up here for that stuff… no it’s not effective”. 
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Appendix 4.2   Variable summary missing cases 
 
Variable Summarya,b 
 Missing Valid N Mean Std. Dev. 
N Per-
cent 
The unregulated sector 
such as Hawala bank-
ing is as significant as 
the regulated sector for 
laundering money. 
64 23.5% 208 2.0577 .88822 
The disparity in sen-
tencing for money 
laundering in the UK is 
too wide. 
64 23.5% 208 2.3125 .76987 
It is likely that money 
from crime in the UK is 
laundered within the 
UK. 
63 23.2% 209 2.5550 .92408 
Financial crime which 
includes money laun-
dering is not seen as a 
serious problem. 
63 23.2% 209 2.5120 1.01957 
Judiciary, Prosecutors 
and stakeholders in 
AML process need 
more training to ensure 
successful prosecu-
tions. 
62 22.8% 210 2.0190 .76378 
The UK law enforce-
ment has sufficient 
knowledge on financial 
matters to tackle 
money laundering. 
62 22.8% 210 3.1667 .98595 
The UK law enforce-
ment is sufficiently re-
sourced to fight money 
laundering. 
62 22.8% 210 3.7619 .96368 
It is likely that money 
from crime in the UK is 
laundered outside the 
UK. 
62 22.8% 210 2.0667 .85579 
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Professionals are 
treated differently in 
court sentencing for 
money laundering. 
61 22.4% 211 2.1801 .83710 
The penalties for 
money laundering 
crime are too lenient. 
61 22.4% 211 2.1943 .88111 
A person convicted of 
drug trafficking is likely 
to receive a more se-
vere sentence than the 
person who laundered 
his drug money. 
61 22.4% 211 2.0569 .79677 
The legal system 
makes it too difficult to 
prosecute money laun-
dering offences. 
61 22.4% 211 2.6872 .99368 
Financial crime which 
includes money laun-
dering is more of a 
problem than any other 
crime. 
61 22.4% 211 2.9052 .94643 
The use of businesses 
to Launder criminal 
money has a direct ef-
fect on the integrity of 
all business. 
61 22.4% 211 2.1090 .85215 
Money laundering is a 
consequence of an-
other crime such as 
drug trafficking but is 
treated differently in 
court in sentencing. 
61 22.4% 211 1.9858 .76519 
Laundering the pro-
ceeds of crime affects 
the national economy. 
61 22.4% 211 1.6209 .58419 
The regulators are 
more concerned with 
breaches of regulatory 
procedures than with 
possible money laun-
dering. 
60 22.1% 212 2.3302 .89466 
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Regulatory enforce-
ment of the financial 
system is necessary. 
59 21.7% 213 1.7653 .67385 
The regulated institu-
tions involved in AML 
compliance feel like 
they are being choked 
with regulation. 
58 21.3% 214 2.5607 .75902 
As a business over-
head it is essential that 
the AML compliance 
function demonstrates 
value for money. 
58 21.3% 214 2.5935 .96325 
There should be 
greater consultation 
with the business sec-
tor over the future di-
rection of money laun-
dering. 
58 21.3% 214 2.0561 .82601 
Money laundering is 
not a priority for Law 
Enforcement investiga-
tion. 
58 21.3% 214 2.8178 1.15448 
More regulation to 
tighten up AML con-
trols is necessary. 
57 21.0% 215 2.5721 .96343 
Money laundering in-
vestigation is too com-
plicated for law en-
forcement investiga-
tion. 
57 21.0% 215 3.1721 1.13696 
Regulated institutions 
are more concerned 
with regulatory failures 
than AML compliance 
failures. 
57 21.0% 215 2.3953 .85761 
Given the significance 
of the financial sector 
to the UK it is vital to 
have a strong regula-
tory framework. 
57 21.0% 215 1.5860 .58867 
Law enforcement pre-
fers to investigate sim-
ple, cost effective 
57 21.0% 215 2.2279 .95171 
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money laundering 
cases rather long 
drawn out expensive 
cases. 
The International de-
bate on money laun-
dering tends to be 
closely controlled by 
Governments and the 
law enforcement lobby. 
57 21.0% 215 2.3674 .83154 
Law enforcement are 
good at identifying as-
sets but not at seizing 
them. 
57 21.0% 215 2.6837 .84966 
Money laundering in-
vestigation is too costly 
for law enforcement to 
investigate. 
57 21.0% 215 2.8465 1.05444 
By setting targets for 
asset recovery the gov-
ernment influences the 
targeting of law en-
forcement on "easy 
prey" rather than the 
"crime lords". 
57 21.0% 215 2.3302 .93117 
The incentivisation 
scheme whereby gov-
ernment agencies re-
ceive a percentage of 
seized assets from 
convicted criminals is a 
money making exer-
cise. 
57 21.0% 215 2.9023 1.03885 
The current economic 
climate will encourage 
some professionals to 
be involved in money 
laundering for crimi-
nals. 
44 16.2% 228 1.9211 .62467 
Because of the money 
laundering controls 
criminals are reluctant 
to use banks to keep 
their crime money. 
44 16.2% 228 2.9518 .97201 
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Local small time crimi-
nals such as drug deal-
ers spend cash as they 
get it. 
44 16.2% 228 2.6096 .84023 
It is possible to identify 
money launderers by 
the lifestyle they lead. 
44 16.2% 228 2.6228 1.01868 
Professional people 
are inadvertently used 
to assist criminals to 
launder criminal 
money. 
43 15.8% 229 2.1354 .79141 
Only organised crime 
gangs making big 
money from crime 
need professionals to 
launder money. 
43 15.8% 229 3.2402 1.06744 
Money launderers 
have to be aware of 
law enforcement tac-
tics. 
43 15.8% 229 2.1703 .84904 
Money launderers 
have to have 
knowledge of AML pol-
icy. 
43 15.8% 229 2.4279 1.00451 
Local small time crimi-
nals such as drug deal-
ers tend not to use 
banks. 
43 15.8% 229 2.5153 .99824 
Money laundering is 
not as sophisticated as 
people think it is. 
43 15.8% 229 2.8559 1.13215 
To circumvent the leg-
islation money launder-
ers are becoming more 
creative in how they 
hide their crime cash. 
43 15.8% 229 1.5721 .57758 
Professional people 
are employed to assist 
to launder criminal 
money. 
43 15.8% 229 1.9782 .98873 
Professional money 
launderers are using 
more sophisticated 
42 15.4% 230 1.7522 .65041 
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methods of laundering 
criminal money. 
Organised crime gangs 
use sophisticated 
methods to launder 
their cash due to their 
high levels of criminal 
activity. 
42 15.4% 230 1.9957 .75053 
The current regulatory 
AML framework is suf-
ficient to dissuade pro-
fessional from being in-
volved in money laun-
dering. 
42 15.4% 230 3.3783 .96237 
It is possible to identify 
criminals by the life-
style they lead. 
42 15.4% 230 2.2739 .89086 
The way to encourage 
new business is to 
have good AML con-
trols in place. 
40 14.7% 232 2.4914 .88269 
The SAR process is an 
effective way of identi-
fying money laundering 
and the methods used. 
40 14.7% 232 2.2974 .87406 
AML compliance costs 
are reasonable given 
the overriding im-
portance of integrity of 
the financial system. 
39 14.3% 233 2.3262 .91729 
It is more difficult to 
identify suspicious ra-
ther than unusual activ-
ity. 
39 14.3% 233 2.3948 .92306 
Other reporting institu-
tions compared to the 
banking industry ap-
pear to have less rigor-
ous AML procedures. 
39 14.3% 233 2.1159 .77089 
It is possible reporting 
institutions lose genu-
ine new business be-
cause of their compli-
ance procedures. 
39 14.3% 233 2.7811 .93273 
396 
 
AML compliance activ-
ity is too focussed on 
customer identification. 
39 14.3% 233 2.6609 .87152 
The SAR process is a 
non-profit making area 
of business that should 
be funded by Govern-
ment. 
39 14.3% 233 2.6953 1.06545 
AML compliance pro-
cedures reassure the 
public and enhance 
reputation of the regu-
lated sector. 
39 14.3% 233 2.6781 .96682 
The financial sector 
should be allowed to 
self-regulate. 
39 14.3% 233 4.1545 .96588 
Some institutions who 
are supposed to make 
Suspicious Activity Re-
ports don’t see it as a 
priority. 
38 14.0% 234 2.0342 .72279 
There is sufficient train-
ing in AML for stake-
holders in the sectors 
who make suspicious 
activity reports. 
38 14.0% 234 3.1709 .89145 
The banking system in 
the UK does a good 
job in preventing the 
use of accounts to 
launder criminal       
money. 
38 14.0% 234 3.1496 .92129 
More attention should 
be paid to other report-
ing institutions other 
than banks in terms of 
suspicious activity re-
porting. 
38 14.0% 234 1.9188 .69163 
The SAR process is a 
deterrent to money 
launderers using finan-
cial institutions. 
38 14.0% 234 2.7436 .93711 
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The regulators are an 
effective force to en-
sure reporting institu-
tions comply with regu-
lations. 
38 14.0% 234 2.7521 .98404 
Members of the public 
are aware of the rea-
son for identity checks 
when conducting busi-
ness that involves cash 
payments. 
38 14.0% 234 2.8034 1.02114 
Feedback from law en-
forcement is necessary 
in order to determine 
AML policy develop-
ment. 
37 13.6% 235 1.7787 .68092 
Money made from 
crime is spent immedi-
ately. 
32 11.8% 240 3.6542 .84412 
Criminals weigh up the 
cost and benefits of 
committing an offence 
prior to committing it. 
32 11.8% 240 2.5375 1.03427 
Money made from 
crime is used to fund 
further crime. 
30 11.0% 242 1.7149 .74935 
Criminals use profes-
sional people such as 
accountants and law-
yers to help them laun-
der their money. 
30 11.0% 242 1.7355 .74309 
Financial Advisors 29 10.7% 243 4.0494 1.99110 
Solicitors 29 10.7% 243 4.1029 2.33588 
Accountants 29 10.7% 243 3.7160 2.30110 
Money laundering con-
trols are a key compo-
nent in winning the war 
against organised 
crime. 
29 10.7% 243 1.7901 .73377 
Criminals do not con-
sider AML policy be-
fore deciding to commit 
an offence. 
29 10.7% 243 2.8560 1.03245 
398 
 
Criminals are more 
aware of AML policy 
now than when it was 
introduced in 2003. 
29 10.7% 243 2.0247 .76561 
Criminals rationally 
choose to commit an 
offence without consid-
ering the risks. 
29 10.7% 243 3.0947 1.05788 
a. Maximum number of variables shown: 77 
b. Minimum percentage of missing values for variable to be included: 0.0% 
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Appendix 4.3: Results of demographic responses  
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Appendix 4.4 : Factor results 
Rotated factor matrix for AML variables 
h²  
 
Variables Factors  
1 2 3  
The penalties for money laundering crime are too 
lenient. 
0.78 
  
0.62 
The disparity in sentencing for money laundering in 
the UK is too wide. 
0.78 
  
0.62 
A person convicted of drug trafficking is likely to 
receive a more severe sentence than the person who 
laundered his drug money. 
0.74 
 
0.12  
0.57 
Professionals are treated differently in court 
sentencing for money laundering. 
0.71 -0.12 
 
0.52 
Financial crime which includes money laundering is 
not seen as a serious problem. 
0.66 -0.18 -0.20 0.50 
Money laundering is a consequence of another crime 
such as drug trafficking but is treated differently in 
court in sentencing. 
0.65 
  
 
0.43 
Financial crime appears to be treated more leniently 
in court than other crimes. 
0.60 
  
0.37 
The banking system in the UK does a good job in 
preventing the use of accounts to launder criminal       
money. 
 
0.79 0.10  
0.63 
AML policy in the UK appears to be effective. 
 
0.75 
 
0.56 
The current regulatory AML framework is sufficient to 
dissuade professional from being involved in money 
laundering. 
-0.16 0.72 -0.13  
0.57 
The regulators are an effective force to ensure 
reporting institutions comply with regulations. 
 
0.69 
 
0.47 
Money launderers have to be aware of law 
enforcement tactics. 
  
0.91 0.82 
Money launderers have to have knowledge of AML 
policy. 
 
 
Eigenvalues 
Variance 
Cumulative variance 
 
 
 
 
3.73 
28.68 
28.68 
 
 
 
2.04 
15.69 
44.37 
 
0.90 
 
 
1.74 
13.42 
 
58.00 
 
0.83 
Note: h² refers to communality 
 
402 
 
Appendix 4.5: ANOVA Test Results  
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
squares 
 
 
df 
Mean 
square 
 
   
 F 
   
Sig. 
 
 
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
 
Between Groups 
    
3.351 
    
3 
  
 1.12 
  
1.14 
 
0.33 
Within Groups 151.45 155  0.98   
Total 154.81 158    
 
 
REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
 
Between Groups 
   
11.76 
     
3 
  
 3.92 
 
 4.21 
 
0.01 
Within Groups 144.30 155  0.93   
Total 156.06 158    
 
 
REGR factor score 3 for analysis 1 
 
Between Groups 
    
 2.76 
     
3 
  
 0.92 
  
0.97 
 
0.41 
Within Groups 146.76 155  0.95   
Total 149.52 158    
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Appendix 4.6: Multiple Comparisons Table    
Multiple Comparisons (* Mean difference significant at the 0.05 level) 
REGR Factor score 1 for Analysis 1 
(I) Newgroup (J) Newgroup Mean Differ-
ence (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper 
Bound 
Accountant Enforcement 0.28 0.29 0.76 -0.46 1.03 
Financial Inst. -0.02 0.30 1.00 -0.78 0.75 
Community Grp 0.27 0.39 0.90 -0.74 1.28 
Enforcement Accountant -0.28 0.29 0.76 -1.03 0.46 
Financial Inst. -0.30 0.14 0.32 -0.75 0.16 
Community Grp -0.01 0.31 1.00 -0.80 0.79 
Financial Inst. Accountant 0.02 0.30 1.00 -0.75 0.78 
Enforcement 0.30 0.17 0.32 -0.16 0.75 
Community Grp 0.29 0.32 0.79 -0.53 1.11 
Community 
Group 
Accountant -0.27 0.39 0.90 -1.28 0.74 
Enforcement 0.01 0.31 1.00 -0.79 0.80 
Financial Inst. -0.29 0.32 0.79 -1.11 0.53 
REGR Factor score 2 for Analysis 1 
Accountant Enforcement -0.85 0.28 0.02 -1.57 -0.12 
Financial Inst. -0.65 0.29 0.12 -1.40 0.10 
Community Grp -1.22 0.30 0.01 -2.21 -0.23 
Enforcement Accountant 0.85 0.28 0.02 0.12 1.57 
Financial Inst. 0.20 0.17 0.65 -0.24 0.64 
Community Grp -0.38 0.30 0.60 -1.15 0.40 
Financial Inst. Accountant 0.65 0.29 0.12 -0.10 1.40 
Enforcement -0.20 0.17 0.65 -0.64 0.24 
Community Grp -0.57 0.31 0.25 -1.37 0.23 
Community 
Group 
Accountant 1.22 0.38 0.01 0.23 2.21 
Enforcement 0.38 0.30 0.60 -0.40 1.15 
Financial Inst. 0.57 0.31 0.25 -0.23 1.37 
REGR Factor score 3 for Analysis 1 
Accountant Enforcement -0.40 0.28 0.50 -1.13 0.34 
Financial Inst. -0.35 0.29 0.62 -1.11 0.40 
Community Grp -0.06 0.38 0.99 -1.06 0.93 
Enforcement Accountant 0.40 0.28 0.50 -0.34 1.13 
Financial Inst. 0.04 0.17 0.99 -0.40 0.49 
Community Grp 0.34 0.30 0.68 -0.45 1.12 
Financial Inst. Accountant 0.35 0.29 0.62 -0.40 1.11 
Enforcement -0.04 0.17 0.99 -0.49 0.40 
Community Grp 0.29 0.31 0.78 -0.51 1.10 
Community 
Group 
Accountant 0.06 0.38 0.99 -0.93 1.06 
Enforcement -0.34 0.30 0.68 -1.12 0.45 
Financial Inst. -0.29 0.31 0.78 -1.10 0.51 
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Appendix 4.7: Question 13 Responses  
 
1. “There has to be a realisation that law enforcement need to invest 
adequate resources into the investigation and prosecution process to 
succeed. This can only be achieved if there is a desire and will from 
both Government and ACPO to do so. Probably little chance in the 
present economic climate”.    
 
2. “More effective enforcement of the existing regulations and laws. More 
accountability within the non-financial regulated sector.  A regulator I 
can believe in”. 
 
3. “A more robust public prosecution service when financial crime is 
involved”. 
 
4. “A return of a national asset recovery agency”. 
 
5. “The current AML legislation has too many loop holes by which 
accountants and solicitors can avoid making SARs; the public are not 
aware of the linkages between the various predicate offenses and 
money laundering; law enforcement find AML cases difficult and 
therefore seem to shy away from them”. 
 
6. “Law enforcement agencies need to make more use of forensic 
accountants who have the experience and ability in such matters. 
However, government is reluctant to fund such a measure”. 
 
7. “Raise more awareness across all financial sector”. 
 
8. “More resources for Law Enforcement to fit ML/TF.  For the government 
to stop 'messing' around with changing SOCA to become the new ECA.  
For Government to stop reinventing the wheel every five years and 
have a Police based FIU and a Police base Economic Crime Agency 
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that is self-funding and attractive for quality people to join and which is 
let to do its job without political interference”. 
 
9. “There is too much focus on regulatory expectation rather than 
effectiveness of the system itself ie. Focus on demonstrating to the FSA 
we have met their idea of what is required (not always in line with what 
legislation requires) rather than how effective the organization is in 
detecting ml. If we look at how much cash is seized vs how much is 
spent on compliance, the current regime appears very inefficient”. 
 
10.  “Train more people to detect it in financial institutions”. 
 
11. “Financial institutions should apply automated controls to detect and 
report AML. A government agency, other than the regulator, should 
monitor the cases that were reported and not followed up. Convictions 
and harsh penalties are needed, to demonstrate action and end 
impunity”. 
 
12. “To actually get responses to SAR reports made”. 
 
13. “The current laws and regulations in the UK relating to money 
laundering and the seizing of criminal property are adequate.  What 
needs to be changed is their enforcement.  In particular, there needs to 
be greater use of money laundering confiscation measures against 
corporations (including, but not confined to, banks) involved in financial 
crime.   For example, companies found to have engaged in corruption 
in order to win commercial contracts should face charges of money 
laundering as well as bribery, much more severe sentences and more 
significant confiscation orders”. 
 
14. “1. Better funding, staffing & amp; training for law enforcement in the 
UK. 2. Better stakeholder engagement. 3. Tougher penalties for 
breaching AML, failing to implement AML, and assisting AML. 4. Better 
incentives for businesses to co-operate in fighting AML &amp; CTF 
(corporate qi tam?)” 
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15. “In my opinion, there is no need of more regulation but more action and 
consequences for those who practise money laundering. In money 
laundering crimes, the message that crime does not compensate has 
not reached the public”. 
 
16. “Remove the threat to MLROs under POCA.  Regulators should be 
more collaborative i.e. engage in constructive discussions with firms. 
Proportionality e.g. having regard to most firms outside of banking, the 
sanctions regime is hugely expensive for very little benefit”. 
 
17. “The setting up and operation of companies is to lax, small limited 
liability company vehicles are the most commonly used vehicle for 
money laundering”. 
 
18. “Better supervision of MSBs. Better quality asset recovery.  More 
practical guidance on key subjects; simplification of difficult standards 
that are unworkable (i.e. monitoring proliferation is rather impossible)”. 
 
19. “Penalties for institutions that do not comply with AML regulations are 
not sufficient to properly incentivize them. Regulators are more 
concerned with getting a future job with the institutions they are 
supposed to supervise than in doing meaningful oversight”. 
 
20. “More focused regulation”. 
 
21. “Recovery of assets is sometimes hindered by excessive estimates of 
the amount of assets available for seizure”. 
 
22. “Have the Regulators actually regulate. (E.g. HMRC actually police 
High Value Goods Dealers and MSBs). Training is little more than a few 
words and a video every 12 months, whatever the sector. Breaches of 
MLR should remain in the criminal courts. More prosecutions. (i.e. more 
than virtually none at present) for breaches, especially in tandem with 
substantive criminal matters such as money laundering”. 
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23. “Given the enormous cost to the regulated sector of the AML regime 
they are entitled to see greater resourcing &amp; prioritisation of 
investigation of AML by law enforcement. Law enforcement cannot 
cope with the level of SARS currently submitted”. 
 
24. “AML/CFT should be taken more seriously... It should have higher 
budgets for recruiting qualified people, buy high tech systems and fund 
investigations”. 
 
25. “Greater use of the existing AML legal provisions (the ones we have are 
good enough and don't need changing, but they do need to be used 
more).  2. Tougher penalties actually imposed on banks and other 
institutions found to be involved in money laundering.  3. Greater use of 
confiscation and civil recovery provisions.  4. Greater enforcement of 
confiscation orders actually made”. 
 
26. “There needs to be a transformation of attitude across the AML system, 
in particular to address the following views:-    Professionals within the 
regulated sector generally view AML as a costly burden, and 
investment is limited to that which will be sufficient to avoid enforcement 
action or reputational damage.    Law enforcement agencies have failed 
to grasp the opportunities to disrupt criminals by using money 
laundering legislation. Investigators view money laundering offences as 
a type of fraud and associate it with lengthy, tedious investigations.  
Senior management limit their enthusiasm to areas such as 
confiscation and cash seizure, viewing it purely as an opportunity to 
provide an income. AML policy has done little to influence these views 
and is often ignored or circumvented by agencies. The level of 
prosecutions and asset recovery, whilst improved under the POCA 
regime, still falls woefully short of some other jurisdictions, providing an 
irony when lauded by Government. A transformation of attitude will be a 
difficult and lengthy process, one which needs to be driven by an AML 
policy that is more effectively implemented”. 
 
27. “A culture change in the ethical standards of senior bankers (and 
others) who must understand that AML laws are in place because 
money laundering is 'wrong' not because the regulators/law 
enforcement are over-controlling!  The technical details are less 
important than winning hearts and minds.  There is much too much 
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emphasis on straightforward compliance with process rather than AML 
prevention/detection/control”. 
 
28. “All cash transaction over a threshold amount should generate a SAR, 
no matter what the industry. It should not be limited to banking and 
financial institutions. All financial crime needs to be treated more 
seriously, including fraud by TBTF banks”. 
 
29. “Just for once, it would be good for the governing bodies would sit down 
with the investigators &amp; Counter Fraud departments to actually 
listen to how they stop us from doing a thorough investigation. Times 
that Regulators are a hindrance more than a help”. 
 
30. “I would like to see more focus on seizures of Properties being wide 
spread, confiscation, more focus on gatekeepers in financial transaction 
and business, more attention on regulating shell Banks especially in 
offshore jurisdictions, FATCA being a wide spread approached to all 
country of the world so that everyone have a fair share in tax revenues, 
more focus on country to take a more serious approached to tax 
evasions and trade base financing, more focus on Human trafficking in 
poor nations of the world and worldwide, more focus on financing and 
training personnel in poor countries of the world and a more serious 
approached for Banks to look at elderly abuse within the system”. 
 
31. “Better responses from SOCA. Feedback regarding typologies from law 
enforcement. Wider publicity. Knowing that the majority of SARs do not 
get looked it is not a good incentive!” 
 
32. “Use private sector to pursue monies through insolvency and civil 
recovery far more effective than prosecution and POCA and costs 
effective”. 
 
33. “Were professionals are involved in ML they should be sentenced more 
harshly (they are not). When regulated entities are discovered to be 
ignoring the AML regulations they should be fined and SHUT DOWN, 
not just fined and allowed to carry on trading. For example: Coutts 
Bank, Wachovia etc.    Investigating bodies should concentrate more on 
409 
 
ML investigations as they see cases where (say) drug trafficking is 
concerned it’s easier to go for the commodity. ML cases are NOT 
complicated but there is wholesale ignorance at senior crime managers 
level about the ingredients needed to successfully prosecute ML 
cases”. 
 
34. “More fairness and transparency of checks within Financial Sector, e.g. 
Insurance V Banking”. 
 
35. “Stricter sentencing for serious crime”. 
 
36. “The SAR process is now so computerised, there is too much 
intelligence in the system. this needs to be filtered and profiled in a way 
that would highlight useful areas of investigation. The 43 forces in the 
UK do not necessarily have a unified approach to the investigation of 
SAR, money laundering or POCA matters, despite efforts to stress the 
importance of POCA. I would like to see money laundering cases 
managed as a target ops proceeds, a syndicate strength using all 
human and technical resources available, including surveillance and 
interception. It is time the facilitators, accountants and solicitors were 
taken out of the loop”.   
 
37. “More communication with law enforcement agencies. In theory, they 
should write the rule for businesses as they are the ones with the 
knowledge. Change is far too slow if you want to try and keep up with 
recent typologies”. 
 
38. “Aligning AML with Fraud”. 
 
39. “Use of evidence gathered in AML investigations used in criminal 
investigations - vs. - the two are one!” 
 
40. “Currently there appears to be a consultation on regulators ideas as to 
direction of future AML regulations. Perhaps there could be more 
consultation around direction itself i.e., ""one-step back consultation". 
410 
 
 
41. “More responsibility put on banking and financial sector.  More 
regulation of accountants and solicitors”. 
 
42. “Clarity as to what happens to the confiscated proceeds.  Sharing 
success stories of convicted Launderers law enforcement and the 
judiciary should have more powers facilitate ease of money laundering 
investigations and enforcement”. 
 
43. “More training and education of the legislation and methodology to 
professionals and the police”. 
 
44. “To quote (I think) Louis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI ""The most 
efficient means of battling organized crime is to act against money 
laundering.""  With increasingly limited budgets I think law enforcement 
concentrate on other crimes which attract more public attention and 
which may be considered key performance indicators.  There are a 
number of specialist financial crime investigators in the UK but I believe 
they focus on the ""quick wins"" rather than the complex organised 
groups that require time and resources to investigate fully and this 
needs to be reviewed.    In addition, legislation in the UK needs to be 
reviewed in relation to people defaulting on confiscation orders and the 
lack of follow up in liquidating their assets obtained through criminal 
lifestyle”. 
 
45. “Ensure confiscation orders are enforced and the money recovered.  
When appeals are lodged by defendants use their funds to pay for the 
appeal.  Enforce confiscation orders against the defendant’s family”. 
46. “A more joined up approach”. 
 
47. “Please note that I am a retired banker who is a subject matter expert in 
the Republic of South Africa on AML and have completed this survey 
from the South African perspective. However, as AML in South Africa is 
based on the UK model I have taken the liberty of completing the 
survey”. 
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48. “A move away from self-regulation by the professions”. 
 
49. “I would suggest that there needs to be a more joint agency approach 
to the problem. This should include regular discussion with financial 
institutions, regulators and law enforcement personnel. This would 
assist in identifying varying typologies at an earlier stage”. 
 
50. “More and more internal controls will help to find out the suspicious 
activity of the customers and their accounts”. 
 
51. “Compliance managers must be of a very high senior position in the 
organization and to have special immunity against being dependant. 
also provide the compliance function all the needed tools, staff, and the 
most enhanced tech solutions to tighten the gap between the gangs 
tricks and those whom combat them”. 
 
52. “Jurors often cannot understand the evidence - perhaps need to have 
dip lock style hearings or similar. The processes to obtain information 
are time consuming - this is where much of the cost to police arises. 
The audit trail to prove fairness etc. has taken over - reviewing this is 
absolutely necessary to reducing costs and enabling more 
investigations to be taken”. 
 
53. “More input from Law Enforcement, a realisation that the financial 
sector is a major contributor to UK plc and therefore needs strong 
regulation to ensure honesty; greater appreciation of lifestyle evidence 
by law enforcement, and a realisation that criminals spend their money 
rather than save it; there is rarely a pot of gold to be recovered, except 
from the launderers (who may of course have indemnity cover to pay, 
rather than losing their own assets”. 
 
54. “Jailing of bankers, failed regulators and corrupt police officers, 
substantial reform of the penal system and law enforcement agencies.  
NB Illegal arms trade is a significant cash generative business”. 
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55. “I would like to see a greater and simpler burden of proof from the 
suspect when they have a lifestyle greater than their visible incomes - 
basically a "" prove your wealth"" or the state has it based on a SAR or 
similar Current processes are too clunky and too burdensome. We all 
know who the bad guys are.....it’s the tools that are required to make 
the process more simplistic to prove and deal with”. 
 
56. “More clear direction from the regulator”. 
 
57. “More resources should be provided by central government to support 
UK law enforcement involved in fighting financial crimes.  Police should 
be given full support from the public and all the agencies involved”. 
 
58. “Fraud and money laundering to be a government priority for police”. 
 
59. “Regulators need more resource to police compliance”. 
 
60. “The reintroduction of a standalone civil recovery agency that is not 
restricted by political interference and unrealistic targets.  The 
introduction of ARA in 2003 saw the embryo of a potentially successful 
system but the politics and vested interests of some politicians and 
senior law enforcement personnel destroyed the concept. It was cost 
neutral in 3 years of operations which in itself was an achievement not 
matched in any other Government based organisation. The business 
model would have taken 5-10 years to establish itself and could have 
been promoted worldwide to have a real impact upon money laundering 
which is truly international crime”. 
 
61. “Greater international consistency. Greater incentivisation for all parties 
to do more. More specific requirements for regulated entities in terms of 
predicate offences such as fraud. A better balance of focus on the 
criminal, not just hitting the legal entities for poor controls”. 
 
62. “More time and money needs to be spent in enforcing compliance 
within the small MSB/SPI businesses”. 
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63. Level of accountability on the front-end force needs to be a bit more 
Make AML laws consistent in 'friendly' countries. Businesses/Firms to 
be encouraged to put more focus on AML controls. The UK accepts this 
but education of European countries or European parent companies is 
required. In Germany there is very much a ""tick-box"" approach, 
whereas the UK outside of financial regulation take a very different risk 
based approach treating everyone on a case by case basis. 
 
64. Law enforcement mystified money laundering and tried to push the 
money laundering offence as a 'standalone' charge taking it to extremes 
were they tried to reverse the burden of proof, 'here is all this money 
prove that it wasn't obtained by criminal activity' did not work.  The CPS 
advice for prosecuting money laundering, as a standalone charge relies 
on;  Accomplice evidence;  Circumstantial evidence and/or other 
evidence;  Forensic evidence (e.g. contamination of cash with drugs) 
from which inferences can be drawn that money came from drug 
trafficking;  Evidence of complex audit trails,   Evidence of the 
unlikelihood of the property being of legitimate origin,    All of which, 
except the forensic results, not the conclusion drawn, is largely opinion 
and therefore argumentative and subject to interpretation. ML and its 
accompanying powers of seizure and confiscation are excellent when 
applied to existing crime charges, be they single charges or those 
which indicate criminal lifestyle, but no so much when prosecuted as a 
standalone. The character, strength and competence of individual 
prosecutors greatly affects the success of prosecutorial decisions and 
their resultant progress in courts. The strategy in the UK, the creation of 
bulky legislation and the creation of new competing agencies should be 
compared to the strategy adopted in the ROI which, I would suggest, 
was more practical and an adoption of existing legislation, skills, 
processes and abilities”.     
   
65. “I would use more intelligence to prevent money laundering through 
banks”. 
 
66. “More severe sentencing. More police resources into Fraud/Money 
laundering. More training for professionals”. 
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67.  “A constable should be able to make a POCA ‘seizure’ of a ‘cash’ bank 
balance. Default sentences should not be eligible for parole”. 
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Appendix 4.8 Results from examination of group re-
sponses 
 
One–way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests if the means across a number of 
groups are equal. Test statistic “F” represents a standardized ratio of variability 
in the sample means relative to the variability within the groups. The F ratio is 
computed from the ANOVA table and the P value is computed from the F ratio. 
The Sig or P value was calculated on group responses to factors 1, 
Sentencing/Deterrent; Factor 2, Compliance Reporting and Factor 3, Criminal 
Knowledge. Any value less than 0.05 is significant and any value greater than 
0.05 is not significant. Table 1 below provides the results of the ANOVA test.  
 
Table 1: ANOVA Test on Factors 
   
 
Factors 
Group A 
Accountant 
 
Mean 
SD 
Group B 
Enforcement 
 
Mean 
SD 
Group C 
Financial 
Institution 
Mean 
SD 
Group D 
Ex- 
offenders 
Mean 
SD 
 
F ratio 
 
Sig. 
 
Sentencing 
 
 
0.884 
1.029 
 
-0.193 
1.005 
 
0.104 
0.977 
 
-0.185 
 0.868 
 
1.143 
 
 0.334 
 
Compliance 
 
 
-0.744 
 0.704 
 
0.100 
0.925 
 
-0.097 
1.074 
 
0.475 
0.931 
 
4.212 
 
 0.007 
 
Knowledge 
 
 
-0.312 
 0.568 
 
0.083 
1.040 
 
0.041 
0.911 
 
-0.251 
 1.143 
 
0.971 
 
 0.408 
 
     
As the p value is less than 0.05 the test ANOVA showed significant differences 
for factor 2 and not significant for factors 1 and factor 3. The ANOVA table is 
provided at Appendix 4.5. 
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Viewing the Multiple Comparisons Table (provided at Appendix 4.6) from the Post 
Hoc tests (Post Hoc Test shows which of the groups differ from the rest) it is 
possible to identify which groups differed. Tukey’s “honestly significant 
differences” (HSD) tests showed that: From a statistical point of view Accountants 
differed in their view with law enforcement in terms of the reporting process in the 
Compliance factor, p = 0.0016.  Accountants also differed in their view with ex-
offenders in terms of the reporting process in the Compliance factor, p = 0.009. 
By viewing the qualitative results in this research this perspective could be 
explained by the suggestion Law Enforcement believe Accountants and other 
professionals are not robust in their efforts to report suspicions of money 
laundering. Accountants suggest the reporting regime appeared to be effective 
however much effort was driven toward the banks role in the process and there 
was no effort to encourage other professional bodies to make reports. Likewise 
Ex-offenders see the reporting regime as preventative but not effective and 
suggest that millions must be getting through the system.  
